Nobody is against Ethiopia using Berbera Port and even acquiring a share in the Port Management, in fact this was offered to Ethiopia numerously. I don’t think even anyone would be against Ethiopia basing a contingency of marines at the recently completed Berbera Military Port and Airport and contributing to regional security, like other militaries have presence on Somali bases in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa. They But clearly Abiy’s intentions go beyond having access and utilising a second port (Berbera) next to Djibouti, and they go beyond just stationing marines at the existing military base and airport in Berbera. Abiy envisions an expanded empire that annexes coastal lands in to Ethiopia, which is a recipe for disaster and regional instability.

Ethiopia makes it clear it wants an own commercial port, it would mean the end of Berbera Port and the expected economic benefits Somaliland was seeking.

Both Somali’s and Ethiopians should have a reality check and look at the state of the countries these leaders inherited and came to power in, and the state of Somaliland and Ethiopia today after six years under their leadership. That should be an indicator of what is to come old this deal and what it might mean for both Ethiopians and Somali’s.

As we are witnessing the latest development of the Ethiopian-Somaliland Red Sea deal the risks of, exacerbating existing regional tensions and the potential ignition of a regional wide conflict in the Horn of Africa, have significantly increased. Ever since the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977, conflicts in the region have been largely contained within the boundaries of countries in the Horn of Africa. But now for the first time in half a century we are seeking significant risk and possibility of a regional wide conflict in the region that could engulf all the countries in the Horn in a devastating war beyond National borders.

Xaaji, these are good points and I hope one will really speak more in-depth in to the issues at hand, and past the semantics, and atleast come with a few outcomes that are signs of reapproachment and give hope to mutually solve things.

The Horn of Africa needs more trade—but not at the cost of more war - Ethiopia Insight WWW.ETHIOPIA-INSIGHT.COM Ethiopia should address its landlocked status firmly rather than forcefully.

Worrisome narrative.

Wa reer Sool, warkoodu wuu cad yahay.

MPs speaking out against the Ethiopian land grab

It’s understandable that SSC-Khaatuma cant completely depart and say farewell to its brotherly Puntland alliance, specially given that Somaliland leadership is threatening war and revenge from Oog and isn’t ready to accept the political realities and thus choose a peaceful pathways of diplomatic talks.

As long Somali’s agreed to solve the Somaliland debacle, I don’t think anyone would consider having an Ethiopian naval base in the region and Ethiopia knows that. Keep in mind that Ethiopia hasted this initiative and deal immediately after hearing of the Djibouti meeting and agreement to restart the talks between Somalia and Somaliland, and rapidly organised for Muse to come to Addis Abeba to sign the deal. Ethiopians are smart and up to date, and perhaps even understand Somali’s current state and trajectory better than we understand ourselves, as we tend to be blinded by clan dynamics and distracted by clan based politics we loose track of real politics.

I was quite surprised by his statement, and wondered what made him say that. Was he pressured by Addis to show a different Somali opinion on the matter or was it on his own initiative and he believes that Kilinka has some sort of benefit in this matter? For example this leased land would be sort of extension and fall under Somali region.

This is an interesting portrait of Abiy Ahmed, from a month ago before this latest saga on the Red Sea deal with Somaliland started. What is quite contradictory about Abiy is that while he seemed quite genuine at first about Horn of Africa integration, and building a political and economic Union in the region that moves towards gradual integration and harmonisation, he does the opposite by this latest move bringing the region on the brick of a potential war. Furthermore, what is even more antithetical is that through an integrated Horn of Africa Union, Ethiopia would have gotten access to the lands, markets and sea of its neighbouring countries and would have been the centre and powerhouse of the region, instead its risking now to become the pariah shunned by the whole region and further dividing the region with all erecting measures against eachother. Che, was right all along Abiy is not the man we all thought to belief he was, perhaps its even worser that he seems to be a maniac driven by hubris and day dreams of chasing grandiosity.

Ciyaari wa galin dambe. It’s not sensible to throw everything you have at it, incl the kitchen, as this is issue requires much political manoeuvring and will be a long game. And Somalia has quite tools political, legal and diplomatic options they should utilise at the right time.

Xaaji, I understand your mistrust of Somalia in the talks. But the issue isn’t just about having international observers, it’s more important that the Somali government needs to see Somaliland as its own predicament, and one needs this sense of responsibility, urgency and prioritisation in order for one to take responsibility and ownership to resolve the political dispute through talks. And so far this has been lacking, further exacerbated by Somalilands mephahone diplomacy as mode for communication.

Personally I have not issue with movement people beyond tribal lines and national borders. But fact remains that as long as the Somali State is weak, Somali people divided and fractured, and the Somali culture fragile that high levels of Oromo migration lead to cultural assimilation of natives, as per example of Dire Dawa and now Jigjiga.

Perhaps the biggest hindrance of all, not mentioned in the piece, are Abiy and Muse’s impediment leadership, the political trajectory and sense of desperation over internal state and anxiety over own position. Which will not be turned by this deal, on the contrary it will further destabilise both countries and at larger the region. Remember how Ethiopia and Somaliland got to the current precarious internal political state in the first place. Will this deal be the healing cure for the political disarray, or perhaps on the contrary become the tipping point?

Reasons to Object to the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU 10 January 2024 Absent the MoU, we have relied on the initial brief provided by President Bihi and the subsequent public statements from Ethiopian officials to piece together key elements of the deal. Bottom line is that this MoU is not good for Somaliland in a myriad of ways. Below are some of the key concerns related to MoU: 1. The MoU has yet to be shared and there have been mixed signals from both Somaliland and Ethiopian officials on the scope and location of the Ethiopian investments – Is it a port deal? Naval base? Is it providing 20kms on the coast? Where exactly – Loyado/Lugaya/Bulahar? Or is it a land bridge connecting Ethiopia to the sea? What are the payment terms and how much? 2. Ethiopia’s historic claims and recent public statements from Abiy and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate an intent to obtain “permanent and reliable” access to the sea for the landlocked country. Therefore, the plans for a naval base, commercial port, and land bridge all should elicit concern that the endgame for Ethiopia may be to redraw the map of Somaliland. One such possible outcome is the map below in which Ethiopia is able to obtain a 20km wide land bridge to the Gulf of Aden: There is a high risk of annexation of land by Ethiopia, as a powerful and much larger neighboring country would never give up military strategic assets and land, and if relations deteriorate would likely choose for annexation, as per example of the Ukrainian region of Crimea annexed by Russia. 3. There should be serious doubts about Ethiopia’s ability to honor any potential payment terms given the fact that the country only just last month (Dec 2023) failed to make a $31 million bond payment. The debt default underscores the Ethiopia's severe financial challenges and explains why the initial payments terms include shares in Ethiopia’s airline and telecom sector or provision of electricity in lieu of cash. 4. The practice of leasing coastal areas to foreign military has not proven to boost overall economic activity in the host country. Djibouti has one of the highest extreme poverty and income inequality rates in the world despite earning hundreds of millions in annual rents from foreign bases on its territory. https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_DJI.pdf 5. Even if there is no formal annexation of land by Ethiopia, the influx of Ethiopians into the 20 kms of territory will change the demographics of Somaliland and provide Ethiopia with de facto control of the land. Somalilanders have already seen a dramatic increase of mostly Oromo people in the country, most as laborers. There are now several generations of Oromos in Somaliland with children who speak fluent Somali. Social media posts from prominent Ethiopians are clear on their goal to rewrite what they consider an historic wrong. 6. Ethiopia has no ability to ensure that Somaliland becomes an internationally recognized country with acceptance into African Union, IGAD, UN, or the new bloc of BRICS. Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey and Transnistria is only recognized by Russia. Both countries are largely isolated and economically and militarily dependent of the larger neighboring country. Somaliland would require financing to largely be acquired from Ethiopia as it would have no access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. 7. The construction of a port for Ethiopian commercial port in Lugaya, Loyado or Bulahar would have disastrous effects on the port of Berbera. In addition, the 20 kms area of the coast that will be controlled by Ethiopia will impact Somaliland’s own commercial activities such as fishing. 8. Ethiopian access to the Red Sea jeopardizes regional stability as Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea would feel existential threats by Ethiopia surrounding them both on coast and hinterland. In addition, the current high stakes conflict in the Red Sea, where multiple foreign navies are jockeying for relevance, could also draw Somaliland into conflict unwillingly. 9. The debate over the MoU has resulted in several Somaliland communities expressing their opposition to the presence of Ethiopian military in the country. Should the MoU move forward without broad-based support, there is a high chance that internal violent conflict may breakout. After the loss at Gojacadde, a return to war would be devastating for a Somaliland. 10. The presence of Ethiopian military in Somaliland will be draw for Al Shabaab to the region, as the extremist group has already made a public statement vowing to fight “foreign invaders”. Ethiopia’s presence in Mogadishu was also what ignited and gave birth to AS and created a breeding ground for extremism. 11. Somaliland will be affected by the complex internal political and economic turmoil in Ethiopia. Somaliland is already economic dependent on trade with Ethiopia, and adding political and security dependency would leave it at the mercy of the whim of whichever Ethiopian regimes comes to power.

This is exactly the point, Ethiopia’d ambition are not investment and access, but control and ownership. Somaliland balaayo isku furtay, Oromadii wexe wada aamineen iney badu yagu iska leeyihiin.

The Tigray and TPLF who got him in to power at the first place.

Many people don’t know that Awdal folks had a rebel movement that was quite actively fighting against Ethiopia for many years, proff Saleebaan from Amoud was the leader of that movement.

Deni managed to have his cake and eat it too, let’s Hope this doesn’t set a new precedent in Somalia.

Xaaji, you pretty well that these are government invoked Guulwadeyn demos and says little about real support of the people.