The traditional governance system or Xeer system was disrupted by colonialism through the imposition of artificial local, regional and National boundaries, European judicial systems and centralised governance. Add to the transformation from a rural to urban economy, leading to increased urbanisation and emergence of an urban elite, leading to marginalisation of the rural population, and further enforcing collusion between the urbanized political elites and the strategic interests of external actors, who both want a modern, centralised judicial and governance system. Xeer system was quite strong, and it’s still influencing much of communal rural and pastoral life, while in many other African countries there are no traces left of their traditional and pre-colonial systems.

The west had its fair share of conflict and went through nearly 1000 years of conflict and disputes between rulers and fiefdoms in the medieval times often referred to as the ‘Dark Ages’. One of the solutions that has worked for the west in limiting powerful tyranny and introduced the rule of law was the ‘Magna Charta’, which in many ways pointed the way to the emergence of parliamentary government and the ‘trias politica’, on which modern Nation states and governance are modeled after. It worked perfectly for the west, and for many other countries to emulate this model but it hasn’t worked quite well for Somali’s, and the reason is not because we don’t have a code, but on the contrary it hasn’t worked well for us, because we had a very strong cultural code or contract that we simply tried to bury and reinvent ourselves which didn’t work, as our culture is not easily changeable overnight. Lastly, you are definitely right that we haven’t asked ourselves the right questions and for pointing out to the absurdity of current status quo.

Somali’s did have a form of a social contract or ‘code’ that established how people live together in society, and how one behaved towards another and these codes (Xeer) often formed the basis upon which traditional elders (Saladiin) governed and regulated communal life and interaction, based on moral principles as seeking consensus and solutions (Xal), and even selection of those whose wisdom one sought was based on proper representative selection (Xul). When two parties had a dispute third parties not involved in the conflict would often send an diplomatic mission to mediate between warring parties (Ergo), and in the Somali social contract refusing their mediation was considered a deadly sin, ‘Ergo diid wa nabad diid’. Unfortunately the Somali social contract which was practised by Somali’s for thousands of years, became an unintentional victim of the drive to modernize, emulate others and mimic a modern Nation State. None of it has been incooperated in the adopted modern governance framework, we adopted a trias politica that was developed by others and was a good solutions for those who saw it as a solution in their context, their background and for their problems. And we must admit that this modern governance and legal model hasn’t quite worked well for the Somali people, and we need to ask our selves what does work for us, what has worked in the past and how we could make things work in the future. i am not an expert in Somali traditions and culture, and hopefully some who have more knowledge on this subject can further shed light on Somali traditional governance and codes that regulated communal life. Maybe then we can enlighten ourselves further on how some of this could be used in the modern urbanized life and the modern Nation State, I am sure we can still adopt and adapt It to make it fit and workable for the Somali’s.

AUN Police officers should carry in normal and standard environments less harmful weapons like handguns rather then AK47, the average size of AK47 ammo is 3x bigger then standard police used handguns and are far deadlier.

Also, none of the other points mentioned in the article proof or substantiate rigging of (s)elections in anyone’s favor. Or that the agreed mechanism are being controlled or dominated by a specific actor, in fact the process and outcome so far shows sings of increasing multiplicity and pluriformity compared with earlier (s)elections process. Nevertheless, without universal suffrage through one man one vote, citizens will never feel ownership or responsible for the outcome of this indirect process nor will the selected leaders feel direct accountability towards citizens. Matt Brydens critique should have been voiced years earlier when there was still time and opportunity to organise a proper election process.

Its called a ‘war economy’, and it’s far bigger then the Hospitality sector alone, think of the security sector, airlines, banks, telecommunication, energy, etc. They all charge extortive prices profiting from the lawlessness, and insecurity, which prevents Somalia from the transitional to a peace economy.

1 Luulyo tends to have double-edged consequences for the Former Italian-Somalia and British Somaliland. On the hand it was a joyous and and victorious historic moment for the former Italian-Somalia to gain independence from Italy’s colonial rule, which did come with an enormous struggle and cost as Italy was resistent to give Somalia it’s hard earned independence, and one was waiting, hoping and preparing for this moment and the birth of this new independent country, for more then a decade. On the other hand for the former British-Somaliland 1da Luulyo ignites certain antagonistic associations, as it joined with Somalia without much thinking through of pre-conditions and preparation of how the State structures of the new Nation would look like, and neither om how the expectations, the political systems l, the political cultures could merge or be harmonized. Which led to immediately to regret buying in or joining the new State, and leading a majority of the people in the former-Northern Somalia rejecting the constitution in the referendum of 1961. Irrelevant of the feelings or consequences that followed 1da Luulyo, it is historically an turning point for all Somali’s, even for those in the other Somali regions and neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya the new Somali State created certain associations.

The 1976 TPLF Manifesto TPLF’s “Republic of Greater Tigray” – news of abyssinia NEWSOFABYSSINIA.WORDPRESS.COM By: Article by Dereje Tariku. The Tigray People Liberation Front, TPLF had published their organization’s manifesto in February... Be careful what you wish for, according to some theories the Tigray have ambitions to annex the Afar regions in Ethiopia, Eritrea up to Djibouti, and getting access to the sea through Asab, making them effectively the new neighbours of the Somali nation. Ethiopia seems quite complex to understand. At this kind of moments I wish our friend and Ethiopian expert Abtigiis was around to give us an analysis of the context and background.

The sentiment that you are observing here is called nostalgia (which comes from the Greek word for ‘homecoming’), it’s a feeling of romanticizing or yearning fo the ‘good old days’, and it can be a very powerful feeling, specially when people have major disruptions and uncertainties, and anxieties in their lives, the more they tend to nostalgically long for the past that they associate with being happy. What make this most dangerous is when politicians use this sentiment of an idealized past to provoke the social and cultural anxieties and uncertainties that make nostalgia especially attractive for purposes of manipulation or as defense mechanism to shade or cloak from people the current or historical facts, specially when people are at they’re most vulnerable. Studies have shown that events, dates, symbols, places and even music can trigger this feeling with people. Hence why some politicians tend to use and create a big fuzz more about certain events, symbols like flags and statues, places/locations, music, etc. It’s a tool Farmaajo has effectively mastered and utilized to rally very loyal supporters here, cloaking how empty his politics actually is.

I am not sure if we should take the Tigray call independence serieus, but see it rather as leverage in negotiations with the central authority. For the Tigray have enormous economic and financial interest in Addis Abeba and other regions, they loose everything if they succeeded? Second the state would not be viable, as it’s land locked with two of the three neighbors being hostile to this region, and it doesn’t even direct road connections to Sudan! Third, the Political historical narrative of the Tigray and Amharas has always been about ruling Ethiopia and being the dominant party in a multinational country that Ethiopia is. Yes, the Tigray are a resilient and resourceful folk that have survived in the most harshest region with an inhospitable climate, and have faced the most challenging of odds against them, occupation, famine, foreign invasion, etc, but in all of these cases they either had access and influence in Ethiopia with other tribes or in Eritrea with access to the sea and a brotherly clan they shared fates with. But none of this is the case. I am sure they will start to negotiate once the Amhara and Oromo’s political temporary alliance forged by Abiy and co starts to deteriorate.

Khadafi, I concur with your analysis on the sociological affects that were underlying to the loss of social identity, which gave rise or rather space for propagation of extremist ideologies. But as the case with complex issues, the religious suppression is just one factor of a multitude of factors that are underlying for the social polarization and inflation of the social contract. Another factor which might further explain loss of the social contract and people seeking refuge in extremist Ideologies and groups, is the socio-economic inequality and economic marginalization experienced by many groups and smaller or less influential clans. Many smaller clans in Somalia have been severely marginalized after the state collapse. Take for example some of the agricultural communities that belonged to more marginalized clans, whose land were taken by larger clans that were not even traditional settled agriculturalists but with no central authority to prevent them from taking land by force, and sometimes even land grap took place through state power for private use by representatives of the state. Pushing these communities who often have no own militias, nor political and state influence, neither access to a lot remittances flowing in from the diaspora, or access to donors and NGO’s, could potentially find refuge in extremist groups who they perceive to be economically more equitable and economically more inclusive then the formal state. Let us continue to dissect the issue to fully comprehend the full nature of the problem and various factors of influence. I am sure there are a couple more factors giving the issue its complex nature and the challenges and impossibilities of resolving it over the last decades or so. let us think of other probable relevant factors of influence here.

Xaaji, hadafkoodu haduu noqday mid ee cadowad ku abuurteen oo qowmiyadihii Ethiopia maanta ciil u qabaan, iskugu tageen, ganacsi goodi ku bur burtay. Ka waran mexee faideyn?

Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae: Ethiopia's Tigray rebel mastermind WWW.BBC.COM A former army general is leading the war against the Ethiopian government. Interesting piece on the leader of the Tigray forces.

For Ethiopia to become a democratic, multinational country its essential to have federalist parties. So in that regard it only made sense for the EPRDF to transform in to a unified party (the Prosperity Party) and as this party is one that is centralizing Ethiopia further. But it would have been wise and it still might be possible to provide some political space for a counter party to form that provides pathways for those that are advocating for greater devolution, self-administration or autonomy of the regions, and at the same time this would have forced all those ‘ethnic’ oriented parties to come together at federal level and form coherent policies, to get a seat seat at the ‘national table’, something which would have been far more challenging to achieve for those with ‘ethnic’ or ‘regionalist’ oriented ideologies then the ‘centrist’ party block. And this Preventing any extreme position such as has happened now with the Tigray and their wish for independence and other other opposition parties that now feel disenfranchised. Imagine all those who were watching dreams for genuine self-rule slip away before real freedom is tasted—especially after having only recently escaped the TPLF’s choke, to be only replaced by the P&P. But that opportunity was not offered by Abiy and co, forcing TPLF and other like minded regional ‘peripheral’ parties to boycot his elections and to extreme position. One thing that we have to realize, also in the Somali context, is that political ideas and ideologies don’t just die nor can they vanish with suppression only, without offering genuine alternative pathways, even if it’s sometimes just for the surface and for cosmetics than genuine reality. This is something that one can learn from the TPLF, they been doing this for three decades with their version of ‘federalism’ in name only which in reality was a brutal democratic centralism under the banner of so called ethnic federalism. There are options and there are examples of different state forms that both accommodate centrist and federalist, and also many examples where ‘ethnic’ border issue have been resolved through some sort of consensus accommodating different sides.

Xaaji, it’s frankly quite sad to see Ethiopia edging towards civil war. It’s not in the interest of Somali’s to witness our largest neighbor Ethiopia becoming a conflict or killing zone for any of its tribes. We must hope that Ethiopians return to the dialogue table and somehow come to a mutual understanding. And it’s becoming more clear that Abiy’s becoming part of the problem rather the the solution. Having said that, the authoritarian tendencies that we are witnessing and the brute force of the National Army against a tribe or region is not new to Ethiopia, and it’s roots have been laid long before Abiy came to scene, and he is using the same futile and destructive brute politics he has learned from the previous regimes that have laid the seed of the cycle we are witnessing today. And many have hoped that he would able to break that vicious cycle.

I think a valid point we can dissect from here is that, one can’t completely return to the religious practices of the past, as some of that like ‘intercession’ would be considered by many Somali’s today as wrong or even ‘kufri’, as Apopthis stated. I think that is a valid point, how would you respond to that, Khadafi? And how would this fit in with your suggested direction of returning to Sufism?

Seems PM Abiy is trying to escape responsibility here which is not a good sign for what is to come. Eventually Tigray, Amhara and Ethiopia will come to the negotiating table, but it seems that Abiy has no plans to be part of that, as he is moving the goal post further away even after loosing his plot in Tigray.

Khadafi, Thanks for this interesting piece, and if I may try to summarize your thesis here is that systematic repression of original Somali religious identity(Sufism) and oppression of the Somali Islamic scholars has led to a confused or loss of social identity, which in turned opened up the space or conditions for many to seek solace and propagate externally constructed and applied extremist ideologies. Does this summarize and capture your thesis to an extend?

The sustained presence of the foreign troops isn’t because there is lack of Somali soldiers or lack of guns win Somalia, but Somali’s are lacking societal trust among themselves which is the most fundamental basis for any institutions(e.g. army, police) to be able to function. And to build trust you need honesty, integrity and consistency, and despite the whole world witnessing our tragedies for the last 30 years, we still remain in denial and can’t even acknowledge the most basic historical facts while nowadays we have access to all the information and knowledge that is out there. how can you decide on a path for the future, if one can’t even digest the events of the past. See the above nonsense that Galbeedi has written here, proving we have a long path to go.

I seriously recommend that you do try to update yourself on the current and past realities in Somalia, cause what you have written here sir, is the biggest load of nonsense I have read on SOL in the past decade or so.

Don’t tell us only a dictator can bring order with a military hard hand and violence because Somali’s are savages?

Nobody is questioning that, and even those you are calling baboons do send their congratulatory wishes to Somalilands elected winners and leaders. But there is a big elephant in the room that one has been ignoring for a while now, and it’s quite unfortunate that others from outside of this region are pointing again and again to that elephant in the room, while the elected leaders and even Parliamentarians are not addressing the obvious. Shame really, irrelevant of the rhetoric defenses one showcases the elephant remains in the room.

The state and peace are not that fragile, but the social contract and political narrative are, as these kids love to poke fun at every now and then with any simple blue fabric at hand, wether it’s through a blue kastuumo or blue bedsheets. Even if one tries to ignore these kids and then their blue linnen, one still can’t ignore the fact that Buhoodle, Boocame, Badhan, Dhahar and Las Qoray are not fully part and parcel of the state nor are their controlled by Somalilands government, which constitute 5 of the 23 electoral districts in Somaliland. Neither do the constituencies from these region fully participate in Somalilands political life, governance and elections. Something none of the Borama, Hargeisa or Buroa elites really care about, except for few kids that sometimes showcase or poke fun at the narrative’s fragility, weather through social online or through showcasing blue Kastuumo’s.

The article analyses how Somali’s select the wrong leaders, but still doesn’t mention any concrete skill, capability or criteria for that matter. As often the case it repeats generic statements like, ‘ninkii Somali badbaadin lahaa’, whatever that means. lets try to dig a bit deeper, with a few simple questions we needs to ask ourselves; 1) Does Somalia need someone who is living abroad/diaspora or someone who has lived, worked and has familiarized himself with the country, for at-least the past decade or so? 2) Does Somalia need someone with diplomatic and mediation skills, who can bring together different parties and build bridges and narrow the political polarization? 3) How about experience with International and multilateral organizations? 4) And are management capabilities a must, or is that something that is required from the Prime Minister? 5) Does one need governance experience, or at-least Understanding how bureaucracies work? 6) Does the President need to inspire and motivate people? 7) Does he need to be a political neutral figure that can stay above the parties, or hardened politician who knows the ropes of the political dirty work? What exactly does one want from a President?

With the large number of candidates campaigning to become Somalia’s next president, it can be difficult to distinguish various candidates from one another. So lets try to create and agree on a profile for the right Presidential candidate, maybe then finding the right person becomes easier me So what do you think should the core qualities, capabilities, capacities and skills that the ideal candidate he/she should have?