Niyaw horta comments kaagu kaama khasaarin aragti saxaad cabirtay oo aad qortay. Laakiin imika waanba sakhraansanay oo kuuma jawaabi karo indrkay talaabo wax waydiiya. Anigu geeridii nebiga ma ogiye

On the positive side this shows Somaliland is starting to realize ictiraaf isn't possible and taking more active role in the politics of Somalia.

The future is bright.

DP World completes 400 meter expansion of Somaliland’s Berbera port. 59Shares Friday August 14, 2020 DP World this week announced the completion of a 400-meter expansion of the Berbera port in Somaliland. The Dubai Port Company that is contracted to expand the port said once operational, it will increase the terminal’s capacity by 500,000 TEUs per year and further strengthen Berbera as a major regional trade hub servicing the Horn of Africa. In a tweet, DP World stated: “We have just completed a 400m quay and a new extension at Berbera Port, Somaliland. Once operational, it will increase the terminal’s capacity by 500,000 TEUs per year and will further strengthen Berbera as a major regional trade hub servicing the Horn of Africa.” The news has elicited excitement within the Somaliland government with the vice president Abdirahman Abdilahi saying: “As Deputy President of Somaliland and on behalf of the people, words can’t express my great excitement about the nearing completion of the Berbera port expansion. my gratitude goes to the Sheikhs of the UAE and the DP World.” DP world, the Dubai based world’s largest port operator is the key player in the rebuilding of Berbera, they have invested $442 million for the expansion of the port and are also the economic free zone. It has projected to complete work by February next year. advertisements In 2017 when the original agreement was signed, the CEO of DP World Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem drew a parallel between the growth of Dubai and the development path Somaliland is on and added “Our vision is to make Berbera a trading and transportation hub for the Horn of Africa.” Berbera port is among the few corridors in the Horn of African region, which serves for both military and commercial purposes. The Berbera Port was built in 1964 by the Soviet Union and further expanded by the United States of America (USA) in 1982. It has served for both the Soviet Union and the U.S military within a span of 20 years. Once completed, facilities and service will surpass those in the neighbouring Djibouti according to the contractors. According to the DP World, the port will be able to handle the biggest ships compared to the other ports in the region and will complement activities at the Port of Djibouti and the Lamu Port which is also under expansion in the coast of Kenya. The Berbera Port expansion is the largest investment in Somaliland since it parted ways with Somalia in 1991. Work on the port expansion has reduced due to the measures put in place in the fight against the spread of the deadly coronavirus but the Somaliland government and the DP World have projected all facilities will be ready for operation early 2021. “We are very much on course. Of course the coronavirus has affected the speed at which we were on, but we will soldier on and deliver the most modern port facility in Berbera,” an official of the DP World said. The Berbera port expansion, designed to equip the Somaliland port for major vessels and transform it into one of Africa’s pre-eminent facilities. Expansion of the port started early last year with the first phase at a cost $101 million. Federico Banos-Linder, Vice President External Relations, DP World, said once the port is done, Somaliland will be one of the biggest and most modern players in the maritime industry in the Horn of Africa. “Already with phase one of the three phases done, we have increased the container capacity by 50 per cent and pushed volumes by 70 per cent which is a massive improvement. “We are now exporting 4 million livestock from 1.5 million just less than a year ago,” said Banos-Linder. Total investment of the two phases will reach $442m. The port’s current capacity is around 150,000 twenty-foot equivalent units [a measure of ships container carrying capacity] and is set to expand to 450,000 TEUs once development is complete. DP World firm will also create an economic free zone in the surrounding area, targeting a range of companies in sectors from logistics to manufacturing, and a $100m road-based economic corridor connecting Berbera with Wajaale in Ethiopia “Our aim is to make this an important regional hub for the maritime industry in the Horn of Africa,” DP World chairman and Chief Executive Officer Sultan bin Sulayem said. “We are within schedule in our work,” he added. DP World holds a 51 per cent stake in the Berbera port, while Ethiopia holds 19 per cent and Somaliland the rest

The recently upgraded Hagreisa land database registry is actually part of a larger project by Somaliland Gov't and SolidBlock Inc. The project will be using state of art block-chain based database to register land titles and other key assets.

Oodweyne They can't keep up. Befuddled, bemused and bewildered by Somaliland’s growing gravitas at international diplomacy. While they play tiddlywinks with Mudulood this and Dhuusomareeb 2.4 that. At least they're a curious bunch.

This is great improvement.The land database in Somaliland has been a consistent headache and cause for a lot of troubles including missing files, disputes etc. The introduction of GIS system will greatly simplify while at the same time is more secure and more reliable.

Ilhaan is also with white man now

And when they are training our navy and Air force it will be reported as a "Latin American" and an "Eastern European" country respectively

Very much reflections of what I would expect from a bloody foreigner on a hushed visitation to a war zone marinated with a toss of mislaid Somalinimo flavour to balm chapped cavities of the forlorn diaspora hordes. Take you seriously, I shall not, till you have taken a crowded bus, with tiny seats not fit for a tall, burly gentleman of a certain age, from Adam Adde airport, paid the $5 fee to stride to the taxi rack, fight your way through rows of poor beggars to find a taxi or a bajaj to your destination; then at dawn, take a stroll through Bakaraha market for a homely breakfast in one of the low end shacks-turned-restaurants competing fresh "laxoox / canjeelo" flying off the pan with builders / workers in the morning rush, and get a sodden whiff of the rubbish, from the day before, still stacked up in the streets. With that, you would be a local lad back at home. But with you fancy bulletproof limo, VIP reception, backdoor exit to the city, and trotting between blue beaches and fancy hotels, mate, you are a bloody foreigner on tour. Now, tell me, is Awdal safe? Is Lughaya secure? Is Ceel Sheekh off limits?

This guy is right. If the mad man goes ahead with this destruction of our existence as free people, anyone who cares about their future should join any armed resistance movement to fight the tyrant and the criminals around him.

Farmaajo pushed the dictatorial limits and that was most likely his downfall. He was truly convinced of his own invincibility till the end. People were also tired of the continued corruption that never went away even though Farmaajo campaigned on a promise to end it. I think this was anti-Farmaajo vote than anything else. Anyways, the country needs prayers and all the help it can get because the new guy was far worse on corruption than Farmaajo. Hopefully HSM learned his lesson and comes up with new ideas to govern the country because he was truly unable to deliver anything meaningful the last time he was given the chance.

It did: The foreign-backed so-called opposition - namely C/raxmaan C/shakuur and Xasan Sheekh - think this issue can be exploited by paying what they say are 'parents.' Xasan and co. are also who openly tried to qabiilize ciidamadii qaranka a mere few weeks ago. That itself is treasonous act. Again, I have no issue with this haddee run tahay xataa. They are paid Soomaali soldiers and if they fight in Tigrey land to avenge the war crimes they have done in 2006/07 in Muqdisho. No Xabashi was proresting then, parent or not. No Kiikuuyo is protesting against what their sons are doing in Jubbooyinka. So are Ugaandheeska, Burundiga. This is a manufactured crisis in third attempt, waana wada aragnaa.

At least 100 killed in border clashes between Ethiopia’s Somali and Afar regions – official Border clashes between Ethiopia’s Afar and Somali regions have killed at least 100 people, a regional official said on Tuesday, the latest outbreak of violence ahead of national elections in June. Around 100 civilians were killed since clashes broke out on Friday and continued through Tuesday, Ahmed Humed, deputy police commissioner for the Afar region, told Reuters by phone. He blamed the violence on an attack by Somali regional forces. Ali Bedel, a spokesman for the Somali region, said 25 people had been killed on Friday and an “unknown number of civilians” died in a subsequent attack by the same forces on Tuesday. Both sides deny having initiated the attacks and blame the other for the violence. Reuters could not verify whether the 25 deaths claimed by the Somali official were in addition to the 100 deaths or included in that figure. Clashes along the border predate the six-month-old conflict in the north that has pitted the federal government against the former ruling party of the Tigray region. Yet the violence has intensified just as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government is trying to assert control over Tigray - underscoring how the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize winner is struggling to keep the country together. The election is regarded as a litmus test for the country’s fragile unity, challenged by many newly resurgent regional and ethnically based parties. “The Somali region special forces ... attacked the areas of Haruk and Gewane using heavy weapons including machinegun and rocket-propelled grenades. Children and women were killed while they were sleeping,” Ahmed said. In 2014 the boundary between the two states was redrawn by the federal government, then headed by a multi-ethnic ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Three small towns were transferred to Afar from Somali, which has since tried to win them back. As a result militias from the two eastern states have clashed before over their disputed boundaries. In October last year 27 people were killed in a wave of clashes over the border, with each side blaming the other. Reuters

Spoilers warned!

Census in 2021 Somaliland: Governemnt Reveals Plans for Population Census MENAFN.COM <br /><span class=wp-caption-text>Somaliland planning minister revealed planned census at parliament in Hargeisa</span> <p>Somalilandsun: The government of Somaliland has announced...

Japan named a scholar who teaches in China as its new ambassador.

With no visible means of support The unexpected success of Somaliland By Kieran Pender For some time now, our global landmass has been neatly divided into the 193 member states that make up the United Nations. Cartographically, the world has remained remarkably static in recent years, with just one new member admitted to the club of nations in the past decade (South Sudan) and only three in the decade before that. This stasis belies a convenient fiction, however. In a number of places, the cartography does not reflect the reality on the ground. Some examples are prominent – Palestine, say, which is recognized by over two-thirds of UN member states but lacks full acceptance on the international stage. Google Maps uses a dotted line to delineate its border with Israel. Northern Cyprus gets the same treatment: it is recognized only by Turkey. So too does Kosovo, which has received over a hundred diplomatic recognitions. Such cartographic oddities multiplied in the 1990s, during a wave of violent secessionist conflict. In the Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Georgia claims that both are now Russian-occupied; most locals disagree. Transnistria is a narrow sliver of land between Moldova and Ukraine, which seceded around the same time, as did Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Elsewhere, Iraqi Kurdistan, Western Sahara and Somaliland have similarly found themselves with some degree of sovereignty but without international recognition: “square pegs in a world of round holes”, according to the politics professor Deon Geldenhuys. These de facto nations have all the trappings of statehood – passports, currency, flags, elections, parliaments – but they are routinely ignored by the global community. Isolated from international institutions, formal trade networks and political blocs, such pariah territories have been routinely dismissed – including by institutions such as the European Paliament – as war-torn badlands and hotbeds of organized crime. They were also assumed by many to be transitory, and thus received little scholarly attention. But in time it became apparent that they were not going anywhere. Almost three decades since many of them were spawned, they persist – real on the ground, invisible on the map. In When There Was No Aid: War and peace in Somaliland Sarah Phillips considers a particularly peculiar example. Once a British protectorate, Somaliland enjoyed a fleeting week of independence in 1960 before merging with its southern neighbour, Italian Somaliland, to form Somalia. It was an unhappy union. Famine and oppression from the south ultimately precipitated civil war, and in 1991 (northern) Somaliland unilaterally declared independence. Most separatists have had a patron state to provide support and limited recognition. Abkhazia, for example, was recognized by Moscow in 2008 after the Russia–Georgia war – and diplomatic acknowledgement followed from several states allied with the Kremlin. The Somalilanders had no such fortune; pleas for international endorsement of their independence fell on deaf ears. Hence the title of Phillips’s book. While most post-conflict zones benefit from considerable international assistance, Somaliland has received barely a penny. International isolation and negligible aid were an inauspicious start for this fledging statelet, particularly as billions of pounds and swarms of international advisers poured into Somalia. Yet for all this assistance Somalia remains to this day racked by violence, piracy and terrorism. Somaliland, meanwhile, has emerged as a beacon of hope in the Horn of Africa – stable, relatively democratic and broadly functional. For Phillips, an expert on international development, Somaliland therefore provides a curious example of development without intervention. “For all the doubts raised about the effectiveness of international assistance in advancing peace and development,” she writes, “there are precious few examples of developing countries that are even relatively untouched by it.” As a result, it is ordinarily very difficult to consider counterfactuals, which question whether aid is actually helpful. Somaliland’s example offers partial clues. Its peace was “painstakingly negotiated under the trees at dozens of clan-based conferences”, while Somalia’s was “negotiated in five-star hotels funded by the United Nations”. Only one endured. When There Was No Aid is the result of extensive fieldwork. Phillips interviewed hundreds of people across a range of fields to understand how Somaliland secured stability while its southern neighbour remained mired in violence. She has drawn on this impressive research alongside other scholarly literature to produce a compelling account of Somaliland’s path to peace. While it is evidently written with an academic audience in mind – the book is grounded in theory and has an exhaustive reference list – When There Was No Aid is lively and accessible. Phillips makes a compelling case for the unexpected positives of non-recognition. As one minister tells her, the country’s isolation has been a “blessing in disguise”. Because the peace process was free from “institutional endpoints favored by international donors”, Somalilanders, the author tells us, “had the freedom to cherry-pick from local and international institutional governance models and to experiment”. This enabled the country to fashion innovative models blending Western governance with local customs. A system of clan-based proportional representation (the beel) was adopted, while an unelected house of elders (the Guurti) was integrated alongside a democratic two-tier legislature, presidential executive and an independent judiciary. While these structures are not faultless – Phillips suggests that the once influential Guurti has lost local legitimacy – their endurance stands in contrast to Somalia’s abiding governance crisis. Phillips’s most original contribution comes through her observation that stability has been maintained largely through words rather than actions. She suggests that while Somaliland’s institutional capabilities remain limited, and open to corruption – “the law here is fifty US dollars”, says one security official – the “othering” of Somalia’s continuing violence and the desire for international recognition have incentivized peace. Somalilanders, she argues, “have responded to institutional weakness by discursively compensating for it on the level of identity and by asserting their ability to maintain peace without strong institutions on the basis of that identity”. Her evidence for this is persuasive. She points to a contested presidential election in 2003, when many observers expected violence. Instead, the chair of the defeated party, Kulmiye, which had lost by just 0.01 per cent of the vote, publicly rejected the idea of forming a parallel government, saying: “I won’t go down that road, because no one can guarantee that we won’t end up like Mogadishu”. Phillips cites the absence of piracy in Somaliland as another measure of its success, putting this again down to the social consensus. As a local analyst tells her: “the population is alert to what the international community needs to see to recognize Somaliland. They want to protect that”. Phillips is also a shrewd detective. She highlights the pivotal role played by female activists, who can “cross clan lines” to facilitate dialogue because they hold dual clan identities – familial and matrimonial. And she identifies the centrality of one local boarding school, Sheekh Secondary – privately funded but non-fee-paying – to the country’s political make-up: of the fifty or so most influential political actors during the 1990s, fully half had attended the small, merit-based, cross-clan institution. One graduate tells Phillips that the alumni network functioned “like a secondary tribe”, aiding political cohesion during the turbulent decade. While some observers, such as the ethnologist Markus Hoehne, have called Somaliland a “sui generis” case, with little for us to learn from, Phillips disagrees. The country’s experience may have been idiosyncratic, but “this does not mean the underlying drivers of its trajectory do not have broader relevance”. In her eyes, Somaliland indicates that development institutions have been asking the “wrong question” when it comes to external intervention. “Aid matters less than we think it does because it does not alter the asymmetries that make it difficult for countries in the Global South to extract themselves from violence and poverty.” These observations are astute, and it thus seems a shame that they were crammed into the nine-page conclusion and not further explored. Today, Somaliland is no longer quite so isolated. The UN has twenty-two different agencies operating there, under the guise of its wider activities in Somalia, while the British and Danish governments have found ways to channel assistance indirectly. The United Arab Emirates is a major commercial investor and has also cooperated on security matters. In June, the presidents of Somalia and Somaliland even met in Djibouti for peace talks. “Somaliland is at a critical juncture”, Phillips observes – even if it is not yet on the map. Kieran Pender is an Australian writer and lawyer based in London. He has reported extensively from Abkhazia for the Guardian, Al Jazeera and Monocle

Somaliland offers location. It offers stable, secure and democratic platform that anyone who wants to invest in can build on and grow. Yes, Somaliland is poor in terms of economics but it is rich in terms of resources and hunger for success. The UAE is not building Berbera Port or Berbera corridor just out of humanitarian gesture. They are investing in Somaliland as business and expect their ROI and profits just like any other business investment. Somaliland is not looking for donations or Aid. We are looking for partnerships in business investments that will generate profits for both sides. This includes investment in the Berbera Free Zone to build factories and other value added services. For example one of the first things that Taiwan is expecting to finance and invest in is exploiting the fisheries. This is not just catching fish and move it to Taiwan. Rather it is about catching the fish and processing it in Somaliland exporting the 'Made in Somaliland' Product to Taiwan. That way the maximum benefit in terms of job creation and taxation is taken into account. The possibilities are endless.

El-Presidente Mudane Muse Biixi has proven again that he is no-nonsense man. And by that he has won a lot of admirers from around the world and specially in the crucial and important group in the Foreign Policy circles. Africans are watching and learning from Somaliland.

Taiwan is going to assist upgrading Somaliland coast guard capabilities.

We need to transition away from live animal exporting towards a frozen meat trade. The animals would be saved from the suffering of the voyage It’s worth more to the Somaliland economy to process animals in Somaliland, instead of shipping them live (leather). Meat processing facilities would create thousands of jobs. Farmers selling to the frozen meat trade would be exposed to less risk from closed markets or markets disrupted by disasters.

Hello; Roughly 20 years ago I remember this beggar from Baidoa nearly lost it when President Riyaale expelled from Somaliland a couple of hundred Professional beggars from Baidoa and it seems he’s still bitter about it. Sadly in my absence from SOL no one bothered to set him straight so I will try to play the devils advocate here and break the sad news to him knowing fully well how obstinate beggars are. President Biixi does not chew qaad, smoke or drink. I know your beggers mind can’t and won’t grasp that but it’s a FACT. However I can’t say the same for your Fellow beggars back home in Baidoa and among the few in the diaspora. 75% of the income your folks earn begging in Mogadishu is spent on those 2 vices. both alcohol and qaad have become a favorite pastime in Baidoa enjoyed by many of the locals. Even the former chief beggar Jawari was an alcoholic. Excuse me if I forgot my manners but one can’t but help kick an obtuse beggar once in a while. good to see the old folks who I knew from many many years ago btw.

WAJAALE NEWS DAWLADDA ETHIOPIA OO XAFIISKEEDA HARGAYSA GAADHSIINAYSA HEER SAFAARADEED! July 20, 2020 - Written by Editor: Addis Ababa(W,N), Dawladda dalka Ethiopia ayaa xafiiska Arrima Ilaaliyaha (Mission) ee ay ku leedahay Caasimadda Somaliland ee Hargeysa gaadhsiinaysa heer Safaaradeed (Embassy), Sidaana Waxa Arabsiyo Online u sheegay Saraakiil sarsare oo ka tirsan Wasaaradaha Arrimaha Debadda ee Ethiopia iyo Somaliland, kuwaasi oo codsaday in aan la magacaabin. Sida ay Saraakiishani sheegeen, talaabadani ay dawladda Ethiopia qaadayso, waxay ka dambaysay ka dib markii ay todobaadkani dhexdiisa wada hadalo dhinaca Telefoonka ahi dhexmareen masuuliyiinta Somaliland iyo kuwa Ethiopia. Wada hadaladani ayaa la sheegay inay salka ku hayeen, ka dib markii ay dawladda Ethiopia ka shakiday ujeedada Wefti heer sare ah oo booqasho dhawr maalmood qaadatay ku yimid Somaliland. Wasiir ku xigeenka Wasaaradda Arrimaha Debada ee Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland Liibaan Yuusuf Cismaan oo waraysi arrintani la xidhiidha siiyay Wargeyska Daily News Egypt oo ah maalinle madax banaan oo ka soo baxa dalka Masar, waxa uu sheegay inay Somaliland iyo Masar isla soo qaadeen sidii ay iskaga kaashan lahaayeen is-dhexgalka dhinaca ganacsiga, gaar ahaana xoolaha iyo Beeraaha. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2020/07/18/somaliland-says-keen-on-stronger-ties-with-egypt/ Sidoo kale Mr. Liibaan Yuusuf Cismaan, Wasiir KU xigeenka Arrimaha Debada iyo Iskaashiga Caalamiga ah ee Wasaaradda Arrimaha D ebada ee Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland, waxa kale oo uu ka jawaabaay su’aalo la xidhiidha in imaatinka weftiga Masar ee Hargeysa ay cabasho ka muujisay dawladda Ethiopia, waxaanu isaga oo arrintaasi ka hadlaya yidhi. “waxaanu wada xaajood la geli karnaa dal kasta oo aanu danahayaga kala hadli karnaa, taasi waa shaqadayada’” ayuu y idhi, Wasiir ku x ixgeenku. Waxaanu intaasi ku daray oo uu yidhi. “Xidhiidhkayaga Masar wax dhaawac ah u geysn maayo, xidhiidhka aanu la leenahay Ethiopia, waxaananu ugu baaqaynaa labada dhinac ee Ethiopia iyo Masar in khilaafkooda dhinaca Biyo XIdheenka Ethiopia inay wada hadal ku dhamaystaan, haddii loo baahdana annaga laf ahaantayadu waanu dhex-dhexaadin karnaa, maadaama oo aanu khibrad u leenahay xalinta khilaafaadka” . Hase yeeshee, dawladda Ethiopia ayaa sida ay wararku sheegeen waxa ay bilawday sidii ay kor ugu qaadi lahayd xidhiidhka saaxiibtinimo ee ay la l eedahay Somaliland, tan iyo markii ay Jamhuuriyadda SOmalilanad Madax Banaanideeda kala soo noqotay dalka sannadkii 1991-kii oo ay ahayd d awladda keli ah ee iyadu goob joogga ka ahayd goobtii lagaga dhawaaqay madax banaanida Somaliland ee magaalada Burco, halka ay dawladda Masar oo waqtigaasi doonaysay inay wefti u soo d irtana la sheegayy in loo diidday saababo la xidhiidha taageero military oo ay siin jireen d awladdii hore ee Maxamed SIyaad Barre oo xasuuq baahsan ku haysay dadweynaha Somaliland sannadihii sideetamadii.. Maamulkii xilligaasi ee dalka Massar waxa uu talaabadaasi kaga jawaabay inuu u ololeeyo go’aamo go’doomin ah oo ka dhan ah madax banaanida Somaliland oo uu ka ansixiyay ururkii midnimada Afrika iyo Jaamacadda Carabtaba, aakhirkiina Qaramada Midoobay. Isku soo duuboo, khubarada caalamiga ah ee ka faaloodda arrimaha GObolku waxa ay ku sheegeen xidhiiddhka Cusub ee Somaliland Iyo Masar, mid ay ku doonayso inay noqoto dal samaysanaya saaxiibo cusub, isla markaana aan luminaayn saaxiibadiisii hore.

Djibout - Borama - Jigjiga Road Somaliland's Ministry of Transport & Roads Development

Taiwan trains counter-terrorism troops for Middle Eastern country Taiwan's 42-year-old MPSSC has already trained one group of recruits while another on hold due to pandemic, local media claims 3454 By Sophia Yang, Taiwan News, Staff Writer 2020/05/09 13:55 MPSSC in 2017. (Wikimedia Commons photo) TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — A high-ranking military official has claimed that a Middle Eastern country has inked a training agreement with Taiwan, according to a Liberty Times Net (LTN) exclusive story. Under the deal, Taiwan's Military Police Special Services Company (MPSSC), under the Military Police Command, is responsible for coaching the Middle Eastern country's counter-terrorism force. They will travel to Taiwan in groups for training that will enhance their knowledge, skill, and responsiveness in the war against terror. Similar to the United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets), the MPSSC was established in 1978 and has earned international acclaim for counter-terrorism operations and protecting high-ranking officials and ambassadors in Taiwan. It is also known for anti-hijacking and anti-sabotage operations. Taiwan is one of the few Asian countries capable of training special task forces and providing such services to other countries, according to LTN. It reported the first batch of trainees has concluded training and returned to home, while a second batch of recruits is on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3930970?fbclid=IwAR0emABRyt6O1Tu0X9gkWMx7vMox2MgKtLVwCAOv3zIB_heUQwd_e2IfBps Rumours has it that it's Somaliland.

UK, Denmark and Netherlands approve agreements with Somaliland Government on critical infrastructure to improve people’s lives - GOV.UK WWW.GOV.UK The new agreements, supporting projects on roads, agricultural systems, water facilities and fisheries, will spur...

Somaliland has the best case in africa legally really. It's just that lack of economic interest from western powers is the problem. But it has shown the world that Somaliland is here to stay and that no one in Somalia can change that. Deep inside most of the koonfurians know this to the 2 countries. Have been to seperate countries for almost 3 decades this will surpass the short lived union of 20 years. In the later half of afweyne reign somaliland was at war with Somalia. In the end runtay tegeysa.

Khayre has failed. Even a child knows that this Sufi outlaw was hungry for power. He knew his rule was over if elections took place in Galmudug. Farmaajo is also pushing a well known " Budhcad Badeed" named Qoor Qoor as the future leader. The best option is for Khayre and company to swallow their pride, accept defeat and keep Xaaf to rule until a real reconciliation takes place in Galmudug. If he keep insisting on his failed policy, Khayre will create three presidents within the three main sub clans of GAlmudug. Nin Saaxiibkay ah ayaa yidhi isagoo kaftamaya, " Reer Dayniile ayaa maamul HG u Samaynaya waxay ahayd riyo beena".

This guy is history he surrenders and is going to retire and live his life. The mountain operation is over and Somaliland a usual and its people are united. No body can damage Somaliland.

It won't do much for the average Somali. All it does is allow Somalia's corrupt government to borrow more money so that corrupt politicians can finally get very rich. It is a gimmick.

Do you think the Americans are unaware that Somaliland is just a smaller version of southern Somalia with just as much corruption, nepotism, mistrust among clans, violence, tribalism, religious extremism, etc?

You sound delusional.