Imagine 5 federal states in Somalia Puntland Galmudug jubaland bay and bakool state hiiraan and shabelle state how will this practically work in the country in the long term what if the central government and a particular federal state have a dispute over sharing and distributing the resources of the country or region what if there is an internal dispute in of the federal states a subclan dispute remember the police from each and every federal state all belong to one Qabil.5 federal states will make a small nation like Somalia very weak some states will even withdraw from the federal structure of the state government and be an autonomous state and have one on one relations with Somalia's neighbors kenya and Ethiopia is that what you want for Somalia a weak divided Somalia along clan lines and fictional clan borders.You need to cure Somalia not poison it with more clanish unnecessary division.Somalia u need to look further than today 2012 think about the future think about you're grand children in what for Somalia will they live in, what we decide today is Somalia's future inshallah. Somalidu waxay ku mah mahan talo rag kama dhamaato eeh hala is dabo qabto intay goori goor tahay.

^^ Somaliana goormey edo clinton yeelatay edo clinton waxad ku tidhahda ninkaga ka ilaasho habar kale timo madow , intanay Somalia isku mashquulin the problem is with Somalia they take the IC and their words as a holy scripture. Suaashu waxa weye federalism Somalia ma u dan ba?

Eng.Cadde;796901 wrote: It is the responsibility of the Local clans to come together and make thier maamul while the Gov tries to help them achieve that. Saaxib federalism was declared in 2003 and almost 10 years later clan federalism is still not implemented the people of Somalia have no interest in clan federalism its destined to fail. For instance you cannot deny one clan state and embrace the other this will only create more conflicts.

Somalia;796890 wrote: There will be unity as Somalis and sharing of natural resources. Each clan will build his federal state and meet in Mogadishu to discuss national issues. The Somalidiid region will be given the choice to secede along its clan lines and if it chooses to do so unity is much more likely. :cool: Eastern sanaag and eastern sool regions are part and parcel of Somaliland its indisputable

Federalism has a long way to go there are only two federal states in Somalia now galmudug and Puntland the rest of Somalia is hardly interested in clan federalism.

General Duke;796862 wrote: Out frustration you contradict yourself. How can you be a multi tribal and cousins at the same time? Or you don's have the slightest what you are talking about. So you support, Siilanyu, the TFG defense Minister and Al Qaeda leader Ahmed Godane in order to show all of us the multi-tribal society that you hail from? Somalilanders are all related remember we are one ethnic group the Ethnic Somalilandish group of people different tribes though.I have never supported any of the various faction groups in Somalia i always called for a dialogue between the TFG and shabaab so that they come to an agreement.And president Ahmed siilaanyo is the president of the afro hashimite republic in the horn Africa.

General duke you seem a bit angry Somaliland is a multi tribal society clan cousins often fight but we have our Traditional elders who played a huge role bringing back all the Communities in Somaliland closer to each other those in Sanaag those in sool those in togdheer and those in awdal and those in hargeysa. And that is what is today the Somaliland republic it cannot compared to banana states and pirate enclaves who have a hard time uniting a subclan, a subclan state which is turning into a sub sub clan state soon we will here federal clan states in the pirate enclave:D

Carafaat;796847 wrote: Since when does he support secession? Come with proof. Taleexi fahan wuxu ku leeyahay profesooorku wa inu tageero mamuulada qabiilka iyo mamuulada reeraha hoose markasay Somalinimadu muuqanaysa:D

^^ The professor never supported Somalilands withdrawal form the failed union

AUN

^^ loool taasina wa baab kale:D

Carafaat do you know where it all went wrong when the Sumaals people like you and me tried to introduce their way of culture into the rest of the said Somalis in particularly those who we call the farmers who go by the name of Biyo-maal. Our Nomadic pastroralist culture i just a section of what our people are and that's where it all went wrong. There are two major tribes who claim that they are from Arabia or have some genealogical links with the Arabian peninsula kuwa kale waxay yidhahan cali zulu baanu la tol nahay.

^^ Waryaa Somaliland dee siyasada Somalia shaqo kuma laha wa dal la jaar ah Somalia wax fahan:D

Mr Carab ciise is working hard

International engagement in Somalia: lessons from Somaliland? By Michael Walls, on 29 February 2012 Alex de Waal, writing in the NY Times on 21st February, argued that instead of focusing on the negative, international policy-makers should recognise the remarkable achievements of many in Somalia, and most particularly those of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. [http://nyti.ms/zP0L4T] His comments were timed for two days before a major international conference on Somalia held in London and hosted by the UK government on 23rd February. But in the run-up to the conference, William Hague repeatedly used the phrase ‘Somalia is the world’s-worst failed state’, suggesting that the focus on the negative is here to stay. This is in spite of conference talk about ‘supporting local initiatives’ and the need for the process to be ‘Somali-led’. Taking a rather more cynical line, respected French academic Gerard Prunier described the conference as ‘Alice in Wonderland Goes Imperialist’, and ridiculed the organisers for calling for Somali-led initiatives while inviting few Somalis to the conference itself. [http://bit.ly/whCEH3] So how do we pick our way through the myriad of viewpoints? While I agree with many of Prunier’s points and even much of his argument, I have to say that I am not as cynical about the process as he is. And while I wholeheartedly support the tenor of much of de Waal’s article, we need to take considerable care if we are to chart a constructive engagement that recognises positive achievement. The conference was welcome in many ways in that it raised many important questions and suggested a new sophistication in some of the discourse amongst the international donor, diplomatic and civil society communities. However, there is no consensus yet on what that sophistication means in policy terms. And what of Somaliland? They have certainly achieved an immense amount. Meaningful elections, the transfer of power from a standing incumbent to his opposition challenger … these are remarkable advances, as is the durability of peace throughout most of the country. Indeed, Somaliland is seen by some as an object lesson in how Somalis will succeed if they are just left alone. But that fails to recognise the fact that Somali society has always been based on links, particularly through trade but also religion and politics, with the outside world and between different Somali clans. That model relies precisely on not being ‘left alone’. But Somaliland also clearly shows us that the nature of engagement is vitally important. Heeding that observation, many people are talking about the need to support locally-based initiatives. But there is great risk there too, because it means having to find a way of picking who to support. Somaliland has achieved a lot, and Puntland has also made some progress, but what about the burgeoning number of smaller entities who are claiming ‘local legitimacy’? Individuals were even handing out business cards at events in London during the week of the conference declaring them to be President of some hitherto unknown Somali state. Which ones are real and worth supporting? As complicated as the situation is, there are some lessons we can learn as outsiders. There seems little doubt that there is a need for local disputes to be resolved before there is a move to form a ‘national’ government, whatever that might look like. That is the process that occurred in Somaliland. It means that there needs to be a great deal of discussion amongst Somalis and led by Somalis about how they will settle the complex web of grievances and counter-grievances that have built up over the past two decades of conflict in the south. International actors can support the process by allowing it to take place, by insisting that resolutions are agreed before the process moves on, and by providing small amounts of material support where there is a demonstrable need. But those interventions need to be proportionate. They must not dominate the process, which needs to succeed or fail on its own terms. In other words, there has to be real reward for local groups who succeed in agreeing a peace deal with their neighbouring antagonists, but they must also bear most of the cost of achieving that deal, and also the cost of failing to do so. That also means that an early focus on elections would be counter productive. For many Somalis, representative democracy in which individuals are elected to make decisions on behalf of a populace is less democratic than the patriarchal but otherwise egalitarian (for men) system of discussion and debate that is employed under Somali custom. So elections are not a process of ‘democratisation’ but rather the opposite: a retreat from the slow and unpredictable process of consensus-building to a less egalitarian but more efficient form of decision-making. Now let’s not get this wrong: it is very likely that representative democracy will eventually be needed in some form in the Somali territories in order to facilitate the establishment of a reasonably legitimate state. That is, after all, the transition that Somaliland has gone so far towards achieving. But in the southern areas of the erstwhile Republic of Somalia, the time is not yet right for that transition. And in the meantime, external actors need to be prepared to go along with an unpredictable and probably fairly slow process of consensus-building. The most remarkable thing about Somaliland is that, whatever the claims to the contrary, it was founded as a genuinely multi-clan polity, and no other multi-clan Somali political entity has been so successful and with such genuinely local involvement. The simmering tensions between the different clans represented within Somaliland’s colonial borders represent a significant challenge, but it is important to remember that those who are currently most dissatisfied with the Somaliland administration were intimately involved in the formation of the state between 1991 and 1997. The fact that Somaliland was founded as a multi-clan political union with broad local support should not be forgotten by anyone. Part of the lesson is that political nationalism is not the same as cultural, linguistic or religious unity. The political nation-state is a construct that requires a great deal of compromise. Somali society is remarkably vibrant and, in many ways, successful. The measure of economic performance that would pass for GDP per capita if reliable data were available almost certainly surpasses that of neighbouring countries. The telecoms, finance and trade sectors thrive. Just about everywhere, not just in Hargeisa or Bosaso. But business unity and cultural, linguistic and religious commonalities have not formed a good base for nationhood elsewhere, so why should they here? The dream of a unitary state based on either one or other sub-clan grouping or, at the other extreme, a Greater Somalia, just don’t make sense. As the various actors who met in London on 23rd February move to develop a new approach to supporting stability in the Somali Horn of Africa, they would do well to build on local initiatives, and to support the successes that are already evident. But that needs to be done with caution and patience. Hurrying the process is likely to worsen security for the UK, US and Somalia’s neighbours and prolong the crisis for locals. But facilitating a process which is Somali-led requires a willingness by international actors to step back and let Somalis agree for themselves: first of all, the terms under which they’ll coexist with other clans and sub-clans; and, secondly, what their state will look like. That will test the patience and commitment of international actors, regardless of how sophisticated their dialogue. But it’s a test that they need to pass just as Somalis themselves must negotiate difficult compromises.

Tarzan rag badan ba ka cadhooday:D

aun inti dhimatay

War ileen tan oo kale dhimasho dhimasho ka fiican ma jirto allah ha naxariisto all the people died those who died in hargeysa or in mogadisho in 1991 or the one killed by the foreign invaders or the one killed in somali galbeed.

Muxu yidhi dr osman we can bribe nations meesha ma wuxu haysta xeradi xawayaanka eeh faroole. This getting funnier and funnier.

Cabdilahi yusuf the warlord was not welcome in Xamar you have a problem with that.

tarzan will be a great leader if he he actually runs and i am sure he will even win.

Saalixyas were not actual suufis the madhab was based sufism but it had more of Salafaism Muhammad Bin salih the founder of the Salihiya tariqa was a devoted salafist before he went into the Salihya order. The dervishes used to refer to themselves as Darawishiya Saalixiya.

The Senousi Mahdist followers arrived in berbera they were Sultaan nuurs guests in the late 19 century (“Ten days elapsed, but no reply to my letter came from Sultan Nur. I heard, however, that two Senousi Akwan were guests in his kraal ; and this was a very significant fact, since it showed that these guests, members of a very influential community, were hatching a scheme to retaliate on and injure the Administration.â€) The Senousi sent emissaries to Berbera, and we afterwards ascertained from documentary evidence found on the body of a dead Mugrubi (a Western Arab) that a number of these rascals had been specially sent to create riots and disorder at Berbera. Their object was to promulgate hatred against all Christians, to preach the doctrine of “Africa for the Africans” and the total exclusion of the white man. Now the Somali is at heart a trader ; yet many of them, in order to show sympathy with the Mahdi and his cause, agreed not to supply camels or sheep, or to allow the recruitment of drivers and coolies for the British Army, then fighting Osman Digna and the Dervishes at Suakin, however, owing to their deep-rooted commercial instincts, they were unable to bring themselves in practice to cut off trade relations with us, or to exclude the British from Somaliland. These views and actions brought about many serious fights in Berbera and inland between the Senousi and the Mahdists, at which I greatly rejoiced, since these differences of opinion and policy rendered my position very much easier. (Page 212 Under The Flag Somali coastal Stories 1887.)

The security officer rageedi kan madow hadal bu haya si fican ba loga galiyey sida jilibka loogu dhuftay ma arkeysey.