Niyaw horta comments kaagu kaama khasaarin aragti saxaad cabirtay oo aad qortay. Laakiin imika waanba sakhraansanay oo kuuma jawaabi karo indrkay talaabo wax waydiiya. Anigu geeridii nebiga ma ogiye

On the positive side this shows Somaliland is starting to realize ictiraaf isn't possible and taking more active role in the politics of Somalia.

DP World completes 400 meter expansion of Somaliland’s Berbera port. 59Shares Friday August 14, 2020 DP World this week announced the completion of a 400-meter expansion of the Berbera port in Somaliland. The Dubai Port Company that is contracted to expand the port said once operational, it will increase the terminal’s capacity by 500,000 TEUs per year and further strengthen Berbera as a major regional trade hub servicing the Horn of Africa. In a tweet, DP World stated: “We have just completed a 400m quay and a new extension at Berbera Port, Somaliland. Once operational, it will increase the terminal’s capacity by 500,000 TEUs per year and will further strengthen Berbera as a major regional trade hub servicing the Horn of Africa.” The news has elicited excitement within the Somaliland government with the vice president Abdirahman Abdilahi saying: “As Deputy President of Somaliland and on behalf of the people, words can’t express my great excitement about the nearing completion of the Berbera port expansion. my gratitude goes to the Sheikhs of the UAE and the DP World.” DP world, the Dubai based world’s largest port operator is the key player in the rebuilding of Berbera, they have invested $442 million for the expansion of the port and are also the economic free zone. It has projected to complete work by February next year. advertisements In 2017 when the original agreement was signed, the CEO of DP World Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem drew a parallel between the growth of Dubai and the development path Somaliland is on and added “Our vision is to make Berbera a trading and transportation hub for the Horn of Africa.” Berbera port is among the few corridors in the Horn of African region, which serves for both military and commercial purposes. The Berbera Port was built in 1964 by the Soviet Union and further expanded by the United States of America (USA) in 1982. It has served for both the Soviet Union and the U.S military within a span of 20 years. Once completed, facilities and service will surpass those in the neighbouring Djibouti according to the contractors. According to the DP World, the port will be able to handle the biggest ships compared to the other ports in the region and will complement activities at the Port of Djibouti and the Lamu Port which is also under expansion in the coast of Kenya. The Berbera Port expansion is the largest investment in Somaliland since it parted ways with Somalia in 1991. Work on the port expansion has reduced due to the measures put in place in the fight against the spread of the deadly coronavirus but the Somaliland government and the DP World have projected all facilities will be ready for operation early 2021. “We are very much on course. Of course the coronavirus has affected the speed at which we were on, but we will soldier on and deliver the most modern port facility in Berbera,” an official of the DP World said. The Berbera port expansion, designed to equip the Somaliland port for major vessels and transform it into one of Africa’s pre-eminent facilities. Expansion of the port started early last year with the first phase at a cost $101 million. Federico Banos-Linder, Vice President External Relations, DP World, said once the port is done, Somaliland will be one of the biggest and most modern players in the maritime industry in the Horn of Africa. “Already with phase one of the three phases done, we have increased the container capacity by 50 per cent and pushed volumes by 70 per cent which is a massive improvement. “We are now exporting 4 million livestock from 1.5 million just less than a year ago,” said Banos-Linder. Total investment of the two phases will reach $442m. The port’s current capacity is around 150,000 twenty-foot equivalent units [a measure of ships container carrying capacity] and is set to expand to 450,000 TEUs once development is complete. DP World firm will also create an economic free zone in the surrounding area, targeting a range of companies in sectors from logistics to manufacturing, and a $100m road-based economic corridor connecting Berbera with Wajaale in Ethiopia “Our aim is to make this an important regional hub for the maritime industry in the Horn of Africa,” DP World chairman and Chief Executive Officer Sultan bin Sulayem said. “We are within schedule in our work,” he added. DP World holds a 51 per cent stake in the Berbera port, while Ethiopia holds 19 per cent and Somaliland the rest

The future is bright.

The recently upgraded Hagreisa land database registry is actually part of a larger project by Somaliland Gov't and SolidBlock Inc. The project will be using state of art block-chain based database to register land titles and other key assets.

Oodweyne They can't keep up. Befuddled, bemused and bewildered by Somaliland’s growing gravitas at international diplomacy. While they play tiddlywinks with Mudulood this and Dhuusomareeb 2.4 that. At least they're a curious bunch.

Very much reflections of what I would expect from a bloody foreigner on a hushed visitation to a war zone marinated with a toss of mislaid Somalinimo flavour to balm chapped cavities of the forlorn diaspora hordes. Take you seriously, I shall not, till you have taken a crowded bus, with tiny seats not fit for a tall, burly gentleman of a certain age, from Adam Adde airport, paid the $5 fee to stride to the taxi rack, fight your way through rows of poor beggars to find a taxi or a bajaj to your destination; then at dawn, take a stroll through Bakaraha market for a homely breakfast in one of the low end shacks-turned-restaurants competing fresh "laxoox / canjeelo" flying off the pan with builders / workers in the morning rush, and get a sodden whiff of the rubbish, from the day before, still stacked up in the streets. With that, you would be a local lad back at home. But with you fancy bulletproof limo, VIP reception, backdoor exit to the city, and trotting between blue beaches and fancy hotels, mate, you are a bloody foreigner on tour. Now, tell me, is Awdal safe? Is Lughaya secure? Is Ceel Sheekh off limits?

LOL...it's late for me. I joined the' I like shaving my head' community.

Kids got jokes.

One of my relatives was killed by the French for assisting the liberation struggle.

I don't understand why anyone needs to blame her for a mere speech. The United States along with pretty much everyone on this planet already made it clear to the Xabashis that Ethiopia has no right to buy cheap land and sea from the despot in Hargeisa.

This guy is right. If the mad man goes ahead with this destruction of our existence as free people, anyone who cares about their future should join any armed resistance movement to fight the tyrant and the criminals around him.

For those interested to learn from another example, of a major and more powerful neighbour leasing military ports and coastal lands, should read about the Kharkiv agreement between Ukrainian and Russia on Crimea Ports and what happened eventually to all of Crimea. Powerful countries do not just give up coastal areas and military ports, even if they initially agreed to a lease, and if needed they even annex the whole region, as happened with Crimea. Kharkiv Pact - Wikipedia EN.M.WIKIPEDIA.ORG Putin tears up lease for Sevastopol naval base WWW.FT.COM

The ‘ictiraaf’ thing has really confused some, Ethiopia already enters agreements with Somaliland, has a diplomatic mission that reports directly to Addis, has direct flights to Hargeisa. What more ictiraaf than that will Ethiopia bring you, changing the sign board of its Consular Mission to Embassy is that worth selling your land for it.

The stip of land probably bigger than Gaza which warlord Muuse is giving away to Ethiopia will quickly be flooded with millions of Oromos and Afar, creating a de facto Ethiopian province in our own country. This new foreign region will cut off the Somalis in Djibouti from those of Somaliland and Somalia, completely isolating them. This isolation will weaken them and enable Ethiopia to help the Afar take over Djibouti. After getting access to the sea, Ethiopia will then be even more aggressive in pushing the Somalis in Ethiopia off their land and threaten every other region from the sea. This disaster waiting to happen must be stopped before it is too late.

It was clear from the beginning, that the Oromo narrative was pushed by Ethiopia as the precursor for voluntary and indirect annexation. Ethiopia has for decades used a politics of Oromisation in Somali region solidify its government grip on Somali’s and expand its territorial hold, so this wasn’t anything new, what is new however is this politics being applied or expanded to inside sovereign Somali territory.

Carfaat Layskuma hayo in afrikaan iyo amxaaro maamulaan koonfurta, xoogna ku joogaan markaan dhexdeenii is dilnay oo daciifnay. Gaalo kale oo walaalahood ah yaa koofiyad cagaaran u xidhay nimankaasu waa sharciyaysan yihiin. Meesha kaliya oo aan islahaa waa lagu faani karaa waxay ahayd waqooyiga oo aan askari ajnabi ah joogin marnabana aan lagu arag. Laakiin snm waxay noqotay ninkii boqolka soomay oo bakhtiga ku afuray Baqdinta aan iminka qabaa waxay tahay in la arkay meesha aad ka jilicsan tahay oo ah "tol" la'aanta. Taasina waxay keenaysaa in amxaar kuul leh lagula walaaleeyo, dadkaagii soomaaliyeedna cadaw kuu noqdaan. Ugu dambayn Adeer hashaasu waa jabtay, waliba si sahlan geelu haduu jabo ma kabmo waa la qashaa, Hashaas jabtay cuna oo karsada intuu amxaar ceeriin ku cuni lahaa. Afeef Hadaad luuqadayda garan waydo raali ahaw, jiilkii hore yaan kasoo jeedaa. Ogowna aduunka waxaan ugu necbahay caadifadda ka sakow, inaan arko soomaali, soomaali kale maydkiisa kor taagan xataa haduu shbaab yahay.

Xamar iyo shirqoolkeeda ha iska ilaaliyo. Meesha bahalo ka buuxo.

Rationality in its simplest form

"We are Somalis, we will remain as Somalis, the most painful thing we felt was that you will not govern yourself, but we will govern you. We have denied that, the decision and advice of what happened in LasAnod, SSC Khaatumo is for the Somalis. We do not want to revenge them, the victory we achieved is a victory for the Somalis." Leader of SSC-Khatumo Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw Ali. (Today’s speech at Laascaanood September 14, 2023). "Anagu Soomaali baanu nahay, Soomaali baan ahaan doonaa, waxa ugu xanuunka badan ee aan dareenay wuxuu ahaa - Tashan mayside anaa kuu talin doona! Taas anagaa beeniney, go'aanka iyo talada wixii ka dhacay Laascaanood Waxay u taalla Soomaali. Ma doonayno in aanu aarsano, guushii aanu gaadhney waa guul Soomaaliyeed.” Hogaamiyaha SSC-Khaatumo Cabdiqaadir Ahmed Aw Ali. (Maanta khudbadii, Laascaanood, September 14, 2023."

Mr Khadafi my views about the points you mentioned were always made public here in this forum. I supported the garaad community or atleast their elite when they were with Somaliland and would occasionally cheer them when they chased away the trouble making Puntlanders from one dusty village to another. That was when they were willing partners in the state building project. However, now it just doesn't make any sense to force them against their will. My values and views are not random or driven by mere emotions. Rather they are carefully crafted with one simple aim in mind: that on the Day of Recompense, I shall be absolutely free from any guilt when it comes to the blood, property, and honour of the believers. When I would not enjoy standing in a high court in this world for trial after being accused of a serious crime like murder, why would I risk standing in the court of Allah carrying a heavy burden on my shoulders? Allah already made it clear to us that whoever participates in an evil deed shall share its evil outcome and whoever participates in a good deed shall reap its rewards. Fighting unjust wars, or supporting it financially, or encouraging the waging of such a war online or offline is quite simply booking a ticket to hell. Another way you could be shedding Muslim blood is by supporting politicians who are known wrongdoers or known for not fearing Allah. Voting for them or financing their campaign is aiding them in their transgressions.

Masaakiin, maati carruur iyo waayeel ku jiro, maalin walba la duqeynaayo ayuu ku jees jeesteynaaye, arrogantly and proudly. Qofka saas camal ah needs to be brought to earth in a crush. And as a self-admitted jaahil himself, karbaash ayuu wax ku gartaa, not walaaloow iyo ereyo jilicsan. His behaviour also reminded me Caydiid Sn's and Jr's moooryaantiiaa heystay deegaanada Koonfur Galbeed from mid to late 1990s. Saan camal ayee u kibirsanaayeen, faan iyo booto bilaash ah wadeen. Tii ka dhacday Rabi ayaa ogaa, xataa xaasaskooda ka cararay, including Xuseen Caydiid's wife lagu qabtay markii Baydhabo laga saaray in mid 1999. Waala sii daaye oo Xamar aaday. I guess waa dhaqabka 'habraha' - be them in Waqooyi ama Koonfur - dad la dulminaayo faan iyo booto ugu sii daraan.

Human wave attack baa nagu dhacay , we underestimated ciilka dadka Ku gadhoodhay. Rag waad Ka adkaan kartaa laakiin bulsho dhan oo gurigooda jooga lagama adkaan Karo. Waan Ku faraxsanahay in muddo dheer oo Sool Clan wax naga tirsanayey ay maanta si wacan nooga adkaadeen. As a HJ Guushan Anigu uma arko qiyaame noo dumay, if we honour it. Waxan u arkaa nolol cusub oo noo bilaaban tay anaka iyo Sool Clan . Mid Ku dhisan sinaaan iyo walaaltinimo. Sidii awalba noo caadada ahayd, after every war halays waso. Saacada laga bilaabo qalasad baan isu dhiibaya faraxsan Anagu qab baanu Ku dagaalana haduu doono kibirba ha ahaadee , mar hadii goojacade nalaka saaray general bootaana la qabtay. Qabkaasi naguma jiro hada. Sool clan deserved this victory. Congratulations baan leeyahay. Wixii lasii wadwadaa waa dagaal saqajaan .

These whole moves by Xasan Socdaal regime just proves how terrified they are about Reer Baraha Bulshada. Xasan, Xamsa and Alqabyaala openly are complaining about their corruptions being exposed on social media and declared amateur war on them. They first tried to buy them, starting with tolka Qaraxquute and C/llaahi Balwaan. Balwaan refused, however Qaraxquute is on per diem. Shiine Culey was paid by Xamsa as is Amiin Caamir by wasaaradda warfaafinta. They briefly shut down Cali Yare's Facebook accounts twice, declaring him dead, so was Abwaanad Naciimo Qorane. They tried to shut down Sh. Cabdi Xirsi's social media accounts by sending legal threatening letters to Meta and Youtube. Macalinka Luggeeya kama fakan, trying to hack while he is on live. C/risaaq Teera iyo Naciimo Qorane baasaboorada ayee ka kansaleen. Kabtan Ayuub weyba ka samreen. Moooryaan aanan xishood iyo sharci midna kaa qabaneynin dalka xoog inay ku heystaan rabo. They are really mad at Ilhaan Garaad because her superviral video about gabadhii ordeysay exposed their full incompetency.

Che iyo aniga inaa nahnay the dinosaurs of Reer SOL ma'ogid miyaa. I joined SOL in Aug., 2001, though registered a few months later. Waaba 22 sano, tii/kii waagaas dhalatay/dhashay doobnimo waa dhaaftay/dhaafay.

I feel old!

This competition and the similarly cringe worthy ones before it epitomises the Somali people as a whole. It is a perfect picture of our collective failure. This world and everything in it is defined by competition. It's fabric is made of the carcasses of the loosers and the trophies of the winners. From the constant struggles between the prey and the predator in the animal kingdom (survival of the fittest) to the competition for resources between individual humans and their families, everything is based on competition. Nations which are just a collection of families, are also in competition. And in this group competition of families, we became a joke just like our tortoise sister in this embarrassing clip.

Kollayba Anigu magac u waayi maayo dadkaanu is hayno sida , badhyo culus , qurjiiley iyo dhuxulaysato. Eeg hada cidna ma magacaabin , sharciga forum kana ma jebin, cidaan u jeedana waad wada fahmaysan. Malaha waxaaba loo qaatay inaynu si sharaf leh magacooda saxda ah isticmaalno. Galbeedina saacadaa laga bilaabo waa xafajo. Sidaa maku heshiina ? Marnaba anigu magac xun u waayi maayo Baroorwiish ama falastiin hadba sidaad u taqaanin.

This secessionist troll's obsession with 'laan' is on next level. What an incel oo ku waashay laan, laan, laan. Soco gabar raadso, not that you will find one. Also reminded me what a Reer Xamar lady in berisamaadkii said to a new neighbour who moved to her xaafad. Waqooyiga ka timid oo ku waalatay 'laandheere, laandheere.' Maalintii dambe loogu jawaabay, "Ninkaaga ku dhib qabo laankaaga dheer." From that day, ma dambe laandheerenimo lagama maqlin.

Sanaag and Maakhir people are the winners. They fully boycotted the Somaliland election two years ago with almost zero members, and today they 100% participated the Puntland election. No one can dispute where they belong. There is nothing more democratic than the people deciding their future by vote without fear. Of the original five districts of Sanaag, only Ceel Af Weyn did not vote.

On the lighter side, LOL

Hit who? Kenya?

Waa wax lagu tartamo oo lagu faano. Hambalyo imtixaanka dugsiyada sare ee koonfurta Soomaaliya inta ku wada baastay, gaar ahaan kuwa heerka koowaad galay. Reer Koonfur Galbeed on social media are celebrating seeing seven out of the top ten coming from Koonfur Galbeed. Me? I am celebrating to see our young sisters being in the top list.

It did: The foreign-backed so-called opposition - namely C/raxmaan C/shakuur and Xasan Sheekh - think this issue can be exploited by paying what they say are 'parents.' Xasan and co. are also who openly tried to qabiilize ciidamadii qaranka a mere few weeks ago. That itself is treasonous act. Again, I have no issue with this haddee run tahay xataa. They are paid Soomaali soldiers and if they fight in Tigrey land to avenge the war crimes they have done in 2006/07 in Muqdisho. No Xabashi was proresting then, parent or not. No Kiikuuyo is protesting against what their sons are doing in Jubbooyinka. So are Ugaandheeska, Burundiga. This is a manufactured crisis in third attempt, waana wada aragnaa.

That is true Xaaji. The rights of the job seekers from SL should be respected. Let's not forget their rights are enshrined in the constitution called 4.5.

There was supposed to be choas, war and rage in Mogadishu today. I must say reer Mogadishu have disappointed us

I guess Iskushuban will be next.

Spoilers warned!

Do we now need 4.5 to manage the houses of Allah?

Mashruuca Dekedda Maydh

Japan named a scholar who teaches in China as its new ambassador.

With no visible means of support The unexpected success of Somaliland By Kieran Pender For some time now, our global landmass has been neatly divided into the 193 member states that make up the United Nations. Cartographically, the world has remained remarkably static in recent years, with just one new member admitted to the club of nations in the past decade (South Sudan) and only three in the decade before that. This stasis belies a convenient fiction, however. In a number of places, the cartography does not reflect the reality on the ground. Some examples are prominent – Palestine, say, which is recognized by over two-thirds of UN member states but lacks full acceptance on the international stage. Google Maps uses a dotted line to delineate its border with Israel. Northern Cyprus gets the same treatment: it is recognized only by Turkey. So too does Kosovo, which has received over a hundred diplomatic recognitions. Such cartographic oddities multiplied in the 1990s, during a wave of violent secessionist conflict. In the Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Georgia claims that both are now Russian-occupied; most locals disagree. Transnistria is a narrow sliver of land between Moldova and Ukraine, which seceded around the same time, as did Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Elsewhere, Iraqi Kurdistan, Western Sahara and Somaliland have similarly found themselves with some degree of sovereignty but without international recognition: “square pegs in a world of round holes”, according to the politics professor Deon Geldenhuys. These de facto nations have all the trappings of statehood – passports, currency, flags, elections, parliaments – but they are routinely ignored by the global community. Isolated from international institutions, formal trade networks and political blocs, such pariah territories have been routinely dismissed – including by institutions such as the European Paliament – as war-torn badlands and hotbeds of organized crime. They were also assumed by many to be transitory, and thus received little scholarly attention. But in time it became apparent that they were not going anywhere. Almost three decades since many of them were spawned, they persist – real on the ground, invisible on the map. In When There Was No Aid: War and peace in Somaliland Sarah Phillips considers a particularly peculiar example. Once a British protectorate, Somaliland enjoyed a fleeting week of independence in 1960 before merging with its southern neighbour, Italian Somaliland, to form Somalia. It was an unhappy union. Famine and oppression from the south ultimately precipitated civil war, and in 1991 (northern) Somaliland unilaterally declared independence. Most separatists have had a patron state to provide support and limited recognition. Abkhazia, for example, was recognized by Moscow in 2008 after the Russia–Georgia war – and diplomatic acknowledgement followed from several states allied with the Kremlin. The Somalilanders had no such fortune; pleas for international endorsement of their independence fell on deaf ears. Hence the title of Phillips’s book. While most post-conflict zones benefit from considerable international assistance, Somaliland has received barely a penny. International isolation and negligible aid were an inauspicious start for this fledging statelet, particularly as billions of pounds and swarms of international advisers poured into Somalia. Yet for all this assistance Somalia remains to this day racked by violence, piracy and terrorism. Somaliland, meanwhile, has emerged as a beacon of hope in the Horn of Africa – stable, relatively democratic and broadly functional. For Phillips, an expert on international development, Somaliland therefore provides a curious example of development without intervention. “For all the doubts raised about the effectiveness of international assistance in advancing peace and development,” she writes, “there are precious few examples of developing countries that are even relatively untouched by it.” As a result, it is ordinarily very difficult to consider counterfactuals, which question whether aid is actually helpful. Somaliland’s example offers partial clues. Its peace was “painstakingly negotiated under the trees at dozens of clan-based conferences”, while Somalia’s was “negotiated in five-star hotels funded by the United Nations”. Only one endured. When There Was No Aid is the result of extensive fieldwork. Phillips interviewed hundreds of people across a range of fields to understand how Somaliland secured stability while its southern neighbour remained mired in violence. She has drawn on this impressive research alongside other scholarly literature to produce a compelling account of Somaliland’s path to peace. While it is evidently written with an academic audience in mind – the book is grounded in theory and has an exhaustive reference list – When There Was No Aid is lively and accessible. Phillips makes a compelling case for the unexpected positives of non-recognition. As one minister tells her, the country’s isolation has been a “blessing in disguise”. Because the peace process was free from “institutional endpoints favored by international donors”, Somalilanders, the author tells us, “had the freedom to cherry-pick from local and international institutional governance models and to experiment”. This enabled the country to fashion innovative models blending Western governance with local customs. A system of clan-based proportional representation (the beel) was adopted, while an unelected house of elders (the Guurti) was integrated alongside a democratic two-tier legislature, presidential executive and an independent judiciary. While these structures are not faultless – Phillips suggests that the once influential Guurti has lost local legitimacy – their endurance stands in contrast to Somalia’s abiding governance crisis. Phillips’s most original contribution comes through her observation that stability has been maintained largely through words rather than actions. She suggests that while Somaliland’s institutional capabilities remain limited, and open to corruption – “the law here is fifty US dollars”, says one security official – the “othering” of Somalia’s continuing violence and the desire for international recognition have incentivized peace. Somalilanders, she argues, “have responded to institutional weakness by discursively compensating for it on the level of identity and by asserting their ability to maintain peace without strong institutions on the basis of that identity”. Her evidence for this is persuasive. She points to a contested presidential election in 2003, when many observers expected violence. Instead, the chair of the defeated party, Kulmiye, which had lost by just 0.01 per cent of the vote, publicly rejected the idea of forming a parallel government, saying: “I won’t go down that road, because no one can guarantee that we won’t end up like Mogadishu”. Phillips cites the absence of piracy in Somaliland as another measure of its success, putting this again down to the social consensus. As a local analyst tells her: “the population is alert to what the international community needs to see to recognize Somaliland. They want to protect that”. Phillips is also a shrewd detective. She highlights the pivotal role played by female activists, who can “cross clan lines” to facilitate dialogue because they hold dual clan identities – familial and matrimonial. And she identifies the centrality of one local boarding school, Sheekh Secondary – privately funded but non-fee-paying – to the country’s political make-up: of the fifty or so most influential political actors during the 1990s, fully half had attended the small, merit-based, cross-clan institution. One graduate tells Phillips that the alumni network functioned “like a secondary tribe”, aiding political cohesion during the turbulent decade. While some observers, such as the ethnologist Markus Hoehne, have called Somaliland a “sui generis” case, with little for us to learn from, Phillips disagrees. The country’s experience may have been idiosyncratic, but “this does not mean the underlying drivers of its trajectory do not have broader relevance”. In her eyes, Somaliland indicates that development institutions have been asking the “wrong question” when it comes to external intervention. “Aid matters less than we think it does because it does not alter the asymmetries that make it difficult for countries in the Global South to extract themselves from violence and poverty.” These observations are astute, and it thus seems a shame that they were crammed into the nine-page conclusion and not further explored. Today, Somaliland is no longer quite so isolated. The UN has twenty-two different agencies operating there, under the guise of its wider activities in Somalia, while the British and Danish governments have found ways to channel assistance indirectly. The United Arab Emirates is a major commercial investor and has also cooperated on security matters. In June, the presidents of Somalia and Somaliland even met in Djibouti for peace talks. “Somaliland is at a critical juncture”, Phillips observes – even if it is not yet on the map. Kieran Pender is an Australian writer and lawyer based in London. He has reported extensively from Abkhazia for the Guardian, Al Jazeera and Monocle

Somaliland offers location. It offers stable, secure and democratic platform that anyone who wants to invest in can build on and grow. Yes, Somaliland is poor in terms of economics but it is rich in terms of resources and hunger for success. The UAE is not building Berbera Port or Berbera corridor just out of humanitarian gesture. They are investing in Somaliland as business and expect their ROI and profits just like any other business investment. Somaliland is not looking for donations or Aid. We are looking for partnerships in business investments that will generate profits for both sides. This includes investment in the Berbera Free Zone to build factories and other value added services. For example one of the first things that Taiwan is expecting to finance and invest in is exploiting the fisheries. This is not just catching fish and move it to Taiwan. Rather it is about catching the fish and processing it in Somaliland exporting the 'Made in Somaliland' Product to Taiwan. That way the maximum benefit in terms of job creation and taxation is taken into account. The possibilities are endless.

Somalida Inta kale wa dad wanaagsan reer jabuutiga reer kilinka shanaad reer nfd. Dhibku wuxu inaga haysta. Somalida amisom gumeysato. oo jecel inay luqontooda tagaan. Iyago duli ah.

Taiwan is going to assist upgrading Somaliland coast guard capabilities.

Seems we've had a crack at this, but there is room for improvment.

We need to transition away from live animal exporting towards a frozen meat trade. The animals would be saved from the suffering of the voyage It’s worth more to the Somaliland economy to process animals in Somaliland, instead of shipping them live (leather). Meat processing facilities would create thousands of jobs. Farmers selling to the frozen meat trade would be exposed to less risk from closed markets or markets disrupted by disasters.