Well, according to this Reuters news report seems it has your answer: "DJIBOUTI, Sept 9 (Reuters) - A Somali businessman who financed the ousted Islamic Courts said on Sunday he had cut ties with the group after meeting Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. Gedi had flown to Djibouti to ask businessman Abukar Omar Adan to use his influence to encourage armed remnants of the movement to accept a government amnesty. "I am not anymore with the Islamic Courts," Adan told reporters after meeting Gedi amid tight security at a Djibouti hotel. He did not elaborate." ------------ I don't think in uu Caddaani sameynaayo waxaas ama ku dhaqaaqi doono, even at the pathetic begging by desperate Geedi. The Xabashi stooge Geedi thinks since he -- Caddaani -- is a close "tolka," so can be influenced and persuaded to join his "tol" dowladda ku jiro and what Geedi thinks are their clan interests. Will Caddaani believe that crap? Methinks not.

The last clip ilin kaa keenaayo. Dankis for sharing, Daa'uud. Heestii la jeclaa ee Saliim Saciid Saliim aan soo xasuustay. Xamar caddeey Xeebteeda u xiisayee Xamar Caddeey Xaalkeeda xasuustayee Xamar caddeey Xudunteeda ku duuganee Xamar caddeey Xamareey waa lagu xumeeye yaa ku xaal marinaa. O' Xamar, forgive us.

Xildhibaana Max'ed Cabdi Yuusuf iyo Yuusuf Dheeg oo safka ku jiro; they are both wearing the koofi barawaani. Dr. Raabi waiting in the line as well. Xildhibaan Saleebaan Colaad Rooble and Xildhibaanad Fowsiya Max'ed Sheekh in the middle. More sawiro.

Qofkaan Buuxo miyaana? Maxaa, diracii hore ma nacday? Adaa mudan abaayadiis. Laakiin maku sheegi kartaa markaa dhalatay bisha Soomaaliyeed? Isku tijaabi.

Originally posted by Caamir: Maakhir is for the people by the people and of the people. MMA, All you needed is to remember this little concept. People, power, and government are all interchangeable. Also, it is important to know the difference between state and government . Even if government collapses , the state remains and lives, so government comes from compact or agreement from the people to organize and rule their own affairs. According to former Somali government, Four out of the five districts in Sanaag are inhabited by Maakhir people, but the community also reside the western side of Bari including Bosaso. You hadn't answered my specific questions, Caamir. I have a Soomaali map on the wall of my room, and according to this map -- it is an official one, published by the regime, don't sure the date, though -- it has four districts, namely Ceerigaabo, Laaqorey, Badhan and Ceelafweyn. This so-called state, which seems to be all but on paper, claims to represent the entire Sanaag gobol, yet, I don't see or none answered on here, that it has yet reached Ceelafweyn or more importantly, Ceerigaabo, the gobol's xarun. That is two out of four. That is sad, because instead of uniting Reer Sanaag -- one of the two gobols from the original 1960 government, the other being Hiiraan, that was untouched by the subsequent creations of other gobols or carves -- this state has now is even more dividing the people of the gobol. Let me be clear on myself: I am on a principle against the further division of Soomaaliya, whether into clan-based federal states or autonomous states. This state, which again seems to be on paper only, is not the first, nor will it be the last, to hastily proclaim to be a provincial state, without a clearly defined provincial boundary, constitution and intergovernmental relationships between the other gobols. All other before it failed -- such as Shaatigaduud's Southwestern State, Hiiraan's Midland and the recent Kiimiko's Galmudug. They all failed because most were reactionary, hastily reached decisions, without no political consultations other people who live the lands they claim to include. This new phenomenon fathom state is no different. It is just a phenomena. Anyway, all the best.

Nugaaleed, mar labaad aan ku weydiinaa, what firm evidence do you have that Zionist citizens were at present? According a brief sentence in a Reuters report? You still haven't still answered my questions, ee marka let me requote myself again: "Ka waran kan Xabashka asalkiis in uu Yahuud madoowyahay aaminsan keenay Xamar, oo u horseeday, una sahlay Xamar inay ku xaar xaaraan, ku xasuuqaan maatidii Soomaaliyeed? What do you call those shamed people, with those undisputed real facts? And what, Eebboow, would you call these who support those Xabashi stooges and puppets for a clan reason?" PS - Xabasho iyo Falasha aniga iskuma qaldin. Xabashada [and Tigrey for that matter] too believe a special relationship inay ka dhaxeyso Yahuuda, believing being Semitic to begin with and speaking a Semitic language, despite Carabs too being Semitic, who would have been more closer to them than Yahuuda. That relationship waa mida Zionist state ku qasabtay inay usoo diraan advisers, military aid and other military experts in taht '77 war of Soomaali Galbeed. PS - Yahuud too are humans. Not all of them are Zionists, ee taas muran kuma jirin, so if even some Yahuuds were present, they are humans and be can be guests. Adigaa "Isra'iil" ku heysid, as though you recognize that state.

Ka waran kan Xabashka asalkiis in uu Yahuud madoowyahay aaminsan keenay Xamar, oo u horseeday, una sahlay Xamar inay ku xaar xaaraan, ku xasuuqaan maatidii Soomaaliyeed? What do you call those shamed people, with those undisputed real facts? And what, Eebboow, would you call these who support those Xabashi stooges and puppets for a clan reason? Markaas war aan la hubin noo keenaayo meeshaan. Reuters, for your own information, is not Quraanka that has a final answer and always correct.

His Honourable ku dar. Where is this so-called state seated at horta? Xaruntooda intee waaye? Baran? Meeqo degmo ayee maamulaan, as opposed those claimed, but not controlled by them. Is Ceerigaabo included, too?

Bogga uu maqaalkaan uu fiiriya leeyahay aanba aaday, oo taariiqda Soomaalida bishaan dhashay ka helay. Waa wareey iga dheh. Maalin Jimco aan dhashay, ku beegan 18 Dago [sako]. Meeshaan waaye meesha aad isla barbardhigi kartid. Noo sheeg goortaa dhalatay ee bisha Soomaalida.

Habeentiris: Islaamka ka hor, Soomalidu miyey lahayd Kaalendar dhaqameed soo jireen ah? Hordhac Soomaalida waa dad dhaqan ahaan aan hidde u lahaan jirin inay wax qoraan. Taasi waxay had iyo jeer sababtaa inay lumaan taariikhda asalraaca ah ee ay leeyihiin bulshooyinka noocan oo kale ah “oral society”. Gaar ahaan somalida oo ay u dheer tahay reer guuraanimo, malaha wax hadhaa reeba oo loo qaadan karo tixraac. Maqaalakan oo bar bilow u ah taxane aan kaga hadli doono cilmi-dhaqameedka xiddigiska ee somalida, waxaan si dulkaxaadis ah ugu eegi doonaa hababka tirsiimo ee taariikh ee saamayn ku yeeshay kaalendarka Soomaalida. [Ka eeg barmaamij isugu kaa beddelaya taariikh Soomaali, Islam iyo Gregorian.] [Kabooday] Habeentiriska Soomaalida (Somali Calendar) Dhulka Soomaalidu ku nooshahay badankiisa hadda waxaa laga isticmaalaa labada tirsiimo ee Gregorian-ka iyo Islaamka. Halka had iyo jeer dowladuhu ka isticmaalaan habeentiriska Gregorianka, dadwaynuhu waxay gooraynta ku xusan diinta Islaamka (ramadaanka, bixinta sekada, xajka, ciidaha, iwm), iyo goobaha diinta (Masaajidka, Malcaamadaha qaarkood, iwm) u isticmaalaan habeentiriska islaamka. Waxay taasi in badan ku riddaa jaha wareer dadwaynaha, oo lagaba yaabo inaanay da'yartu aqooninba tirsiimada kaalendarka islaamka. Waxaa kale oo jirta iyana in ay somalidii hore lahaan jirtey tirsiimo u gaar ah. Habeentiriska somalida oo ka horeeyey intii aan diinta islaamka soo gaadhin. Habeentiriskaas oo u baahan baadhitaan xooggan waxaa waxoogaa ka daah furay alle ha u naxariistee Musse X. Ismail Galaal. Gooraynta Soomaalidu ma lahayn bar bilow, sidaa darteed malaha tirsiimo sannadeed. Somalidu waxay tirsan jirtay xilli, dhererka xilligaasi wuxuu ku xidhnaa dhacdo gaar ah. Waxaa inta badan lagu magaacaabi jirey xilli kasta dhacdooyinka yimaadda (xilli barwaaqo ah, mid abaareed, mid colaadeed, dayax madoobaad, iwm.). Tusaale ahaan waxaad maqlaysaa hebel wuxuu dhashay “xaaraame-cune” hortii yar, ama “abaartii daba-dheer” dabadeed. Hayeeshee Soomaalidu waxay lahayd habtiris waadix marka loo eego bilaha iyo maalmaha. Marka ay Soomaalidu iswaydiinayso taariikhda waxaa sida caadi ah la iswaydiiyaa “waar maanta bishu waa imisa?” iyadoo loo jeedo “taariikhdu waa imisa?”. Arrintanu waxay sal ku leedahay habdhaqameedka habeentiriska Soomaalida oo ku koobnaa bisha iyo maalmaha. Habeentirska biluha ee Soomaalidu wuxuu ku salaysanyahay dayaxa, waxaanuu la bah wadaagaa kan islaamka. Magacyada loo yaqaano biluhu waxay ku kala duwan yihiin degmooyinka ay somalidu degto. Tusaale ahaan Somaliland, gaar ahaan magaalada burco iyo agagaarkeeda, ilaa hawd, waxaa loo yaqaanaa: Afsoomaali: Tirsiga Soomaalida sida Burco looga yaqaan [Afcarabi: Tirsiga Islaamka] Dago (ama Sako) [Muxaram] Bildhurohore [safar] Bildhurodambe [Rabi`al-Awwal] Rajalhore [Rabi`ath-Thani] Rajaldhexe [Jumada l-Ula] Rajaldambe [Jumada t-Tania] Sabuux [Rajab] Waaberis [shacbaan] Soon [Ramadaan] Soonfur [shawal] Sidataal [Dhu l-Qa`da] Carafo [Dhu l-Hijja] Maadaama ay hadaba bilaha Soomaalida ku salaysan yihiin dayaxa, islamarkaana aad ugu dhowyihiin kuwan habeentiriska islaamka, waxaynu iswaydiinaynaa siday u xisaabin jireen kalgalka maalmaha ku salaysan qorraxda ee ay caado-xusi jireen ee aan diinta islaamka shaqo ku lahayn. Tusaale waxaynu usoo qadanaysnaa “Dabshidka” ama “Nawriishka”. Dabshidku waa bilowga sannadka habeentiriska Soomaalida. Aqoonyahan dhaqameedka bulsho reer guura ah u go’aamiya habeenka dabshidku wuxuu isticmaali jirey, sida uu xusay Musse Ismail Galaal, isugaynta bilaha qun-dhalad iyo kuwa toomman oo isku noqda 354 cisho, markaas buu ku dari jirey 11 cisho dhammaadka bisha carrafo. Halkaas buu wuxuu si lama-ilduufaan ah ugu simi jirey bilowga sannad qorrexeedka (xilliga roobka). Markaa, tusaale ahaan, bisha dabshidku soo galayaa wuxuu is beddelaa saddexdii sannadoodba mar. Marka kowaad wuxuu dhacaa bisha horraanteed, sannadka ku xigana bisha badhtankeeda, sannadka saddexaadna dhammaadka bisha. Sannadka afraad buu u gudbaa bishaa bisha ku xigata, kuna nagaadaa saddex sannadood. John A. Hunt wuxuu leeyahay habeentiriska Soomaalidu wuxuu ku salaysan yahay isku-dhaf ah: 1. Habkii hore ee Persianka (oo aanaynu halkan kaga hadal) 2. Babeentiriska islaamka 3. Hab lagu saxo tirsiga dayaxa oo saddexdii sannadoodba ku sima tirsiga qorraxda si ay isu waafaqaan xilliyada roobka. Waxaa jirta aragtiyo kala duwan oo midkood odhanayso habeentiriska Soomaalida ee sannadku waa mid kalgal 7'aadle ah, oo toddobadii sannadoodba waxaa loo tiriyaa sannad. Xigasho ------------- Waan tifaftiray maqaalkaan, oo suu aqriska maqaalka u sahlanaado ama u fududaado.

Bilooyinka iyo sidahii [calender] hore ee Soomaalida laba ayee u kala baxaan: Kuwii hore oo hadda badankood dhumay iyo kuwa hadda sii dhumaayo oo aan Muslimiinta kale aan la wadaagno, inkastoo la Soomaaliyeeye oo magacyadda qaarkood kuwii hore kasoo haray. Soomaalida bilooyinkeeda dayaxa ayee raacaan, sida tan Islaamka. Koley magacyadooda ayaan rabaa inaa inta kusoo dhigo. Haddee qalad ku jiraan, waa sixi kartiin. Dago [dadka qaarkood Sako dhahaan] Bildhurohore [Miira] Bildhurodambe [Mowliid] Rajalhore [Maalmadoone] Rajaldhexe [bandhexe] Rajaldambe [bandambe] Sabuux Waaberis [soondheere/Gasayar] Soon Soonfur Sidataal Carafo ------------- Bari oo Axad ah waxee ku beegantahay 27 Waaberis ee bisha Soomaaliyeed, la soco. Soon maalma yar kaliya ka hartay.

Magacaagana xaa helay, ee riigadda yar qaanjeerta u eg xee ahayd?

Sawiradda from shirka. Yuusuf Dheeg, Cumar Iimaan iyo Gaashaanlesare Jaamac Max'ed Qaalib. The Soomaali flag can be impressive, more impressive in the right colours and in the right venue. The thick, dark blue some Soomaalis use is not the calanka dhabta ah.

Dacaayad can be raqiis. What do you really expect if we can criticize the gathering like this? You don't have to support the individuals who gathered there, but the meaning and idea behind the shir. One needs a common ground, a common voice, instead of myriad opposition voices. That is what always ku dhici jirtay Soomaalida, never ka fiirsan jireen waxa soo socdo. They, the then jabhado, never planned or agreed to who will lead the country after the last Kacaan regime is toppled. They never planned what will be done and when from any of those 14 peace conferences. We are a hasty society, meel aan ka socono iyo meel aan u socono ma naqaano. Hokey, if this conference is not arranged and the concerned issues are not addresed at a venue, what then will you suggest? That any one can speak for those who are fighting against Xabashadda? Meeqo voice ayaa jireyso markaas? This conference was suggested and it was a by-product of suggestions made some semi-conferences held in UK during the past couple months. The likes of Cabdi Ismaaciil Samatar and Cali Khaliif Galeyr suggested the opposition groups to have a common, agreed voice, if not unified party. Marka in laga fiirsado waaye waca dhici doono. They need to form a single, well-meaning and strongly united voice against Xabasho occupation. Nothing to do with ideology or a single individual.

This, in a nutshell, has always been the aggressive Xabashi policies, endlessly in dream-like pursuit and obsession, when it comes to Soomaaliya and Soomaali people. They always have had this hostile, emperialist policies toward to non-Xabashi lands, especially to Soomaalis. This is what the then Xabashi prime minister, Tsehafe Tizaz Aklilu, said at the opening of Organization of African Unity in 1963: "The Somali delegation apparently wishes to apply in all conference the well-known adage "If you throw enough mud, some of it will stick," but I had not expected him to apply it as this major conference, attending by great Heads of states from our continent. Whence comes this accusation? I shall restrict myself to a few facts only, so that every one may know the truth (for) once for all. Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation, for more than 3000 years. That is a fact. Second fact: The historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact: There is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali Nation. That is too a fact. I apologize for stating it." What agitated our Xabashi man, being on the verge of almost hysterical, was an opening remarks by Eebba ha u naxariistee, halyeey, Aabihii Dalka, Marxuum Aaden Cabdille Cismaan, whose partial open remarks at that crucial conference were: "The present State of agitation and ferment in those areas will continue to fester, unless an equitable solution is found. If the wound is not healed, it will constitute a constant source of trouble in the region, and may affect adversely the friendly relations between the Somali Republic and her neighbors. Let there be no misunderstanding about our intentions. The Somali Government has no ambitions or claims for the territorial aggrandizement. At the same time the people of the Republic cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren. The Somali Government, therefore, must press for self-determination for the inhabitants of the Somali areas adjacent to the Somali Republic. Self-determination is a cornerstone of the United Nation Charter, to which we all subscribe. If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to express their will freely, the Government of the Republic pledges itself to accept the verdict." He was lucky, for he faced Aaden Cadde, Eebba janadiis haka waraabiyee, a very diplomatic man and well-aware of where he was at -- for OAU being located in Adisababa -- and not one of hard-core Soomaaliweyn nationalists. The Xabashi man was even on the verge of denying the very existence of Soomaalis, almost trying to wipe out their historically chronicled contribution in the Horn. Bold and bullshuud lies. Ma Axmed Gurey Xabashi ayuu ahaa? Soomaali nation kulahaa. He and his current Xabashi ilk probably did not know the definition of a 'nation.' I know, I know, in uu qof walba la socdo, and some worse had been said by Xeyle Salaase himself, laakiin just another reminder to those still Xabashi u adeego, their few qabyaalad-obsessed stooges and puppets who shamed and tainted the Soomaali name for generations to come.

Following is a statement on the recently opened Soomaali conference in Asmara. The opening remarks, read by Amiin Max'ed Saciid, painfully states Eritareeya's position on the current events in the Geeska Afrika. Ladies and Gentlemen, Participants and invited guests to the Somali Congress for Liberation and Reconciliation, Allow me to welcome you and congratulate you on organizing this Congress. I feel proud to present at this crucial and historic moment friendly greetings to the Somali people in Somalia and all over the world, on behalf of the people, the Front, and the Government of Eritrea. Honorable participants, The historic relation between the peoples of Somalia and Eritrea has its beginning at the start of the spread of colonialism in the Horn of Africa in the 19th century. There won’t be any need for further analysis as this relationship is recorded in history. During the first half of the 20th century, especially after the Second World War, the people of Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, instead of gaining their independence and establishing harmony and cooperation based on their own decision, they were pushed into crises and conflicts as a result of the then superpowers. Although the Ethiopian people were able to win independence after a brief period of colonialism, the regime that came to power with the aid of the superpowers, instead of respecting the rights and the unity of Ethiopians and playing a constructive regional role, it supported foreign interest and remained a source of crisis and conflicts in the Horn region. While the Somali people in the North and South were able to gain independence in 1960 and establish a sovereign state, the Eritrean people, by the choice of the then superpowers, were denied their independence and tied up to an agent of colonialism and were therefore compelled to pursue a political and military struggle for independence. The Somali people, due to their historic relations with the Eritrean people, stood along the Eritrean struggle against the unjust decision. Subsequent Somali governments since independence in 1960, representing the choice and wishes of the Somali people, gave unparalleled support to the Eritrean cause in spite of all the inconsistent regional and international situations. During the Eritrean war for liberation, the Somali people gave unmatched political material and military aid to the people of Eritrea, and this is an unforgettable historical fact. The people and government of Somalia gave their support not only to the struggle of the people of Eritrea, but also to the struggle of the people’s of Ethiopia, including the present ruling clique—Woyane. Although historians may look at this from different angles, there is however, an undeniable and incontestable historical truth: the common and indivisible wishes of the peoples of Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia for independence, mutual respect, and friendship. This historical truth, although foreign interests try to undermine it through different interventions, is nevertheless unalterable. The friendship of the people and the Government of Eritrea and the people of Somalia is therefore based on this historical background, unchangeable with time, and aims for mutual interest and regional stability. Ladies and Gentlemen, By some historical coincidence, without going into detail, Eritrea became a sovereign state in 1991; the people of Ethiopia were liberated form a succession of oppressive regimes in 1991; the government of Somalia collapsed in 1990 and the end of the Cold War also occurred during the same period. Undeniable, all these historical coincidences provided new historical opportunities, individually or collectively, to Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. But unfortunately, the developments during the last sixteen years did not meet the expectations of the peoples. When the people of Somalia tried to rectify the damage caused by foreign interference and administrative weakness, it was frustrated by warlords and complicated by continued foreign intervention. The people of Somalia, during the last seventeen years, ended in a quagmire; and the destruction of the country and the decimation of the Somali people is truly a sad and horrifying situation. In Ethiopia, the Woyane (TPLF), who claimed to struggle for the liberation of the people of Ethiopia and regional harmony, having distanced itself from its original promise, is using Ethiopia for the benefit of its own narrow interests. Having marginalized the broad masses of Ethiopia and creating conflict among them, it has now found itself in a self-made quagmire. Thinking that it would extricate itself from its own self-made quagmire, the TPLF has chosen to look for external sacrificial lambs and ties with foreign powers to serve as their agent. Woyane tried to correct an error with another error. But what is both sad and astonishing, is that it chose the people of Eritrea as it sacrificial lamb. It provoked the border conflict followed by death and destruction which was followed by the use of the Somali people as another sacrificial lamb. Here also is a case of history repeating itself. Having identified those who can serve its strategic interests and having chosen the TPLF as the first of its assets, the USA, at the cost of the peace and tranquility of the people of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, regards the TPLF as its primary tool and the principle actor in the conflict in this region. And this is a dangerous development and a cause for concern. Ladies and Gentlemen, The people of Somalia, after 16 years of conflict, having freed itself from the era of the warlords and foreign intervention and having chosen to follow the path of peace and stability, in 2006, relative peace prevailed around the Mogadishu area. And this fact was confirmed by the world and our regions as well as by the UN. The role of the Union of Islamic Courts, the UIC, during the time of relative peace cannot be underestimated. But the development did not occur by the magic wand of the UIC only, but because it was the choice and wish of the Somali people as well. The tendency towards stabilization was clearly the beginning and not the end. It was an event that had the support of all those who have the good will of the Somalia. What is unfortunate is that, as I have already stated, the development was not to the satisfaction of the ‘agenda’ of the ‘Strategic Interests of the USA.’ And because the TPLF, due to reasons already mentioned, wanted to exploit the situation, both the US and the TPLF decided to take steps which would frustrate the promising developments. A naked invasion was, therefore, launched. The invasion was not only against the decision of the Security Council, but it was also against the wish of the Somali people and was in violation of the rule of law and has raised the situation of our region to a dangerous level. Ladies and Gentlemen, How can this invasion, which is conducted against the rule of law, be neutralized? During the last few years what has become the fashion and is being discussed widely is the war against terror. During the past 16 years, it is an uncontestable fact that many forces have tried to exploit the situation created in Somalia. It is also not surprising to find, in the current global situation, a few highly fundamentalist tendencies. Classifying the entire people of Somalia and the struggle of the Somali people as ‘terrorists’ and identifying the stability and consciousness of the Somali people that started to take shape in 2006 as a result of terrorism is a baseless argument and fabrication. In order to free itself from past tensions there would be no reason for the people of Somalia to seek ‘terrorism’ as the appropriate method. It is also not possible for the people of this region, who seek peace and stability, to choose ‘terrorism’ as a means towards this end. But because those who protested were ignored, and the concern for ‘terrorism’ was widely publicized, an invasion took place: the progress of the Somali people towards peace and stability was interrupted; more than a million people were displaced; killing and plundering and robbing because everyday occurrences and the Somali people became victims of political domination and suffering. That the Somali people, in its entirety, was compelled to resist the invasion and choose to continue to fight for justice and stability6 is a natural reaction which shouldn’t surprise anyone. Ladies and Gentlemen, For the people and Government of Eritrea, as I have already briefly stated, to stand by the side of the Somali people and its struggle is both a historic and moral obligation. This should not surprise any party. To regard the stand of the people and the Government of Eritrea as something based on narrow and temporary tactical interests or as a reaction against TPLF is a shameful attitude which is calculated to confuse and pervert the truth. What is worse is the defamation that is being attempted to present the friendship between the people of Eritrea and the people of Somalia as providing support to terrorism. The main purpose of this defamation is to cover the failure and crimes of the TPLF and the Americans. Defaming any party that supports the Somali people and opposes foreign intervention and supports those who struggle for peace and justice is labeling these forces as ‘terrorists’ has become a common practice of our time. This is also intended to frighten the Somali people, to isolate them and thus crush them, as everybody can easily see. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is not only the people of Eritrea, who support the just struggle of the Somali people, but also the people of Ethiopia and the people of our region as do all justice loving people of the entire world. The struggle of the people of Somalia is part and parcel of the struggle of the entire people of our region for peace, justice, freedom, and tranquility. The friendship and cooperation among the peoples of our region is not only for today and tomorrow but something which would go on for generations and for which we shoulder the obligation and the responsibility. And in spite of all the interventions and obstacles, it is a historical necessity that justice and the wish of the people will finally triumph. Your congress marks an important chapter in the process leading to independence and the reconstitution of Somalia. I wish this Congress success in attaining its objectives and n the name of the people of Eritrea, I again express my best wishes. Long live the friendship of the people of Somalia and Eritrea. Victory to the people of Somalia Victory to the Masses

There were always rumours in uu Daahir Aweys joogo Asmara, laakiin mar walba qaala wa qiila, kutiri kuteen ahayd. Korneel Aweys Daahir. Nin duur ku jiray umaba ega, xaajiga. Anyway, the picture is from shirkii maanta ka furmay Asmara, from bidix to midig: Korneel Aweys, Jaamac Cali Jaamac, Shariif Xasan Sh. Aaden, an unidentified elder, Shariif Sheekh Axmed, Xuseen Max'ed Faarax Caydiid. Even Xuseen Caydiid koofi barawaani isku taagay.

Several killed in Somali clashes MOGADISHU ( Reuters ) - Fighting between Somali government forces and insurgents killed several people in Mogadishu on Wednesday, police and residents said, in some of the worst clashes since a peace conference ended. Residents woke to the rattle of machinegun fire as gunmen battled police and soldiers in the rubble-strewn streets of the coastal capital. "We killed eight insurgents in the operation and three policemen were also wounded," said police spokesman Abdi Wahid Mohamed. Many residents were trapped in their houses by the early morning clashes. "I saw three dead men and six wounded people (in the street) but I could not go out of the house," Farah Aden Omar told Reuters by telephone. The Madina Hospital received 29 wounded people, of whom one died, said a medical source who asked not to be named. An African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission meant to bolster the interim government lacks resources and is badly understaffed with only 1,600 of the promised 8,000 troops on the ground. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer said Congress had approved $40 million (19.8 million pounds) to help fund the AU mission but conceded that a lack of training and nearly daily attacks in Somalia were deterring countries from sending troops. "Countries are hesitant to deploy because of the violence," Frazer told a news conference in Uganda, which has sent peacekeepers. "(It) makes countries rightly think twice about sending their forces there, but we are prepared to support anyone who's prepared to deploy," she added. Frazer welcomed the conclusion of a six-week national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, which critics say produced nothing but optimistic resolutions. "It was part of a process. The success of Somalia will be a process that includes further dialogue," she added. In Nairobi, Somalia's ambassador to Kenya said President Abdullahi Yusuf had given an assurance the government would fulfil the pledges made at the conference -- such as solving the crisis, disarmament and sharing of power and wealth. Opposition figures, including some Islamist leaders, plan to hold a rival conference in Eritrea starting on Thursday, to try to unite Somalia's anti-government forces. Somali Ambassador to Kenya Mohamed Abdi Nur criticised the move as redundant and unhelpful. " We believe anything organised outside the country will come to nothing ," he told a news conference. Somalia has had no stable leadership since the 1991 ouster of military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, and has had 14 attempts at restoring central rule. Maba ogeyn inay Nayroobi Soomaaliya ku taalay. Dowlad ku sheega uu sheeganaayo in uu matalo intee lagu soo dhisay? Iskushuban? Goofgaduud? Outside Soomaaliya kulahaa.

Media watchdogs warn of Somali journalists' safety NAIROBI ( Reuters - 5 Sep 2007) - Two international media watchdogs said on Wednesday Somali reporters were in danger after unidentified gunmen threatened the life of an official in the country's journalists union. The International Federation of Journalists said a leader of the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), Ali Moallim Isak, received threatening telephone calls and two armed men went in search of him at the group's offices on Tuesday. " Ali and his colleagues are now targeted because their work disturbs some people who claim they are fighting for democracy but ignore the fact that press freedom is one of the bases of democracy ," said Gabriel Baglo, a director at the federation. Another press freedom organisation, Reporters Without Borders, issued a statement condemning the murder of seven journalists in the anarchic country this year. "Mogadishu's chronic violent crime makes journalists an easy target," the Paris-based body said. "The government should adopt urgent protective measures to show that it wants to retain what is currently one of the country's best assets." Reporters Without Borders said at least 13 journalists had fled Mogadishu, with 10 stuck at a border crossing into Kenya because of restricted entry visas into the more stable neighbouring country. Last month, three journalists were killed in Somalia. These included two from the prominent HornAfrik media house. One was shot dead while going to work, the other was killed in a remote-controlled blast returning from the funeral. The Horn of Africa country has known little peace in the last 16 years, since the fall of a military dictator, and is facing an insurgency led by Islamist fighters opposing the interim government and its Ethiopian military allies. Both sides blame each other for the journalists' deaths. Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, who has survived half a dozen assassination attempts, said last month he was deeply concerned about rising violence against the media. "We want journalists to be able to do their work freely, and we are doing all we can to help them do that," he said.

Aan kasii wado meeshii. (Argument) Cilaaq [Carabi?] Muran Akeekan Hagag Dabeebo Jactad [Carabi?] Jikaar Jaari Jiriiban (Ability) Karaan Tahlid [Carabi?] Tarid Karti Karasho Maaro (Accusation/accuse) Mudac Heydaaro Hanaayo Garan Eedee Muusoow Hiif (Age) Cimri [waala soo deensaday] Facaad Dhalin Fil Fac (Agreement) Cahdi [Carabi?] Oggolaan Heshiis Israac Halayeelo Heemasho (Air) Leer Neecaabi Hawo [Carabi] (Comedian) Taltaliini [Talyaani] Shactiroole Jile Majaajile (Anger) Geyr Cartan Caro Gedaad Juuqjuuq Gidaad Gadood Dhirif (Notice) Awaaji [Carabi?] Naadi Iclaan Ogeysiin (Anxiety) Sakati Murugo Kurbo Welwel (Appearance) Bidhaan Muuqaal Hannaan (Ask) Wareyso Weydii Tooyo ------------ Kuwa kale oo badan inta ayaa laga heli karaa.

Gunther IV at a board meeting, supposedly discussing his "investments, trusts" and "portfolios." Gunther at an exclusive resort, with the hired "young, sexually active, euphoric" workers. ------------- The absurdities bini'aadenka qaarkood ku dhacaan -- well, then again, mar horaa ka quursaday if anything that will ever surprise me again.

Gunther the Dog Gunther IV, a totally atypical German Shepherd well known as the "millionaire Dog", has been a controversial media event since 1993. He is the beneficiary of a multi-million dollar trust which owns, among other assets, Madonna's ex-Miami mansion. Gunther IV was chosen and appointed as the beneficiary of the trust because he was the best and most efficient example among a new type of "Joyful Dogs" a group of German Shepherds prepared and trained for specific purposes. In collaboration with expert breeders and trainers of German Sheperds, a scientific method was formulated in order to select a group of dogs not inclined towards obedience or aggressiveness. Rather, the selection sought dogs which were spontaneously looking for joy and amusement and an increased tendency for sexual activity. Gunther IV has become a symbol of those dogs and is jokingly referred to as the "Material Dog." He certainly is not the classic police dog or guardian in that he does not exhibit the classic symbols of defense, aggressiveness, protectionism or order. Rin Tin Tin, Lassie and Rex's style are all very far from Gunther's. In fact, Gunther does not have owners. He has trustees. Thus, Gunther and the other dogs of the group's whole life and training are oriented towards the achievement of joy, pleasure, amusement and improvement of their sexual activity. Recall that Gunther and the other dogs were originally chosen because of their spontaneous inclination towards these types of behavior. Another element which the experts believe is necessary in order to raise the quality of a dog's life is for the dog to live without a specific "owner." Rather, the animal should live together with young euphoric people. These youngsters should be as dynamic, joyful and clever as possible. The experts contend that the company of young, joyful and sexually very active people operates to increase the drive, mood, alertness and other cerebral processes of the dog which in turn generates its happiness and, ultimately, better psychological health [ ]. Additionally, the company of these youngsters "pleases" the dog and brings him to fulfillment. From Gunther's own, dedicated site.

Baliis note the report was published on two weeks ago, long before the so-called "national reconciliation conference" hastily concluded in failure; thus the report is giving some positive aspects of that soon to fail conference.

Faint Signs of Political Evolution Appear in Somalia's Devolutionary Cycle F rom mid-July through mid-August, the political picture in Somalia became mixed, as insurgent violence spiked in the country's official capital Mogadishu at the same time that a National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) was held without interruption in the city. The image of the conference as an island in a sea of strife captures the current dynamics of Somalia's politics, in which the devolutionary cycle into primary solidarities deepens, yet hints of evolutionary processes emerge. Since the ouster of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) in December, which had gained control of much of Somalia south of the sub-state of Puntland in 2006, by an Ethiopian military intervention backing the country's weak and internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), and supported by the United States, PINR has consistently argued that Somalia is reverting to a condition of political fragmentation and conflict. Now, for the first time, counter-tendencies have appeared, although they do not necessarily indicate evolutionary momentum. PINR's analysis of Somalia's politics is based on the polar variables evolution-devolution, consolidation-fragmentation, convergence-divergence, and integration-disintegration, all of which define -- with slightly different shades of meaning -- movement of a political community toward regularized processes of conflict resolution and movement toward self-help by sub-units of the community in conflict situations, respectively. Unlike most conflict-analysis organizations, PINR does not advocate peaceful conflict resolution; it simply describes the interplay of tendencies. During the past 15 months, PINR emphasized evolution during the rise of the I.C.C. and devolution since its fall, depending on its assessments of events on the ground and in the conference chambers. The justification of a sustained conflict-monitoring project is the value of grasping change in the making, which provides resources for predictive intelligence. Devolution Deepens As Congo's ambassador to the United Nations, Pascal Gayama, said on August 14 -- in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the U.N. Security Council to intervene more robustly in Somalia -- the country "is one of the most difficult among all the conflict situations pervading the world." During July and August, the level of violence rose in Mogadishu as insurgents spearheaded by the radical jihadist Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) attempted to disrupt the N.R.C. and undermine its credibility, and the Ethiopian occupiers and T.F.G. forces mounted crackdowns in order to protect the N.R.C. and provide it with at least a semblance of credibility. The result was that the Y.M.M. and its hardcore ******-clan and nationalist allies were unable to torpedo the conference, and the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces were unable to pacify the city. After the opening of the N.R.C. on July 15 was disrupted by eight rounds of mortar fire, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces began intensive weapons searches, going house to house and through markets, arresting suspected insurgents, closing commercial roads and reportedly engaging in looting, beatings and shootings. The insurgents responded by launching grenade and mortar attacks on occupation and government patrols and bases, engaging in shoot outs and roadside bombings, and carrying out targeted assassinations of government officials. A cycle of violence ensued in which an insurgent attack would be met by indiscriminate return fire, searches and lockdowns, followed by new attacks spreading throughout the city. The majority of killed and wounded in the violence were civilians caught in the crossfire or in the attacks. Residents began to flee Mogadishu, hospitals were over-strained, and aid deliveries were impeded, leading to a humanitarian crisis that continues. PINR logs violent incidents day by day from multiple sources, checking them against one another and sorting them out. On an average day, at least five incidents are recorded; there has not been a day without violence and on some days there have been more than ten incidents. A sense of the conditions on the ground can be gained by listing the incidents recorded for a single day. August 9 was one of the more violent days and is chosen because it includes a representative sample of the kinds of incidents characteristic of the conflict in Mogadishu. The major incident on August 9 was a two-hour gun battle in the northern Huriwa district sparked by an attack on a government battlewagon and leading to face-to-face combat. Men and young boys reportedly fled the neighborhood to escape arrest. No casualty figures were available. In other incidents, one person died and three were injured when Ethiopian forces opened fire on civilians after they were attacked near the SOS Hospital. Three people died when Ethiopian troops fired on people in the Suuq Holaha livestock market in an attempt to disperse them during a search operation. A government battlewagon was attacked in the Suuq Holaha neighborhood and two grocers were killed in the return fire. An officer with the T.F.G. security forces was assassinated in a home invasion. A former official in the Darkinley district was gunned down after he left a mosque. Two people -- one of them an employee of a currency exchange -- were gunned own in the Yaqshid neighborhood with no apparent motive. The events of August 9 illustrate the conditions on the ground in Mogadishu by spotlighting the unremitting insecurity brought on by the cycle of attack, counter-attack and preemptive operations. Abstracting from the severe human costs, which have been documented by several U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations, the inability of the occupation and the government to quash the insurgency, despite proactive measures, marks a defeat on the security front. PINR's monitoring of Y.M.M. statements indicates that the jihadist element of the opposition is becoming ever more radical and uncompromising and is taking credit for more incidents. Meanwhile, the measures of Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces increasingly alienate the residents of Mogadishu, making the ability to protect the N.R.C. come at a steep price. PINR sees no early end to the insurgency in Mogadishu because the Ethiopian-T.F.G. crackdown cannot be sustained indefinitely and is not succeeding in any case. Signs of a deepening devolutionary cycle also were evident in Somalia's regions, which are covered almost exclusively by local media and escape international attention. In the strategically important central Hiraan region, which borders Ethiopia, there have been persistent problems with roadblocks set up by militias to extort money from travelers, leading to efforts by Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces to eliminate them. On July 21, a major operation took down ten roadblocks, but has not stopped the practice. In order to tighten control over Hiraan and to build a machine co-opting former warlords, the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, appointed Yusuf Dabaged -- an ally of Mogadishu's mayor, Mohamed Dheere -- as governor of the region, sparking opposition from the incumbent governor, Hussein Ahmed Moalim and sectors of the population allied with him. On July 30, a truck transporting water to an Ethiopian base on the outskirts of Hiraan's capital Beledweyne was attacked by grenades. The Ethiopians responded with intensive searches for suspects and weapons, and then shelled parts of Beledweyne, killing three people. Local media also reported an attack on an Ethiopian convoy and on the Ethiopian base. On August 4, Dabaged was in the Jalalaksi district of Hiraan meeting with district officials and militias loyal to him in order to mobilize support against Moalim who asserted his claim to be the "legitimate" governor. Local media reported that factions in Beledweyne were preparing for a showdown as 1,000 Ethiopian troops waited in the wings. Meanwhile, five people were killed in inter-clan fighting in the Mahas district. On August 6, Dabaged was back in Beledweyne announcing that members of the I.C.C. would not be harmed if they "lived peacefully." On August 7, Dabaged took a tougher line, threatening to arrest families and relatives of criminals and insurgents if the latter evaded arrest, and defended the Ethiopian shelling as a necessary response to attacks. In the past two weeks, the situation in Hiraan has remained tense, but there have been no reports of clashes between Dabaged's and Moalim's supporters. In the deep-southern Lower Jubba region, dominated by the key port city of Kismayo, the administration of the city remained under the control of militias of the ******* sub-clan of the ***** clan family, which had ousted the region's governor from the ********* sub-clan of the *****, who had been appointed by President Yusuf, also a *********, as part of his machine-building project. Through late July and into August, inter-clan fighting occurred in different towns of the Middle and Lower Jubba regions. On August 14, the former ******* warlord of the Jubba regions and ex-T.F.G. defense minister, Barre Hirale Shire, was reportedly in Addis Ababa, attempting to convince Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, not to permit the T.F.G. to launch an armed operation against Kismayo. Hirale's aim is to establish an autonomous "Jubbaland region" that would recreate his Jubba Valley Alliance, which ruled the Jubba regions before the rise of the I.C.C. The situation in the Jubba regions was further complicated on August 17 by the visit of Abdulqadir Haji Mohamud Dhaqane -- one of the dissident members of the T.F.G.'s parliament who are based in Eritrea -- to the capital of Middle Jubba, Buale, where he conferred with local leaders on the transfer of their allegiance from the T.F.G to its exiled political opposition. Dhaqane vowed that the political opposition would take control of the Jubba regions. Apparent sectarian violence flared up in the central Mudug region on August 14, when two people were killed and seven were wounded in an attack on a religious center run by the moderate Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a movement in the region's capital Galkayo. Local officials blamed the incident on the fundamentalist al-Ittihad al-Islami movement, a predecessor of the I.C.C. Inter-clan fighting was reported over the past month in the Mudug, Galgadud and Bay regions. Extortionate roadblocks were reported on major roads throughout Somalia. The return of warlords to prominence in Hiraan and the Jubba regions, widespread inter-clan violence and criminal activity throughout the country, the appearance of sectarian violence, and instability where warlords are attempting to assert control, either under the T.F.G.'s aegis or against the government, point to the deepening of the devolutionary cycle in much of Somalia outside Mogadishu. Coupled with the unabated insurgency in Mogadishu, conditions in the regions indicate that the T.F.G. remains weak and dependent on Ethiopian support, and has not made headway toward effective governance. Signs of Political Evolution After opening on July 15 and then being abruptly adjourned after insurgent mortar fire targeted its venue, the N.R.C. resumed on July 19 and conducted regular sessions into the second week of August when it adjourned for a week after discussions on resource policy broke down into acrimonious disputes and elements of the ****** clan family participating in the conference began talks with ****** rejectionists in order to find "common ground." The fact that the clan-based conference is taking place at all and has not been disrupted by violence shows the limits of the insurgency and indicates that substantial sectors of Somali society have at least acquiesced in the reconciliation process and are willing to try to see if it can work. Although the political opposition to the T.F.G. has boycotted the N.R.C. and has its own clan support, the N.R.C. is not entirely composed of President Yusuf's allies. There has been genuine debate and the conference has not served as a rubber stamp for the T.F.G. executive. It is on the basis of the appearance of serious political debate -- not any concrete steps toward reconciliation -- that PINR counts the N.R.C. on the side of evolution. That opposing actors are willing to air their interests and encounter one another in discussion constitutes the germ of the genuinely political process that the N.R.C.'s international backers -- the U.S., European Union and U.N. donors to the T.F.G. -- wanted to engender and hoped for when they pressured Yusuf to hold the conference. Having noted that the N.R.C. is being taken seriously by its participants, it is necessary to add that it has not produced impressive results and has been confused and confusing. Staged by Yusuf as an attempt to reconcile clans and not to address questions of political organization, the N.R.C. has shifted -- under pressure from donor powers -- to embrace a political agenda, rendering its future uncertain. Originally scheduled to spend its projected 45 days on inter-clan issues, such as disarmament of clan and sub-clan militias, and compensation for property stolen in previous clan conflicts, the chair of the N.R.C.'s organizing committee, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, announced on August 1 that the conference had concluded that work and would now move on to political issues. Mahdi's announcement was met with surprise by local analysts and observers, and ****** conference participants, because none of the issues among clans had been practically resolved. Instead, the N.R.C. came to broad agreements on principles: a cease-fire was declared without enforcement mechanisms, an intent to disarm clan militias was proclaimed -- again without enforcement mechanisms, and promises were made to restore looted property to its original owners. Implementation of property compensation is to be vested in a committee that would hear and adjudicate claims. In sum, nothing concrete came out of the "first phase" of the N.R.C., and inter-clan conflict has continued since Mahdi's declaration of "Cease-Fire Day." On August 9, the spokesperson for ****** participants in the N.R.C., Abdullahi Sheikh Hassan, disputed Mahdi's claim that the conference had successfully addressed inter-clan issues, noting that non-participating ****** elders had not signed on, and calling for an extension of the first phase, triggering the conference's adjournment for a week. Even before the ****** withdrawal, the N.R.C. was bogging down on the political issues. The first of those to be considered was the definition of religious extremism, which touched off debates between delegates in favor of isolating radical Islamists and those who did not want to endorse a politically-defined interpretation of what forms of Islam are legitimate. The delegates decided to defer the issue by setting up a committee of clerics to discuss it. The next issue -- resource policy -- was even more contentious, and discussion of it was compromised by the T.F.G. executive's effort to enact a hydrocarbons law that would preempt any decisions of the N.R.C. Garowe Online reported on August 9 that debate over a proposed Somali Petroleum Corporation (S.P.C.) became so heated that "the N.R.C. hall burst into dispute," leading to the suspension of deliberations. As the N.R.C. entered its "second phase," donor powers pressured Mahdi to reach out to the political opposition, based in Eritrea and composed of the political wing of the I.C.C. led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the dissident "Free Parliament" led by former speaker of the T.F.G. parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, nationalists, and some ex-warlords. On July 29, Mahdi invited the political opposition to meet with him anywhere except Asmara, and the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, said that the N.R.C. was "still open" to the T.F.G.'s opponents. On August 5, Mahdi stated that he had been contacted by the opposition, which proposed a meeting in Djibouti. The opposition quickly denied Mahdi's statement and repeated its objections to the N.R.C. Sharif called Mahdi's offer a "ploy" to gain donor support, and Hassan said that although he welcomed dialogue, it would have to focus on removing Ethiopian occupiers from Somalia. Both leaders remained firm in their plans to convene an alternative national conference on September 1 in Asmara. On balance, the N.R.C. has thus far been a practical failure, having achieved neither concrete agreements nor inclusiveness. Skeptics argue that the delegates have remained at the meetings because they are being compensated financially for their attendance, a point that is not discounted by PINR. Yet, it is worth repeating that elements of a political process have been present in the N.R.C., tenuous though they may be. Another faint sign of political evolution in Somalia has been the assertion of factions in the T.F.G.'s parliament attempting to check the powers of the T.F.G.'s executive, which is unprecedented since the ouster of the Asmara group of parliamentarians and has gone unreported in international media. As in the case of the N.R.C., PINR counts the emergence of political opposition within the T.F.G. as evolutionary because it represents an institutional assertion of divergent interests -- a political process. On July 23, parliament began debating a motion to hold the executive accountable by requiring timely reports on its activities. Discussion of the motion, which had been signed by 100 of parliament's 225 members, became acrimonious and, on July 30, a parliamentary session was adjourned when no compromise on the motion could be reached. Meanwhile, Gedi met with parliamentary speaker, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nuur -- an ally of the T.F.G. executive -- on how to deal with the revolt. On August 1, debate resumed with Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jeele saying that "the time is not right" for accountability and adding that he "rather expected compliments from the transitional parliament." Dissident parliamentarians responded by calling for a vote of confidence on Gedi and urging Yusuf to come to parliament to attempt to resolve the issue. On August 5, Gedi addressed parliament and said that his "government is ready to be taken into accountability," although it had been doing a "great job." Madobe announced the formation of a nine-member committee to study the accountability motion. Since then, parliament has been gearing up to debate a controversial media law and the proposed hydrocarbons law, including the terms of exploration agreements with foreign energy companies, which have begun trying to make deals with the T.F.G., generating confusion and opposition. Although Somalia's oil reserves are unproven, small energy companies, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (C.N. .C.) and reported proxies for energy multinationals are interested in assessing the country's potential. At present the situation is clouded, with reported splits between Gedi and Yusuf; tensions with Puntland, where previous agreements have been signed; and mounting political resistance based on suspicious that Yusuf and Gedi are planning power and money grabs. PINR will explore Somalia's oil policy when the political configuration becomes clear; the looming debate on the hydrocarbons law will be a test of parliament's independence. It is too early to tell whether the transitional parliament will function effectively as an independent institution that can check the executive and represent broad sectors of Somali society. Parliament's track record in the past has been poor, but its use as a tool of political opposition indicates incipient political processes. The most marked evolutionary development in Somalia came on August 1, when a locally chosen governor was installed in the west-central Bakool region, with the blessing of the T.F.G. According to the new governor, Mohamed Abdi Mohed, the electoral process, which was aided by the Center for Research and Dialogue (an N.G.O.), the Italian government and the United Nations Development Program, was based on "interest and principle" rather than clan divisions. In contrast to other regions in Somalia, Bakool appears to have institutionalized a political process from the bottom up and the T.F.G. has had to acquiesce in it. Given the more unstable conditions in the other regions of Somalia, where governors have been imposed by the T.F.G. -- as in Hiraan -- or local warlords are bidding for control in the name of clan or sub-clan loyalty, the probability is low that the Bakool model will be replicated elsewhere in the short run. Nonetheless, if a political process becomes rooted in Bakool, its example would be influential in the long term. Conclusion On balance, the devolutionary cycle in Somalia has deepened from mid-July through mid-August, with an unabated insurgency in Mogadishu led by increasingly militant jihadists, an external domestic opposition adamant in its refusal to participate in the N.R.C., persistent inter-clan conflict in the regions, the appearance of sectarian violence, and resistance to the T.F.G.'s authority in key regions. With the exception of the Bakool region, where opposition has begun to be regularized in a political process, signs of political evolution reside in the emergence of institutionalized opposition in the N.R.C. and the transitional parliament. The latter developments are not yet sufficiently rooted to alter PINR's consistent forecast that devolution is likely to persist, yet they indicate alternative possibilities for Somalia if they gain momentum and become strong enough to provide a check on the T.F.G. executive. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein [August 20, 2007]

Ciyaal xaafadda, from every age group, naaneysyadooda soo xasuustay, aad u badnaa. Intaa ka xasuusto: Juuni, Malmali, Codey [oo walaalo ahaa] Wardheere, Dhuub, Xuseen Afeey, Shooble [oo iyagana walaala kala ahaa] Dumeeniko, Cumar Galey, Amad Jiiji, Cali Aash [kuwa kale walaalo ahaa] Mahad Qooreey Mahad Huunyo C/casiis Madaxeey Ismaaciil Dooro Abaloota Qaloowqaloow Jameyka Yuusuf Shiine Yuusuf Dhilqaaye Yuusuf Qaliiroow Khaalid Qal-daan Liibaan Baac Axmedeey Aalkole Ibraahim Goobe Uunlaaye Maatamaata Caloow Kunciil Uuseey Awkuuku Niinoow Wariiri Buunshe Jeeri Taamoow Qaraaye Bowlac Cuti Caliingoow Ar inta ku jirto oo geeriyooday Eebba ha u naxariisto. That was a wonderful xaafad.