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Everything posted by Deeq A.
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Khilaafka Laascaanood haddii la Daaroodeeyo, oo Geeska Afrika la isaga habarwacdo, xaqa Sool clan ee xalaasha ah aniga iyo qof kale toonna akhlaaq ahaan ma difaaci karo, run ahaantii. Eex iyo xadgudubna anigu ku ma jiro, runtana la ii ga ma dhakowsiiyo. Aynnu ka bilowno xaqiiqadan. Iyada oo aan qof Isaaq ahi juuq ka celin, dhawr iyo toban sano waxaa la gu soo celcelinayay halhayska ah “Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn”. Haddaba waa maxay Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn xaqiiqo ahaan? Maxaa loo ga jeedaa? Sidee ku yimid halqabsigan meel walba ka dhacay? Maxaa se Isaaqu intaas oo dhan u ga aamusnaa oo u ga falcelin waayay? Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn waa eray halgameed Soomaalilaand liddi ku ah oo ay samaysay jabhaddii SSC iyo mataanteedii Khaatumo, ujeeddaduna ahayd in Sool clan helo maamul goboleed. Sida dastuurka Soomaaliya qorayo, maamul goboleed waxaa is ku noqon kara laba gobol iyo ka badan. Hadddaba jabhaddaasi wax ay hindistay in ay faafiso dacaayad ah in ay u halgamayso saddex gobol oo magacyadoodu yihiin Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn. Haddii arrintu sidaa ahayd, saddexda gobol aynnu macnaynno. 1. Cayn ma aha gobol siyaasad ahaan jira, oo Soomaaliya weligeed ma ay magacaabin gobol Cayn la yidhaahdo. Taariikh ahaan Cayn waxaa ahaa degmada Caynaba iyo ceelasha iyo daaqsinta ku meersan, waana degaan leh dabeecadda loo gu magacbixiyay oo ah il ama ilo. Dhulkaa waxaa dega qabiilka East Burco Clan. Laakiin qolada jabhadda Sool clan wax ay Cayn u bixiyeen degmada kale ee Buuhoodle, taas oo dhul ahaan ka tirsan Ciid iyo Hawd, siyaasad ahaanna ka tirsan gobolka Togdheer. Haddii se jabhaddu Buuhoodle gobol Cayn la yidhaahdo u la baxday, waa degmo u qaybsan Sool clan iyo East Burco Clan, oo ay si is la’eg u wada degaan, iyada oo magaalada Buuhoodle Sool clan u gaar tahay. 2. Sanaag waa gobolkii awowyada soomaalida, oo la yidhaahdo dadkuba halkaas buu ka soo tafiirmay. Gobolkaa degmooyinkiisa waxaa wada leh Isaaq iyo East Sanaag Clan, laakiin Sool clan daaqsin uu ka soo gaadho mooyee wax degmo ah ku ma laha. Markaa adeegsiga magaca “Sanaag” waa hadal aan wax macne ah lahayn. 3. Sool waa gobolkii Maxamed Siyaad ka jaray gobolka Togdheer sannadihii dabka SNM ku shidnaa si uu reeraha u ka la qaybiyo oo isu gu diro. Laakiin afarta degmo ee gobolka, magaalada Laascaanood oo ah xarunta waxaa leh Sool clan, Taleex waxaa leh Sool clan, Xuddun waxaa wada leh Sool clan iyo Sacad Yoonis, Caynaba oo ah magaalada labaad ee gobolka u gu bulsho badan waxaa leh East Burco Clan, tuulooyinkuna sidaas bay u qaybsan yihiin. Taa macnaheedu waxaa weeye, Sanaag ma jirto, Cayn ma jirto, Sool waa la wada lee yahay, sidaa darteed halhayska Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn waa dhalanteed. Isaaqu maxay intaas oo sano u ga falcelin waayeen adeegsiga halhayska Sool, Sanaag iyo Cayn? Sababta oo ah Dhulbahantaha ayay ogaan hadalka u gu daynayeen oo u gu sedburinayeen, iyaga oo is lahaa Soomaalilaand-nimada ku wada jira oo qabyaalad ha tusina. Haddaba aqoonyahanka iyo siyaasiga Daarood ee af iyo addinba duullaanka ah, ee malleeshiyaadka soo abaabulaya, ee leh dhul Daarood baan xoraynayaa iyo maamul goboleed baan samaynayaa, bal umadda Soomaaliyeed hadalkaa aan qoray ha ka la doodo oo af la fahmi karo ha ku qanciyo. Waxa qoray Ibraahim Hawd Source
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Qarax ka dhashay xatooyo Shidaal dalka Nigeria ayaa sababay geerida 12 ruux, kadib markii ay qaraxday Dhuun Shidaal oo ku taalla magaalo dhacda Koonfurta dalkaasi. Qaraxa ayaa yimid sida laga soo xigtay Booliiska, kadib markii koox burcad ah ay isku dayeen in ay xadaan Shidaal, dhuun ku talla Degaanka Niger Delta ee shidaalka lagu sifeeyo.. Deegaanka ayaa inta badan waxaa ka dhaca qaraxyada dhuumaha shidaalku waxaana ka dambeeya kooxo dambiilayaal ah oo Shidaalka xada haddana dib u sifeeya si aan sharci aheyn. Arrinta ayaa dhaawaxc dhibaato dhaqaale ah geysata, sidoo kalena keenta dhibaatooyin dhinaca degeenka ah, koox bulshada rayidka ah ayaa sheegay in tirada dhimatay ay sii badan karaan. Goobjoog News Source: goobjoog.com
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Dowlad goboleedka Puntland ayaa markale ku celiyay in aysan qeyb ciidameeda ka aheyn dagaalka ka dhacaya magaalada Laascaanood ee xarunta gobolka Sool, xilli Somaliland dhankeeda ay sheegtay in dagaalka ay ku jiraan ciidamo ka tirsan Puntland iyo kuwa dowladda federalka Soomaaliya. Qoraal kasoo baxay wasaaradda arrimaha gudaha federalka iyo dimuquraadiyeynta Puntland ayaa lagu sheegay in dagaalka Laascaano aysan qeyb ka aheyn ciidanka maamulka, iyadoo magaalada ay ku dagaalamayaan bil ku dowaad ciidanka SSC iyo Milatariga Somaliland , kaas oo dhaliyay khasaare xoogan. Magaalada Laascaanood oo labadii maalin ee la soo dhaafay yare deganeed ayaa waxaa muddo bil kudhow ku dagaalamayay ciidamada Milatariga Somaliland iyo xoogga deegaanka, kuwaas oo diidanaa joogintaan ciidanka maamulka ee magaalada, waxaana dagaalka ka dhashay khasaare naf iyo maaliyadeed ah. Goobjoog News Source: goobjoog.com
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Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federalka Soomaaliya mudane Xasan Shiikh Maxamuud ayaa soo gabagabeeyay safar qaatay sedex maalmood uu joogay magaalada Kismaayo ee xarunta KMG ah ee maamulka Jubbaland, isaga oo aan booqan gobolka Gedo oo ay ka jirto dood u dhaxeysa maamulka gobolka iyo madaxda Jubbaland. Madaxweynaha ayaa dhanka kale bogaadiyay howlgallada ay wadaan ciidanka xoogga dalka iyo oo taageero ka helaya kuwa Jubbaland, isaga oo carab ku dhuftay inuu bilowday howlgalka looga soo horjeedo Al-shabaab ee deegaannadaas, bulshada ayuu ugu baaqay in ay ka qeyb noqdaan dagaalka iyo dib u-dhiska dowladnimada. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh Maxmauud oo uu wehlinayo Madaxweynaha dowlad-goboleedka Jubaland mudane Axmed Maxamed Islaam ayaa dhagax dhigay waddo laami ah oo isku xirta degmooyinka Kismaayo iyo Af-madoow ee gobolka Jubada hoose taasi oo masaafo ahaan dhan 120 Kiilo mitir oo baahi loo qabay. Safarka madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda ee magaalada Kismaayo ayaa waxaa uu kusoo aadayaa xilli ciidamada huwanta ah ay bilaabeen dagaalka ka dhanka al-shabaab ee deegaannada maamulkaas oo Al-shabaab ay ka joogaan deegaanno iyo degmooyin ay ku jirto magaalada caasimadda ah ee Bu’aale gobolka Jubbada dhexe. Goobjoog News Source: goobjoog.com
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Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud ayaa bogaadiyay Hawlgallada ka dhanka ah Al-shabaab ee ka socda Jubaland. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh ayaa Ciidamada Xoogga dalka SNA iyo kuwa Jubaland ku bogaadiyay guulaha ay ka gaareen dagaalka Al-shabaab. “Waan bogaadinayaa ciidamada qaranka iyo daraawiishta Jubaland guulihii ay kasoo hooyeen Dagaalkii ay shalay la galeen Khawaarijta. DFS waa ay sii xoojinaysaa doorkeeda howlgalada socda” ayuu yiri Madaxweynaha Hadalkan ayuu Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh jeediyay kadib markii uu soo geba-gabeeyay Safarkii uu tegay Dowlad Goboleedka Jubaland. Halkan ka daawo Hadalkiisa PUNTLAND POST The post Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh oo bogaadiyay Hawlgallada ka socda Jubaland appeared first on Puntland Post.
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Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Xildhibaano ka tirsan Baarlamaanka Soomaaliya ayaa ka falceliyay muddo kordhinta la damacsan yahay in loo sameeyo hay’adaha kala duwan ee dowladda federaalka, kadib markii guddoonka labada Aqal uu u guddi u xilsaaray arrintaas. Ergeyga gaarka ah ee madaxweynaha Soomaaliya uu qaabilsan arrimaha bani’aadanimada, ahna xildhibaan ka tirsan Golaha Shacabka, Cabdirxamaan Cabdishakuur Warsame ayaa ka horyimid tallabadan gaar ahaan in muddo kororsi loo sameeyo labada Aqal, madaxweynaha iyo ra’iisul wasaaraha. Cabdiraxmaan Cabdishakuur ayaa shaaciyay in guddoonka Baarlaamanka laga filayay inay soo bandhigaan ajandayaan ku aadan sidii dalka looga bixiin lahaa doorashada dadban. “Guddoonka Baarlamaanka waxaa laga sugayey in ay soo gudbiyaan ajandayaal ku aaddan sidii doorashada dadban looga bixi lahaa, oo mid dadwaynaha cod ku leeyihiin lagu heli lahaa, dalkana looga hirgelin lahaa hannaankii xisbiyada,” ayuu yiri CC Shakuur Warsame. Sidoo kale wuxuu intaasi sii raaciyay “Ma ahayn in ay xilligaan muddo kororsi ka fekeraan, iyagoo weliba og mashaqadii iyo dhibkii muddo kororsi laga soo maray”. Dhankiisa Xildhibaan Ambasador Cali Siciid Fiqi oo ka tirsan Golaha Shacabka ayaa ka digay muddo kororsigan, wuxuuna ku taliyay in laga fogaado, isaga oo tilmaamay inay arrin sharci darro ah. Fiqi ayaa sidoo kale ku baaqay in laga daayo shacabka Soomaaliyeed, isla-markaana laga shaqeeyo horumarka dalka iyo danaha Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. Waxa kale oo qaddiyadan si adag uga hadlay Xildhibaan Dayax Axmed Cumar, kaas oo wax lala yaabo ku tilmaamay tallaabada guddoonka labada Aqal ay ku doonayaan in muddo kordhin horleh loo sameeyo hay’adaha dowladda federaalka Soomaaliya. Qodobka ugu weyn ee doodda dhaliyay ayaa ah in muddo xileedka hay’adaha dowladda federaalka Soomaaliya laga dhigo shan sano, halka markii hore uu ahaa afag sano. Si kastaba Durbadiiba arrintaan waxay abuurtay guux iyo diidmo ay kala horyimaadeen siyaasiyiinta qaar, siyaasiyiinta sida weyn uga soo horjeeda qorshahaan waxaa ka mid ah madaxweynihii hore ee dalka Shariif Sheekh Axmed iyo Cabdiraxmaan Cabdishakuur oo labaduba ka tirsan Xildhibaanada Golaha Shacabka ee baarlamaanka Soomaaliya. The post Falcelin xoogleh oo ka dhalatay ‘muddo kororsiga loo sameynayo’ hay’adaha DF appeared first on Caasimada Online.
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Yesterday, the United States’ State Department’s Rewards for Justice program placed a $5 million bounty on Musa Baluku, the emir of the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The group is known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces, or ADF. Source: Hiiraan Online
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Conflict in Las Anod and Crisis in Somaliland: External Investment, Intensifying Internal Competition, and the Struggle for Narrative BY JETHRO NORMAN MARCH 3, 2023 Debating Ideas aims to reflect the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. The Multi-million dollar Berbera port project, is one of the recent economic investments in Somaliland. Credit Jethro Norman The de facto state of Somaliland has earned the reputation of an island of peace, democracy and stability in an otherwise tumultuous Horn of Africa region. Yet this narrative, carefully curated over more than three decades, threatens to come crashing down with every shell that lands in the town of Las Anod. The recent conflict in the northern Somali city has been defined by increasingly polarised and irreconcilable narratives about the causes of the fighting. The Somaliland administration blames ‘terror groups’ for instigating the violence, whilst traditional authorities in Las Anod claim they are defending their community from rising insecurity and fighting for self-determination, legitimated by a widespread desire to reunite with Somalia. Yet if we want to understand the structural causes that undergird the current conflict, we need to first look to the evolving character of the Somaliland state and the consequences of greater international political and economic investment. An influx of international support in the last five years has had destabilising consequences for the unrecognised state. It has raised the stakes, intensifying internal competition amongst political elites in the centre, whilst heightening perceptions of marginalisation in peripheral regions. From this perspective, the asymmetrical violence unfolding in Las Anod is not an exercise in counterterrorism (or defence against covertly deployed forces from Somalia) as the government in Hargeisa claims, but state suppression at least partially fuelled by international support. At the core of this conflict, therefore, is the changing relationship between clan and state in the context of a recent flurry of international investment. This insight is crucial not only for ending the conflict in Las Anod, but also for reflecting on the kind of political institutions that are currently being created across the Somali territories. The article draws on fieldwork in Somaliland, including in Las Anod in summer 2021, and conversations with residents in Las Anod and across many of Somaliland’s regions during the course of the conflict. Conflict in Las Anod On the evening of 26 December 2022, Abdifatah Abdullahi Abdi “Hadrawi”, a popular young politician in Somaliland’s opposition party, was killed by armed gunmen as he left a mosque in the town of Las Anod. Spontaneous protests erupted, directed mostly at Somaliland officials and forces stationed in the town. As tensions grew, Somaliland forces responded to Las Anod youth throwing stones by firing live ammunition, reportedly killing as many as twenty demonstrators. Then, on 3 January 2023, the anti-government demonstrations escalated into armed conflict following the police killing of Mohamud Ali Saadle, the bodyguard of an influential local businessman. The Somaliland forces withdrew from Las Anod to defuse the situation, whilst a committee composed of town leaders and traditional elders was appointed to deliberate on the political future of the region. On 6 February, the committee attempted to publicly announce the intention to reject Somaliland and form a federal state under Somalia, to be called SSC-Khaatumo. However, the Somaliland forces, which had taken up positions outside of Las Anod, disrupted the announcement by shelling the town. Despite promises of a ceasefire, indiscriminate shelling has continued, damaging key infrastructure including hospitals, electricity and water supply. By some estimates, the ongoing conflict has resulted in at least 150 dead, approximately 600 wounded, and 185,000 displaced from the Sool clan population alone (data concerning Somaliland casualties is pending). The fighting in Las Anod has drawn widespread international condemnation and raised fears that the conflict may escalate into a regional war. The public killing of Hadrawi was not an isolated incident, but the latest in a string of unresolved assassinations in Las Anod that are linked to decades of simmering tensions. Las Anod is the capital of Sool, a region caught between two colliding state building projects: Somaliland to the west and Puntland to the east (Hoehne, 2015). Somaliland was borne out of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a predominantly Isaaq clan guerrilla resistance that fought, in coalition with other rebel movements, against the Somali dictatorship under President Mohamed Siad Barre. In 1988 the indiscriminate bombing of major Isaaq inhabited cities of Hargeisa and Burco under Siad Barre resulted in the systematic massacre of tens of thousands of civilians. This brutal episode of violence, and the notion of a state-sponsored Isaaq genocide, is central to the narrative of Somaliland independence, which was declared in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali state (Bradbury 2008). Over 30 years later, Somaliland remains strongly associated with the Isaaq clan. Whilst the Isaaq mostly inhabit the central regions of Somaliland, Somaliland claims the territorial border of the former British Somaliland protectorate, that also includes other clans. This is the basis for Puntland’s claim to Sool, which rests on a genealogical logic: the region is predominantly inhabited by the Sool clan clan, who are part of the larger Harti clan family that are the majority in Puntland. Whilst being suspended between two colliding state building trajectories can confer advantages to certain Sool clan elites (Hoehne 2015) it has also led to an enduring perception of political and economic marginalisation and insecurity. A war of competing narratives As fighting between Somaliland forces and clan militias on the outskirts of Las Anod continue, a contested and intensely polarised struggle around the dominant narrative has emerged. Fought largely through social media, this parallel war has drawn in participants from across the world, including diasporas, journalists, academics, and even rival US lobbying firms. This maelstrom of competing discourses tends towards explaining the drivers of the conflict in radically different and largely irreconcilable ways. To make sense of this, we need to understand that the success of Somaliland rests in no small part on the efforts of an influential Hargeisa-centred elite and Somali-landers in the diaspora who have successfully produced and sustained a powerful narrative of statehood, inclusivity and peace in juxtaposition to (and in part because of) prevailing international understandings of chaos and violence in Somalia. Somaliland has – quite rightly – been lauded for its (relatively) democratic elections and largely successful attempts to keep the peace. For example, as Somaliland celebrated its 30 year anniversary two years ago, a steady stream of journalistic and academic pieces heaped praise upon the de facto state, describing it as ‘a miracle on the Horn of Africa’, and ‘a beacon of democracy’. Clearly Somaliland’s shelling of its own citizens in Las Anod fits uneasily with this carefully curated image of peace and stability. That this narrative crisis for Somaliland might now be existential is reflected in the increasingly strained attempts to explain the conflict to the wider world. The Somaliland administration has consistently sought to frame itself as engaged in a counterterror operation. The President, Muse Bixi, repeatedly called the protesters terrorists, strongly implying Al-Shabaab was behind the unrest and downplaying the scale of popular support. Then, forces from Somalia and Puntland were alleged to be involved. Recently, a new bogeyman has been evoked: China, we are told, might be fomenting the unrest. This discourse has found some purchase within the international media. For example, one widely shared analysis oscillates between baseless allegations of Chinese involvement, and a highly reductionist claim that the current fighting can be explained by Darood/Sool clan power loss in 1991. These confused narratives disregard legitimate Sool clan grievances and obscure the underlying issues around resource sharing and decades of perceived marginalisation. To be clear: there is no doubt that some Sool clan figures are playing on these tensions and inciting violence. There is also a real threat that, in the future, Al-Shabaab, who have operatives across the Somali territories and thrive in contexts of instability, might try to exploit the situation. Yet none of this means that there are not legitimate grievances in Sool that remain unaddressed and often unacknowledged. Nor does it mean that the solution is to shell the city into submission. If we want to actually understand the Sool clan position, we could do worse than to look at the Las Anod declaration released on 6 February by the 33-member committee and 13 traditional elders appointed to represent the different Sool clan subclans.[1] The Las Anod declaration rejected Somaliland’s claim to independence and announced the intention to form a federal state under Somalia, to be called SSC-Khaatumo. The document appeals to principles of self-determination and international law, and effectively announces Sool clan self-government. Thus far, most of the discussion of these demands has focused on this political desire to reunite with Somalia, and debate over the right to self-determination in the context of the legal status of Somaliland’s breakaway from Somalia in 1991. However, the declaration also highlights two very specific grievances related to the position of Las Anod within the Somaliland state building project: insecurity and economic underdevelopment. The first concerns a string of unresolved assassinations that have targeted prominent intellectuals, businessmen and high-ranking officials. By some accounts, the killing of Hadrawi was the latest in over 100 killings which began in 2009 but have increased in recent years. A lot of rumour surrounds these killings, and it is unclear whether one group or multiple groups are involved. However, there is a widespread perception within the Sool clan community that the Somaliland administration is either directly behind or implicitly enabling the killings. They argue that Somaliland has a large military and police presence in Las Anod, yet there have been no meaningful arrests for the assassinations. The second grievance concerns what the declaration calls an ‘economic embargo’ imposed by Somaliland designed to restrict the presence of international development agencies in the east and concentrate resources in Somaliland’s central, Isaaq inhabited regions. This has led some to argue that the assassinations were part of the strategy to divide the Sool clan and maintain a perception of insecurity in the east. It is important to stress these are only rumours. There have been long-standing divisions within the Sool clan, and a significant number of those assassinated were from a largely pro-Somaliland subclan. Yet whilst the veracity of these claims remains unclear, what ultimately matters for understanding the present crisis is the narrative. Economic underdevelopment and insecurity are inherently interlinked issues that are the key to understanding the current conflict, and its resolution. These twin issues have intensified in recent years in tandem with an influx of international economic and political assistance to Somaliland. Increasing international engagement In its three-decade search for international recognition, Somaliland has long lamented a lack of international funding. Indeed, a lack of international investment is central to Somaliland’s narrative as a standout example of self-governance that has succeeded against the odds.Academics have also suggested that, contra the conventional wisdom of the World Bank, the absence of international aid at the crucial moment of Somaliland’s political formation may paradoxically be a key reason for its success. Whilst this may have been true for Somaliland’s early years, it is no longer the case. Buoyed by promises of peace and stability, international partners including the US, the United Kingdom, the EU, the UAE and Taiwan have all announced various infrastructure, trade and military cooperation initiatives and increased their diplomatic presence in Hargeisa. From 2018–2024 (overlapping largely with the term of the current President of Somaliland, Muse Bihi) the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway pledged $38 million for infrastructure projects in Somaliland. The multi-million-dollar investment by UAE’s DP World is transforming Berbera port into a 1 million container trade hub, and by linking it to Ethiopia (via Hargeisa) with a 250km motorway, is anticipated to reshape the regional economy. The number of nations setting up diplomatic missions within Somaliland has grown, whilst Somaliland has generated a noticeable presence in Washington through certain conservative think tanks and lobby groups. The United Kingdom has funded and trained an elite police unit, the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), whilst Washington is reportedly also interested in using Berbera port as a new military base. Finally, in early January 2023 oil was discovered in Somaliland’s central Maroodi Jeex region, further raising expectations of a lucrative new revenue stream for the fledgling Somaliland state. Intra-Isaaq competition This accelerating international engagement has had destabilising consequences for Somaliland that have come to a head under the current administration. Firstly, the recent influx of foreign investment and political engagement has renewed hopes of international recognition for the de facto state. This has raised the stakes, and intensified competition over the state and amongst powerful local business actors. In the flagship Berbera port deal, for example, the Somaliland government contentiously overrode the concerns of local non-state actors (Musa and Horst, 2019). This has political consequences, too. Somaliland’s democratic elections are often heralded by international partners as stand-out examples in a wider region defined by authoritarianism. Yet a political crisis emerged in 2022 over delayed elections, highlighting increasingly fractious internal competition within the Isaaq sub-clans over the state. There were arbitrary detentions of traditional leaders, and in anti-government demonstrations in Hargeisa in August 2022, five civilians were killed in clashes with security forces. The British funded RRU was implicated in these killings as well as in the shooting of protesters in Las Anod at the end of 2022. Much like in Las Anod, Muse Bixi has branded these protesters in Hargeisa as terrorists too. The net result is that politics has become far more of a zero-sum game. Commentators have been correct to observe that customary clan law known as xeerhas been key to the peace making process that rendered Somaliland a viable political settlement. Yet one effect of increasing international investment is to undermine this system by further eroding the tradition of consensus building that was the foundation of the 1991 peace pact. Indeed, it is telling that the Garhajis, an Isaaq sub-clan who form the basis of Somaliland’s two opposition parties, publicly condemned the violence in Las Anod. Shops in Las Anod tell a story of self-governance initiatives. Credit Jethro Norman Peripheral discontent If the increased stakes of statehood have resulted in intra-Isaaq divisions in the centre, then it has done the opposite in the peripheries: uniting previously divided groups against Somaliland. It seems that the suddenly realisable prospect of recognition has infused a sense of urgency amongst those who viewed the project as a useful way of keeping the peace, but never seriously considered that it might become an independent nation. The Sool clan are a case in point. The idea of a counter-administration has been around for a long while, and the Sool clan effectively governed themselves for much of the 1990s and early 2000s (Hoehne 2015: 54). This was formalised with the establishment of the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) administration in 2009, followed by the short-lived Khaatumo administration in 2015. In recent years, support for a counter-administration has waxed and waned. An agreement was reached with Somaliland in 2017 seemed to cement the integration of the region into Somaliland. Yet since the escalation of the crisis in Las Anod over the past six weeks, every Sool clan I have spoken to, whether in Las Anod or the diaspora, insists that support for SSC-Khaatumo is now uniform. This includes several individuals who were not previously supporters of Khaatumo. There is a growing perception not only within the east but also in the western regions, that the state is becoming more Isaaq dominated. Awdal region, where Isse and Gadabursi clans predominate, is represented by only 13 MPs, compared to 56 in the Hargeisa region. There are currently no MPs elected from the East Sanaag Clan subclan, who live mostly in eastern Sanaag, members of whom recently joined the Sool clan forces fighting in Las Anod. Much of the recent infrastructural development is also concentrated in the centre. The Berbera corridor for example, cuts a neat line of economic opportunity from Berbera, through Hargeisa, and into Ethiopia (see Hagmann and Stepputat 2023). Travel west from Berbera 120km down the coast to Lughaya and Zeila, and the Berbera corridor is met with indifference, or outright hostility. Infrastructure here is almost non-existent, with much traveling taking place along dry riverbeds. Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty rests on a territorial logic, derived from the borders of the former British colonial protectorate. Yet in economic terms, it increasingly appears more like a city state (Hargeisa) with an appended port (Berbera).[2] Finally, recent oil discoveries have further raised the stakes. From 2013 to 2015 sporadic oil exploration in eastern Somaliland’s Nugaal valley faltered due to fears of insecurity and the risk of violent conflict. Yet now, the discovery of oil proximate to Hargeisa threatens to further entrench the economic power of the centre at the expense of the margins. Las Anod water supply spearheaded by Sool clan community and diaspora. Credit Jethro Norman Consequences for Las Anod The present-day conflict in Las Anod must be understood within the context of intensifying clan competition over state resources as a consequence of accelerated international engagement. The ‘economic embargo’ and assassinations that are front and centre to the Khaatumo declaration reflect a widespread narrative that Somaliland has an interest in creating insecurity in the region to keep diaspora investors and international development actors out of the region. As previously mentioned, it is impossible to verify the truth of these claims, and it is beyond the scope of this article to do so. Rather, this article will show how this narrative of manufactured insecurity and economic marginalisation has intensified following the expansion of the Somaliland state through increasing international investment. When NGOs do manage to travel to Las Anod, they are officially advised to stay in Aynabo, a nearby Isaaq town, and to only travel into Las Anod during the day.[3] Locals argue this reinforces perceptions of insecurity and takes business away from Sool clan. This charge is not entirely fair as the situation is also a consequence of the UN and aid agencies’ own increasingly stringent security policies. Moreover, beginning under the former presidency of Silanyo (2010-17) there were some efforts to develop Las Anod through government funded projects and international aid agencies. Notably, this has included the rehabilitation of Nugaal university, the general hospital, several roads, and a hybrid solar power plant. Nonetheless, this investment is still perceived to be a fraction of that invested in Somaliland’s central heartlands. Moreover, the alleged ‘economic embargo’ on the east goes beyond development projects. For example, in 2022 there were 97 scholarships available for Somaliland students to study abroad at Ethiopian universities. Only one was awarded to a student from Sool region. Strategically situated at the mouth of the Nugaal valley, Las Anod has the potential to become a major trading hub. In the last few years the city has enjoyed a spurt of economic growth, driven in large part by increasing diaspora investment. Important infrastructure such as the water supply, a number of hospitals, the electric company, and even roads leading to and from Las Anod have been spearheaded by the local Sool clan community and their relatives in the diaspora.[4] This includes a large real estate project modelled on US-style gated communities, as well as several new high-end hotels. Land prices have soared, and each summer more diaspora members return to Las Anod. Yet an economically growing Las Anod has been interpreted as a threat to Hargeisa, both economically and in terms of leading towards greater Sool clan demands for autonomy. Thus, the narrative goes, Somaliland enables the assassinations in Las Anod (mentioned above) to continue. The assassinations have been a feature of the town for over a decade, but in the last five years have been increasing during the current (2017–) administration. In October 2021, the Somaliland administration expelled en massean important group of several hundred traders from Las Anod. The traders were from a clan that mostly lives in southern Somalia called the Rahanweyn, who have in the past been vilified as Al-Shabaab collaborators. Again, whilst evidence is scarce, rumour is plentiful. The Rahanweyn were an important business community in Las Anod and some Sool clan interpreted their expulsion an attempt by Somaliland to undermine the growing economic power of Las Anod and scapegoat them for the killings. This is consistent with the narrative that the assassinations were also intended to scare off diaspora investors and prevent the town becoming a rising business hub. However, there is another narrative that Sool clan traders were being outcompeted, and themselves orchestrated the deportations. Another example of how economic competition was intensifying in the run up to the conflict in Las Anod concerns the lucrative khat business. In Las Anod, every morning you can watch the daily khat delivery flying in from Kenya, landing at the airport just outside of town. Until recently, the khat business was monopolised by a prominent Sool clan/Jama Siyad businessman, Mohammed Abdirahman Arale ‘Jabutawi’. Yet in October 2022, Somaliland apparently revoked Jabutawi’s licence to import Khat, reportedly awarding sole licence to import Kenyan khat to a company controlled by members of Somaliland’s president’s sub-clan. Jabutawi is an important figure in Las Anod. Whilst khat is his main business, he has also invested in other industries, including a prominent electricity company and a huge hotel. His business ventures are a direct source of employment for hundreds of families in Las Anod. It is significant therefore that Jabutawi was an important factor in the immediate escalation from the anti-government demonstrations into a wider conflict. The protests that began on 26 December remained largely spontaneous civilian protest until the evening of 3 January when Somaliland forces stopped and killed one of Jabutawi’s bodyguards in the centre of town. In retaliation, forces loyal to Jabutawi took up arms against the Somaliland troops and pushed them out of the city. The current conflict continues to bear the hallmarks of this economic struggle. Notably, Somaliland forces have targeted infrastructure that has not been built by Somaliland, but by the Sool clan diaspora. In 2021 I visited the water supply system built by Sool clan diaspora that provides clean water to much of the town. I also witnessed the Las Anod community fundraising $120,000 for an oxygen plant during the Covid-19 crisis. As the conflict escalated, Somaliland troops attacked the water system, whilst shelling of the general hospital also destroyed the oxygen plant. Most recently, Sool electric plant owned by Jabutawi and Sool clan diaspora investors was attacked, with one worker killed and seven captured. Aside from the immediate health consequences for those still living in Las Anod, these attacks on infrastructure funded and built primarily by the Sool clan community clearly have an extra symbolic importance. As the number of displaced approaches 200,000, in the midst of the dry season, a humanitarian crisis is looming. Yet communities across Sool have refused to accept any humanitarian aid that comes from Hargeisa, whether it comes from the Somaliland business community or international NGOs. They have raised concerns that aid sent through Somaliland would be diverted. Yet these communities also want to send a political message that they do not want to receive aid coming via Hargeisa anymore. This again highlights how the issue of aid and development is highly political and at the centre of grievances driving the conflict. Conclusion and ways forward Following six weeks of fighting in Las Anod, the narrative of peace and stability that Somaliland has carefully built over three decades is rapidly unravelling. To understand the recent violence in Somaliland we need to look at the relationship between clan and state in the context of a recent influx of international investment, and address the core interrelated grievances of insecurity and economic underdevelopment. Somaliland has functioned remarkably well if we understand it for what it is to most Somalis within its borders: a social pact amongst clans to keep the peace. However, once it becomes a serious exercise in state-building – that is, through the construction of a centralised administration and institutionalisation of political and economic hierarchy – the more repressive aspects of the state inevitably come into view. This is an insight that is crucial not only for solving the conflict in Las Anod, but also for reflecting on the kind of political order and institutions currently being created across the Somali territories. Conflicts in the Somali territories are often explained in terms of clan. This is unquestionably an important factor in Las Anod. But focusing solely on the clan ignores how the conflict is also an issue of a rapidly expanding state structure and concomitant political instability. The central unresolved contradiction at the heart of the Somaliland project is that it is an attempt to create a multi-clan national identity in the midst of a social reality where the clan remains the dominant social structure for many people. Las Anod is not simply about Sool clan resistance to Isaaq domination. It is part of a generalised pattern of resistance to an encroaching state apparatus increasingly aligned with a particular clan. Over the last decade, other counter-administrations have been announced, including Awdalland State in Somaliland’s western region of Awdal, and Maakhir state in eastern Sanaag region. These have been diaspora driven initiatives, and thus far failed to galvanise popular support on the ground, but they share the same basic grievances as SSC-Khatumo, and the same aim – to form a federal member state of Somalia. At present, there is dangerous deadlock in Las Anod. Somaliland appears unwilling to back down and leave their base at Goojacade outside of the city, whilst Sool clan traditional leaders will not negotiate until the troops withdraw to Oog. Trust between the two sides has almost completely broken down. Despite -or perhaps also because of – the hyperconnectivity of the conflict (the whirlwind of videos, images and WhatsApp messages through which most people come to understand the conflict) at present there remains a degree of opacity around what is actually happening on the ground in Las Anod. There are shifting geopolitical layers to the unfolding crisis, not least the alleged role of Djibouti, and speculation over how Mogadishu, specifically the recently re-elected president Hassan Sheik Mohamoud, might respond. Make no mistake: there are also global dimensions to the conflict in Somaliland too. But it is not the spectre of transnational terrorism or China that international partners should be most concerned about. Rather, it is their own skewed investment strategies, buoyed by Western imaginaries of a romanticised ‘state that does not exist’, and blind to the plurality of political voices on the ground. EndNotes [1]And also the Fiqishiine, a Mogadishu Clan subclan that has resided in Sool since the 1960s and often intermarry with Sool clan. [2]This bears some interesting resemblance to the Sultanates of Ifat (1285–1403) and Adal (1415–1577) who similarly functioned as city states connected to ports in the region (in this instance, Zeila). [3]This is especially contentious because until the 1930s Aynabo was inhabited by the Sool clan, but they were subsequently pushed out by Isaaq/East Burco Clan. [4](see Norman, 2022 for a wider discussion of community-diaspora development) References Bradbury, M. (2008). Becoming Somaliland. https://iupress.org/9780253219978/becoming-somaliland/ Hagmann, Tobias and Finn Stepputat (eds) 2023. Trade Makes States. Governing the Greater Somali Economy. London: Hurst & Company. Hoehne, M. V. (2015). Between Somaliland and Puntland Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions rift valley institute | Contested Borderlands. www.riftvalley.net Musa, A. M., & Horst, C. (2019). State formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland: the impact of the private sector in an unrecognised state. Https://Doi.Org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1561621,19(1), 35–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1561621 Norman, J. (2022). ‘Kinshipping’: Diasporic infrastructures of connectivity, circulation, and exchange. Geoforum, 135, 93–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEOFORUM.2022.08.005 Previous Article Learning from Sembène: Telli Qaran News
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MOGADISHU: The European Union has approved €110 million (about US$116.6 million) for stabilisation efforts in Somalia battling al-Shabab terrorists across the country, reported Xinhua. Source: Hiiraan Online
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Kenya has lost some 2.61 million livestock to drought in the past months as the crisis worsens in arid and semi-arid areas, the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) said in a report Thursday. Source: Hiiraan Online
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A Mogadishu-based lender that has been in operation for under 10 years is set to acquire a controlling stake in First Community Bank (FCB), whose capital is below the required minimum. Source: Hiiraan Online
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Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Tan iyo markii Al-Shabaab ay magaalada Muqdisho ka billowday dagaalka ay kula jirto ciyaal weerada iyo dadka ka ganacsada daroogada, waxay ku lifaaqeen xeelad cusub oo ku ogaanayaan bulshada iyo dadka ka ganacsada daroogada. Caasimada Online oo la hadashay dhowr ganacsade oo looga shakiyay inay iibiyaan taabuuga iyo daroogada ayaa sheegay in goobahooda ganacsi ay marar kala duwan yimaadeen hal ilaa labo dhallinyaro iska dhigay inay dadka daroogada isticmaalaan. Waxay sheegeen in dhallinyaradaas ay weydiiyeen in laga iibiyo taabuu, balse ay u sheegeen inaysan iibin. Hase yeeshee waxaa markii danbe goobahaasi ganacsi ee dhallinyarada ay tageen lasoo xiriirtay Al-Shabaab, una sheegtay in la hubiyay inaysan iibin daroogada. Ganacstada ayaa intaas ku daray in Al-Shabaab ay ka codsadeen inay soo gudbiyaan goobaha lagu tuhmayo in lagu iibiyo taabuuga. Dhinaca kale, labadii habeen ee u danbeeyey ayaa degmooyinka Kaaraan iyo Heliwaa waxa ay dhalinyaro ku caweyneysay goobaha shaaha laga iibiyo, xaqiijiyeen inay arkeen maleeshiyo hubeysan oo wajiyada u qarsanaa, kuwaasoo dha;linyarada ka baarayay daroogada iyo waxyaabaha kale ee maanka dooriya. Dhallinyaro dhacdadaas habeen hore ku qabsatay Xaafada Xaliimo Heyti ee degmada Kaaraan ayaa Caasimada Online u sheegay in maleeshiyo ka tirsan Al-Shabaab ay yimaadeen labo maaqayad oo shaaha laga cabo. Dhalinyaradii ku sugneyd maqaayadahaas ayaa dhamaantood jeebabkooda laga baaray taabuuga iyo waxyaabaha maanka qofka dooriyo, kadibna maleeshiyadii Al-Shabaab ayaa si nabdoon goobta uga tagay markii ay daroogo ka waayeen dhallinta ay baareen, ayaga oo aan ka qaadan wixii kale ee ay haysteen. “Ilaa sagaal nin oo hubeysan ayaa hal mar ka war helnay iyagoo dhinacyada naga taagan, waxay inoo sheegeen inaan is dejino, wax dhib ahna uusan jirin, kaliyana ujeedkoodu yahay inay naga baaraan daroogo iyo tubaakada taabuuga, markii ay na baareen oo dhallinyaradii ka waayeen wax daroogo ah, waxay inoo sheegeen in qofkii lagu helo ay nafta dhaafsiin doonaan, noomana sheegin cidda ay yihiin iyo halka ay ka tirsan yihiin, laakiin waxaan ogaanay inay ahaayeen Al-Shabaab markaan aragnay muuqaalkooda,” ayuu yiri Xuseen Cabdulle oo ka mid ahaa dhallinyaradaas. Al-Shabaab ayaa toddobaadkaan shaacisay in Muqdisho kula dagaalameyso kooxaha daroogada ka ganacsada iyo ciyaal weerada, iyadoona ka dhabeysay, waxayna fuliyeen dhowr howlgal oo ah qaraxyo ay ku burburiyeen xarumo lagu iibin jiray daroogada, sidoo kale waxay toogteen dhow dhallinyaro oo ku lug lahaa ganacsiga daroogada. Howlgallada Al-Shabaab ee Muqdisho ka billowday ayaa sababay inay durba yaraadaan ciyaal weerada iyo in si tuuganimo oo qarsoodi ah dadka u kala iibsadaan daroogada iyadoo dhinacyada la iska fiirinaayo. Tallaabooyinka Al-Shabaab ayaa ceeb weyn ku ah dowladda federaalka oo muddo wax ka qaban waysay ciyaal weerada iyo ka ganacsiga daroogada. The post Xog: Al-Shabab oo Muqdisho ka bilowday xeelad cajiib ah appeared first on Caasimada Online.
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The file photo shows two children holding their mother's legs inside the IDP camp in Doolow, a border town with Ethiopia, in Somalia, on March 20, 2017. (Xinhua/Sun Ruibo) About 1.8 million children aged under five are still expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in Somalia this year, though the risk of famine has been averted for the time being, an international charity has warned. MOGADISHU, March 3 (Xinhua) -- About 1.8 million children aged under five are still expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in Somalia this year, though the risk of famine has been averted for the time being, an international charity has warned. Save the Children said in a statement released in the Somali capital of Mogadishu on Wednesday evening that humanitarian needs remain high and urgent, and called for more funding so that humanitarian organizations can continue delivering life-saving aid. "Somalia has reached a tipping point. The situation remains extremely serious, as the country is expecting a sixth season of below-average rainfall from March to June, and exceptionally high food prices," said Save the Children's Country Director in Somalia Mohamud Mohamed Hassan. The charity said the total number of children facing malnutrition has not changed since December 2022, although the number projected to be severely malnourished had slightly reduced to about 480,000 from 513,500, with children losing their lives. The file photo shows a child, suffering from malnutrition, sitting in bed at Banadir Hospital in Mogadishu, Somalia, on March 9, 2017. (Xinhua/Faisal Isse) It called for urgent international funding to prevent the further loss of life, warning that there continues to be a risk of famine if there is poor rainfall and if humanitarian assistance does not reach the most vulnerable people, including displaced populations, and people living in areas which are hard to reach due to conflict. In 2022, the United Nations warned of a looming famine in Somalia which is facing its worst drought in about four decades after five failed rainy seasons combined with rising food prices and ongoing conflict, fuelling concerns of a repeat of 2011 when about 260,000 people died. Mohamed said while humanitarian efforts have so far averted a possible famine, the number of hungry and malnourished children across the country remains alarmingly high. He said a global response is still needed to address immediate humanitarian needs and implement lasting solutions to hunger. "We are concerned that the increase in children experiencing acute malnutrition coincides with a reduction in humanitarian funding for Somalia, and we're warning of deadly consequences if funds are withdrawn," he added. Source: Hiiraan Online
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Ankara (Caasimada Online) – Mucaaradka Turkiga ayaa ku guuldarraystay inay yeeshaan musharrax qura oo doorashada soo socota kula loolama Madaxweyne Rajab Tayib Erdogan. Arrintan ayaa fursad wanaagsan u abuurtay hoggaamiyahan mudada dheer u talinayay Turkiga, oo culays badan uu kasoo food saaray qaabka ay dowladdiisa u maaraysay dhul-gariirkii dadka badan ku laayey dalkaas. Hogaamiyayaasha lix xisbi siyaasadeed oo isbahaysi samaystay ayaa Khamiistii kulan xasaasi ah isugu tegay, si ay u shaaciyaan musharraxa ka hortagaya Erdogan, balse kulankaas ayaa kusoo idlaaday fashil. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, oo madax u ah xisbiga ugu weyn mucaaradka Turkiga ee CHP, ayaa doonaya in loo doorto musharraxa isbahaysiga, arrintaas oo laga diiday isaga oo mucaaradad xooggan kala kulmay xubnaha xisbiga kale ee IYI. Kulankii Khamiista dhacay ayaa ahaa midkii 12-aad ee ay mucaaradka yeeshaan si ay isula meel dhigaan musharraxa la tartami doona Madaxweyne Erdogan. Madaxweynaha ayaa ku tilmaamay mucaaradkiisa kuwo aan dhinac isu raaci karin, islamarkaana aan lagu aamini karin masiirka Turkiga. Maalin kahor inta aanay mucaaradku yeelan kulankii ugu dambeeyay, ayaa Erdogan waxa uu sheegay in doorashooyinka madaxtooyada iyo baarlamaanka ay dhici doonaan 14-ka May. Markaa kadib waxaa meesha ka baxay tuhun ahaa in doorashada ay dib u dhici doonto maadaama Turkiga ay soo wajahday musiibo ka dhalatay dhulgariiradii is xigay ee ay ku dhinteen in ka badan 45 kun oo qof. Doorashada May Waxaa la saadaalinayaa in doorashada soo socota ay noqon doonto tii ugu adkeyd ee uu wajaho Erdogan oo hogaaminayay Turkiga muddo 20 sano ah. Xukuumadda uu hoggaamiyo ayaa billowday mashaariic ku kacaya balaayiin dollar oo dib loogu dhisayo magaalooyinkii ku burburay dhul-gariirka. Mucaaradka ayaa lagu dhaliilay in aanay soo bandhigin qorshayaal muhiim u ah dalka, si ay u soo jiitaan dadka aan weli go’aansan cidda ay u codeyn doonaan. Sidoo kale waxa aanay mucaaradku ka faa’iideysan dhaliilaha loo jeedayay xukuumadda ee ku aaddan qaabka ay uga falcelisay dhul-gariirradii dhacay. Horraantii sanadkii tegay, mucaaradka ayaa kasbaday taageero badan, haddase waxaa muuqata in taageeradaas ay u wareegtay dhanka Erdogan iyo xisbigiisa talada haya, sida ay sheegeen dadka ka faallooda siyaasadda Turkiga. Erdogan oo awoodo ballaaran ku helay doorashadii 2018 ayaa ah siyaasiga ugu caansan Turkiga. Hase yeeshee waxaa hoos u dhacday shacbiyadda xisbigiisa Cadaaladda iyo Horumarinta oo ay ka weecdeen dadka saboolka ah ee Turkida. Dalkaas ayaa la taacalaya dhaqaalo xumo baahsan oo ka dhalatay sicir-barar gaaray heerkii ugu sarreeyay muddo tobanaan sano ah. Waxaa uga sii daray dhul-gariiradii dhacay bishii hore. The post Rejada dib u doorashada Erdogan oo xoogaysatay kadib markii mucaaradka ay… appeared first on Caasimada Online.
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Magaalada Buhoodle Waxa Laga cabsi qabaa in dadka Deegaanka oo gadoodsan inay dilaan mid Kamida sheekhyada magaalada oo Masaajid Gudahii kaga dhawaaqay in Dagaalka ka socda Laascaanood aanu ahayn Jihaad ee yahay Fidmo Sawirkan hoose wuxuu muujinayaa Dadweyne Gadoodsan oo banaanka Masaajidka ku sugaya sheekhaas oo Gudaha Masaajidka ku xaniban Qaran News
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“Islaamka dhexdiisa dadku cadaw iskuma aha. Reer hebel baa cadawgayaga ah, islaamku mayaqaan, inaad qoys islaam ah cadaw ku sheegtaa waxa ka dhalanaysa inaad dhiigooda banaysato”. Sh. Cismaan Cali Xuseen. Qaran News
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Kismaayo (Caasimada Online) – Faahfaahino dheeraad ah ayaa waxaa laga helayaa howlgal qorsheysan oo ay si wadajir ah maanta ciidamada Xoogga dalka iyo kuwa Nabad Sugidda uga sameeyeen deegaanno ka tirsan gobolka Jubbada Hoose ee Jubbaland. Howlgalkan oo ay iska kaashadeen ciidamada Danab iyo kuwa Jubbaland ayaa si gaar ah loogu bartilmaameedsaday goobo ay ku sugnaayeen xubno ka tirsan kooxda Al-Shabaab. Taliye Carab Dheeg Axmed oo kamid ah saraakiisha howlgalka horkaceysay ayaa shaaca ka qaaday inay tageen deegaanka Turdho iyo deegaano kale ku teedsan jiinka Wabiga Jubba, isla-markaana ay khasaare culus gaarsiiyeen xoogaga Al-Shabaab. Dheeg ayaa xaqiijiyay inay howlgalkan ku dilay 13 xubnood oo ka tirsanaa Shabaab, isla-markaana uu ku jiro sarkaal sare oo uu magaciisa ku sheegan Aruuriyow Maxamed Cumar oo magaciisa afgarashadu yahay (Axmed Sahal), kaas oo kamid ahaa saraakiisha Shabaab. Sidoo kale wuxuu intaasi kusii daray inay sii wadi doonaan dhaq-dhaqaaqyada ay ka wadaan dhanka jiinka wabiga, si ay Al-Shabaab uga saaraan halkaasi. Dhanka kale ma jiro wax hadal ah oo kasoo baxay kooxda Al-Shabaab oo ku aadan howlgalkaasi ee ay guulaha ka sheegteen ciidamada huwanta Soomaaliya. Xaaladda ayaa haatan ah mid aad u kacsan, waxaana dhaq-dhaqaaqyo iska soo horjeedo laga dareemayaa duleedka magaallo xeebeedka Kismaayo ee gobolka Jubbada Hoose. Howlgalkan ayaa ku soo aadayo, ayadoo haatan la qorsheynayo wajiga labaad ee dagaalka ka dhanka ah Al-Shabaab uu ka billowdo gobollada Jubbooyinka ee koonfurta Somalia. Si kastab, madaxweynaha Soomaaliya Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud ayaa haatan ku sugan Kismaayo, waxaana qorshaha uu u tegay kamid ah dardargelinta dagaalka Al-Shabaab. The post Axmed Sahal iyo XUBNO kale oo lagu dilay howlgal ka dhacay JUBBALAND appeared first on Caasimada Online.
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Kismaayo (Caasimada Online) – Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud oo safar ku jooga dowlad-goboleedka Jubaland ayaa shalay booqday deegaanka Malleeyleey oo hoos taga degmada Jamaame ee gobolka Jubbada Hoose. Madaxweynaha ayaa u kuur galay xaaladaha nololeed ee bulshada deegaankaas Maleyley, waxaana Madaxweynaha iyo wafdigiisa deegaankaas loogu sameeyey qado sharaf. Safarkaas waxaa Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh ku wehliyey Madaxweynaha dowlad-goboleedka Jubaland Axmed Madoobe, labada Madaxweyne ayaa dhagax-dhigay waddo laami ah oo isku xirta degmooyinka Kismaayo iyo Afmadoow ee gobolka Jubada Hoose. Wadadaan ayaa dhan masaafo ahaan 120 Kiilo-mitir, waxaana lagu wadaa in deg deg loo hir-geliyo mashruuca dhismaha wadadaas, sida ay Caasimada Online u xaqiijiyeen masuuliyiin ka tirsan Jubbaland. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh ayaa ka dalbaday ganacsatada, qurbajoogta iyo guud ahaan bulshada ree Jubbaland in ay ka qayb qaataan dhismaha wadadaan oo kaalin mug leh ka qaadaneysa fududeynta isku socodka ganacsiga, dadweynaha iyo horumarinta kaabayaasha dhaqaalaha dowlad-goboleedka Jubbaland, gaar ahaan gobolka Jubbada Hoose. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh oo shalay salaadii Jimcaha wax uga tukaday masjid ku yaalla Madaxtooyada Jubbaland ee Kismaayo ayaa dadka reer Jubbaland ugu baaqay inay u diyaar garoobaan sidii ay isaga xoreyn lahaayeen kooxda Al-shabaab, sidoo kale xiisadda maamul ee ka taagan gobolka Gedo ayuu sheegay madaxweynuhu inuu dadaal kasta ku bixi doono, sidii xal buuxa looga gaari lahaa. “Marka hore soo dhaweyntiina waan idinkaga mahad celineynaa reer Jubbaland, walaalayaal waa la socotiin xaaladaha dalkaana ka jira, waxaa naga go’an in xaaladahaas aan wax ka bedelno, dadka reer Jubbaland waxaan kula dardaarmayaa inay is aqbalaan oo midoobaan,” ayuu yiri Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh. Madaxweynaha oo sii hadlaayey ayaa yiri, “Is aqbala walaalayaal, kuma rabo waxay leedahay kuma rabo, taasna looma baahna, waxaan diyaar u nahay in Jubbaland aan wax kasta la qabano, laakiin in howlaha ay madaxda Jubbaland qaba karaan in aan faraha la galno diyaar uma nihin. Mashruuca gobolka Gedo waan xalineynaa, waan tegaa Gedo, tabashada ay dadkaasi qabaan waan dhageysanayaa, waxaana xalineynaa, ogaada in aan heshiino waa muhiim.” Hoos ka eeg booqashadii Madaxweynaha ee Malaayley The post Daawo: Xasan iyo madaxda Jubaland oo safar ku tegay degaan hoos taga Jamaame appeared first on Caasimada Online.
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Lizzie Walker: “Continued indiscriminate violence & shelling in Las Anod has led to hospitals being hit & MSF suspending operations.” Hargeisa (PP News Desk) — Nearly a month after a war erupted in Laascaanood the impact of the war on the administrative capital of Sool is becoming too conspicuous to be downplayed or denied by the Somaliland Administration. Lizzie Walker, the Head of the British Office Hargeisa, has added her voice to calls for an end to ishelling of the district by Somaliland forces. “Continued indiscriminate violence & shelling in Las Anod has led to hospitals being hit & MSF suspending operations. Humanitarian actors are working to provide lifesaving assistance. All sides must ensure they are able to do so with unfettered access & safe space to operate” tweeted Lizzie Walker. A ward of Laascaanood General Hospital shelled by Somaliland forces. According to Médecins Sans Frontières, Laascaanood General Hospital was “hit the fourth time” since 6 February. Several weeks ago, a doctor at the Laascaanood General Hospital lost his life after Somaliland forces indiscriminately shelled hospital premises. Somaliland forces at the behest of President Muse Bihi Abdi destroyed houses, schools, mosques and business premises in the district. The Mayor of Laascaanood Abdirahim Ali Ismail yesterday released a situation report on the impact of the war on Laascaanood. “210 persons lost their lives in Laascaanood, 600 persons sustained injuries, while 200,000 persons have been displaced as the result of the war in addition to 16,000 small businesses adversely affected by the war” said the Mayor. © Puntland Post, 2023 The post Head of British Office Hargeisa Calls for an end to indiscriminate shelling of Laascaanood by Somaliland Forces appeared first on Puntland Post.
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DP World and Somaliland Government open Berbera Economic Zone Aiming to create a business-friendly environment to attract investment and create jobs for Somaliland Dubai,03March2023 “ Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and CEO of DP World The dynamics of global trade are changing, and there is a growing need for trade infrastructure, such as economic zones, with easy and fast access to international shipping. The integration of Berbera port with the new Economic Zone is a great example of this, making Berbera a world-class trading ecosystem, now and for the future. Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and CEO of DP World „ Follow me on Twitter(opens in new window)Add me on LinkedIn(opens in new window) DP World and the Government of Somaliland have inaugurated the new Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ), which along with the Port of Berbera, is transforming the area into a major trade hub in the Horn of Africa. The first phase of the BEZ was officially opened by His Excellency Muse Bihi Abdi, President of Somaliland, and Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and CEO of DP World, at a special event attended by several hundred guests. These included representatives from DP World’s investment partner in the port and zone, British International Investment (BII), the UK’s Development Finance Institution (DFI) and impact investor. The opening followed the inauguration of the new container terminal at Berbera Port in June 2021. DP World’s vision for Berbera is to develop it into a trade hub, taking advantage of its strategic location along one of the busiest sea routes in the world and access to the vast hinterland in the region, including Ethiopia. The BEZ is located just 15 km from the port along the Berbera to Wajaale road (Berbera Corridor) that connects to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, which needs multiple sea gateways to meet its trade requirements. This integrated maritime, logistics and industrial hub will serve the Horn of Africa, a dynamic region with a population of more than 140 million people. It is based on the highly successful model of DP World’s Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) in Dubai. There will also be synergies between the two zones, where companies in Dubai can register for Berbera through the Jafza one-stop shop, while companies in Berbera can access Jafza’s incubation centre facilities. The zone is designed to create a business-friendly environment to attract investment and create jobs for Somaliland. It includes a competitive and conducive environment, enabled by a new Special Economic Zone Law, Special Economic Zone Companies Law, fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, along with a one-stop shop for all registration and licensing requirements, modern offices, warehousing and serviced land plots. DP World has already signed an agreement with IFFCO, a major UAE-based food company, to develop a 300,000 square feet edible oil packing plant in the BEZ and a dozen more companies operating across various sectors have already registered. Speaking at the event, His Excellency Muse Bihi Abdi, President of Somaliland, said: “This is another proud and historic moment for Somaliland and its people. After the inauguration of the container terminal at Berbera Port, and now with the economic zone open for business, we are taking a major leap forward in realising our vision to establish Berbera as an integrated, regional trade gateway, which will be a key driver of economic growth, achieved through increased trade flows, foreign investment and job creation.” Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and CEO of DP World, said: “The dynamics of global trade are changing, and there is a growing need for trade infrastructure, such as economic zones, with easy and fast access to international shipping. These will bring companies closer to their customers, improve their logistics and allow them to expand into new markets. The integration of Berbera port with the new Economic Zone is a great example of this, making Berbera a world-class trading ecosystem, now and for the future.” Liz Lloyd, Chief Impact Officer of British International Investment, added: “We are very proud to be part of this important milestone to inaugurate the Berbera Economic Zone, which will provide a vital economic boost to Somaliland and support growth in the broader Horn of Africa region. The overall expansion of the port is expected to improve the quality of life and livelihoods for over a million Somalilanders, increasing the availability and affordability of goods and indirectly supporting over 53,000 jobs locally.” The Master Plan for the BEZ covers more than 1,200 hectares and will be expanded over time as demand grows. With phase one now open, it offers serviced land plots for the construction of company facilities, 10,000 square metres of pre-built warehouses, build-to-suit facilities, open yard storage, a common user warehouse which DP World will operate to handle customers’ cargo, as well as office space with end-to-end IT services. The Berbera Port is a multipurpose port with world-class infrastructure, including extensive bulk and breakbulk handling facilities, liquid cargo handling capability and a state-of-the-art container terminal. It has a deep draft of 17 metre, a quay of 400 metre and three ship-to-shore (STS) gantry cranes, which can receive the largest container vessels in operation today. It also has the capacity to handle 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) a year. The terminal also includes a modern container yard with eight rubber tyred gantry cranes (RTGs) and a one-stop service centre. The Berbera Port is a cornerstone of the economy. As a result of the expansion, it is expected to facilitate trade equivalent to approximately 27% of Somaliland’s GDP and 75% of regional trade by 2035. The BEZ will make trade easier for businesses in Somaliland and also the wider Horn of Africa. This will benefit a variety of sectors including exporters, importers and processors of livestock, agricultural and perishable goods, textiles and construction materials. DP World Qaran News
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Mareykanka ayaa Jimcihii ku dhawaaqay kaalmo cusub oo gargaar milatari ah oo loogu talagalay Ukraine, taasoo dhan $400 milyan, sida laga soo xigtay xoghayaha arrimaha dibadda Antony Blinken. Blinken ayaa sheegay in kaalmada militari ay ka koban tahay rasaasta madaafiicda goobta nooca loo yaqaan HIMARS ee uu Mareykanku ugu deeqay Ukraine iyo sidoo kale rasaasta taangiga Bradley, gawarasida gaashaaman, hubka wax bur-buriga iyo qalabka dayactirka. Wuxuu intaas ku daray in kaalmadan ay sidoo kale qeyb ka yihiin taagero dhinaca tababarka ciidamada Ukraine. Blinken ayaa intaas ku daray in madaxweyne Binden aanu oggolaasho uga baahneyn Congress-ka si uu ugu wareejiyo qalabka iyo adeegyada kaydka Mareykanka ee ay Ukraine u baahan tahay inta lagu jiro xaaladda degdeg ah. Marka lagu daro xirmadan ugu dambeysay, Mareykanka ayaa hadda Ukraine siiyay in ka badan $32 bilyan oo gargaar militari. Wadamada Midowga Yurub ayaa sidoo kale ka shaqeynaya sidii ay kumannaan madfac u gaarsiin lahaayeen Ukraine, iyadoo ay ku baxayso barnaamij ku kacaya 1 bilyan oo doolar. PUNTLAND POST The post Maraykanka oo kaalmo milatari ugu deeqay dalka Ukraine appeared first on Puntland Post.
