Madaxweyne Rayaale oo Xadhiga ka Jaray Dhisme Cusub oo lagu Kordhiyay Hay’adda Shaqaalaha Dawladda Sunday, 06 December 2009 Daawo Sawirada Madaxwayhaha JSL Md. Daahir Rayaale Kaahin ayaa maanta xadhiga ka jaray dhisme cusub oo loogu talo galay machadka tababarka shaqaalaha dawlada oo ay hay’ada UNDP ka hir galisay xarunta hay’ada shaqaalaha ee magaalada Har...sa. Madaxwayne Daahir Rayaale Kaahin oo munaasibadii furitaanka dhismaha cusub, hadal kooban ka jeediyay ayaa ka waramay baahida loo qabo macadka tababarka shaqaalaha dawlada waxaanu xusay in macadka loogu talo galay si kor loogu qaado xirfada aqooneed ee shaqaalaha, si shaqaaluhu adeeg hufan ugu fidiyaan bulshada, waxa kale oo uu tilmaamay in loo baahan yahay macalimiin aqoon wanaagsanle oo ka hawl gala macadkan. “Mahada Kowaad waxaan siinayaa Hay’ada UNDP oo maalgelisay machadkan halkan ka dhisan, oo aan filayo la’aanteed inaanu machadkani hirgaleen, U jeedada kowaad ee uu machadkani sameyn doono waxa weeyaan dadku maxay ku kala sareynayaan oo ay darajo ku kala helayaan, waa aqoonta ay baryaan ee ay machadkan kala soo baxaan, imika waxa jira dad badan oo shaqaalaha Dawlada ah oo gaboobay, waxaanu isla soo qaadanay sida loogu sameynayo patient [Lacagta bisilka ah], lacagta qofka hawlgabka ah la siinayo waa in imika la sii bilaabaa, maaha inaynu imika uun lacag siinayno, laakin waa inuu barnaamujku meesha inoo yaala shaqaaluhuna uu is-bedelayaa kolba waa inay kuwo dhalin-yar ahi meesha soo gaalan, waxa kale oo loobaahan yahay in machadkan loo helo macaclimiin tayo leh, oo wax barta oo fara badana waa in loo helaa.”ayuu yidhi Madaxweyne Rayaale. Isaga oo hadalkiisa sii watana waxa uu intaa raaciyey oo uu yidhi“Run ahaantii marka aan ka sheekeeyo taariikhdiisa machadkan, UNDP waxaanu beriga weydiisanay in machadkii SIDAM uu dalkeenani yeesho oo halkan laga furo, Markaa waxaanu ka doorbidnay inta la dhisayo inaynu sugno in jaamacada tababarka lagu sii bilaabo inta laga dhisayo, taasina waa al-xamdulilaah maanta haday noo hirgashay oo maaragtaanay aynu machadkii aynu maanta furnay oo uu inoo dhisan yahay,” ayuu yidhi Madaxweyna Rayaale. Mar uu Madaxweyne Rayaale Ka hadlayey u jeedada loo dhisayi machadkan shaqaalaha Dawlada waxa uu yidhi “U jeedada loo dhisayo machadkan waxa-weeyaan in tababar lagu siiyo shaqaalaha Dawlada lagu siiyo , adee...aal ayey u yihiin bulshada ee si ay adeeg wanaagsan bulshada ugu qabtaan, oo la suurtageliyo in shaqaalaha xirfad iyo mihnad lagu kordhiyo Si tayadooda loo hagaajiyo oo ay noqdaan kuwo si fiican ugu adeega bulshada ee ay ka midka yihiin ee ay u shaqeynayaan.” “Xukuummad ahaan waanu isku noqon doona hay’ada in siyaasad loo sameeyo xukuummada, iyo Strategy-yada aynu ka rabno mustaqbalka inaynu gaadhsiino dadkeena aynu wax ku barayno iyo u jeedada aanu ka leenahay”ayuu yidhi Madaxweynuhu. Isaga oo hadalkiisa sii watana waxa uu yidhi“Waan akhriyey warqadaha aad qorteen qaar waxay ka hadlayaan shaqaalaha oo kale in caafimaadka iyo waxbarashada la yareeyo, horta kuwaasi yaraan maayaan ee way badanayaan, caafimaadka baahidiisu way sii badanaysa, baahida waxbarashadu way sii kordheysa weli literacy-ga dhinaca aqoonta weli meel hoose ayeynu joognaa, in la kordhiyo ayaa loo baahan-yahay, markaa waa inaanu ogaana wakhti kasta waxaanu qaban karno, tacliinta ilaa intee ayaa inoo dhiman waa inaynu gaadhsiino, caafimaadka ilaa intee ayaanu dadka gaadhsiinay, ilaa intee ayaa inoo dhiman inaynu ka shaqeyno ayay u baahan tahay, waxaan isleeyahay wakhtiga la soo bilaabay iyo halka la marayo wax badan ayaa la qabtay, wadankani maanta ilaa maalintii la soo galay waxa uu ku socda qori isku dhiib uuna sii socon doona” Md. Rayaale mar uu la hadlayey wasaaradaha waxa uu yidhi “Wasaaradaha waxaan ku amrayaa inay dadku u kala sareyn doonaan sida ay u kala sareeyaan, u jeedada kowaad ee uu machadkani sameyn doono waxa weeyaan, dadku maxay ku kala sareynayaan ee ay darajada ku kala helayaan? Waa aqoonta ay bartaan ee ay kala soo baxaan machadka. U jeedada aanu tiigsanaynaa waxa-weeyaan in dadka wax barto, kii wax-barta inuu xaq u yeesho inuu ka shaqeeyo xafiiska ugu sareeya,”. Guddoomiyaha Machadka Shaqaalaha Dawalada Maxamed Mixile Boqore oo isna halkaas ka hadlay ayaa waxa uu sharaxaad ka bixiyey noocyada tababarada ay bixiyaan, waxaanu yidhi “Tababarada aanu bixinaa waxa weeyaan maamulka iyo maareynta, Xisaabaadka guud, habka hanti dhowrk ah qorsheynta iyo xoghaymaha, kobcinta dhaqaalaha, hogaaminta awoodeynta iyo kartigelinta haweenka, habka maamulka hantida qaranka, ta technology-yada, luuqada Ingiriisiga, Iyo habka horumarinta Dawladaha Hoose”. Guddoomiyaha hay’ada Shaqaalaha Dawlada Somaliland C/raxmaan Ismaaciil Cadami oo isna xafladaasi ka hadlay ayaa waxa uu yidhi“Qorshaha machadkan maa waxa loo dhisay shaqaalaha Dawlada iyo dawladaha Hoose, iyo kuwa private-ka qorshaha waxa machadka ugu jira inay ku tababartaan si la iskula jaan-qaado madaxda dawlada ee Sarsare,” “Wiixi intaa ka danbeeya intaa ka danbeeya ee ama ah shahaadada Degree-ha hore ama ka danbe waxa balanqaaday oo kafaalo-qaaday College-ka tababarka Shaqaalaha Dawlada ee Dalka Ethiopia, oo ay imika ku jiraan 11 qof, sanadkan cusub ee bilaabmayana waxa ta...a 15 qof”ayuu yidhi Guddoomiyaha hay’ada Shaqaalaha Dawlada” ayuu yidhi Cabdiraxmaan Cadami. Gudoomiyaha hay’ada shaqaalaha dawlada Md. C/raxmaan Ismaaciil Cadami ayaa isna furitaankii dhismahan ka waramay qorshayaasha ay ugu talo galeen macadka shaqaalaha dawlada iyo hawlaha wali ka dhiman dhamaystirka macadka. Dhinaca kale wasiirka cadaalada Axmed Xasan Cali Casoowe ayaa isna maanta xadhiga ka jaray xabsiga dhexe ee magaalada Har...sa oo ay hay’ada UNDP isna dib u dhis iyo dib u habayn ku samaysay waxaanu ka waramay baahida loo qabo furitaanka jeelka iyo sida uu wax uga tari doono baahidii maxaabiista, waxaanu wasiirku u mahad naqay hay’ada UNDP oo uu shee... inay gacan ka ...sato, caawimana u fidiso Wasaarada Cadaalada. Masuuliyiinta Dawlada JSL ayaa inta badan ku faana, mashaariicda ay hay’adaha samafalku ka hirgaliyaan dalka. Isla markaana bulshada ku beer laxawsada waxqabadka hay’adaha. Sallaxleynews Desk Hargeysa, Somaliland

brazilian women are the shit.

London(SanaagNews) Waxanu indin ogesiineynaa in dhowaan shirweynihii jaaliyada reer sanaag ee ku dhaqan wadanka UK uu ka dhicidoono magaalada London ee cariga ingiriiska, shirkan oo ah mid aad u balaaran si weyna loo soo abaabuley waxa ka soo qaybgeli doona dadweyne isuga jira culamaaudiin , odoyaal dhaqameed, aqoonyahano, haween iyo dadweyna kale oo fara badan. Hadaba kulinka oo ah mid ka duwan kuwii ka horeeyey xambaarsana ahmiyad gaar ah oo ku waajihsan dhinaca horumarka Gobolka gaar ahaan adeegyada bulshada sida caafimaadka ,waxbarashada, beeraha ayaa dhowaan lagu qabandoonaa magaalada London, fadlan waxan idinka codsanaynaa inaad kasoo qayb gashaan kulinkan albaabadu waa idiin furan yihiin. SHirku waxa uu ka dhici doonaa galbeedka Magaalada London xaafada shepherds bush 95, Boemvontein road, shepherds bush, london w12 7da. tareenka ugu dhaw waa [central line] iyo hammersmith and city] Taariikhda iyo waqtigu waa-: 19/12/2009 Maalin Sabti ah 2:00 pm waqtiga london Hadii aad u baahato tafaasiil dheeraad ah kala siriir Nadra Omar Jabaabul TELE 00447944619066 Mukhtar Ali Madoobe TELE 00447983801242 Mustafe Saalax Xaaji Xasan TELE 00447852176599 Saynab Ali Warsame TELE 00447930220095 Wabilaahi Tawfiiq Qalinkii Siciid Cali Holland http://sanaag.org/details.asp?id=1262&dt=news

anybody seen ayoub here? war Ayoub sxb do you have the pictures of Banano Boarding School - Gaashaamo which you posted about two years ago in the student talk but the pictures don't seem to be there.

ayoub sxb have you got those pictures saved ? i can't see them here can you send me sxb?

Ibtisam since you said you know the C's. of burco and their history can you tell us about Xussen Xamar.

FORGEIN AFFAIRS Bronwyn Bruton Wednesday, December 02, 2009 The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy -- and fast. For the better part of two decades, instability and violence have confounded U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Somalia. The international community's repeated attempts to create a government have failed, even backfired. The United States' efforts since 9/11 to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have alienated large parts of the Somali population, polarized the country's diverse Islamist reform movement into moderate and extremist camps, and propelled indigenous Salafi jihadist groups to power. One of these groups, a radical youth militia known as al Shabab, now controls most of Somalia's southern half and has established links with al Qaeda. The brutal occupation of Somalia by its historical rival Ethiopia from late 2006 to early 2009, which Washington openly supported, only fueled the insurgency and infuriated Somalis across the globe. One of Washington's concerns today is that al Qaeda may be trying to develop a base somewhere in Somalia from which to launch attacks outside the country. Another is that more and more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might embrace terrorism, too. Somali nationals were arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al Shabab, and in August 2009, two Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army installation. The first American ever to carry out a suicide bombing did so in Somalia in October 2008. These isolated incidents have generated more hype than they deserve, but they have nonetheless put the Obama administration in a tough position. If only to avoid seeming weak in combating terrorism, it must prevent these threats from escalating, but it is entering the fray at a time when almost any international action in Somalia is likely to reinforce the Somalis' anti-Western posture. Alarmingly, the State Department seems not to realize this or the failures of past policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is clinging to the bankrupt strategy of supporting the Transitional Federal Government, Somalia's notional government but really a dysfunctional institution that has failed to garner much support from the population. Barricaded in a small corner of Mogadishu behind a wall of international peacekeepers, the TFG is incapable of advancing the United States' primary interests: stopping the expansion of extremist forces throughout Somalia and preventing the formation of al Qaeda cells, other radical strongholds, and training camps in the country. If anything, the TFG's presence in Somalia hurts U.S. goals. Resistance to the so-called government has united various radical groups that would otherwise be competing with one another. These groups and the TFG are now locked in a violent stalemate that is further battering the population, making it more likely that certain corners of Somalia will eventually become hospitable environments for al Qaeda. With 3.8 million people urgently in need of relief, Somalia has once again become the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. This error stems from Washington's mistaken belief that state building is the best response to terrorism. Because Washington has lacked both the political will and the resources to launch a large enough state-building program, U.S. efforts in Somalia have been inadequate. Neither Clinton nor the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, appears ready to support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. Even if enough resources were available, the conditions on the ground mean the approach would be unlikely to work anyway. Somalis may have grown weary of war, but they remain highly suspicious of centralized government. And they disagree about questions as fundamental as whether a Somali state should be unitary, federal, or confederal; whether the judicial system should be wholly Islamic or a hybrid of sharia and secular law; and whether the northern territory of Somaliland should be granted its long-sought independence. Efforts to create a central government under such conditions are a recipe for prolonging conflict. Another major problem with Washington's Somalia policy is that it has not kept pace with important shifts in U.S. thinking about how to confront terrorism. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, General David Petraeus, former U.S. commander in Iraq; General David McKiernan, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, among others, have successfully steered U.S. counterterrorism strategies away from militarized tactics focused on killing the enemy. They have promoted more integrated, population-centric approaches that engage traditional local political authorities, civil society, and a wide range of religious actors -- strategies that stand a better chance of reducing the tensions between the United States' counterterrorism, humanitarian, and stabilization goals. John Brennan, the president's assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism, has said that efforts are under way to develop a new Somalia policy along these lines, but they seem to have been hampered by the lack of an intelligence infrastructure and reliable partners on the ground. Both to protect its interests in Somalia and to help the country, Washington must abandon its hope of building a viable state there and explore new counterterrorism strategies. Perhaps even more important, it needs to better understand the exact nature of the threat that Somalia poses to U.S. national security. For example, piracy has flourished not in the country's anarchic south but in the weakly governed northern regions. And it is a problem of organized crime, not terrorism. Any links between the pirates and al Shabab are profit-motivated, which suggests that even for al Shabab, ideology can yield to pragmatism. The emergence of yet another indigenous jihadist movement in a faraway corner of the world does not merit a militarized response from the United States or its allies, especially when the absence of reliable intelligence on the ground means that even discrete attacks on terrorist suspects could do more harm than good. The presence of al Qaeda operatives in Somalia is alarming, of course, but it does not mean that transnational terrorism will necessarily spread. In its previous inroads into Somalia, al Qaeda bumped up against Somalia's xenophobia and its pragmatic, clannish political culture. In the midst of the UN's invasive state-reconstruction effort in the 1990s, much of the country fell under the control of al Itihaad al Islamiya, a radical movement with links to al Qaeda. But the al Qaeda operatives in the country soon conflicted with recalcitrant nationalist leaders (they considered the locals cowardly for refusing to subscribe to jihad) and were frustrated by the fractious local Islamists and the harsh living conditions, according to a West Point study based on intercepted correspondence. By the mid-1990s, al Itihaad al Islamiya was essentially defunct. Since then, U.S. intelligence analysts have argued that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist groups. Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous creature, but its current foothold in Somalia appears to be largely the product of the West's latest interference. In fact, the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the country. Al Shabab metamorphosed from a fringe movement opposed to the foreign-backed TFG into a full-blown political insurgency only after the U.S.-supported Ethiopian invasion. It is time for the United States to adopt a policy of constructive disengagement toward Somalia. Giving up on a bad strategy is not admitting defeat. It is simply the wise, if counterintuitive, response to the realization that sometimes, as in Somalia, doing less is better. THE GRIP OF TERROR For decades, Somalia was little more to Americans than a pawn in the Cold War. Then, in 1992, U.S. televisions were flooded with images of dying Somali children, the victims of brutal warlords and their civil war. With Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. government set out to respond not only to the humanitarian emergency but also to the clarion call of a new era of peacemaking and multilateral cooperation. Initially intended as a relief effort, the mission soon got mired in Somalia's violent internal politics. On July 12, 1993, U.S. forces mistakenly attacked a peaceful meeting of clan elders, killing 73 civilians. The mission had derailed, and a few months later it hit bottom when a Somali mob desecrated the corpses of U.S. soldiers. The incident, known as "Black Hawk down," was a bewildering assault on the American public's self-image, not to mention a low-water mark of the Clinton administration, and it left the Americans and the Somalis distrustful of each other. For close to a decade afterward, the U.S. government effectively let Somalia be. Even so, it remained concerned. After the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and then 9/11, what had once seemed like a humanitarian imperative to intervene in Somalia receded. The growing concern that the country's lawless territories could become a safe haven for al Qaeda quickly drove the Bush administration's Somalia policy, producing a series of failed political interventions designed to create a central government in Somalia. In 2002, the UN bankrolled efforts by regional actors to set up a transitional government. Negotiations with warlords and clan and civil-society leaders sputtered for a couple of years and then bred the TFG. The TFG's purpose was to balance the interests of all of Somalia's clans, but in practice, it was dominated by the ***** clan, from the north. This left the ******, Somalia's majority clan, feeling like it had been shortchanged, and it responded by striking an anti-TFG alliance of convenience with the business community and a group of sharia courts in Mogadishu. The alliance's goal was to restore enough order in the capital, a ****** stronghold, to undermine the *****'s efforts to locate the seat of government elsewhere. Meanwhile, a group of militant youths formed al Shabab, and although it, too, was associated with the coalition, it belonged to its more radical and violent fringe and started assassinating members of the TFG. Had it not been for the United States' counterterrorism efforts, the sharia courts and al Shabab might have remained marginal. By early 2006, the TFG's inability to govern was evident; the group no longer posed a meaningful threat to the ******. The defensive alliance it had struck with the Islamists and the business community quickly fizzled out. Al Shabab remained isolated, but some businesspeople and criminals were still compelled to form the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, a pro-government group intent on capturing and deporting suspected terrorists. Public outrage over the United States' support of the group, which included several despised warlords, sparked a vicious four-month battle for the control of Mogadishu that eventually brought the Islamic Courts Union, the ******-backed sharia courts, to power. The ICU's rise was the result more of happenstance than strategy, but by quickly bringing an unprecedented degree of order to Mogadishu, the movement generated nationwide enthusiasm, and the sharia-court model was soon replicated across the country. At first, Washington encouraged the TFG to negotiate with the ICU, but it stopped as soon as it understood that al Shabab was effectively operating as the ICU's military arm and was intent on enforcing a harsh version of sharia law. The ICU's policies quickly became unpopular with the public, but Ethiopia nonetheless grew nervous about having a hostile jihadist army that close and so sold to the U.S. government the notion that al Qaeda was controlling the ICU. It was a small step from there to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia. The move, which occurred in December 2006, with U.S. support, was a catastrophe. By then, the ICU had exhausted the Somalis' patience, and it dissolved overnight, its leaders scattering into the bush in southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to occupy Mogadishu to prop up the unpopular TFG, and its presence ignited a complex insurgency. Rampant human rights abuses by the Ethiopian army and the TFG's forces, including the firing of mortar on hospitals and the indiscriminate shelling of civilians, turned the population against the government and its patron, the United States. Washington aggravated the outrage by dropping bombs on terrorist targets and thereby allegedly killing scores of civilians. Jihadists from the Middle East, sensing an unprecedented opportunity to find a foothold in the shifting sands of Somalia's conflict, poured resources into the hands of al Shabab. It recruited a host of angry, desperate young fighters. Experienced terrorists arrived from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan -- even Malaysia -- and brought with them suicide bombings and sophisticated tactics such as remote-controlled detonations. By the time the Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, al Shabab's influence had spread throughout southern Somalia. Under the Bush administration, Somalia became a front in the war on terrorism. A messy decades-long conflict was recast as an ideological battle between secular democracy and Islam, between "moderates" and "extremists" -- blunt categories that blurred important differences in ideologies and tactics. This oversimplification has both severely undermined the capacity of U.S. and other international representatives to relate to the Somali public and allowed al Shabab to unify an otherwise diverse array of actors into a motivated armed opposition. NEITHER NOR There are now two dominant camps in Somalia, the vocally pro-Western TFG and the vocally radical al Shabab. Although they seem diametrically opposed, both are alliances of fortune, and the line between them is thinner than is often believed. Both are mostly driven by clannish and economic interests that often trump ideology in determining allegiances. Yet many experts and diplomats, including Secretary of State Clinton, make much of the groups' differences and argue that the TFG is Somalia's "best chance" for peace, a label that has been attached to every Somali government since 2000. The current optimism centers on the designation of a new president, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, a Muslim cleric who had been vilified by the State Department when he chaired the ICU but was conveniently resurrected as a peacemaker in late 2008, in the run-up to Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia. Sheik Sharif has attempted to position the revamped TFG as a moderate Islamist government, primarily by promising to implement sharia law. But his willingness to engage with Ethiopia and the West has hampered his efforts. The TFG has been categorically rejected as a proxy of the West by the bulk of Somalia's armed political opposition, and although it has won some hearts and minds, it has failed to generate much grass-roots support. The TFG's paramilitary forces -- a ragtag cluster of groups beholden to various warlords with posts in the government -- are a shambles. Even though the United States and its allies have tried to prop up these underpaid forces with ammunition and training, they, as well as members of the TFG and foreign peacekeepers, have been accused of selling munitions to al Shabab for profit -- a claim that seems to be substantiated by the precipitous drop in munitions prices on Mogadishu's black market. Except among hard-liners in al Shabab, loyalty is in short supply. Even if the TFG were able to control more territory, this would serve little good: the government is simply incapable of governing. The parliament has swollen to an unwieldy 550 members. Most of its members reside safely outside the country, and the remainder are paralyzed by factionalism and infighting; just getting a parliamentary quorum in Mogadishu requires Herculean support from the UN. The ad hoc addition of Sheik Sharif's Islamist faction to the TFG's clan-based structure, and the parliament's promise to implement some still unspecified form of sharia law, has turned the TFG into a muddle of Islamist and democratic ideologies. The government's only real value is to provide a legitimating façade for the international community's opposition to al Shabab. This opposition largely takes the form of the African Union's mission to Somalia, known as AMISOM. But so far, this effort has been as ineffective as previous international interventions in Somalia. With support from Washington and the United Nations, the AU is desperately trying to increase AMISOM's contingent from 5,000 troops to 8,000 and is arguing that these forces should be free to launch preemptive attacks on al Shabab. In August, Secretary of State Clinton promised to help the AU increase its supplies of munitions to the TFG forces. Like the Ethiopian forces that came before it, AMISOM is widely viewed as a combatant in the conflict and has been accused by the local press and some clan leaders of firing indiscriminately on civilians. Both al Shabab and legitimate authorities among the clans and Mogadishu's local clerics council have called for ousting the troops. Under these circumstances, bolstering the AMISOM contingent is a fool's errand. At the height of its occupation of Mogadishu in 2008, the 15,000 forces led by the Ethiopian army made no headway against the al Shabab-led insurgency. A decisive military response against today's more powerful and better-organized radical camp would require far more troops than AMISOM or the TFG could ever muster. That said, the radical camp is in no better shape than the TFG. Based in the port city of Kismaayo, it is an awkward coalition of opportunistic clan factions, fundamentalist nationalists, and a few vocal al Qaeda supporters who are committed to the Salafi strand of Islam, control substantial resources sent from the Middle East, and have capitalized on the international hysteria surrounding terrorism. Al Shabab's hold on power, especially its purported control over territory, is weak. Although it holds sway over much of the country's southern half (except for the central districts of Galgaduud and Hiiraan), it does not govern so much as occupy territory through a mixture of public relations, manipulation of local clan conflicts, and outright intimidation. At the approach of a hostile militia, al Shabab often melts into the bush and keeps away until reinforcements arrive. Its blunt efforts to impose sharia law have irritated clans across the country, as have its attempts to ignite local conflicts. Its meddling in Galgaduud, for example, prompted warring ****** subclans there to form a counterforce of local clans and business factions. This alliance is often described as a moderate Islamist movement because it has adopted the banner of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama (ASWJ), an apolitical, nonmilitary organization that represents the practice of Sufi mysticism. Thanks to the group's heavy reliance on financial and logistic support from the Ethiopian army, al Shabab has already managed to depict it as another proxy of the West. As al Shabab has gained ground, it has attracted opportunists and consequently has fractured along both ideological and clan lines. The inclusion of more pragmatic, nationalist factions, such as Hizbul Islam, itself an alliance of convenience, led by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, has challenged the dominance of the radical leaders. Sheik Aweys is a wanted terrorist suspect, but he is distinctly less radical than his counterparts in Kismaayo. He has periodically appeared open to negotiation with the TFG. Al Shabab may be a brutal local political movement, in other words, but it is not a transnational terrorist organization that might one day pose a serious threat to U.S. national security. It has stirred only a few hundred true fanatics -- not thousands -- and attracted many more thugs, mostly teenage boys. The disturbing acts of violence that have dominated media reports, including beheadings and amputations and the pulling of gold fillings from the teeth of ordinary Somalis, are often committed by illiterate children rather than radical leaders. There has been little reporting in the West of the fact that a wide majority of al Shabab factions have actively cooperated with international humanitarian relief efforts -- if only for a fee -- and that many of them have publicly condemned terrorist activities and banditry. The presence of al Qaeda operatives in al Shabab's ranks is indeed alarming, but it is as much a tactical arrangement as an ideological alignment. And the utility for al Shabab of having foreign jihadists fighting by its side will decrease as doing so begins to impede the group's hopes of governing Somalia: many Somalis condemn the presence of foreign fighters in the country on the grounds that they are bound to promote non-Somali values or act like brutal colonizers. Unless the outsiders learn to adopt nonviolent Sufi Islamic practices, their involvement will not last. Sheik Muktar Robow, the former spokesperson of al Shabab and once a backer of al Qaeda, has publicly argued this point. And in fact, differences of opinion have developed between the radicals in Kismaayo and their Hizbul Islam hosts. The tenuous nature of these alliances means there is no clear horse on which the U.S. government can bet. Both the TFG and al Shabab have backers among Somalis, but neither can count on a critical mass. The ostensibly moderate ASWJ has local supporters, but its factionalism and its dependence on Ethiopia are likely to undermine its capacity to generate a national constituency. No doubt this is a problem for the advocates of state building, who were counting on the TFG to be the solution to anarchy. But the weakness of all the parties is also something of a blessing: it means that al Shabab is less powerful than is often feared. The implications of this are clear. With no side capable of keeping the peace if it wins the war, the U.S. government, as well as the rest of the international community, should not focus its efforts on backing any one group. It should also forget about grand political projects to create a central government authority, which are likely to be futile. PARSING THE PLAYERS Backing off this way entails risks, including the possibility that al Shabab will cement, if only temporarily, its hold on southern Somalia. But this is the only way to ensure that the growing tensions within al Shabab and the latent tensions between al Shabab and al Qaeda will play out. Exploiting these tensions is the most reliable and cost-effective means of fighting terrorism in Somalia. It will be impossible to isolate the truly dangerous elements from the nationalist, the pragmatic, and the merely thuggish factions of al Shabab until the United States stops supporting one group over another and disconnects local conflicts in Somalia from broader counterterrorism efforts. Washington's first step, after abandoning what has been its policy for years now, should be to learn to coexist with al Shabab: since the movement is a coalition of fortune, it is susceptible to realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest method of creating those conditions is to open the door to coexistence with the West. Removing al Shabab from the U.S. government's list of terrorist organizations may be too controversial politically in the United States, but it might be possible to delist specific individuals. For example, Sheik Aweys, whose ambitions of becoming a mainstream national leader have been undermined by his status as a terrorist, has reportedly expressed a keen desire to be taken off the list. Granting his wish could induce him to condemn the imposition of a foreign Salafi agenda on Somalia and to delink the Hizbul Islam movement from al Shabab. The same may be true of the many other opportunistic actors who have aligned with the al Shabab leadership in order to resist Western influence in Somalia or simply to survive. It is in the United States' interest to learn to distinguish these actors from its real enemies. But that would mean not taking all pro-al Shabab rhetoric at face value and tolerating uncertainty while the local struggle for influence plays out, town by town. Being patient now would not foreclose the possibility of a military intervention later, but it would reduce the likelihood that such an effort would be needed. Isolating the truly dangerous factions of al Shabab would also require addressing legitimate local grievances. A plurality of important Somali actors -- al Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Mogadishu's local clerics council, and the ****** leadership -- want the foreign troops to leave and foreign governments to interfere less in Somalia's political affairs. This may be too much for the United States and its allies to concede: they want to keep AMISOM in Mogadishu to monitor the situation there, prevent the TFG's collapse, and support international humanitarian relief efforts. But a compromise may be possible. Washington could urge the AU and the UN to either disband the TFG or -- perhaps a more palatable option -- relocate it outside Somalia. The AU could then negotiate for AMISOM to remain on the condition that it only deliver humanitarian relief. If AMISOM's mandate is so redefined, its presence should no longer be as controversial. And as long as the force stays in Mogadishu -- and retains its control over the airport and the port -- the TFG's removal would not seem like an admission of defeat: the international community could still defend itself against the charge that al Shabab overtook the capital. Such a decisive shift from Washington's current interventionist strategy could help undo the harm caused by past U.S. policy and set the stage for more constructive engagement down the line. GRASS ROOTS VERSUS ASTROTURF At some later point, when the anti-U.S. sentiment has subsided, it will indeed be desirable for Washington to try to address the deeper causes of anarchy in Somalia. But it will have to be extremely mindful not to revive past prescriptions, including the idea of finding and supporting national political figures in Somalia. Somalia's leaders, including Sheik Sharif and Sheik Aweys, have limited constituencies and lack credibility across clan and regional lines. The U.S. government should maintain a neutral posture toward clan leaders and warlords alike while also being careful not to empower them and trigger rivalries. It should refrain from trying to achieve an equitable balance of power among Somalia's fractious clans. So far, that approach has succeeded only in creating a very large and very paralyzed government. Given the shortage of viable national leaders, bottom-up governance strategies might appear to be a solution to Somalia's messy, perpetually shifting decentralized politics. For instance, the experience of the ICU, which brought unparalleled stability to an unruly Mogadishu almost overnight in 2006, is instructive. Its ideology may have been distasteful, but its tenure did amount to a kind of inclusive and homegrown rule-of-law project: administered by religious leaders, supervised by the clans, underwritten by Mogadishu's business community, and ardently embraced by the public. The ICU's rise was the result of an exceptional confluence of trends that would be difficult to replicate: the growing influence of local sharia courts as a source of law and order, the business community's willingness to invest in promoting public security, a clan-based backlash against international efforts to back the TFG and then the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, and the population's readiness for peace. And its tenure was short; proving too inclusive for its own good, the ICU was quickly co-opted by al Shabab. Nonetheless, the ICU's stint in power is proof that effective governance can emerge rapidly in Somalia when the conditions are right. Such arrangements, although admittedly fragile, have emerged in the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The best of them depend on local, rather than international, resources to deliver economic growth and other concrete benefits to the public and respect relations among clan and religious leaders, business groups, and civil society. These arrangements stand in marked contrast to another kind of bottom-up approach, the so-called building blocks strategy favored by the UN during the 1990s. In theory, that approach is intended to empower local actors, but in practice, its focus on appointing officials and building professionalized institutions tends to make it so prescriptive as to leave little room for local innovations. It is a bottom-up approach with all the drawbacks of a top-down approach: it breeds conflicts over representation, diverts resources into futile capacity-building projects, and creates clunky administrative structures that local tax revenues cannot support. Rather than endorsing this pseudo-grass-roots approach or formally promoting models of governance, the U.S. government should support cooperative, community-based development efforts. Development can, and ultimately will, lay the foundation for equitable, sustainable political reform in Somalia. Local reconciliation efforts driven by the practical need to manage various clans' access to water and grazing land have been very successful, most spectacularly in the conflict-ridden town of Gaalkacyo. The need to renegotiate and enforce arrangements over water and land has provided regular opportunities for dialogue and compromise. The ****** and ***** clans of Gaalkacyo have also leveraged these negotiations into broader cooperation, for example, creating a joint security force and primary schools attended by both clans. Before the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006, such deals had significantly reduced instability across Somalia. Likewise, local nongovernmental organizations, notably the women's group SAACID, have been experimenting with cross-community development projects -- ranging from food relief to citywide garbage collection -- with outstanding results. The programs are designed and organized in open meetings, and the distribution of benefits is conditional on active cross-clan cooperation. Somali actors are generally responsive to economic incentives. Most combatants are freelancers who have been forced to join militias out of economic need; in fact, they are often stigmatized as bandits for making such a move. In order to give them options other than employment with militias, the United States should promote targeted local development initiatives, such as a decentralized microcredit scheme that would engage both the Somali diaspora worldwide and existing local authorities. So long as these projects steer clear of governance reform, they might encourage the public to pressure local Islamists into distancing themselves from radical anti-Western actors. Somali communities already rely on indigenous trust-based credit-sharing mechanisms, known as hagbed, and Somalia receives approximately $1 billion in remittances each year, mostly from the United States and the Middle East. Most of these funds are spent to meet individual needs, such as food and health care, but if even a fraction were harnessed for use in broader community-development projects, the money could stimulate local enterprise. That, in turn, would support efforts by community leaders to provide Somali youths with alternatives to employment with the militias. Washington should engage its international partners to create a microcredit and community-development fund that would raise contributions from the Somali diaspora and match them one to one. For example, a member of the diaspora could be convinced to contribute $5 of every $200 he would normally send to his family back home to a community-development fund instead, and that amount would then be matched, dollar for dollar, by the international community. The Somali diaspora is widely dispersed, living in large concentrations in the United States (especially in Minnesota and Washington, D.C.), Canada, Norway, and Yemen. It is generally fractured along clan lines, which has made it difficult to mobilize in support of governance and development efforts in Somalia. Moreover, Somalis will not allow their contributions to disappear into a national fund. These problems could be overcome by soliciting and tracking contributions through the use of Web 2.0 technologies, such as blogs and networking sites, which are already extremely popular among diaspora communities, and by ensuring that contributions go to specific villages or neighborhoods. Communities in Somalia could set up local development councils to solicit contributions and oversee their distribution. All transactions could be tracked on a Web site. To further ensure transparency, the selection of council members should be announced online and orally, at regular community meetings, and be subjected to vetting by the public. The selection of credit recipients should also be transparent, and it should be organized on a first-come, first-served basis and be monitored by local nongovernmental organizations or professional contractors. Dispersing the funds through the hawala system, the informal and trust-based means by which Somalis traditionally transfer money, would allow the accounts to be administered remotely from a single location in the United States or Europe. This practice, which has often been unjustly hampered by the West's investigation into the funding of terrorist networks, would send an important political message of reconciliation to the Somalis. These local development councils might eventually be linked and federalized to promote trade across Somalia and thus promote the development of infrastructure and a regulatory framework. This, in turn, could make a viable basis for the creation of formal national governance mechanisms in Somalia. But first things first. For now, the United States should commit itself to a strategy that promotes development without regard to governance. At the same time, it will have to continue its counterterrorism efforts, although preferably in the form of monitoring and deradicalization strategies pursued in cooperation with the local population rather than air strikes. And it must learn to understand the value of relationships that local rivals build in pursuit of common economic goals. Encouraging development without promoting governance may not yield political outcomes that are palatable to Washington -- or even ensure stability in Somalia. But given the near certainty that more assertive efforts will backfire, as they have in the past, it is the only safe way to proceed. Hiiraan.com

Written by BBC NEWS Dec 03, 2009 at 12:31 PM When a suicide attacker blew himself up at a graduation ceremony in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, the BBC's Mohammed Olad Hassan was sitting just a few feet away. He describes the horror of what happened. There were hundreds of people in the meeting hall - the students were all dressed in colourful uniforms for their graduation. The hall had been brightly decorated, and there was a feeling of excitement - such ceremonies rarely happen in Mogadishu. Ministers and various dignitaries were sat at the front of the hall and everyone else was sitting facing them. Journalists were right at the front - I was sitting with my other BBC colleague in the second row, only about one metre away from the top table. People were making speeches and we were taking notes, as usual. Then all this brightness turned to darkness. Shocking scenes All I remember is being covered in dust. Everyone was covered in dust. And there was no light anywhere. I looked across and the young guy sitting next to me was dead. I think he was a Somali journalist. I don't know. But he was dead. I had to jump over him to get out. I tried to get over the table where the ministers had been sitting. I had to step over their bodies to get out. People were screaming: "Is it a bomb? Is it a bomb?" I went through the door that the ministers had come through when they came into the hall and I hid in a small room. I think it was a toilet, I'm not sure. I thought there would be more explosions or more attacks. I had no idea what had happened. But I couldn't hear any more explosions and I had to go back into the hall to get out. It was a shocking, terrible scene. There was blood splattered everywhere. I was really in disbelief, in shock. I have never seen so many people killed at the same time. All these bodies were there, right in front of my eyes. Rescue attempts I looked at the roof to see if there had been some kind of rocket attack but the roof was okay. So I knew something had exploded in the hall - either a suicide attack or a bomb or mine. I went outside and the street was filled with people trying to rescue their friends and family. No-one knew who had been killed and who had survived. I could see my colleagues - journalists I had been talking to just before - lying on the ground covered in blood. One colleague was right in front of me on his stomach. I couldn't tell whether he was alive or dead. Another colleague was being carried out as local people began to arrive and help out. It was a terrible few minutes. It's still impossible to understand how everything turned from colourful celebration to horror so quickly. bbc news

"ladies" were the backbone of the then "SNM's Struggle" reminds me of the SNM Mujahidaad Khadro Cusmaan(Libaaxo).

Koore-Tuunshe what was the name of his father? the 1 you said is a former poet and song writer.

Ibtisam dararweyn is the place were cadde Muse came running and seeking protection from ina Yeey.

anybody in here from Dararweyn?

Jebel Mara-Sanaag. Taken at the rim of volcano in 1989 by Rob McGlone.

May sxb.

Norfsky yes sxb it already mentions this use to be Titanic hotel and the owner rebranded it and changed it completely as you can see it in picture 1 and renamed the hotel. picture 1 how the hotel looks like in the present. picture 2 is how the hotel looked like in the past.

lool horta why do you guys always have to bring members involved instead of commenting on the hotels new looks.

post the direct link you got it from if you don't mind.

kow ma siida ba maan ogayn.

The Youngest Newest talented somaliland Singer. ABDI FATAH YARE

La soco dib u habayn casri ah Oo lagu sameeyay Huteelka Golden Star Ee Burco Oo hore loo odhan jiray TITANIC. Burco(Ramaas) Dec. 02, 2009 - Huteelka Golden Star ee kuyaala Cidhifka Galbeed ee magaalada Burco ayaa dib u habayen casri ah lagu sameeyey ka dib markii ay dib ujediideyeen Mulkilayaasha Huteelkaasi ,kaas oo ka kooban dhisme afar dabaq ah . Mulkiilaha Huteelka GOLDEN STAR C/laahi Yuusuf Dubad oo Ramaasnews uga waramey dib u habeynta casriga ah ee ay xiligan ku sameeyeen Huteelka Golden Star ee Magaalada Burco ayaa sheegay inuu yahey muwaadinkii u horeeyey ee kamid ahaa qurba jooga u dhashey dalka Somaliland, oo maal gashi ku sameeya dhulkiisa kaas oo uu huteelkii u horeeyey oo ka kooban dhisme afar dabaq ah ka dhiso Magaalada Burco ee Xarunta Gobolka Togdheer mudo imika laga joogo sideed sano. Waxanu intaa ku darey C/laahi in uu huteelkaasi oo ah kan ay hadda ku sameeyeen dib u habeynta oo laga badalay magaca hore ee TITANIC ay hadda u bixiyeen magaca Golden Star, isagoo xusey in ay faa’iidadii dhismaha huteelka ee xiligaasi noqotey mid dalka wax weyn ku soo kordhisa ka dib markii ay ku deydeen kuna soo dhiiradeen ciida hooyo qurba joog fara badan oo u dhashey dalka Somaliland, kuwaas oo maanta dalka kusoo kordhiyay huteelo waaweyn oo ay kamid yihiin kuwa ugu waaweyn ee caasimada Hargeysa ka dhisani iyo kuawa ka dhisam Magaaladan Burco. Ugu dambeyntiina mulkiilaha Huteelka Golden Star C/laahi Yuusuf Dubad, waxa uu daaha ka rogey in ay wakhtigan xaadirka ah dibuhabeyn casri ah ku sameeyeen Huteelka weyn ee Golden Star, kaas oo uu kusoo kordhiyay adeegyo farabadan oo raali galinaya guud ahaanba safarada, dalxiisayaasha, qurbajooga iyo dadweynaha reer Burco ee uu kuyaalo Magaaldooda. Sidoo kalena waxa uu C/laahi faah-faahin ka bixiyay qeybaha kala duwan ee Huteelka Golden Star haddii ay noqoto qeybta cuntada oo ay ka sameeyeen Restuarent balaadhan oo laga heli karo cuntooyin heer sare ah oo si wanaagsan loo habeeyey, raaligalinayana cid kastoo nasiib u hesha in ay ku soo beeganto ama timaado huteelka Golden Star waxana loo adeegasanayaa haddii ay noqoto casuumadaha gaarka ah, xafaladaha, martiqaadka wufuuda iyo qeybaha kale oo dhan. Waxa kale oo mulkiiluhu sheegey in ay dhinaca kalena si weyn oo heer caalami ah u hirgaliyeen huteelka qeybta hurdada oo ay u dhan yihiin dhamaanba qalabkii adeega oo qofku ka helayo hurdo raaxo leh oo uu kaga gam’o lacagtiisa. Gabagabdiina waxa uu carabka ku dhuftey mulkiilaha huteelka Golden Star ee Magaalada Burco Mr C/laahi Yuusuf Dubad in uu hadda gacanta ku hayo dhisme hool weyn ah oo uu rajeynayo in uu dhawaan dhameystiro kaas oo uu ugu talo galey Xafaladaha Aroosyada shirarka iyo siminaarada in lagu qaban karo. Waxanu hadalkiisa ku soo xidhey in cidii ubaahataa ay kala soo xidhiidhi karto gudo iyo dibadba Telefoonada line 002522713000, mob:0025224355208/4331345. Ramaasnews Desk Burao http://ramaasnews.com/news.php?readmore=2224

is Ibtisaam and Xidigo reer sland by any chance?

i would say Edna Adan is more like the mother of Caafimaadka.

dude i believe the mother of somali music was either of those three fantastic ladies Maryan Mursal,Magool or Faduumo Qaasiim. as for the mother of waxbarashada i have no idea about that 1 care to fill in?

actually his the father of all somali music not just in somaliland , just like Maxamuud Axmed Ali AUN was father of education.

Abdullahi Qarshe (Somali: Cabdullahi Kharshee, Arabic: عبد الله خارسهي‎) (1924 - 1994) was a Somali musician, poet and playwright known as the "Father of Somali music". Biography Qarshe was born in 1924 in the Somali expatriate community in Moshi, Tanzania. In 1931, at the behest of his family, he left Tanzania and settled in Aden, Yemen for his education. It is in Aden where Abdullahi had his first encounter with cinema and radio playing western films and Indian and Arabic music, which inspired him to buy a lute to accomplish his new goal of creating music in the Somali language. Qarshe was the inception of the modern Somali music, and the first generation were Ali Feiruz, Mohamed Nahari and others. An innovative musician, Qarshe often employed a wide variety of instruments in his art, such as the guitar, piano, and oud. He was also known for his poems and his theatrical work at Mogadishu and Hargeisa venues. In addition, Qarshe was a member of the pioneering Somali musical ensemble Waaberi. Waaberi As Somalia's foremost musical group, Waaberi spawned many popular artists who would go on to enjoy successful individual careers and shape the face of Somali music for years to come. Prominent members of the band included Abdullahi Qarshe Ali Feiruz Fadumo Qasim Hilowle Hasan Adan Samatar Hibo Nuura Hussein Aw Farah Magool Maryam Mursal Mohamed Aden Da'ar Mohamed Suleiman Tube Omar Dhule Ali Saado Ali Salaad Darbi Salaad Maxamed Sahardi Seinab Haji Ali Bahsan Abdikavy Abdullahi Botan Kinsi Haji Aden History The first major form of modern Somali music began in the mid-1930s, when northern Somalia was a part of the British Somaliland Protectorate. This style of music was known as Xer-Dhaanto, an innovative, urban form of Somali folk dance and song. This period also saw the rise of the Xaaji Baal Baal Dance Troupe, which became very influential over the course of its long career. Somali popular music began with the balwo style, which was created by Abdi Sinimo. This style began in Dilla, and then spread throughout the area. It was a mixture of modern poetry and Somali dance music. Cabdillahi Qarshe rose to fame in the early 1940s as part of the qaraami style. Many qarami songs from this era are still extremely popular today. This musical style is mostly played on the kaban (oud). The first somali kaban players were: Ali Feiruz, Mohamed Nahari, and others in 1950s. During the Siad Barre regime, music was suppressed except for a small amount of officially-sanctioned music. There were many protest songs produced during this period. Interview with the late Abdullahi Qarshe (1994) at the Residence of Obliqe Carton in Djibouti Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan mrsh: Let us start with the basics. When and where were you born? aq: I was born in Moshe, Tanzania, in 1924. mrsh: People know you as Abdullahi Qarshe, but what is your real name? aq: Oh, yes, that is true. My real name is Mahmud Muhammad, and Qarshe was the nickname of my father. He was a businessman and trader in the livestock business in East Africa. He was regarded as a frugal man and was fortunate in business. We were five brothers and one sister. We lived in a big house on the outskirts of Moshe. mrsh: Tell us more about the background of your family and the reason your father moved to Tanzania. aq: My father emigrated from Sanaag region in what was at that time called British Somaliland. In those days, emigration (tacabbir) was popular. Men used to travel for work and a better life, but it was not an easy task. Those who emigrated to East Africa, my father included, went through southern Somalia first of all, then proceeded to Tanzania. They had to travel by road or foot through harsh and unfriendly territories. Some of the migrants died along the way, and my father was one of the fortunate who survived. In the Sanaag region, my father’s family lived in the Maydh district. They were involved in the fish industry and the exportation of livestock and animal hides, as well as timber, to the Gulf countries. My family was also a religious one, as they were the “keepers of the shrine” of Shaykh Ishaaq. 65 mrsh: So your family were the muruud (keepers) of the shrine. Likewise, I come from a muruud family and I am familiar with the system. aq: Yes, we were the muruud of Shaykh Ishaaq, therefore we were very well respected because of this role and position. With regard to Tanzania, my father died in 1931. My mother refused to marry my father’s brother, who lived in Tanzania with us, so she sold all the family property so we could move back to Somaliland. First of all, we arrived at Aden, Yemen, and remained there for some time. Then we traveled by boat to Maydh, then from there by road to Cerigavo. We lived there for two years, then we returned to Aden, which eventually became our permanent home. mrsh: What was your first engagement, meaning did you follow your father’s footsteps and enter business or did you go to school? aq: My first engagement was to study the Quran. While we were in Tanzania, there was a Quranic teacher who gave me private lessons in Quranic studies at home. During the two years that we were in Cerigavo, I was sent to a madrasah (Quranic school). Apart from the Quran, I also had my first experience with Arabic language there. When we settled in Aden, I entered a madrasah that was established by the Somali community. I was not really interested in continuing my Quranic studies, but my mother shuttled me to many madrasahs to reignite my interest somehow. I do not understand why I was bored, because I was not only a good student but a popular one as well. I even became a classroom assistant (kabiir). Another of my father’s brothers, who resided in Aden, married my mother and thus became our guardian. He was a very good man who commanded the respect of all the Somalis of Aden. I believe this was related to the title of muruud inherited from my father. After I lost interest in religious studies, I was attracted to the secular British schools in Aden. I requested that my uncle take me to one of these schools one day. However, when this day arrived, we left the house and walked some distance, but I felt that my uncle had other plans. On our way, various friends of his offered him a ride but he refused, saying that we were not going far. Suddenly, he stopped and faced me, and said, “Abdullahi, I really want you to study religion and I do not approve of you going to the British schools. If anything happens to me, then you will be my successor. This is what I wanted to tell you along the way today.” Then I replied, “Why did it take so long for Bildhaan Vol. 2 66 you to tell me this?” Thus, I respected his wishes and entered a madrasah where I finished the thirty parts of the Quran. mrsh: So you read the whole of the Quran? Amazing! This is the first time that I became aware that Abdullahi Qarshe, the composer and musician, read the whole of the Quran! aq: Indeed, not only did I read the whole Quran, but I also studied Arabic grammar, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and other Islamic subjects, as I was supposed to be heir to my uncle, the head of our muruud family. One day, my elder brother called to advise me that my previous conviction to go to school was better for me than following the muruud way. I went to a British school for a while, particularly night school. However, again I became completely bored with formal learning and I became more enticed by music. So instead of spending my time on learning and schooling, I spent many hours watching Indian movies, primarily to listen to accompanying Indian songs. mrsh: Was that, then, the beginning of your career/interest in music, or what Somalis more generally call fenn? aq: Yes. Also, my interest in music came about because of another event. During the Second World War, the British authorities in Aden established a radio station. Among the foreign languages broadcast were Hindi, Arabic, and Somali, which were given half an hour airtime. Both the Hindi and Arabic programs included music, but the Somali broadcast did not. A newsreader called Mahdi Eleeye read the news that was followed by classical Somali poetry (gabay) and took the remainder of the time. When Arabs visited Somali cafes, they would ask them, “Don’t you have your own music?” As I said earlier, my taste for music was first inspired by Indian music, and later I realized that broadcasters in the Arabic department were also using some aspects of Indian music and incorporating it into their melodies. Hence, I thought of doing the same, but at that stage I could not play any instrument. As far as singing was concerned, I used to sing religious songs at some gatherings, so I knew that if I could play the lute, I could sing along with it. One day, I saw a man in the market selling a lute and I wanted to buy it. Once I acquired the money for one, I approached the seller and out of the corner of my eye noticed another young man who also coveted the instrument. I pleaded with him to let me buy it. He was kind enough to do so and, thus, I took immediate possession. Now, where could I put this lute? I could not take it home since having one, according to my family, was tantamount to blas- Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 67 phemy! An idea came to mind: I put it in a box and approached a family friend and told him to pretend that it belonged to him. This was so that he could leave it in my home, and if anyone discovered the lute, then I could not be blamed. This friend did exactly this. Then, when the time for my departure to Somaliland came, he collected the box and brought it to me at the port before I embarked on my journey to Hargeisa. mrsh: So what followed? aq: I arrived in Hargeisa and stayed with a family friend called Mahmud Abdi Arale. Abdi Sinimo’s belwo was already making an impact on the urban population. However, there were only a few musicians and they were either Arabs or Indians inspired by the new Somali genre of the belwo. There were two main characters: Ina Beenaale, an Indian, and Abdo Yusuf, a Yemeni. They played basic instruments, the most important being the violin. They invited me to join them, so I did, but I was not yet really proficient in playing. We tried to create softer lyrics than classical Somali poetry and accompany it with music. In the beginning, it was not easy, and our band consisted of a mixture of clapping, the tambourine, and drumming. For instance, we wanted to inject some music into Elmi Bowdheri’s famous love poetry, and formulate songs. Where the alliteration was not feasible, we added Arabic or Hindi lyrics. At this stage, I wanted to earn some money and make use of the educational skills I acquired in Aden. Thus, I applied for a clerical post in the British colonial administration and succeeded. As a result, I was transferred first to Burao and then later to Berbera. It was in Berbera that I started to focus more on practicing my lute, after I met an elderly man named Bakri whom I asked to teach me the basics of the instrument. We agreed that he would teach me in exchange for a daily portion of khat. Ina Beenaale and Abdo Yusuf were not willing to do the same. I suppose they were afraid that I would steal the limelight from them, since I was the first would-be Somali musician and composer. mrsh: What was the first piece of music that you composed? aq: At this stage, I was not in a position to write music, so I used the melodies of old songs. However, the first composition I wrote was for the song “Ka Kacay! Ka Kacay!” (Wake up! Wake up!). This was 1948. mrsh: This must have been a crucial period of the mobilization for independence in Somaliland, when the territory entered a new phase of national consciousness. Bildhaan Vol. 2 68 aq: You’re right. There was the wind of change of nationalism, which as a political force inspired many people, including the educated few. Political organizations, such as the Somali National Society (SNS) and the Somali Youth League (SYL), were formed and were popular. The SNS established branches in the main towns of the protectorate, such as Hargeisa, Burao, Borama, Erigavo. It started as a welfare organization and later developed into a political party, the Somali National League (SNL). At this time, the belwo became very popular, to such an extent that the religious establishment became very nervous about it. For instance, one night we were practicing and playing songs in a private house in the Zakata Lire quarter of Hargeisa. When dawn broke, a well-known religious personality called Shaykh Ali Jawhar made the call to prayer and followed it with a warning directed at us to stop these “songs of innovation,” as he called them. When this story entered the city, the public’s disgust with us grew even more. They changed the term Belwo into Balaayo (evil). mrsh: Were there not any sympathetic groups? aq: Some of the more educated appreciated the fact that the belwo itself had developed Somali literature and art in general. Among them was Yusuf Haji Aden, a teacher who had already contributed several nationalist songs. He suggested the change of the term Belwo to Heello, so as to rid it of the evil stigma. Yusuf Ismail Samatar, another teacher, supported our cause. During this time, the former District Commissioner of the National Frontier District (NFD), Mr. Reece (also known as “Kamakama” by the Somalis), was transferred to Somaliland. His arrival coincided with the building of the first churches in Hargeisa. I had heard that Reece had been an oppressive colonial character in the NFD. I did not know how it came to me, but I decided to compose a song, which became the well-known song “Ka Kacaay! Ka Kacaay!” (Wake up! Wake up!): Ka kacaay ka kacaay ka kacaay! Wake up, wake up, wake up! Ka kacaay ka kacaay ka kacaay! Wake up, wake up, wake up! Ka kacaay ka kacaay ka kacaay! Wake up, wake up, wake up! Ka kacaay ka kacaay ka kacaay! Wake up, wake up, wake up! Ka kacaay ka kacaay ka kacaay! Wake up, wake up, wake up! kalhore nujabnee We have been defeated before kaftankii ma jiree T this is no time for joking Koroley la gubyay Koroley has been burnt to the ground kufaceen la dilyay Our people have been killed And the infidels have increased in number. kufrigii badayay. mrsh: What other songs did you compose after that? aq: “Ka Kacaay! Ka Kacaay!” was not so serious. I think the first one I wrote was “Garta naqa” (Sort out the Claims): Gadh baan leeyahay oo I am a grown man Guddida ma galee But I am not consulted by the elders Gugaygu ma weynee I am still young Garta naqa. Make your own judgment Labada gelin gaalaa i dirata Morning and afternoon I serve the infidels Habeenki ma gam’ee And at night I remain sleepless Garta naqa. Make your own judgment Wax kaa gooni ah oo Something that is a part of you Aan jidhkaaga gelayn oo But yet detached from you Aan kaa gaabinayn And that cannot be reconnected Garta naqa. Make your own judgment Gabadha cishqiqeedi baa i gel oo I’m overwhelmed by the love of this woman Wax ba ku gudban ee But I am barred from her Garta naqa. Make your own judgment Haddaan guursan lahaa If I married her Gob weeyaan She would be a most suitable bride Haddana ma geeye ee Yet she is out of reach Garta naqa. Make your own judgment These songs were composed in 1948. As I mentioned earlier, I was working as a clerk for the British Protectorate police force from 1948 to 1949. The police force had a musical group called Band Boys, in Mandera. I was interested in becoming involved in this group and I asked another clerk, a friend of mine who was working in Mandera, if we could swap our posts so I could work there. He agreed. I wrote a letter to the authorities regarding this transfer, which was accepted. Some people thought I had been transferred as a punishment for my song “Ka Kacaay! Ka Kacaay!” In reality, however, it was I who had asked for the transfer. mrsh: While you were in Mandera you composed a love song, didn’t you? Bildhaan Vol. 2 70 aq: Oh, yes. The song was for the girl I married and who became the mother of my son. However, she remarried later on, so I prefer not to revisit this song. mrsh: I remember the song myself. It started like this: Intaanan dhiman dhahay dhahay Say it, say it, say it, before I die dhahay Aqalkay ku jirto iyo agta u dhowee The house she lived in and its surroundings Maandheera oo idil way udgoontahay And the whole city of Mandera exude a fragrant smell Udgoon dhahay dhahay. Say it, say it, all are fragrant. The girl you sing about, wasn’t she the daughter of Abdullahi Abi Farah? aq: Yes, she was. We agreed to marry each other, but then I realized that she was promised to another man. Also, financially I was not ready for marriage. When I heard that her family had set her up with another man, I rushed to my kin members in Hargeisa for help, so that they would approach her family for her hand on my behalf. Among the prominent members of my family were two civil servants, Mahmud Abdi Arale and Ali Said Arale. They particularly questioned my eligibility for marriage. They asked me how much money I had. I said, “One hundred dollars.” They laughed at me and said that they could not possibly approach her family if I was in this sorry state. I said to them that I had already made my own decision. I would propose directly to her family myself and either be accepted or rejected. If I were rejected, then they would be humiliated. After a heated debate, Mahmud Abdi Arale interjected and said that Abdullahi would fulfill his threat and bring shame (ceeb) if they did not comply. So the next day, they accompanied me to her house with the dowry and the marriage was agreed and completed. However, I still had to meet the expenses of the second stage, when the bride moves into a house with her husband. I was lucky because at that time I recorded some songs with a company in Aden, which was owned by two Somalis and an Arab. They suggested that I become a shareholder, but I retorted that I required the money immediately for my marriage expenses. mrsh: What were the songs that you recorded for the company? aq: I really do not remember, but they were some of the oldest songs that I recorded. In London, one day, a Somali woman played these songs for me on a gramophone. I asked her if she knew the singer, and Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 71 she replied “yes.” I told her that the singer was me, but she insisted that the voice was that of Abdullahi Laangadhe (Abdullahi with the limp). Then, I told her that that was my old nickname because of my leg injury. mrsh: By the way, what happened to your leg? aq: People often say that an evil wind affected it, but in fact it was the result of a mosquito bite, which happened to me in Tanzania about two years before I returned to Somaliland. mrsh: When did you marry and did you have any children? aq: I had a boy in my first marriage. His name was Artan. I took the name from the play called Cartan iyo Ceebla because he was born when my performing group was involved in this play. mrsh: Back to the world of music and songs. Now we have Abdullahi Qarshe, married in 1950 and working in Mandera. What followed next? aq: While living in that village, I composed several songs and some of them had no names. Soon, I resigned from my job and decided to return to Hargeisa. I got a job at Radio Hargeisa, where I had a dual responsibility: I was an administrator as well as a news broadcaster. In addition to that, during after hours, I used to write music and play with available musicians. mrsh: Let us now focus on the plays that you either produced or coproduced. What was the first play in which you participated? aq: I forgot to mention something earlier. When I was at school in Aden, I asked my teacher if I could join the end-of-year play. He said that, unfortunately, there was no character with a limp for me to play, so I was a little disappointed about that. However, he said that if I was interested, I should hang around the rehearsals. The first play in which I performed was in Burao, and was written by Yusuf Ismail Samatar. Somaliland plays used to originate in schools at the end of the school year, not from professional groups. Samatar pioneered a new genre in the production of the play. He incorporated Somali, Arabic, and English into a play he wrote. The Arabic part was about revenge. The English part commented on the British authorities and the public. The Somali section was a critique of those who were anti-belwo or anti-heello. Samatar included some of the administrative clerks of the protectorate in his play, and a prominent character was an interpreter who could not speak English properly. For example, he did Bildhaan Vol. 2 72 not competently convey the wishes of the public to the authorities, nor those of the authorities to the public. Afterwards, the Somali civil servants’ official Union Centre became the new location, a kind of salon, for exchanging ideas on production. I produced a play called Waano Aabbe (The Advice of a Father) and I was not satisfied with the acting, but otherwise it was a decent creative effort. Thereafter, I thought of forming an artistic group, so subsequently, I created Walaalo Hargeisa (The Hargeisa Brothers). mrsh: When was Walaalo Hargeisa formed? Tell me a little about its background. aq: It must have been the beginning of 1955; and the group was drawn from ordinary artists and civil servants. Of particular note was an Indian artist who played the flute with extraordinary flair. mrsh: He must be Mr. Rao? aq: Yes, it was Rao, an artist of the highest order, who was my right hand. Walaalo Hargeisa became a talented and select group of artists who were to raise Somali modern music to new heights. mrsh: If we look at many of the lyrics of that time, they sound rather frivolous. For instance, let us take the line: “Silsilad gubatay, Siraad xaajay, Sariirta ma noo goglaysaa” (A scattered and broken necklace, you, Sirad Haji, will you prepare the bed for us?). aq: True, the early songs were too playful, but still amusing — for instance: “Sidii Talyinkii, Tacliin badan ee, Maryama tiijar ee, Take my self!” (Like the Italians, one so educated is she, Maryama the teacher, Take my self!). Another example is: “Naftaydana hoo, Naftaadana keen, Ha la isku tumee, Tib ii keen!” (Take my soul! And give me yours! Let them be as one, to crush them together, bring me the pestle!). In addition: “Hablaha dhaanka wada, Ma a dhuuntaa, Mid uun dhexda ma iska duubaa” (Shall I lie in waiting for, one of the girls collecting water? Shall I snatch one and wrap myself around her like a snake?). The next two examples are more serious: “Guduudo Carwooy, Gugii la arkaba, Allow yaa gashaanti kaa dhigaaa” (By every year that passes, Dear God! If only you could be made young again!); and “Sidii cir ku hooray, Meel cusub loo, Cadceeddi u soo baxda ayaad tahay” (You are like lush nature, showered by rain and graced by the sun). mrsh: After forming Walaalo Hargeisa, what was the first play that you took part in? Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 73 aq: It was called Soomaalidii Hore iyo Soomaalidii Dambe (Somalis of the Past and Somalis of the Present), and it coincided with the handing over of the Hawd area to Ethiopia in 1955. The play was a lamentation of this dreadful event and other similar happenings in Somali territories still under colonial occupation. It started with a man who carried a message about Italian oppression in the south of Somalia to a woman, married and living in Berbera. The message contained a request from her family in the south for her help. Subsequently, she convinced her husband to let her leave and aid her people. When he asked her about the welfare of their children, she replied that the fate of the country was more important. The essence of the play was to inform the audience about how the Somalis in the past fought for their country. The play had only one song, called “Taah” (Sighing), which goes as follows: “Intay adiga iyo arliga tahay, Asaanay laabi labo ahaanayn, agtayda ha marin, ishayduna ayaynu ku arkin, Ha ii iman” (When it comes to you and the country, My heart cannot be divided, Do not come near me, And let not my eye fall upon you, Stay away from me!). mrsh: Obviously, as a group (i.e., Walaalo Hargeisa), you were largely defined by the historical and nationalistic era. Did this mean a neglect of other themes such as love and romance? aq: We thought about a plot that could combine love and Pan-Somali sentiments. We wanted to take such a performance to Mogadishu, Aden, and Djibouti. So the group produced a play called Cartan iyo Ceebla (Artan and Ebla). Muhammad Said Guronjire (another major figure of our group) and I composed new songs and music. We benefited from already existing songs, such as “Jowhara Luula” and “Daawac,” whose style we mixed with the new compositions. mrsh: Was the idea for Cartan and Ceebla borrowed from the Arabic love story Layla and Majnoon? aq: No, not at all. It was an original Somali play and had nothing to do with that. mrsh: Can you capture for us the main plot of the play? aq: A man is in love with a girl whose family had already made arrangements with another suitor. Subsequently, the girl became possessed with demons and the family tries every doctor and remedy to cure her. One day, an old woman visits the family and declares that the girl is not sick but merely in love. It was a story intertwining tradition, parental powers, and individual autonomy. Bildhaan Vol. 2 74 The next play was called Isa Seeg (Mutual Miss), and was of a greater complexity. It had seven new songs; among them were “Nugul,” “Damaq,” “Dankeli,” and “Wadaag.” The characters included a man in love with a woman who, in turn, was smitten by a man who, in turn, was attracted to another woman. It is a play full of pretensions and deception. The play attracted a lot of praise from the public. One of the memorable lines of one song was: “Wiilooy, Warsamo ku weheeshanayee, Wiilooy, Ha is cunsiin waraabaha” (Oh tomboy! Warsame is your companion. Oh tomboy! Don’t let the hyenas eat you!). mrsh: I thought this was a political play. aq: There was a lot of metaphor that could be interpreted as political. For example: “Laba darran, Dooro la yidhi” (Between two horrible options, I am condemned to choose) was understood as a reference to the Djiboutian election of 1958, when the public was asked to vote “Yes” for continued occupation by France, or “No,” which meant independence. Among the main actors were Mohammad Ahmed, Omar Dhuule (both playing women’s roles), Ahmed Ali Dararamle, Hasan Geni (who took the part of a maid), and Abdullahi Jama Magalo (who played the father of the main female character). Mohammad Ahmed and Omar Dule assumed those roles because the public did not yet approve of female actors. The next play was titled Kibiroow! Kab iga Xuur! (Oh Ingratitude! You have turned Me into a Pauper!). Despite the absence of any gabay or geeraar, I think that this was probably the most important play that Hargeisa Brothers ever performed. The story goes like this: The wife of a working class man with a limited income comes under the influence of a businesswoman. This businesswoman often brings her a variety of clothes and other items and persuades her to buy them. Eventually, the wife becomes fed up and tells the woman that she cannot afford to buy any of her wares since she and her husband have a low income. The businesswoman then says, “Don’t worry. I will lend you what you need and you can pay me back later.” The wife buys more clothes. The husband complains to his wife about her profligate and consumerist expenditures, and tells her he will not pay any more. The businesswoman tells the wife that if her husband cannot give her what she desires, he does not deserve to be her husband and she must leave him, demand a divorce, and have her dowry paid in cash. She suggests that the money of the dowry could be invested in the khat business. Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 75 The businesswoman also suggests that the woman could attract other men after her divorce. The play depicted how a poor but decent family was corrupted and then destroyed by the influence of an intruder who used self-serving intrigue and deception. mrsh: Now we approach 1960. So what followed? aq: In 1960, we produced a play that we already discussed, Gardiid waa Alla diid (He who Refuses Justice, Refuses Allah). This play coincided with the 1960 election for independence in Somaliland. The play predicted the outcome of the election and what political parties might win. In fact, we put forth that the SNL/USP would win the majority of the seats and the results confirmed our intuition. mrsh: Were you and your fellow artists, the Hargeisa Brothers, supporters of those political parties? aq: Oh, yes, Walaala Hargeisa were fully involved in the political process for independence. However, there were other artists, such as Osman Mohamed (“Ga’anloo”) and Ali Fayrus, who supported other parties such as the NUF (National United Front). Among the songs in this play were “Aan maalno hasheena Maandeeq” (Let us milk our shecamel Maandeeq), “Waa Mahad Alle” (Thanks be to Allah), and “Geeskii Afrikaa gabyoo, wuxuu yidhi” (The Horn of Africa Recited Poetry and Said). mrsh: Was this play written by Balaayo ‘As (Barkhad ‘As)? aq: No, it was written by Sahardiid Mohamed, who also composed some outstanding love songs. mrsh: When Somaliland achieved its independence on June 26, 1960, followed by the July 1 union of Somaliland and Somalia to make the new Somali Republic, what was the state of the arts in Somalia? aq: On June 27, 1960, the majority of Walaalo Hargeisa and I hired a car and went by road to Mogadishu to take part in the momentous 1st of July celebrations. At that time, in my opinion, there were no artists of our caliber in the South. Only small groups of traditional dancers participated with us in the celebrations. mrsh: What about artists such as Ali Malehan, Hilole Maalin, and Dalays? Bildhaan Vol. 2 76 aq: These artists were there but their production skills were not as sophisticated as ours, nor did they compose the same standard of songs and music as we did. mrsh: During the 1960s, two of your songs stood out. One was “Lumumba Mana Noola Mana Dhiman” (Lumumba is neither Alive nor Dead). The second was “Dugsiyada Ogaada u Aada” (Be Alert to Education and Go to School!). Could you remind us of some of the lines of the first song? aq: Oh, yes: “Lumumba mana noola mana dhiman, Labada midna ha u malaynina, Inu maqanyahay ha u moodina, Laba midna ha a malaynina” (Lumumba is neither alive nor dead, Don’t think that he is either, for his spirit is with us, Don’t think he has disappeared. Don’t think that he is either, for his spirit is with us). mrsh: How did this song come to you? aq: One day, I came out from my house and saw a crowd listening to the radio in front of a tea shop. The news was about the crisis in Congo in 1962. The U.N. forces had just intervened in the civil war, ostensibly to save the Prime Minister of Congo, Patrice Lumumba, who was arrested and later assassinated by his opponents. “Lumumba mana noola mana dhiman” had a kind of Pan-African sentiment because of Lumumba’s nationalist vision and courage. mrsh: Could you remind us of some of the lines of the song that underscores the importance of learning? aq: “Aqoon-La’aani waa iftiin la’aan, Waa aqal iyo ilays La’aan, Ogaada ogaada dugsiyada ogaada, U aada u aada dugsiyada u aada, Walaalayaal u aada dugsiyada u aada, Indhaha aan ku kala qaadne, ifka ugu ilbaxsanaane, Ogaada, ogaada dugsiyada ogaada.” (Ignorance is darkness. It is a house without light. Be aware! Be aware! Be alert to education! Go! Go! Go to school! Go to school, my people! Go to school! Let us open our eyes to the wonder of knowledge, and let us be the most educated and civilized!). mrsh: I cannot recall the name of this other play, but it was about the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Do you remember it? aq: It was called Indho-sercaad (Elusive Reality). This was a most important political play, with rich melodies and lyrics, performed by Walaalo Hargeisa. When we played in the capital, Mogadishu, it attracted huge publicity and audiences. For example, the first Prime Minister of the Republic, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, requested that we perform the Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 77 play one night for the diplomatic community in Mogadishu. The Commander of Police, General Mohamed Abshir Muuse, invited us to do the same for the police force. It is often said that this play was a source of inspiration during the war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the ****** territory in 1964. mrsh: Had the standard of Somali plays and songs improved when you moved to Mogadishu? If so, what was your role in this? aq: Immediately after the July celebrations, I moved to a hotel in Mogadishu. I had little money and was waiting for some return on my recordings to pay for my expenses. A group of artists from Mogadishu, including Abdi Muhumad Amin and Ahmed Naaji Saad, who had already established a musical group called Kaah, asked me to join them. So I did, and subsequently moved from the hotel to private accommodations. Later, we all became members of Radio Mogadishu dramatic arts group and produced more songs and plays together, with good instruments and recording equipment. When I wrote the Lumumba song, many people who didn’t know me became more interested in my work. mrsh: So the Lumumba song raised you to new heights and status? aq: Remember, I was not only a musician, but I had been a known administrator and broadcaster in the British Protectorate of Somaliland. I could have pleaded for my job back, but I didn’t ask the new government and no one offered to reinstate me. mrsh: The lyrics and accompanying music for the national flag, “Qolaba calankoo waa cayn” (Every Nation has its Own Flag), must be your most important nationalistic composition. True or not? aq: The music for the flag was meant to be the national anthem. Although it was not adopted officially, the song remained in the public domain as the national anthem. The great composer, Hussein Aw Farah, my co-producer and one of the founders of Walaalo Hargeisa, wrote the lyrics and I composed the music. We started working on it in 1955, after we saw the new national flag. The color and design of the flag was the idea of a man called Awale Libaan, who sent his idea, in 1954, to the committee that was overseeing the design of a new flag, who then accepted it. In 1960, on the eve of Somaliland’s independence, a British band arrived from Aden to rehearse for the celebrations. I was asked to produce a tune that was fit for the occasion. I played “Every Nation has its Own Flag” for them. Then the conductor Bildhaan Vol. 2 78 said, “Do you have anything else?,” so I played the tune of another song called “Dhulkayaga” (Our Land), and they chose this one for the occasion. mrsh: Regarding your only trip to London, when was it and what were the reasons for it? aq: I traveled to London in 1961, and the main reason was medical treatment for my leg. First, the Soviet embassy in Mogadishu suggested that I go to Moscow. However, perhaps the Somali Government was not in favor of that, so they found an alternative, and I was offered a one-year music scholarship and medical treatment by the British Council in Britain. mrsh: During that year in London, did you compose and play any music or meet any foreign artists? aq: In 1962, there were disastrous floods in East Africa, particularly in Somalia, and there was a charity organization collecting money in London for this emergency. I participated with other artists to raise money in aid of the victims. On another occasion, I played at the BBC World Service’s Somali Section, at Bush House in London, in celebration of the second anniversary of the Somali Republic. This was arranged by the Somali ambassador and the staff of the Somali Section. mrsh: What other places have you visited? aq: Many. I visited China, Sudan, Yemen (many times), Egypt, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Italy, France, and Nigeria. mrsh: You mentioned earlier a connection between Somali and Indian music. You have visited and performed in China, and China built the National Theatre in Mogadishu. Is there any affinity between Somali and Chinese music? aq: Definitely. There is a hint of Chinese melodies in Somali music. Some female members of our later Waaberi group, such as Hibo Muhammad, Fadumo Qasim, and Dalays and Maryam Mursal, sang several Chinese songs in Beijing when we were on tour there. Similarly, the Chinese orchestra played a Somali song by Huriyo in praise of Mao Tse-Tung, for which I had written the tune. However, Chinese music is more multidimensional—they even play classical European music, which we don’t. mrsh: Did you write a tune for a song in praise of Chinese foreign minister Chou en-Lai when he visited Somalia in 1962? Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 79 aq: That song was written by the incomparable Ali Sugule. mrsh: The Somali people and others regard you as the “Father of Somali Music.” Is this how you see yourself? aq: No. There was always music: for weddings, lullabies, watering animals, working, dancing (shurbo), night dancing (sacab habeenkii la tumo), exorcism (saar). All these existed, so one can only say that there were no musical instruments to accompany them. One cannot say, therefore, that I am the “Father of Somali Music.” Even modern music was in the air at the time of Abdi Sinimo, who is widely regarded as the genius who formulated and organized it into the belwo and thus took welldeserved credit and honor for it. Perhaps, I am the first Somali to set Somali songs to the music of the lute (kaman). mrsh: Did you ever meet Abdi Sinimo? aq: I met him in Djibouti in 1956, when we performed our first play. mrsh: What did he look like? aq: We sat together and conversed about how the belwo emerged. He was neither tall nor short, neither fat nor thin, but on the slim side. He was brownish in tone and you could tell he was an artist by the way he walked. He used to go to the barber and have his hair cut, all except a bit on the crown of his head. I asked him how the belwo came to him. He said that once, whilst he was driving his truck, he came into a desert area. The truck ran into some difficulty and he had no spare parts. Other trucks approached to help, but they had no spare parts either. This situation, in which people are eager to help you but are unable to, gave rise to the belwo. Abdi Sinimo told me that in the solitude there was something of inspiration, and he just started to sing the following lines: “Balwooy, Hooy belwooy/ Waxaa I baleeyay baabuur/Waxaa I baleeyay Borama.” (Abdi Sinimo was going in the direction of Borama and came from Djibouti. He envisaged his friends in Borama having a nice time.) As we know now, these few lines gave rise to the modern Somali heello. mrsh: You recorded an interview for the BBC Somali Service while you were in Britain in 1962. In this interview, you said that Somali music does not need many instruments. What did you mean? aq: What I meant was that the music that needs many instruments is often one that has a written form like Western classical music. In written music, each musician plays a certain tune in order to produce an orchestra. On the other hand, Somali music is not as yet written. There- Bildhaan Vol. 2 80 fore, it is more beautiful when played with basic traditional instruments, such as the lute. Numerous instruments could result in cacophony. But I believe that there are many musical sounds in the Somali language, some very ancient. If the tragic collapse of the Somali state did not happen, perhaps we might have finally written our music and preserved many musical sounds. mrsh: Do you actually write music? aq: No. I tried several times. While I was in Britain, I took a course on the theory of music. mrsh: Who do you think is the best Somali musician, in your judgment? aq: I think it is Mohamed Saeed (Gu’roon-Jire). We started writing music at the same period, and there was a healthy competition between us. He produced delightful melodies and played the lute with exceptional magnificence. mrsh: What about lyric writers and playwrights? aq: With regard to the lyrics, it must be the late Belaayo Cas or Barkhad Cas, as people now like to refer to him. He was a supremely original as well as a firm nationalist. His lyrics were largely about Somali nationhood and the struggle for independence. As for playwrights, I can say Husein Aw Farah, my co-producer, was the best of our generation. Ali Sugule was impressive as well, but his plays were mainly limited to politics. There are many songwriters, playwrights, and musicians of later generations whose work I have not followed systematically. I am sure there are stars here too. mrsh: There are legendary women singers such as Magool, Maandeeq, Hibo Muhamad, and Marian Mursal. Why don’t we have women composers of music and songs? aq: This is a good question and maybe they did not try. I am sure that if they did, they could write music or play instruments like their male colleagues. mrsh: Let us focus for a moment on 1969, when the military junta seized power in the Somali Republic. You wrote songs to welcome the change but you also had a political opinion. Can you enlighten us on your view on this? aq: I was in favor of the change and I fully supported it. For example, I put together a song for that historic moment, starting with: “Baga, Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan 81 Baga, xoogayaga waan u baahnayne baga baga, Hadii uu baarlamaankii baguugaha ka dhigay waan u baahnayne baga baga, Bishaara bishaara bishaara bilatayee oktoobar, Bilkheyr dhaha bilkheyr dhaha” (Let it be, let it be, We needed our armed forces, Let it be, let it be, If they abolished the corrupted parliament, Let it be, let it be, Good tidings, good tidings, good tidings, October has begun, Celebrate the good news, October has brought a change, Celebrate the good news). But, as you must know, this joy about the military take-over, which I shared with many Somalis, did not last. My last songs prior to the collapse of the Somali state were all banned from being broadcast by Radio Mogadishu. Among them was “Ma Allaah baday suuqa madow, Ma Allaah baday” (Did Allah condemn us to this dark alley, did Allah condemn us?) I realized, like many others, the destruction that the military caused the society, and the song was a reflection of such an agonizing realization. mrsh: Siyaad Barre escaped, in the belly of a tank, from the presidential palace in Mogadishu on January 27, 1991. Where were you at that time? aq: I was in my home, which was only a short distance from the presidential palace, Villa Somalia. The fleeing Siyaad Barre and his bodyguards passed in front of my house. Many friends took refuge with me, so my house was akin to Abu Sufyan’s abode. I think people knew that if they came there, they would probably be safe. In my house there was the engineer, Saeed Antaana, who had the keys of the main studios of Radio Mogadishu. He also belonged to Siyaad Barre’s kin, which was, at this point, the target. The United Somali Congress of General Aideed sent a cohort to my house to take Saeed Antaana to open the national studios. I told them that the man was under my protection in my house, and therefore I would not allow them to take him. They said, “Abdullahi Qarshe, we know you and no harm will be done. We only want Saeed to open the studio for us.” They did what they promised. After few days, I left Mogadishu and arrived here in Djibouti. mrsh: This is exile. How are you coping? aq: First, the Djibouti Government promised accommodation and support, but somehow this did not materialize. Later, some members of my extended family group started to collect contributions, which turned out to be a significant sum to support my needs. This was not Bildhaan Vol. 2 82 my preference. I would have liked to have been helped by Somalis in general rather than relying on a kin donation. mrsh: Doesn’t this show the denudation of Somali nationalism (Soomaalinimo) at this historical juncture? aq: Very much so. mrsh: What are your plans now? aq: I have sent the family to Hargeisa and I am preparing to go to London. With regard to the general question, the Somali people are now passing a critical stage in their history. This is a time of destruction and flagrant abuses. The consequence is less interest in nationalist songs, the mainstay of my creative imagination. It is so disheartening that the evil vanquished the good. Now tribalism or clanism (qabyaalad) and the explosion of the gun (qarax) dominate the Somali social scene. In a situation like this, we must seek refuge in Allah. My two most recent songs take this direction. The following is a prayer for peace and harmony: “Roonoow Rabbiyoow Rahmaanoow, Soomaalida u roonoow” (O, benevolent and gracious God, extend your mercy to Somalis). It is a song about peace and harmony. mrsh: Given your outstanding contribution to Somali literature and arts, and in conjunction with the independence movement, have you been nationally honored? aq: Yes, in 1959, even before independence, I was awarded a medal together with other artists, at the Mogadishu celebrations. Moreover, the military regime also awarded me medals on a number of occasions —a silver one, a gold one, and one of copper. But more importantly, for me, I have treasured the love and support extended to me by the entire nation. Such is the greatest ambition of any artist. http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=bildhaan