Have you even listened to the good Professor here yourself? He contradicted everything single thing you and others have claimed here.

That’s the only real option he has to strengthen the centre against empowered and muscle flexing regions. Wuu isku jabiniya gobolada, with the centre coming out as the neutral arbiter. I don’t think any region will dare to take any more unilateral actions once the Tigray militants is dealt with.

Are you saying that Af Maay version of Somali doesn’t have a written form? Or that it’s not necessary to have the exams in the written Af Maay version?

Maanshallah, kudos to South-West folks. Was the exam taken in Somali or Maay Maay?

This is a very serious issue that should not be taken lightly.

The Railroad is not in the Afar region. Maybe they are trying to create their own corridor?

So next to the Amhara’s, we can now assume now that the Afar will be as committed to go to war. This will be a bloody war between the regions, the Ethiopian National Army just has just to ensure that no particular region gets the overhand and comes as out as victor, its the only way for Ethiopian State to survive in longevity.

I agree with your analysis that the centre has weakened, but this process was already happening even before Abiy came to power with the regions increasingly being emboldened. With the centre instigating the current war, and the next battles being fought between the regions it could easily lead to a reversed weakening of the regions, and with the centre gaining again political space to play a central role in accommodating the regions with the federal process and facilitating a process of pacification and uniting for a common purpose of national identification. War is not always a failure of politics, but sometimes its the continuation of politics.

Its not a purely Tribal war such as in South-Sudan, where the conflict would have no real political consequences irrelevant of which tribe came on top. Ethiopia’s war and its outcome will have severe consequences for the political ideologies of the State. Look at the two possible scenarios of this war; 1) The mighty and powerful Tigray forces are completely beaten, which will mean equally the downfall and demise of the propagated ideology of ethnic politics and ethnic pride. As the TPLF downfall wil work deterrent for other tribes, and they would not dare to walk the same path and stand up against the State and put it’s ethnic pride and power above the state’s power, as it will mean complete destruction by the centre and all other regions together. 2) The TPLF prevails to hold ground against the others tribes and central government, which will be regarded by other tribes that ethnic pride and power does pay off and each tribe will try to fight for its territorial claims, pride and propagate and eject equally their political ideologies and pride in to centre, which will mean further power and leverage for the ethnic regions and states against the centre and against Abiys propagated uniformity, and will fuel for competition for another ethnic group with it’s ethnic political ideology to prevail over the others.

Yes, Ethiopia exploited Somalia’s misfortunes as any other country in the world would when they neighbours and arch enemies, make it too easy to be dominated and exploited. But it’s rather a sign of the lack of a national or Somali identity, which should have been a fundamental aspect in separating the domestic from the foreign politics. When there is to a certain extend a national identity and values, it helps to protect in the dealings with external actors. But without it becomes challenging for political leaders to define its own image and ideology and being able to strategize and reconcile the political internal dimensions of that moment and the external dimension. That is the difference between an Ethiopian civil war and a Somali civil war, for they (Ethiopians) will not give ‘cart blanche’ to every external actor that comes along with any kind of exploitative agenda in to their domestic affairs without certain limits. And hence why Somalia, Egypt, Sudan or even Eritrea will not able to exploit Ethiopia’s current misfortunes limitless irrelevant of the extend or severity of their domestic affairs. Backing back again to the earlier made points on need for a social contract.

Interesting timing to release a thousand POW soldiers. Could this be intended to relieve some of the hightened tribal tensions and involvement through goodwill?

1) Nobody has tried to incorporate the traditional social contract in the modern governance, except for Somaliland during the period of reconciliation in the 90’s. 2) Nobody is saying we should ditch democracy or a government system, but Abdillahi rightly pointed out to the lack of a common understanding and the lack of a social contract or code of how Somali’s should live with each other which is a basic necessity or fundament to make a Nation State work. Just hoping to get a good leader through a casino like ‘election’ process, and then hoping that person could fix everything without taking in to account what works and what doesn’t work, and what might possibly work, is sheer naivety.

The traditional governance system or Xeer system was disrupted by colonialism through the imposition of artificial local, regional and National boundaries, European judicial systems and centralised governance. Add to the transformation from a rural to urban economy, leading to increased urbanisation and emergence of an urban elite, leading to marginalisation of the rural population, and further enforcing collusion between the urbanized political elites and the strategic interests of external actors, who both want a modern, centralised judicial and governance system. Xeer system was quite strong, and it’s still influencing much of communal rural and pastoral life, while in many other African countries there are no traces left of their traditional and pre-colonial systems.

The west had its fair share of conflict and went through nearly 1000 years of conflict and disputes between rulers and fiefdoms in the medieval times often referred to as the ‘Dark Ages’. One of the solutions that has worked for the west in limiting powerful tyranny and introduced the rule of law was the ‘Magna Charta’, which in many ways pointed the way to the emergence of parliamentary government and the ‘trias politica’, on which modern Nation states and governance are modeled after. It worked perfectly for the west, and for many other countries to emulate this model but it hasn’t worked quite well for Somali’s, and the reason is not because we don’t have a code, but on the contrary it hasn’t worked well for us, because we had a very strong cultural code or contract that we simply tried to bury and reinvent ourselves which didn’t work, as our culture is not easily changeable overnight. Lastly, you are definitely right that we haven’t asked ourselves the right questions and for pointing out to the absurdity of current status quo.

Somali’s did have a form of a social contract or ‘code’ that established how people live together in society, and how one behaved towards another and these codes (Xeer) often formed the basis upon which traditional elders (Saladiin) governed and regulated communal life and interaction, based on moral principles as seeking consensus and solutions (Xal), and even selection of those whose wisdom one sought was based on proper representative selection (Xul). When two parties had a dispute third parties not involved in the conflict would often send an diplomatic mission to mediate between warring parties (Ergo), and in the Somali social contract refusing their mediation was considered a deadly sin, ‘Ergo diid wa nabad diid’. Unfortunately the Somali social contract which was practised by Somali’s for thousands of years, became an unintentional victim of the drive to modernize, emulate others and mimic a modern Nation State. None of it has been incooperated in the adopted modern governance framework, we adopted a trias politica that was developed by others and was a good solutions for those who saw it as a solution in their context, their background and for their problems. And we must admit that this modern governance and legal model hasn’t quite worked well for the Somali people, and we need to ask our selves what does work for us, what has worked in the past and how we could make things work in the future. i am not an expert in Somali traditions and culture, and hopefully some who have more knowledge on this subject can further shed light on Somali traditional governance and codes that regulated communal life. Maybe then we can enlighten ourselves further on how some of this could be used in the modern urbanized life and the modern Nation State, I am sure we can still adopt and adapt It to make it fit and workable for the Somali’s.

AUN Police officers should carry in normal and standard environments less harmful weapons like handguns rather then AK47, the average size of AK47 ammo is 3x bigger then standard police used handguns and are far deadlier.

Also, none of the other points mentioned in the article proof or substantiate rigging of (s)elections in anyone’s favor. Or that the agreed mechanism are being controlled or dominated by a specific actor, in fact the process and outcome so far shows sings of increasing multiplicity and pluriformity compared with earlier (s)elections process. Nevertheless, without universal suffrage through one man one vote, citizens will never feel ownership or responsible for the outcome of this indirect process nor will the selected leaders feel direct accountability towards citizens. Matt Brydens critique should have been voiced years earlier when there was still time and opportunity to organise a proper election process.

Its called a ‘war economy’, and it’s far bigger then the Hospitality sector alone, think of the security sector, airlines, banks, telecommunication, energy, etc. They all charge extortive prices profiting from the lawlessness, and insecurity, which prevents Somalia from the transitional to a peace economy.

1 Luulyo tends to have double-edged consequences for the Former Italian-Somalia and British Somaliland. On the hand it was a joyous and and victorious historic moment for the former Italian-Somalia to gain independence from Italy’s colonial rule, which did come with an enormous struggle and cost as Italy was resistent to give Somalia it’s hard earned independence, and one was waiting, hoping and preparing for this moment and the birth of this new independent country, for more then a decade. On the other hand for the former British-Somaliland 1da Luulyo ignites certain antagonistic associations, as it joined with Somalia without much thinking through of pre-conditions and preparation of how the State structures of the new Nation would look like, and neither om how the expectations, the political systems l, the political cultures could merge or be harmonized. Which led to immediately to regret buying in or joining the new State, and leading a majority of the people in the former-Northern Somalia rejecting the constitution in the referendum of 1961. Irrelevant of the feelings or consequences that followed 1da Luulyo, it is historically an turning point for all Somali’s, even for those in the other Somali regions and neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya the new Somali State created certain associations.

The 1976 TPLF Manifesto TPLF’s “Republic of Greater Tigray” – news of abyssinia NEWSOFABYSSINIA.WORDPRESS.COM By: Article by Dereje Tariku. The Tigray People Liberation Front, TPLF had published their organization’s manifesto in February... Be careful what you wish for, according to some theories the Tigray have ambitions to annex the Afar regions in Ethiopia, Eritrea up to Djibouti, and getting access to the sea through Asab, making them effectively the new neighbours of the Somali nation. Ethiopia seems quite complex to understand. At this kind of moments I wish our friend and Ethiopian expert Abtigiis was around to give us an analysis of the context and background.

The sentiment that you are observing here is called nostalgia (which comes from the Greek word for ‘homecoming’), it’s a feeling of romanticizing or yearning fo the ‘good old days’, and it can be a very powerful feeling, specially when people have major disruptions and uncertainties, and anxieties in their lives, the more they tend to nostalgically long for the past that they associate with being happy. What make this most dangerous is when politicians use this sentiment of an idealized past to provoke the social and cultural anxieties and uncertainties that make nostalgia especially attractive for purposes of manipulation or as defense mechanism to shade or cloak from people the current or historical facts, specially when people are at they’re most vulnerable. Studies have shown that events, dates, symbols, places and even music can trigger this feeling with people. Hence why some politicians tend to use and create a big fuzz more about certain events, symbols like flags and statues, places/locations, music, etc. It’s a tool Farmaajo has effectively mastered and utilized to rally very loyal supporters here, cloaking how empty his politics actually is.

I am not sure if we should take the Tigray call independence serieus, but see it rather as leverage in negotiations with the central authority. For the Tigray have enormous economic and financial interest in Addis Abeba and other regions, they loose everything if they succeeded? Second the state would not be viable, as it’s land locked with two of the three neighbors being hostile to this region, and it doesn’t even direct road connections to Sudan! Third, the Political historical narrative of the Tigray and Amharas has always been about ruling Ethiopia and being the dominant party in a multinational country that Ethiopia is. Yes, the Tigray are a resilient and resourceful folk that have survived in the most harshest region with an inhospitable climate, and have faced the most challenging of odds against them, occupation, famine, foreign invasion, etc, but in all of these cases they either had access and influence in Ethiopia with other tribes or in Eritrea with access to the sea and a brotherly clan they shared fates with. But none of this is the case. I am sure they will start to negotiate once the Amhara and Oromo’s political temporary alliance forged by Abiy and co starts to deteriorate.

Khadafi, I concur with your analysis on the sociological affects that were underlying to the loss of social identity, which gave rise or rather space for propagation of extremist ideologies. But as the case with complex issues, the religious suppression is just one factor of a multitude of factors that are underlying for the social polarization and inflation of the social contract. Another factor which might further explain loss of the social contract and people seeking refuge in extremist Ideologies and groups, is the socio-economic inequality and economic marginalization experienced by many groups and smaller or less influential clans. Many smaller clans in Somalia have been severely marginalized after the state collapse. Take for example some of the agricultural communities that belonged to more marginalized clans, whose land were taken by larger clans that were not even traditional settled agriculturalists but with no central authority to prevent them from taking land by force, and sometimes even land grap took place through state power for private use by representatives of the state. Pushing these communities who often have no own militias, nor political and state influence, neither access to a lot remittances flowing in from the diaspora, or access to donors and NGO’s, could potentially find refuge in extremist groups who they perceive to be economically more equitable and economically more inclusive then the formal state. Let us continue to dissect the issue to fully comprehend the full nature of the problem and various factors of influence. I am sure there are a couple more factors giving the issue its complex nature and the challenges and impossibilities of resolving it over the last decades or so. let us think of other probable relevant factors of influence here.

Xaaji, hadafkoodu haduu noqday mid ee cadowad ku abuurteen oo qowmiyadihii Ethiopia maanta ciil u qabaan, iskugu tageen, ganacsi goodi ku bur burtay. Ka waran mexee faideyn?

Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae: Ethiopia's Tigray rebel mastermind WWW.BBC.COM A former army general is leading the war against the Ethiopian government. Interesting piece on the leader of the Tigray forces.