I partly disagree with Boqor Buurmadoow and Xil Khaliif here, both are saying Garaads should stick to the Khaatuma cause and not interfere with Somaliland ( or rather the rest of SL). But the Garaads concern and interference in Somaliland only shows that the communities in Somaliland(the North) fate is inseparable and their futures destiny is inter-wined. They might differ in political views, future’s political discourse and even name of the region (Somaliland/SSC/Gobolada Waqooyi), but irrelevant of that all, eventually when the disputes cooo down and emotions settle, peace will return and they will walk in the same direction towards one of those possible pathways(willingly or unwillingly). So the Garaads intervention to influence the direction of common pathway is quite rational and makes sense, as the future is not here yet and it’s for those that shape it.

Ilyria, how do u see the role of SSC-Khaatumo representations and participation in Puntland’s elections?

Couple of points; A. Even though there is a general definition of federalism different understandings exist around the on the political modes that establishes the constitutionally specified division of powers. The US has its own history, political context and modes for determining those divisions of powers, and so have other federalist country their own modes in which often its the overarching centre that decides on the modes and divisions of powers. And that goes also for Somalia, where the state existed before most of the states or perhaps all states, depending on we define the state and its sovereignty. B. Second, whereas States in other context such as the US guard to have a say, mandate and authority on their local and specific ‘realities’, ‘ways’, ‘customs’, ‘values’ and ‘norms’, the Somali States have so far proven to be vehicles guarding the interest of ‘whoever’ is in power in those states, and whose political priorities are hardly a reflection of issues of most concern to the people. Meaning the States are perhaps closer to the people in terms of physical distance but not necessarily in terms of representation and ownership by the people for the people. Not discounting the need for state authorities to have their say, input or right to be consulted but stating that we should not necessarily assume automatically they know, understand or care about what the people need. C. Issue of Clan. In the Somali context clans tend to that have a certain degree of sovereignty, organisation and authority and clan leadership to a certain extend ‘sovereignty’ and definably higher moral ‘authority’ coming closest to the “people’s will”. As we have seen recently in Las anod the role and authority of the Garaads played, in Somaliland the Saladin solving the political dispute and also in Puntland the Isims are often the last resort and highest authority to resolve the major issues of peace, war and disputes the system and its elected officials are unable to solve. So, I am missing the role of the traditional leaders in your narrative where in you only focussed on the shared authority and division of labour between verticals layers of government (centre and regions), but did not address the horizontal layers of power, roles and division of labour between modern state government and traditional governance, and Traditional leaders who clearly have and will continue to have the higher authority, autonomy and the power to resolve or interfere where others can’t. Specially on the most crucial issues of peace, war and conflicts. And lastly the elephant in the room, which makes our entire discussion a bit impotent is that both the Somali central and regional authorities and officials, don’t even understand the different roles and mandates of governance, government mandates and roles. They hardly comprehend, distinguish or differentiate between the different roles of policy and legislating, enforcement and implementation, operational management and oversight, and role of dispute settlement and custodian of the law (judiciary). This is often the source of the disputes and misunderstandings between the different authorities, government layers and officials, as they don’t distinguish roles and have a common understanding on what their role is exactly and what other authorities roles are. You will hear them say; ‘Anaga maamulna ‘Airportka’, ‘Wadooyinka’, or whatever function, or ‘Anaga ka masuul ah ‘Ganacsiga’, which automatically leads and ignite a dispute and becomes a source of conflict. The amendment of the constitution is a good example, which authority should be consulted, who should be heard, who should be drafting, who should amend, consent, eventually approve and legislate. Surely if there is no clarity on that, how can one expect the constitution to give any more clarity on the exact roles and mandates of government layers.

This current discourse isn’t benefiting anyone, and you are right that one community is more at fault then the other for this.

Galbeedi, I am not complicating things, and neither saying that things should or can remain the same. But saying that the political future of those neighborly and brotherly clans is inseparably connected with one another, and wether their future is in joining Somalia’s federalist project, continued search for independence, joining or whatever other pathway, that its detrimental that they walk that pathway together and going at it separately might lead to a certain demise and trifling outcomes. But you are right that current Habro politics is futile and riding out that train would be fatalistic and doesn’t make sense and for local leaders to do something about the current pathways. I agree with you on that, but the question is what can be done, that won’t lead to an even worsen outcome for all.

I think understanding and speaking Maay definitely would help to integrate and settle. And it’s so widely spoken throughout South-Central.

Indeed have seen that as well that deegaan based connections are more important that clan. Was also suprised how prominent Shariif community is in Baidoa, for some reason I used to think that Shariif Sakiin was a unicorn. Interesting, but Xari*** is correct with a X. By the way how come Eel* are so well known outside of SW while they are not the largest?

I am not saying HSM cares about Puntland, but that a crisis in Puntland is not in his benefit even though he might think that and could lead to a chain reaction in other federal states and could mean a crisis for federalism and thus for the federal government.

Listen to the full video. He talked about those two issues separately. he said the core problem of Somaliland are the Habro’s and they need to solve and come together. Not saying I take him serieus , nor agree with it or think such a convening would have any purpose.

Also I understand that majority of Lay** community are against Laftagareen, and he has partly support from Xad*** community, which doesn’t promise much for his political fortunates without major league players in his corners.

There is no road between Las Anod, Sool districts and Las Qoray, Badhan/Dhahar. And aside from clan connections, the socio-economic connections of regions and linkages differ. Not everything can be based on clan connections, specially for shared governance (Maamul) there needs to be a historic or atleast socio-econimic logic of shared connections, linkages and interest. In that sense Berbera has closer connections to Maakhir than Las Anod has. And Burco has closer connections to Buhoodle and Bocame, than Badhan has. At the of the day, when the clan postering and fevers have reached its heights and one is ready to work on common interest and shared services one needs to sit down with eachother and talk real governance.

Is Abdullahi Balaag the one who wanted to attend funeral of his brother but was refused? I didn’t know the history of maamul dhisid in SW, but understand the destructive postures and consequences that Somali political dynamics can have. But on the other hand, keeping mucaarid close to the power centre’s can also have positive effects, they add to creating an open dynamic atmosphere, boost confidence of diaspora to return and invest, and also boost social and development work as they want to showcase that their adding something to the locality. Another thing what struck me was the aid industry and their local handlers seeming to hardly deliver or being less visible, while SW and Baidoa is an area where aid industry has been operating for decades and claiming to have done a lot, but hardly being visible compared to other regions where at-least 10-20% of work is implemented. I am not sure, but it seemed that there is less scrutiny or pressure on aid and development actors to deliver atleast some of their commitments

Baidoa is currently very stable, peaceful and there has been quite some investment in infrastructure (roads, drainages, sidewalks). What I found quite apparent was the complete absence of local political leaders, I understand that Laftagareen won’t allow any of the opposition leaders to set foot in the region, Is that true?

No Qaraar here, just stating the facts.Congratulations to SSC. If you would ask me, I think SSC should claim the role and position to appoint all the SL MPs/Senators in next elections and perhaps even organise their elections in Las Anod instead of Mogadishu, would also be very strategical of the FGS to make Las Anod the unionist capital of the North and give that leverage to SSC. But I don’t think many would grasp that sort of politics, as thinking is reduced to single cell clan thinking.

Naah, don’t think so. They are twins joined at the hip sharing vital organs, any attempts of separating the twins would mean the end life of governance. For over 130 years, both sub-clans have been fully part and parcel of the same governing administration (Colonial, Somali State, Somaliland), where one goes the other goes. But one can always oppose or start a rebel, as that is inherent to the nature of Somali politics.

You’re saying Abiy is from tolka?

It’s not recognition as a Federal Member State, but as an ad-interim administration (maamul ku-meel gaadh ah) which makes sense to recognize and work with the local realities.

Your intending or hoping for Puntland to absorb SSC?

Galbeedi, I wasn’t intending to respond, but as you seem quite serieus and adamant on your initial assertion, and the incorrectness of your assumptions here, you have compelled to respond. A. The Zeila Ports main trade linkages were with Yemen which have come to halt since the war in Yemen, in which the country faced a maritime blockade that stopped all trade and boats movement between Zeila and Yemen. This blockade went even as far as opening fire on the boats from Zeila that dared to make the crossing, even Yemeni fisherman being targeted. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/world/middleeast/yemen-fishing-boats-saudi.html Possible recommendation would be to start lobbying(via different channels like Hargeisa, Mogadishu, IGAD, etc) to lobby the Saudis to allow trade with Zeila and Yemen to re-open. It could have a good chance of succeeding, specially now in org Saudi Arabia wanting the war to end and working on a peace initiative in Yemen, it’s more likely for them to accept resumption of maritime linkages specially to Zeila that poses little threat in suppling weapons of any kind. B. Somaliland wants to develop the Port as it’s good for its own tax revenues, and don’t assume that it has any sort of deal that prevents developing the Zeila sport. Just like Maydh Port has recently been constructed in SL, and Garacad in Puntland, and nothing would stop it or justify preventing Zeila to develop. The issue challenging the Port of Zeila more so then other Ports, is the development of the road that is quite costly as its going through very rough terrain (mountainous, swamps like and desert like, all the same time) increasing the cost of construction of the road for which already an assessment has been made by Somaliland. Now to make trade with Ethiopia possible, one would need to seek investments specially for the road as that would be in the hundreds of millions. Possible action, develop small group of technical and project experts (e.g. like Bayle, ex Afdb) to develop a good business case and incl investment plan, and focus on getting support from Ethiopia/Somalia in AfDB to finance or alternatively Islamic Dev Bank. These kind of investments are demand driven, so don’t expect that initiative has to always come from the investor side. But keep in mind nobody will invest if the business case isn’t there, e.g. trade with Yemen, Fish production and trade, opportunities and willingness Ethiopian trade linkages, as example. C. If Ethiopia’s intention would be purely to access and lease a Port for commercial purposes, they could have taken the initiative to initiative such a process with Somaliland authorities that has also eagerly welcomed any Ethiopian interest. Next to Ethiopia having plenty of other options in the region to lease, and could even restart using Massawe if the intention is purely commercial. But it seems Abiy’s purpose isn’t only a commercial aim but also a military and political as well. Look at the swift respond from Asmara on the statement, as one has earlier indicated to wanting to become a regional Maritime and Navy power, not on leased ports but rather annexed stretches of coast. And it looks likely that one thinks an annexation would be without impunity, given the shifting international order and trend of ‘regional powers’ violating sovereignties of countries, e.g. Russia in Ukraine, China in South China Sea, India with Kashmir, Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey in Syria, Gulf in Yemen, etc. Action; Don’t for a second entertain the idea of Awdal becoming part of Ethiopia or willingness to be annexed, as a way of seeking a position or leverage as the consequences could be fatal for the same community you are seeking positive development for. Just inquire with your Somali-Ethiopian cousins on the other side in Teferi Ber, Dembel, Lafaciise and Shinile, what they think of Awdal to become co-emerged in Ethiopia, and while you at it also inquire with Prof.Saleebaan on the history of the communities rebellion against Ethiopia with the Horyaal rebels and the long way one has come since in thinking, and that you want a free and Democratic Awdal to join Ethiopia today. D. You mentioned Kismayo Port and foreign troops. But perhaps you are not aware but there are no Kenyan civilians in Kismayo intending to settle there, have brought their families to Somalia nor is the country known for intending population displacement. While on the contrary Borama and Hargeysa are already quit filled with Ethiopians who have settled there, so think of what this would mean for future demographical composition in Zeila and Awdal, if your intention of ‘joining’ Ethiopia as its newest ‘Kilinka’ state would materialize? Personally I am in no way against regional integration, divers urban areas, but I am sure you would cry foul when socio-cultural and demographic shifts take place in your native region.

It’s better for the community to take the initiative for developing and promoting the investment case, rather then awaiting initiative from external actors, who would always priorities own agenda and wouldn’t necessary take local interest in to account.

Far from that, main issue and drivers are more economic hence why the press statement emphasized economic development of the Zeila Port and linkages with Ethiopia. While Abiy’s speech is very much political and concerning as he isn’t talking about investment and access to a Port but rather to reorganize the regional order for Ethiopia to ‘annex’ coastal areas.

It’s from the Awdal Movement. You guys still don’t understand it and Galbeedi isn’t telling the full story and intentions behind it.

Garowe elites might played a role in the ignition of the simmering crisis, but think issue is bigger then personalities involved and very much a crisis of the social contract and political arrangements, of which Puntland is a limit test for other states in Somalia. And Federal Government of Somalia better keep a close check on developments without choosing sides but maintaining a third party role, perhaps have someone in Garowe as observer and dedicate a team of the FGS Executive and Parliament to monitor things. As a blown-out crisis in Puntland could tear down the legitimacy of the federal government itself and spell out similar crisis in other regions, which could lead to both Mogadishu and regional capitals becoming engulfed in political elites infighting leading to collapse of the already fragile and weak Somali State. AS is only one of the factors in the equation preventing Somali state building, the other is political elites power competition and infighting for power without having a last resort for mediation and dispute solving. And the political crisis in Puntland may perhaps be the first ’constitutional crisis’ on state level, in which dispute is about the basic rules of the social contract (the constitution).