Hargeisa (HOL) – Authorities in Hargeisa have banned the carrying of small arms, including knives and machetes, across all districts of the Somaliland capital in response to a recent surge in knife-related violence. Source: Hiiraan Online

Mogadishu (HOL) – The Somali Custodial Corps has been deployed to the Middle Shabelle region to support ongoing military operations against Al-Shabaab, despite concerns over their combat readiness. Source: Hiiraan Online

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Afhayeenka ciidanka booliska Soomaaliyeed, Cabdifitaax Aadan Xasan oo shir jaraa’id ku qabtay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa ka warbixiyay dhacdadii shalay Afarta Darjiin ee sababtay dilka wiil Bajaajle ahaa iyo in la gubo gaari ay lahaayeen ciidamada booliska, kadib shaqaaqo ka dhacday halkaasi. Ugu horreyn wuxuu xaqiijiyay in gacanta lagu soo dhigay askarigii ka dambeeyay falkaasi oo ka tirsan ciidanka Taraafikada, wuxuuna sheegay inuu ku xiran yahay xarunta dambi baariska ee C.I.D, isaga oo intaas ku daray in la horgeyn doono maxkamadda ku shaqada leh. “Waxaan rabaa inaan shacabka Soomaaliyeed u xaqiijiyo in dil uu ka dhacay isgoyska Afarta Darjiin, kaas oo uu gaystay eedeysane ka tirsan ciidanka nabad-gelyada waddooyinka, gaar ahaan Taraafiko. Eedeysanahaas waxaa gacanta ku haya ciidanka booliska Soomaaliyeed, waxaana ku socota baaris, si cadaaladda loo horgeeyo” ayuu yiri afhayeenka ciidanka booliska Soomaaliyeed. Sidoo kale wuxuu tilmaamay in booliska Soomaaliyeed uu ku raad-joogo shaqsiyaad uu sheegay inay ka dhex faa’iideysteen shaqaaqada, isla markaana gubay mid kamid ah gawaarida ciidanka booliska oo shalay lagu burburiyay goobta, kadibna dab la qabad-siiyay. Waxaa kale oo uu hoosta ka xariiqay, haddii lasoo qabto dadkaasi in lasoo taagi doono maxkamad si loogu qaado faldambiyeedka ay galeen sida uu hadalka u dhigay. “Taliska ciidanka booliska Soomaaliyeed wuxuu ku raad-joogaa eedeysanayaal kusoo dhex dhuuntay goobta uu dilka ka dhacay xilliga ay saxmadda socotay, kuwaas oo si bareer ah u burburiyay gaari uu lahaa booliska Soomaaliyeed oo ah hanti dadweyne, kaas oo ay si bareer ah u burburiyeen, kadibna ay dab qabad-siiyeen” ayuu markale yiri. Afhayeenka ayaa intaasi kusii daray in qof weliba dambiga uu gaysto isaga lagula xisaabtami doono, wuxuuna falalka noocaan ah uga digay muwaadiniinta Soomaaliyeed. “Bulshada Soomaaliyeed waxaan sidoo kale ku wargelinayaa shaqsi kasta oo ah muwaadin Soomaaliyeed dambiga uu gaysto inuu isaga masuul ka yahay” ayuu raaciyay. Falkan wuxuu daba socday dilka wiil Bajaajle ahaa oo si bareer ah uu askari ka tirsan Taraafikada ugu gaystay Afarta Darjiin, waxaana kadib dib-bax dhigay Bajaaleyda iyo shacab careysan oo isugu soo baxay halkaasi, kadibna waxay isku dhaceen booliska. Dhacdooyinkan ayaa soo noq-noqday, waxaana marar badan darawallada Bajaajleyda oo u badan dhalinyaro siyaabo kala duwan loogu dilay gudaha magaalada Muqdisho. The post Daawo: Booliska Muqdisho oo qaaday tallaabo deg-deg ah, kadib gaarigii looga gubay… appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Breaking News: Tensions Rise in Mogadishu as US Embassy Begins Staff Withdrawal. In a significant move, the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu has begun withdrawing some of its essential staff, as reported by diplomatic sources. The situation in the city is becoming increasingly precarious, with Al-Shabaab reportedly encircling Mogadishu and positioning themselves just 6 kilometers away. This terrorist group has recently acquired from Iran and Houthis short- and medium-range missiles capable of reaching up to 40 kilometers, raising concerns about potential threats to both EU and U.S. embassies. Military intelligence suggests that the local government, led by President Hassan Sh. Mohamud, has struggled to maintain security in the capital. As conditions deteriorate, the critical question arises: Will the EU and UK follow suit and evacuate their personnel as the risks escalate following the recent U.S. terror alert? Stay tuned for more updates on this unfolding crisis. Source Guledwiq Qaran News

Mogadishu (HOL) – Mogadishu police have arrested a traffic officer accused of fatally shooting an auto-rickshaw operator at the Four Gardens intersection on Sunday, an incident that sparked violent protests by local youth and motorcycle riders. Source: Hiiraan Online

Kenya and the International Monetary Fund will discuss a new lending programme for the East African nation, as both sides agreed to abandon a ninth review of the current $3.6 billion loan. Source: Hiiraan Online

The Somali National Army, on Saturday, said it countered a terrorist attack by Al-Shabaab militias in Awdheegle District of Lower Shabelle and the Buursha Sheekh area of Middle Shabelle. Source: Hiiraan Online

Authorities in Somalia have returned two rifles that were taken from a Kenyan police officer who was killed in an attack at a security post near the Kenya-Somalia border in Mandera County. Source: Hiiraan Online

After 70 long years the wait is over for Newcastle. Source: Hiiraan Online

Kooxda Xuutiyiinta ee Yemen ayaa ku dhawaaqday inay la wareegeen markab ay sheegeen ay leeyahay Israa’iil, xilli uu marayay Badda Cas. Afhayeenka ciidamada Xuutiyiinta, Yaxye Saree, ayaa bayaan uu jeediyay ku sheegay in markabkaasi lagu qabtay howlgal ay ciidamadoodu ka fuliyeen Badda Cas, kaddibna loo leexiyay xeebaha Yemen. Saree wuxuu intaa ku daray in markabkan uu yahay mid si toos ah ugu xiran Israa’iil. Balse dowladda Israa’iil ayaa si adag u beenisay sheegashada Xuutiyiinta, iyagoo ku adkaystay in markabkaasi aanu laheyn wax xiriir ah oo ay la leeyihiin shirkado Israa’iili ah. Dhammaadkii bishii Oktoobar, Xuutiyiintu waxay markii ugu horreysay ku dhawaaqeen inay weerarro ku qaadeen Israa’iil, iyagoo adeegsanaya gantaallo iyo diyaarado aan duuliye lahayn (drones). Kooxda Xuutiyiinta, oo xiriir la leh Iran, waxay sheegeen in weerarradoodu ay yihiin jawaab celin ka dhan ah duqeymaha Israa’iil ay ka waddo Qaza, halkaas oo dagaallo culus ay ka socdaan tan iyo markii uu qarxay khilaafka u dhexeeya Israa’iil iyo Xamaas 7-dii Oktoobar. Howlgallada ay Xuutiyiintu ka wadaan Badda Cas ayaa kor u qaaday cabsida laga qabo amniga marinnada biyaha caalamiga ah, iyadoo waddamo badan ay walaac ka muujiyeen khatarta sii kordheysa ee ka dhalan karta weerarrada kooxdan. Dowlado dhowr ah, oo ay ku jiraan Mareykanka iyo Ingiriiska, ayaa horey ugu hanjabay inay tallaabo ka qaadi doonaan Xuutiyiinta haddii ay sii wadaan weerarrada ay ku beegsanayaan maraakiibta ganacsiga iyo kuwa xiriirka la leh Israa’iil. Source: goobjoog.com

Ankara (Caasimada Online) – Madaxweynaha Turkiga, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ayaa khadka telefoonka kula hadlay Madaxweynaha Mareykanka, Donald Trump, ayaga oo yeeshay wada-hadalladii ugu horeeyey ee tan iyo markii Trump uu ku soo laabtay Aqalka Cad. Waxay ka wada-hadleen arrimo ay ka mid yihiin; dadaallada lagu joojinayo dagaalka u dhexeeya Ruushka iyo Ukraine, xasilloonida Suuriya, iyo horumarinta iskaashiga difaaca ee labada dal, sida lagu sheegay bayaan ka soo baxay xafiiska Erdogan Axaddii. Erdogan ayaa u sheegay Trump in Turkigu taageersan yahay “dadaallada go’aanka leh iyo tooska ah” ee Mareykanku ku doonayo in lagu soo afjaro dagaalka Ruushka iyo Ukraine. Wuxuu ballanqaaday in Turkigu sii wadi doono dadaallada loogu jiro nabad waarta oo cadaalad ku saleysan. Dhanka Suuriya, Erdogan wuxuu carrabka ku adkeeyay “muhimadda ay leedahay in si wadajir ah looga shaqeeyo qaadista cunaqabateynta Suuriya si xasillooni loogu soo celiyo, maamulka cusub u shaqeeyo, iyo in la taageero dadaallada dib u hagaajinta.” Bayaanku wuxuu xusay in tallaabadani ay muhiim u tahay in muwaadiniinta Suuriya ay dib ugu laabtaan dalkooda. Khilaafka Turkiga iyo Mareykanka Erdogan wuxuu sidoo kale xoojiyay baahida Turkiga ee ah in Mareykanku qaado tallaabooyin lagula dagaallamayo argagixisada, si waafaqsan danaha amni ee Ankara. Mareykanka wuxuu si dhow ula shaqeeyaa xoogagga Kurdish-ka ee Suuriya, kuwaasoo door muhiim ah ka qaatay dagaalka ka dhanka ah kooxda Daacish. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, Turkiga wuxuu YPG—oo ah garabka militari ee Kurdish-ka Suuriya—u arkaa laan ka tirsan PKK, oo Ankara ay u aqoonsan tahay urur argagixiso ah. Erdogan ayaa si adag u dhaliilay taageerada Mareykanka ee YPG, isaga oo ku tilmaamay “khiyaano” ka dhan ah xulafanimada NATO. Dhanka iskaashiga milateri, Erdogan wuxuu kala hadlay Trump in la joojiyo xayiraadaha Mareykanka ee CAATSA, iyo in si degdeg ah loo dhameystiro heshiiska Turkiga ee iibsiga diyaaradaha F-16 iyo dib ugu soo noqoshada barnaamijka F-35, si loo xoojiyo iskaashiga difaaca ee labada dal. Mareykanka ayaa Turkiga kusoo rogay cunaqabateyn kadib markii Ankara ay 2019 iibsatay nidaamka difaaca gantaallada S-400 ee Ruushka, taasoo keentay in laga saaro mashruuca F-35. Erdogan ayaa mar kale ku celiyay muhiimadda ay leedahay in xayiraadahaas la qaado, si loo hagaajiyo iskaashiga difaaca ee labada dal. The post Erdogan oo dalabyo xasaasi ah hordhigay Donald Trump appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Jowhar (Caasimada Online) – Warar kala duwan ayaa kasoo baxaya khasaaraha ka dhashay duqeymo culus oo xalay ka dhacay deegaanno ka tirsan gobolka Shabeellaha Dhexe, kuwaas oo lagu beegsaday maleeshiyaad ka tirsan kooxda Al-Shabaab. Duqeymaha oo ahaa is daba-joog ayaa lagu garaacay deegaanno ay ku sugan yihiin Al-Shabaab, sida Ceel Cali Axmed, Ceelbacad iyo aagga degmada Aadan Yabaal ee gobolka Shabeellaha Dhexe, waxaana jira khasaare culus oo la gaarsiiyay argagixisada. Sidoo kale duqeymahan oo ay fuliyeen saaxiibada caalamiga ah ayaa ka dhacay deegaanno dhaca xadka uu Shabeellaha Dhexe la leeyahay gobollada Hiiraan iyo Galgaduud oo ah meelaha ay kasoo tallaabadaan xubnaha soo galay gobolkaasi. Saraakiil ka tirsan milatariga Soomaaliya ayaa sheegay in la bartilmaameedsaday goobo ay ku dhuumaaleysanayeen xubnaha Khawaarijta, lana gaarsiiyay khasaare culus. Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa la filayaa inay faah-faahin dheeraad ah ka bixiso duqeymahan iyo khasaaraha ka dhashay, maadaama xilli habeen ah ay dhaceen. Duqeyntan waxaa ka horreysay mid kale oo habeen hore ka dhacday degmada Jilib ee xarunta gobolka Jubbada Dhexe, taas oo lagu beegsaday xarunta degmada, xarunta waxa ay ugu yeeraan jabhadaha, labo xarun oo ay ku samayn jireen tababarada iyo qaraxyada iyo labo guri oo ay daganaayeen Horjooge Xasan Yacquub iyo Horjooge Amiin, sida lagu sheegay warsaxaafadeed kasoo baxay wasaaradda warfaafinta. Qoraal kasoo baxay dowladda ayaa waxaa lagu sheegay in la burburiyay dhammaan xarumahaasi, sidoo kalena lagu dilay horjoogayaal iyo maleeshiyaad tiro badan oo ka tirsanaa kooxaha argagixisada, waxaana dowladdu intaasi kusii dartay in la burburiyay xarumaha la duqeeyay. “Howlgal aad loo qorsheeyay oo ay sameeyeen Ciidanka Qaranka iyo saaxiibada caalamka ayaa lagu bartilmaameedsaday xarumo muhiim ah oo Khawaarijta ay ku lahaayeen magaalada Jilib ee Gobolka Jubbada Dhexe, kuwaas oo kala ah, xarunta degmada, xarunta waxa ay ugu yeeraan jabhadaha, labo xarun oo ay ku samayn jireen tababarada iyo qaraxyada iyo labo guri oo ay daganaayeen Horjooge Xasan Yacquub iyo Horjooge Amiin” ayaa lagu yiri war shalay kasoo baxay wasaaradda warfaafinta. Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa dhinaca kale digniin culus u dirtay shacabka weli dhex deggan Al-Shabaab oo loogu baaqay inay ka fogaadaan goobaha ay ku dhuumaaleysanayaan xubnaha kooxda, maadaama lagu hayo duqeymo joogta ah. “Digniin, Dowladda Soomaaliya waxay uga digaysaa shacabka Soomaaliyeed ee sugan goobaha Khawaarijtu ku dhuumaalaysanayaan inay u dhowaadaan xarumaha Khawaarijta ama goobaha ay joogaan cadowgu, maadaama Khawaarijta lagu beegsanayo goob kasta” ayaa lagu yiri warsaxaafadeedka dowladda Soomaaliya. Duqeymahan ayaa waxaa lagu taageerayaa ciidamada dowladda iyo dadka deegaanka ee haatan dagaalka adag kula jiro argagixisada oo ay isku hayaan Shabeellooyinka. Waxaa kale oo looga hortegayaa qorshaha dib isku soo abaabulidda Al-Shabaab oo mar kale kusoo rogaal celisay deegaanno horay looga xoreeyay, iyadoo ujeedka duqeymaha ay yihiin in lagu curyaamiyo awooddooda. The post Faah-faahinta duqeymo culus oo ka dhacay Sh/Dhexe appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Dagaal u dhexeeya ciidamo ka tirsan Daraawiishta Puntland iyo firxadka dagaallamayaasha argagixisada ISIL ayaa xalay ka dhacay buuraleyda Xabley oo ka tirsan degmada Ufayn ee gobolka Bari halkaasi oo uu dhawaanahan ka socday hawlgal ka dhan ah firxadka kooxdaasi. Warar hordhac ah oo soo baxaya ayaa sheegaya in ciidamada difaaca Puntland ay dagaalkaasi xalay ku dileen mileeshiyaad firxad ah oo isku dayay in ay weerar gaadmo ah ku sameeyaan ciidamada balse kooxdaasi weerarka soo qaaday badankooda la dilay islamarkaana laga furtay qoryaha fudud. Ciidamada oo hawlgalka sii wada ayaa saaka weli ku raad-jooga intii xalay ka fiigtay firxadka argagixisada ISIL ee baxsadka ah waxaana la filayaa in saraakiisha ciidamada hoggaaminaysa saacadaha soo socda faahfaahin ka bixiyaan dagaalkii xalay ee lagu dilay mileeshiyaadka argagixisada. PUNTLAND POST The post Dagaal xalay dhexmaray Ciidamada Puntland iyo mileeshiyaad ka tirsan dagaallamayaasha Daacish appeared first on Puntland Post.

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Taliyaha ciidamada booliska Soomaaliyeed, Sarreeye Guuto Asad Cismaan Cabdullaahi (Diyaano) ayaa xalay qaaday tallaabo culus oo la xiriirta amniga magaalada Muqdisho, isaga oo sameeyay kormeer amni xaqiijin ah. Taliyaha oo ay wehlinayeen saraakiil ka tirsan Booliska Soomaaliyeed ayaa booqday baraha koontarool ee laga sugo amniga caasimadda, saldhigyada booliska iyo goobaha dadweynuhu isugu yimaadaan oo ay ku jiraan kuwa ganacsiyada ee Muqdisho. Asad Diyaano ayaa sidoo kale la kulmay qaar kamid ah bulshada Soomaaliyeed oo uu ugu baaqay inay booliska kala shaqeeyaan amniga, si looga hortago falalka amni darrida ah. Qoraal kooban oo kasoo baxay taliska booliska ayaa waxaa lagu sheegay in ujeedka taliyaha uu ahaa sidii uu qiimeyn lahaa xaaladda amni iyo mida shaqo ee ciidamada. “Kormeerka shaqo ee Taliyaha ayaa salka ku hayey u kuur galidda xaaladda shaqo ee Ciidanka Booliska, waxaana bulshada uu la kulmay ee ku sugnaa baraha hubinta iyo goobahooda ganacsi ee habeenkii xiliga dambe shaqeeya ka waraystay xaaladooda amaan, isagoo ka codsaday in Ciidanka ay la shaqeeyaan” ayaa lagu yiri qoraalka. Inta uu kormeerka ku jiray taliyaha ayaa sidoo kale ka dukaameystay goobo ganacsi oo ku yaalla waddada hareeraheeda, isaga oo ganacsatada ku bogaadiyay shaqadooda. Arrintan ayaa laga gol-leeyahay dardar-gelinta amniga caasimada oo maalmahan ay kusoo dhawaadeen Al-Shabaab, kadib markii lagu arkay duleedka magaalada Muqdisho. Meelaha lagu arkay xubnaha Shabaab waxaa kamid ah deegaannada Ceelasha Biyaha, Xaawo-Cabdi iyo Lafoole oo dhaca inta u dhexeysa Muqdisho iyo Afgooye, taas oo keentay cabsi laga qabo inay koxoda weeraro ka fuliso halkaasi. Horay sidaan oo kale waxa ay usoo gaareen degmada Balcad oo iyana qiyaastii 35 KM u jirta caasimada, iyaga oo saacado kooban haystay, kadibna isaga baxay. Hadal-heyn culus ayaa hadda ka taagan magaalada Muqdisho oo sidaan ay Shabaab ugu soo dhawaadeen markii ugu horeysay 10-kii sano ee lasoo dhaafay, kooxda ayaa horay ugu goodisay in 17-ka Ramadaan ka hor ay Muqdisho qabsanayaan. Soomaaliya ayaa hadda u baahan badbaado deg deg ah, maadaama Al-Shabaab ay wadaan weerarro is dabajoog ah oo aan horay loo arag, halka awoodda ciidamada qaranka ay sii dhimayso, halka meelaha qaarna ay ka jirto abaabul yari iyo gaabis dhanka dowladda ah. The post Asad oo qaaday tallaabo la xiriirta amniga Muqdisho appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Kooxda Xuutiyiinta Yemen ayaa sheegay inay beegsadeen markab nooca diyaaradaha xambaara ah oo uu leeyahay Mareykanku, kaas oo tobanaan gantaal ay ku garaaceen, ayagoo ka jawaabaya duqeymo khasaare badan dhaliyay oo dhowaan Mareykanku ka fuliyay deegaanno ka tirsan dalkaasi Yemen. Dhanka kale wakaaladda wararka AP oo xiganaysa sarkaal Mareykan ah ayaa xaqiijisay in Xuuthiyiintu ay 11 diyaaradood iyo gantaallo u adeegsadeen weerar ay qaadeen ka dib duqeymihii Mareykanka. Xuutiyiinta ayaa wacad ku maray in maraakiibta Ganacsiga iyo dagaalka Maraykankaba ay ka mamnuuci doonaan marista badda cas, islamarkaana si lamid ah Israa’iil ay u beegsan doonaan. Source: goobjoog.com

Addis-Ababa (Caasimada Online) – Dowladaha Itoobiya iyo Eritrea, oo muddo dheer colaad ka dhaxeysay, ayaa mar kale u muuqda kuwo ku sii socda dagaal, sida ay ka digeen mas’uuliyiinta waqooyiga Itoobiya iyo xeel-dheerayaasha gobolka. Haddii dagaal cusub qarxo, wuxuu dharbaaxo culus ku noqon doonaa heshiiskii nabadeed ee 2018, kaasoo horseeday in Ra’iisul Wasaare Abiy Ahmed uu ku guuleysto abaal-marinta Nabadda ee Nobel-ka sanadkii 2019. Dagaalku wuxuu sidoo kale sii xumeyn doonaa xaaladda bini’aadanimo ee horeyba ugu cakirnayd Geeska Afrika. Maxaa sababay cabsida dagaalka? Digniinaha dagaalka ayaa yimid kaddib markii xaalad cusub oo xasillooni-darro ah ka soo cusboonaatay gobolka Tigray ee waqooyiga Itoobiya. Gobolkan wuxuu horay u marti geliyay dagaalkii sokeeye ee 2020-2022, kaasoo sababay dhimashada boqolaal kun oo qof. Intii uu dagaalkii socday, ciidanka Eritrea ayaa xadka ka tallaabay, iyaga oo garab siinayay ciidamada federaalka Itoobiya si ay ula dagaallamaan xoogaggii Tigray, oo uu hoggaaminayay xisbiga Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Hase yeeshee, heshiiskii nabadeed ee la saxiixay bishii November 2022 wuxuu xumeeyay xiriirka Itoobiya iyo Eritrea, maadaama Asmara aysan qeyb ka ahayn wadahadallada. Hoggaanka cusub ee ku-meel-gaarka ah ee Tigray, oo TPLF ay maamusho iyadoo oggolaansho ka heysata dowladda federaalka, ayaa hadda kala qeybsamay. Toddobaadkan, koox mucaarad ah ayaa la wareegtay magaalada Adigrat, iyaga oo ku eedeeyay maamulka Tigray inay khiyaaneeyeen danaha gobolka. Dhanka kale, maamulka rasmiga ah ee Tigray ayaa ku eedeeyay kooxaha mucaaradka ah inay la shaqeynayaan Eritrea. Labada dhinacba way beeniyeen eedeymaha midba midka kale u jeediyay. Xeel-dheerayaal ayaa sheegaya in xiisaddan ay dhalin karto in Itoobiya iyo Eritrea ay kala taageeraan kooxaha iska soo horjeeda ee Tigray, taasoo ugu dambeyn sababi karta dagaal toos ah. Bishii Febraayo, warbixin ay soo saartay hay’ad xuquuqda aadanaha u doodda ayaa sheegtay in Eritrea ay sameysay abaabul ciidan oo ballaaran. Isla markaana, ilo diblomaasiyadeed iyo mas’uuliyiin ka tirsan Tigray ayaa u sheegay Reuters in Itoobiya ay ciidamo geysay xadka ay la wadaagto Eritrea. Dowladaha Eritrea iyo Itoobiya ayaan weli wax faallo ah ka bixin arrintan. Xiriirka taariikhiga ah ee Itoobiya iyo Eritrea Eritrea, oo horey u ahayd gumeysi Talyaani ah, waxaa Itoobiya la midoobiyay sanadkii 1962. Hase yeeshee, xoogag mucaarad ah oo uu hoggaaminayay Isaias Afwerki ayaa dagaal hubeysan oo 30 sano socday ku qaatay madaxbannaani, taasoo Eritrea ay ku heshay xorriyaddeeda sanadkii 1993. Markii Eritrea ay xornimada qaadatay, xiriir wanaagsan ayaa ka dhaxeeyay Itoobiya, oo markaas ay maamulayeen hoggaamiyayaashii Tigray ee xukunka la wareegay kaddib ridistii hoggaamiyihii militariga Itoobiya, Mengistu Haile Mariam, sanadkii 1991. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, dagaal xooggan ayaa labada dal dhex maray sanadihii 1998-2000, markii ay isku qabteen lahaanshaha magaalada Badme. Dagaalkaas oo socday labo sano ayaa lagu qiyaasay in ay ku dhinteen 80,000 oo qof. Xiriirka labada waddan wuxuu si rasmi ah u go’naa ilaa 2018, markaasoo Madaxweyne Isaias Afwerki iyo Ra’iisul Wasaare Abiy Ahmed ay ku heshiiyeen in ay dib u soo celiyaan xiriirkooda diblomaasiyadeed iyo iskaashigooda dhaqaale. Heshiiskaas wuxuu suurageliyay in qoysas kala maqnaa muddo 20 sano ah ay dib u midoobaan, in la billaabo duullimaadyadii tooska ahaa ee Addis Ababa iyo Asmara, iyo in Itoobiya iyo Eritrea ay balanqaadaan iskaashi horumarineed oo ku aaddan dekedaha Eritrea. Maxaa xiriirka labada dal u xumeeyay? Xiriirka Itoobiya iyo Eritrea wuxuu si xun u xumaaday markii uu dhammaaday dagaalkii Tigray, markii Itoobiya ay heshiis nabadeed la gashay TPLF iyada oo aan Eritrea wax door ah ku lahayn. Xeeldheerayaal ayaa rumeysan in Eritrea ay ka cadhootay in TPLF—oo ay si weyn u naceb tahay—ay mar kale maamusho Tigray, xilli ay Eritrea dooneysay in kooxdaas laga takhaluso gebi ahaanba. Dowladda Mareykanka ayaa sheegtay in ciidamo Eritrean ah ay weli joogaan dhulka Itoobiya, inkasta oo heshiiskii Pretoria uu farayay in dhammaan ciidamada shisheeye ay ka baxaan dalka. Eritrea arrintaasi si toos ah ugama hadlin. Madaxda Eritrea ayaa sidoo kale si adag uga falceliyay hadallo uu Abiy Ahmed jeediyay tan iyo 2023, kuwaasoo uu ku sheegay in Itoobiya, oo ah dal aan badda lahayn, ay xaq u leedahay in ay hesho marin badeed. Hadalladaasi waxaa si weyn u fasiray Eritrea inay xambaarsan yihiin hanjabaad militari. Bishii Sebtembar 2023, Ethiopian Airlines ayaa hakisay duullimaadyadii Asmara kaddib markii xisaabaadkeedii Eritrea lagu xayiray. Bishii Oktoobar ee isla sannadkaas, Eritrea waxay heshiis amni la saxiixatay Masar iyo Soomaaliya, taasoo loo arkayay tallaabo lagu xakameynayo damacyada Itoobiya ee ku aaddan badda Cas. Maxaa hadda dhici kara? Xiisadda Itoobiya iyo Eritrea ayaa si xowli ah u sii kordheysa, taasoo khatar weyn ku ah nabadda gobolka. Haddii dagaal qarxo: Tigray wuxuu noqon karaa goob dagaal oo cusub, maadaama labada dal ay u muuqdaan kuwo kala taageeraya kooxaha iska soo horjeeda. Xaaladda bini’aadantinimo ee Geeska Afrika waxay kasii dari doontaa, iyadoo dad badan ay macluul iyo barakac wajihi doonaan. Xiriirka diblomaasiyadeed ee Geeska Afrika wuxuu noqon doonaa mid sii xumaada, gaar ahaan marka la eego loollanka Itoobiya iyo Eritrea ee ku aaddan awoodda gobolka. Dhaqaalaha labada dal wuxuu hoos u dhici doonaa, maadaama dagaal uu curyaamin doono ganacsiga iyo isku socodka. Iyadoo xaaladdu weli mugdi ku jirto, dadaallo diblomaasiyadeed ayaa loo baahan yahay si looga hortago dagaal hor leh oo saameyn weyn ku yeesha gobolka Geeska Afrika. Hase yeeshee, sida ay wax u socdaan, waxay muujinayaan in colaaddu ay ka dhici karto waqti kasta haddii xalka nabadeed la heli waayo. The post Sharaxaad: Muxuu salka ku hayaa dagaalka ay Itoobiya iyo Eritrea qarka u saaran yihiin? appeared first on Caasimada Online.

The Trump Administration’s Diplomatic Push for Somaliland Recognition: Strategic Access, Resource Dynamics and Geopolitical Implications in the Gulf of Aden In late 2024, whispers of a transformative shift in United States foreign policy began to circulate within diplomatic circles, centered on the Trump administration’s nascent engagement with Somaliland, a self-declared independent entity in the Horn of Africa. An informed official, speaking to U.S. media, revealed that the administration was conducting “a quiet conversation with Somaliland about a range of areas where they can be helpful to the U.S. in exchange for recognition.” This statement, though understated, signals a potential realignment of American priorities in a region long defined by its strategic volatility and resource wealth. Somaliland, perched along the northern fringe of Somalia and straddling the Gulf of Aden, occupies a pivotal geographic position, with approximately 10% of global trade traversing its adjacent waters. Since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991, following the collapse of Somalia’s central government amid a bruising conflict with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, Somaliland has operated as a de facto state, yet it remains unrecognized by any United Nations member. Somalia, its erstwhile parent state, steadfastly asserts territorial sovereignty over the region, a claim that has perpetuated decades of diplomatic stalemate. The Trump administration’s interest in Somaliland emerges against a backdrop of intricate regional dynamics and global power rivalries. Ethiopia, a landlocked nation of over 120 million people as of 2024 World Bank estimates, has cultivated unofficial ties with Somaliland, eyeing its coastline as a conduit to the sea. In January 2024, Ethiopia inked a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, securing a 50-year lease on a 20-kilometer coastal strip near the port of Berbera in exchange for pledged recognition—a deal that inflamed tensions with Somalia and prompted Turkish mediation efforts by December of that year. Turkiye, leveraging its maritime security partnership with Somalia, has positioned itself as a regional arbiter, while China’s expanding footprint in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia—most notably through its naval base in Djibouti established in 2017—looms large over U.S. strategic calculations. Historically, the United States has rebuffed Somaliland’s independence aspirations, maintaining a military presence in Somalia that includes Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and plans for additional bases. Yet, the incoming administration’s overtures suggest a recalibration, driven by Somaliland’s potential to counterbalance Chinese influence and secure American interests in the Gulf of Aden. At the heart of this diplomatic push lies Somaliland’s newly elected president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, who assumed office on December 12, 2024, following a democratic election that saw over one million voters participate from a population exceeding six million, according to the Somaliland National Electoral Commission. Abdullahi has made international recognition his administration’s cornerstone, signaling a willingness to negotiate concessions with the United States. Among the more contentious proposals floated by the Trump team is the relocation of Gazans from the war-torn Palestinian enclave to Somaliland or elsewhere in Africa—a plan endorsed by Israel but categorically rejected by Palestinian authorities. This proposition, while peripheral to Somaliland’s core objectives, underscores the transactional nature of the administration’s approach, raising questions about the broader geopolitical ramifications of such a move. Beyond these diplomatic maneuvers, the Horn of Africa’s abundant resources—spanning agriculture, fisheries, livestock, gold, oil, gas, gemstones, and untapped geothermal potential—further elevate Somaliland’s appeal, positioning it as a prize in a high-stakes contest for regional dominance. The Gulf of Aden, a narrow maritime corridor linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, serves as a linchpin of global commerce. In 2023, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that 9.2% of world trade, valued at approximately $2.1 trillion annually, passed through this waterway, including 12% of seaborne oil and 8% of liquefied natural gas shipments. Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline, encompassing the modernized port of Berbera, places it astride this critical chokepoint, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, where disruptions—such as Houthi attacks from Yemen since 2023—have periodically imperiled shipping lanes. The United States, with its longstanding naval presence in the region, views Somaliland as a potential stabilizer, offering an alternative to the overcrowded U.S. military hub in Djibouti, which hosts over 4,000 American personnel alongside French, Japanese, and Chinese forces, per 2024 Pentagon data. Recognizing Somaliland could enable the establishment of a new military base near Berbera, enhancing U.S. surveillance of weapons flows and Houthi activities while countering China’s regional ambitions. Ethiopia’s role in this unfolding drama cannot be overstated. With a gross domestic product of $159.7 billion in 2023 (World Bank) and a military expenditure of $1.1 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2024), Ethiopia ranks among Africa’s most influential powers. Its lack of sea access, however, has constrained its economic growth, with over 95% of its trade historically routed through Djibouti’s port, costing an estimated $1.5 billion annually in transit fees, according to a 2023 Ethiopian Ministry of Transport report. The MoU with Somaliland, signed on January 1, 2024, promised Ethiopia a naval and commercial foothold on the Gulf of Aden, a move that Somalia decried as an affront to its sovereignty. By December 2024, Turkish-brokered talks had yielded a tentative agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia to pursue “reliable, secure, and sustainable” sea access arrangements, though the fate of the Somaliland deal remained uncertain. This rapprochement, if successful, could diminish U.S. incentives to recognize Somaliland, as stability between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa aligns with longstanding American counterterrorism priorities, notably the fight against al-Shabaab, which controls swathes of southern Somalia and executed 132 attacks in 2023, per the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). China’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa adds another layer of complexity. Since opening its Djibouti base, Beijing has invested heavily in regional infrastructure, including $4.6 billion in Ethiopia’s railway network between 2011 and 2023 (China Africa Research Initiative) and $1.2 billion in Somalia’s fisheries and port projects through 2024 (Chinese Ministry of Commerce). Somaliland, however, has resisted Chinese overtures, aligning instead with Taiwan—a stance that prompted Beijing to withdraw business interests in 2020 after offering an infrastructure package contingent on severing Taipei ties. The Trump administration, wary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has funneled $1 trillion globally since 2013 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024), sees Somaliland as a democratic bulwark against authoritarian encroachment. Recognition could bolster U.S. leverage over the Gulf of Aden, where Chinese naval patrols have increased by 15% since 2021, according to the U.S. Naval Institute’s 2024 analysis, challenging American maritime dominance. Turkiye’s mediation efforts reflect its own ambitions in the Horn. With a defense budget of $15.8 billion in 2023 (SIPRI) and a naval base in Mogadishu since 2017, Ankara has deepened ties with Somalia, signing a hydrocarbons exploration deal in March 2024 valued at $600 million annually (Turkish Ministry of Energy). This partnership, coupled with its role in easing Ethiopia-Somalia tensions, positions Turkiye as a counterweight to both U.S. and Chinese influence. Somaliland, however, views Turkish involvement skeptically, particularly after Ankara’s denunciation of the Ethiopia MoU as a threat to Somali unity. The Trump administration’s transactional diplomacy, emphasizing immediate strategic gains over multilateral consensus, may thus sidestep Turkish objections, prioritizing a bilateral deal with Hargeisa that secures American interests without entangling broader regional alliances. The prospect of relocating Gazans to Somaliland introduces a wildcard into this geopolitical calculus. As of October 2024, the Israel-Hamas conflict had displaced 1.9 million Palestinians, with 85% of Gaza’s 2.2 million residents internally displaced (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Israel’s support for their resettlement abroad aligns with its security objectives, reducing population pressures in Gaza, where the population density reached 5,900 per square kilometer in 2023 (World Bank). Somaliland, with a land area of 176,120 square kilometers and a population density of just 34 per square kilometer (Somaliland Ministry of Planning, 2024), presents a theoretical resettlement option. Yet, Palestinian leaders, backed by the Arab League, have condemned the idea as a violation of self-determination, while Somalilanders fear it could strain their nascent state’s resources and stability. The Trump administration’s consideration of this plan—potentially tied to recognition—reflects a willingness to exploit Somaliland’s aspirations for leverage in the Middle East, though its feasibility remains dubious given logistical, political, and humanitarian hurdles. Somaliland’s resource wealth further amplifies its strategic allure. The Horn of Africa boasts proven oil reserves of 4.7 billion barrels, with Somalia and Somaliland holding an estimated 30% share, according to a 2023 U.S. Geological Survey report. Gold deposits in Somaliland’s Awdal region, projected at 1.2 million ounces (Somaliland Ministry of Energy, 2024), and gemstone finds near Berbera enhance its economic potential. Agriculture, dominated by livestock exports worth $384 million in 2023 (Somaliland Chamber of Commerce), sustains 60% of the population, while fisheries along the Gulf of Aden yielded 32,000 metric tons in 2022 (Food and Agriculture Organization). Geothermal prospects, with an estimated capacity of 1,000 megawatts (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2024), remain untapped, constrained by Somaliland’s lack of recognition and access to international financing. A U.S. partnership could unlock these assets, integrating Somaliland into global markets and bolstering American economic influence in a resource-rich frontier. The domestic context of Somaliland’s quest for recognition reveals a polity at once resilient and fragile. Since 1991, it has held six democratic elections, with the November 13, 2024, contest deemed “free, fair, and credible” by the Brenthurst Foundation. Its GDP, estimated at $2.5 billion in 2023 (Somaliland Ministry of Finance), reflects modest growth, driven by remittances ($1.2 billion annually) and trade through Berbera, which handled 450,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2023, per DP World data. Yet, challenges persist: 38% of its population lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 2024), and inter-clan violence in Las Anod, which displaced 200,000 people in 2023 (UNHCR), underscores internal fissures. Recognition could stabilize Somaliland by attracting foreign investment—projected to increase GDP growth from 3.2% to 5.8% annually, per a 2024 Atlantic Council study—while failure to secure it risks amplifying these vulnerabilities. Somalia’s opposition to Somaliland’s independence rests on historical and legal grounds. The 1960 union of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, formalized under UN auspices, underpins Mogadishu’s claim, despite Somaliland’s argument that the partnership dissolved with the 1991 civil war. Somalia’s federal government, with a 2023 budget of $917 million (Somali Ministry of Finance), struggles to assert control beyond Mogadishu, relying on 18,000 African Union troops to combat al-Shabaab (AU Mission in Somalia, 2024). U.S. military aid to Somalia, totaling $1.3 billion since 2017 (U.S. State Department), reflects a commitment to this counterterrorism framework, complicating any shift toward Somaliland. Mogadishu’s $600,000 lobbying contract with BGR Group in 2024 signals its intent to counter U.S. recognition efforts, highlighting the diplomatic stakes. The African Union (AU), with its 55 member states and $782 million budget in 2024 (AU Commission), adheres to a doctrine of territorial integrity, rooted in the 1963 Organization of African Unity charter. Recognizing Somaliland could ignite secessionist movements elsewhere—Nigeria’s Biafra, Cameroon’s Ambazonia, or Congo’s Katanga—destabilizing a continent where 15% of states face active insurgencies (ACLED, 2024). Yet, proponents argue that Somaliland’s unique colonial history and sustained self-governance distinguish it from these cases, a view echoed by 62% of U.S. Africa policy experts surveyed by the Hudson Institute in 2024. The Trump administration’s unilateralist bent may bypass AU objections, prioritizing strategic imperatives over continental norms. Israel’s tacit support for Somaliland recognition aligns with its Horn of Africa strategy. Since 2017, the United Arab Emirates, an Israeli ally post-Abraham Accords, has trained Somaliland’s security forces and invested $101 million in Berbera’s port expansion (DP World, 2024). Israel, seeking to counter Iranian proxies like the Houthis—who launched 220 attacks on Red Sea shipping in 2023 (U.S. Central Command)—views Somaliland as a potential base, enhancing its 460-mile Gulf of Aden coastline’s defensive value. This convergence of interests could amplify U.S. pressure for recognition, though Egypt, a key Trump ally with a $14.5 billion defense budget (SIPRI, 2023), backs Somalia to offset Ethiopia’s Nile River dam ambitions, muddying the diplomatic waters. The Trump administration’s approach, rooted in a “brutally transactional” ethos per Semafor’s 2024 analysis, contrasts with the Biden era’s multilateral caution. Where Biden officials visited Berbera in 2022 to explore cooperation without recognition, Trump advisors—63% of whom favor Somaliland’s independence, per Africa Intelligence—see a chance to reshape the Horn’s power balance. A military base near Berbera, costing an estimated $500 million to construct (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2024 projection), could host 2,000 troops, doubling U.S. regional capacity and cutting Djibouti reliance by 40% (Atlantic Council, 2024). This shift, while bolstering maritime security—where piracy incidents dropped 92% since 2011 (International Maritime Bureau)—risks alienating Somalia, whose 2023 exports to the U.S. totaled $42 million (U.S. Trade Representative). Public sentiment in Somaliland, where 78% support U.S. recognition (2024 Afrobarometer survey), reflects optimism tempered by caution. Students like Aisha Ismail, quoted by the BBC in 2025, hail Trump as a “savior,” while analysts like Ken Menkhaus warn of Somalia’s backlash, potentially deporting 40,000 undocumented Somalis from the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2023). The Horn’s delicate equilibrium, where 14 million faced food insecurity in 2023 (World Food Programme), could fray further if recognition sparks conflict, with Somalia’s $68 million arms imports from Egypt in 2024 (SIPRI) signaling readiness to resist. Ultimately, the Trump administration’s diplomatic push for Somaliland recognition in 2024 encapsulates a high-stakes gamble. It intertwines strategic access to the Gulf of Aden, where $2.1 trillion in trade hangs in the balance, with resource dynamics promising economic dividends and geopolitical leverage against China, Turkiye, and regional rivals. Somaliland’s democratic credentials—evidenced by a 71% voter turnout in 2024 (Somaliland NEC)—and Ethiopia’s sea-access quest bolster the case, yet Somalia’s fragility, AU principles, and the Gazan relocation wild card pose formidable obstacles. As Abdullahi navigates this crucible, the Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads, its future shaped by a U.S. policy poised to redefine alliances, security, and sovereignty in one of the world’s most contested regions. Somaliland’s Economic Potential and Geopolitical Leverage in the Horn of Africa: A Quantitative and Strategic Analysis for 2024 and Beyond Table: Somaliland’s Economic Potential and Geopolitical Leverage in the Horn of Africa (2024 and Beyond) Category Details GDP and Economic Growth – Total GDP (2023): $2.5 billion (Somaliland Ministry of Finance Development, World Bank 2024) – GDP per capita: $413 (World Bank 2024) – Population (2024): 6.2 million (Somaliland National Population Estimation Survey, January 2024) – GDP Growth (2019-2023): 3.2% annually (World Bank 2024) – Comparison with neighbors: Ethiopia: $159.7 billion (IMF 2024), Djibouti: $4.1 billion (AfDB 2024) Port of Berbera – 2023 Container Throughput: 482,000 TEUs (+7.1% from 2022) (Somaliland Ports Authority, 2023) – Djibouti Throughput (2023): 1.1 million TEUs (Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, 2023) – Projected Capacity (2027): 750,000 TEUs after DP World’s Phase II expansion (Somaliland Chronicle, December 20, 2024) – Investment in Modernization: $442 million (DP World, 2023) – Projected Annual Revenue: $200 million (Somaliland Ports Authority, 2024) – Potential Cost Reduction for Ethiopia: 22% on $1.8 billion annual transit costs (AfDB 2024) Agriculture and Livestock – Workforce Employed in Agriculture: 58% (Somaliland Ministry of Agriculture, 2023) – Livestock Exports Revenue (2023): $384 million (FAO, 2024) – Major Export Destinations: Saudi Arabia, UAE – Livestock Count (2023): 1.9 million goats, 780,000 sheep, 420,000 camels (Somaliland Ministry of Livestock, 2023) – Trade Surplus: $312 million ($384M exports – $72M imports) (Somaliland Customs Service, 2024) – Potential Productivity Growth (with recognition and investment): +35% (FAO, 2024) – Projected Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Growth (with recognition): $500 million annually (Atlantic Council, 2024) – Projected Livestock Output (2030): 2.5 million metric tons (FAO, 2024) Mineral and Energy Resources – Gold Reserves (Awdal region): 1.4 million ounces ($2.8 billion at $2,000/oz, USGS, 2023) – Copper Deposits (Borama): 1.2 million metric tons ($9.6 billion at $8,000/ton, AngloGold Ashanti, 2023) – Capital Investment Deficit: $150 million (Somaliland Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 2024) – Potential Mining Investment (post-recognition): Major firms (BHP, Rio Tinto) exploring East Africa ($3.2B investment in 2023) – Geothermal Potential: 1,200 megawatts (IRENA, 2024) – Households Powered (potential): 3.6 million (based on 333 kWh/household, IRENA, 2024) – Potential Energy Cost Reduction: 45% (from $0.72 to $0.40/kWh, AfDB 2024) Geopolitical Leverage – Gulf of Aden Trade Volume: 11.3 million barrels of oil per day ($1.4 trillion annual market, U.S. EIA, 2024) – Potential for U.S. Naval Operations: Reduction in Houthi-related disruptions (-30% response time, U.S. Naval Institute, 2024) – China’s Investment in Djibouti Ports (2018-2023): $1.6 billion (China Africa Research Initiative, 2024) – Chinese Trade Monitored (via Djibouti): 18% (UNCTAD, 2024) – Ethiopia’s Annual Exports: $42 billion (Ethiopian National Bank, 2024) – Projected Ethiopian Trade Shift to Berbera (post-recognition): 60% (AfDB, 2024) – Djibouti-Berbera Transit Time Comparison: 72 hours vs. 48 hours (-33%) (AfDB, 2024) Fiscal Projections – Somaliland’s National Budget (2023): $342 million (Somaliland Ministry of Finance, 2024) – Somalia’s National Budget (2023): $917 million (Somali Ministry of Finance, 2024) – Tax Revenue Efficiency: 63% (Somaliland) vs. 41% (Somalia) (World Bank, 2024) – Potential IMF/World Bank Loans (post-recognition): $300 million annually (IMF, 2024) – Infrastructure Development Plan: $180 million Hargeisa-Berbera Highway (AfDB, 2024) – Trade Efficiency Improvement: +25% (AfDB, 2024) – Projected Exports Growth (AfCFTA Membership by 2035): +$1.1 billion (UNCTAD, 2024) Projected Economic Impact – Potential GDP Growth (2030, with recognition): 6.8% annually (IMF, 2024) – Regional GDP Growth Comparison: Horn of Africa Average: 5.1% (IMF, 2024) – Strategic Trade Impact: Somaliland linked to $3.9 trillion in annual global trade (UNCTAD, 2024) The intricate tapestry of Somaliland’s economic landscape and its prospective role in reshaping the geopolitical equilibrium of the Horn of Africa warrant an exhaustive examination, particularly in light of potential shifts in international diplomacy as of 2024. Situated at the nexus of vital trade arteries, this unrecognized polity possesses a confluence of attributes that could catapult it into a position of considerable influence, provided it secures the requisite global acknowledgment. This analysis eschews historical recapitulations and instead embarks on a forward-looking exploration, leveraging an array of meticulously verified quantitative data and strategic projections to elucidate Somaliland’s untapped potential. Drawing exclusively from authoritative sources such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), this discourse aims to illuminate the multifaceted dimensions of Somaliland’s economic viability and its capacity to serve as a linchpin in regional and global strategic frameworks. Somaliland’s economy, though constrained by its lack of formal recognition, exhibits a resilience that belies its modest scale. In 2023, the Somaliland Ministry of Finance Development reported a gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $2.5 billion, a figure corroborated by the World Bank’s 2024 Horn of Africa Economic Outlook, which estimates a per capita GDP of $413 for its population of 6.2 million, as per the Somaliland National Population Estimation Survey conducted in January 2024. This places Somaliland’s economic output significantly below that of its neighbors—Ethiopia’s GDP stood at $159.7 billion in 2023 (IMF, 2024), while Djibouti’s reached $4.1 billion (AfDB, 2024)—yet its growth trajectory reveals a compelling narrative. Between 2019 and 2023, Somaliland’s GDP expanded at an average annual rate of 3.2%, outpacing Somalia’s 2.9% (World Bank, 2024) and reflecting a stability that contrasts sharply with the latter’s persistent insecurity. This growth, driven predominantly by remittances and port activities, underscores a latent capacity for economic dynamism that could be exponentially amplified through international integration. The linchpin of Somaliland’s economic architecture is the Port of Berbera, a facility that has undergone transformative modernization since the Dubai-based DP World assumed a 51% stake in its operations in 2016, under a $442 million investment agreement ratified by the Somaliland Parliament (DP World Annual Report, 2023). In 2023, Berbera handled 482,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), a 7.1% increase from the 450,000 TEUs recorded in 2022, according to the Somaliland Ports Authority’s annual statistics. This throughput, while modest compared to Djibouti’s 1.1 million TEUs (Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, 2023), positions Berbera as a viable alternative in the Gulf of Aden’s competitive maritime ecosystem. The port’s capacity, projected to reach 750,000 TEUs by 2027 following the completion of Phase II of the DP World expansion (Somaliland Chronicle, December 20, 2024), could generate annual revenues exceeding $200 million, based on current handling fees averaging $420 per TEU (Somaliland Ports Authority Tariff Schedule, 2024). Such figures suggest that, with enhanced infrastructure and diplomatic recognition, Berbera could rival regional hubs, reducing Ethiopia’s $1.8 billion annual transit costs through Djibouti (Ethiopian Ministry of Transport, 2024) by up to 22%, as estimated by the AfDB’s 2024 Infrastructure Financing Trends report. Beyond maritime logistics, Somaliland’s agricultural sector constitutes a cornerstone of its economic fabric, employing 58% of its workforce, per the Somaliland Ministry of Agriculture’s 2023 Labor Survey. Livestock exports, primarily to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, generated $384 million in 2023, a figure validated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 2024 Horn of Africa Livestock Trade Assessment. This sector, comprising 1.9 million goats, 780,000 sheep, and 420,000 camels (Somaliland Ministry of Livestock, 2023), sustains a trade surplus of $312 million when offset against imports of $72 million, predominantly machinery and foodstuffs (Somaliland Customs Service, 2024). However, the absence of access to international financial markets caps the sector’s growth; the IMF’s 2024 Financial Access Survey notes that Somaliland’s exclusion from global banking systems inflates borrowing costs by 18% above regional averages, stifling mechanization efforts that could boost yields by 35%, as projected in a 2024 FAO feasibility study. Recognition could unlock $500 million in annual foreign direct investment (FDI), according to a 2024 Atlantic Council economic modeling exercise, potentially elevating livestock production to 2.5 million metric tons by 2030 from its current 1.7 million metric tons (FAO, 2024). Somaliland’s mineral endowments further augment its economic allure, presenting a frontier for resource-driven development. The 2023 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Mineral Commodity Summaries estimate the Awdal region’s gold reserves at 1.4 million ounces, valued at $2.8 billion at December 2024 spot prices of $2,000 per ounce (London Bullion Market Association). Additionally, exploratory drilling by AngloGold Ashanti in 2023 identified 1.2 million metric tons of copper deposits near Borama, with a market value of $9.6 billion at $8,000 per metric ton (London Metal Exchange, December 2024). These resources remain largely unexploited due to a $150 million capital investment deficit, as reported by the Somaliland Ministry of Energy and Minerals in its 2024 Strategic Plan, a gap that international recognition could bridge through partnerships with firms like BHP or Rio Tinto, which invested $3.2 billion in East African mining in 2023 (Mining Intelligence, 2024). Moreover, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) projects Somaliland’s geothermal potential at 1,200 megawatts, sufficient to power 3.6 million households based on a regional consumption average of 333 kilowatt-hours per household annually (IRENA, 2024). Harnessing this could reduce energy costs by 45%, from $0.72 per kilowatt-hour to $0.40, per a 2024 AfDB energy pricing analysis, fostering industrial growth. Geopolitically, Somaliland’s economic assets translate into leverage that could recalibrate power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The Gulf of Aden’s trade volume, encompassing 11.3 million barrels of oil per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024), underscores Berbera’s proximity to a $1.4 trillion annual energy market. A U.S.-aligned Somaliland could facilitate naval operations, cutting response times to Houthi disruptions— costing $1.2 billion in rerouting expenses in 2023 (UNCTAD, 2024)—by 30%, according to a 2024 U.S. Naval Institute logistics study. This strategic positioning also counters China’s $1.6 billion investment in Djibouti’s port infrastructure between 2018 and 2023 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2024), offering the U.S. a foothold to monitor 18% of Beijing’s regional trade flows (UNCTAD, 2024). Ethiopia, reliant on $42 billion in annual exports (Ethiopian National Bank, 2024), could pivot 60% of its trade to Berbera, slashing transit times from 72 hours via Djibouti to 48 hours, per a 2024 AfDB transport efficiency report, thereby deepening trilateral economic ties. The fiscal implications of recognition are equally profound. Somaliland’s 2023 budget of $342 million (Somaliland Ministry of Finance, 2024) pales beside Somalia’s $917 million (Somali Ministry of Finance, 2024), yet its tax revenue of $218 million reflects a collection efficiency of 63%, surpassing Somalia’s 41% (World Bank, 2024). Integration into the IMF and World Bank could secure $300 million in concessional loans annually, based on precedents like South Sudan’s $334 million allocation in 2012 (IMF, 2024), enabling infrastructure projects such as the $180 million Hargeisa-Berbera highway upgrade, forecast to boost trade velocity by 25% (AfDB, 2024). Moreover, entry into the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could expand Somaliland’s market access to 1.3 billion consumers, potentially increasing exports by $1.1 billion by 2035, per a 2024 UNCTAD trade simulation. In synthesizing these metrics, Somaliland emerges as a latent economic powerhouse poised to wield disproportionate geopolitical influence. Its port, resources, and fiscal discipline, if catalyzed by recognition, could generate a GDP growth rate of 6.8% annually through 2030, outstripping the Horn’s 5.1% average (IMF, 2024), while anchoring a U.S.-led strategic axis in a region pivotal to $3.9 trillion in annual global trade (UNCTAD, 2024). This analysis, grounded in an exhaustive array of 2024 data, posits Somaliland not merely as a supplicant for recognition, but as a prospective architect of regional transformation, its potential bounded only by the inertia of international politics. Global Powers and Their Strategic Maneuvers in Somalia: A Quantitative and Geopolitical Dissection of Economic Interests and Trump’s Potential Impact in 2024–2025 Table: Global Powers and Their Strategic Maneuvers in Somalia (2024–2025) Category Details Geographical and Economic Importance – Total Coastline: 3,333 km (Longest in Africa, FAO 2024) – Total Land Area: 637,657 km² (CIA World Factbook, 2024) – Annual Trade through Red Sea & Indian Ocean Routes: $1.9 trillion (ICS, 2023) United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Total Investments in Horn of Africa: $4.5 billion (UAE Ministry of Economy, 2023) – Port of Bosaso TEUs (2023): 92,000 (+14% from 2022) (Puntland Ports Authority, 2024) – Annual Trade through Bosaso: $680 million (Puntland Chamber of Commerce, 2024) – Military Investment in Puntland Maritime Police: $210 million (UAE Ministry of Defense, 2024) – Maritime Security Fleet: 18 patrol vessels, 1,200 personnel trained (2024) – Oil Transit Secured: 6.2 million barrels/day (U.S. EIA, 2024) – Regional Piracy Losses (2023): $142 million (International Maritime Bureau, 2024) – Increase in Emirati Diplomats in Mogadishu (2022–2024): +22% (UAE Foreign Ministry, 2024) Turkey – Total Investment in Somalia: $1.2 billion (Turkish Ministry of Energy, 2024) – Infrastructure Investments: $750 million, including Aden Adde International Airport – Airport Passenger Traffic (2023): 1.1 million passengers (Somali Civil Aviation Authority, 2024) – Turkish Development Projects (2011-2023): 142 schools, 19 hospitals (TIKA, 2024) – People Benefiting from Turkish Projects: 320,000 students, 1.4 million patients annually – Turkish Military Base in Mogadishu: $350 million, training 3,800 troops annually (Somali Ministry of Defense, 2024) – Somali National Army Size: 18,000 troops trained by Turkey – Turkish Oil Agreement (March 2024): $1.8 billion, targeting 2.9 billion barrels offshore (Oil & Gas Journal, 2024) – Increase in Turkish Naval Patrols off Somalia (2024): +31% (SIPRI, 2024) China – Global Belt and Road Initiative Investment (2023): $1.1 trillion (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024) – Chinese Investment in Somali Fisheries (2018–2023): $320 million (FAO, 2024) – Annual Fishery Output Growth (2019–2023): +28% (41,000 metric tons in 2023) – China’s Port Rehabilitation (Mogadishu): $147 million, increased capacity to 320,000 TEUs (Somali Ports Authority, 2024) – Trade Volume via Mogadishu Port (2023): $410 million – Chinese Naval Presence in Djibouti: 780 troops, 42 anti-piracy missions in 2023 (Chinese Ministry of National Defense, 2024) – Annual Trade Secured via Bab-el-Mandeb Strait: $780 billion (ICS, 2024) – Chinese Loans to Somalia (2020–2024): $280 million (China Africa Research Initiative, 2024) – China’s Share of Somalia’s External Debt: 62% of $5.3 billion (IMF, 2024) Qatar – Humanitarian Aid to Somalia (2017–2024): $620 million (Qatar Fund for Development, 2024) – Aid in 2023 Alone: $180 million for drought relief, supporting 2.1 million people – Investment in Somali Telecommunications: $95 million (Ooredoo) – 4G Coverage Expansion (2024): 68% of urban areas, 4.2 million subscribers (Somali National Communications Authority, 2024) – Somali Delegations Hosted in Doha (2022–2024): 14 (Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024) – Saudi Aid to Somalia (2018–2024): $1.4 billion, supporting rival factions (Saudi Ministry of Finance, 2024) European Union (EU) – Total Development Aid to Somalia (2014–2023): €1.9 billion ($2 billion) (European Commission, 2024) – 2024 Security and Governance Allocation: €420 million ($445 million) – EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia: €82 million ($87 million) annually – Total Somali Soldiers Trained Since 2010: 9,200 troops – Total Somali Security Forces (2024): 22,000 troops trained via EU programs – Somali Exports to EU (2023): €98 million ($104 million), +19% from 2022 (Eurostat, 2024) – EU Anti-Piracy Budget (2024): €14.7 million ($15.6 million) (European External Action Service, 2024) – Operation Atalanta Patrols (2024): 108 missions protecting $1.3 trillion in trade – Somali Migrants in Europe: 1.2 million (UNHCR, 2024) United States (Trump Administration, 2025) – Total U.S. Counterterrorism Spending in Somalia (2017–2024): $1.6 billion (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024) – Trump’s Airstrikes (February 2025, Golis Mountains): 17 militants killed (AFRICOM, 2025) – U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia (2023): 42, costing $92 million (U.S. Air Force, 2024) – Proposed U.S.-Somalia Trade Deal (December 2024): $200 million (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2024) – Projected Bilateral Trade Growth (2027): $450 million (U.S. Trade Representative, 2024) – U.S. Strategy Against China in the Region: Reduce China’s 18% regional trade dominance (UNCTAD, 2024) – Potential U.S. Military Aid Reallocation (2025 Projection): $300 million redirected from Somalia to UAE-backed entities (CBO, 2025) – Al-Shabaab Attacks in Somalia (2023): 132 incidents (ACLED, 2024) – Egyptian Military Aid to Somalia (2023): $68 million (SIPRI, 2024) The intricate interplay of international actors vying for influence in Somalia in 2024 unveils a complex geopolitical chessboard, where economic imperatives and strategic ambitions converge with unparalleled intensity. This sovereign entity, endowed with a 3,333-kilometer coastline—the longest in Africa, as documented by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 2024 Fisheries Profile—commands a pivotal position in the Horn of Africa, rendering it a crucible for global powers. Far from a passive recipient of foreign attention, Somalia’s territorial expanse, encompassing 637,657 square kilometers (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2024), and its adjacency to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade routes, valued at $1.9 trillion annually by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in 2023, amplify its significance. This analysis meticulously dissects the economic and geopolitical stakes of nations actively engaged in Somalia, leveraging an exhaustive array of quantitative data from authoritative sources such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It further prognosticates the ramifications of the Trump administration’s policies in 2025, grounded in empirical evidence and strategic foresight, eschewing conjecture for rigorous factuality. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerges as a formidable economic player in Somalia, channeling its ambitions through a $4.5 billion investment portfolio in the Horn of Africa, as reported by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2023. In Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, the UAE’s DP World secured a 30-year concession in 2017 to manage the Port of Bosaso, which processed 92,000 TEUs in 2023, a 14% surge from 81,000 TEUs in 2022 (Puntland Ports Authority, 2024). This port, strategically positioned along the Gulf of Aden, facilitates $680 million in annual trade, predominantly hydrocarbons and livestock, per the Puntland Chamber of Commerce’s 2024 Economic Review. The UAE’s military footprint complements its economic thrust, with a $210 million training program for Puntland’s Maritime Police Force, equipping 1,200 personnel with 18 patrol vessels by December 2024 (UAE Ministry of Defense, 2024). This dual strategy aims to secure maritime corridors, where 6.2 million barrels of oil transit daily (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024), against piracy, which incurred $142 million in losses regionally in 2023 (International Maritime Bureau, 2024). Geopolitically, the UAE seeks to counter Turkey’s influence, leveraging Somalia as a proxy battleground in their broader Gulf rivalry, evidenced by a 22% increase in Emirati diplomatic staff in Mogadishu since 2022 (UAE Foreign Ministry, 2024). Turkey, in contrast, pursues a multifaceted agenda in Somalia, blending economic penetration with soft power projection. By 2024, Turkish investments reached $1.2 billion, with $750 million allocated to infrastructure, including the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, which handled 1.1 million passengers and 28,000 metric tons of cargo in 2023 (Somali Civil Aviation Authority, 2024). The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) reported constructing 142 schools and 19 hospitals between 2011 and 2023, serving 320,000 students and 1.4 million patients annually (TIKA Annual Report, 2024). Militarily, Turkey’s $350 million base in Mogadishu, operational since 2017, trains 3,800 Somali National Army troops yearly, bolstering a force of 18,000 (Somali Ministry of Defense, 2024). Economically, a March 2024 hydrocarbons pact with Somalia, valued at $1.8 billion over 10 years (Turkish Ministry of Energy, 2024), targets offshore oil reserves estimated at 2.9 billion barrels by the Oil & Gas Journal (2024). Turkey’s geopolitical calculus hinges on amplifying its stature in the Islamic world, with Somalia’s 99% Muslim population of 18.1 million (Pew Research Center, 2024) as a receptive audience, while challenging UAE and Saudi designs, evidenced by a 31% uptick in Turkish naval patrols off Somalia’s coast in 2024 (SIPRI, 2024). China’s engagement in Somalia, though less ostentatious, is no less consequential, driven by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which committed $1.1 trillion globally by 2023 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). In Somalia, China’s $320 million investment in fisheries infrastructure since 2018 has boosted annual catches to 41,000 metric tons by 2023, a 28% rise from 32,000 metric tons in 2019 (FAO, 2024). The China Harbour Engineering Company’s $147 million rehabilitation of Mogadishu’s port in 2022 increased its capacity to 320,000 TEUs annually, handling $410 million in trade (Somali Ports Authority, 2024). Strategically, China’s 780-strong naval presence in Djibouti, 240 kilometers from Somalia, conducted 42 anti-piracy missions in 2023 (Chinese Ministry of National Defense, 2024), safeguarding $780 billion in annual trade through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (ICS, 2024). Beijing’s $280 million in concessional loans to Somalia since 2020 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2024) underscores its intent to cultivate economic dependency, with 62% of Somalia’s $5.3 billion external debt now Chinese-held (IMF, 2024), positioning Somalia as a node in China’s Indian Ocean strategy. Qatar’s involvement in Somalia pivots on ideological and economic leverage, with $620 million in humanitarian aid disbursed since 2017, including $180 million in 2023 for drought relief, aiding 2.1 million people (Qatar Fund for Development, 2024). Doha’s $95 million investment in Somalia’s telecommunications sector, led by Ooredoo, expanded 4G coverage to 68% of urban areas by 2024, serving 4.2 million subscribers (Somali National Communications Authority, 2024). Geopolitically, Qatar aligns with Turkey to bolster Somalia’s Federal Government against UAE-backed factions, hosting 14 high-level Somali delegations in Doha between 2022 and 2024 (Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). This $715 million combined economic footprint aims to secure a loyal ally in the Horn, countering Saudi Arabia’s $1.4 billion aid to Somalia since 2018 (Saudi Ministry of Finance, 2024), which supports rival clan networks. The European Union (EU) maintains a robust presence in Somalia, disbursing €1.9 billion ($2 billion) in development aid from 2014 to 2023, with €420 million ($445 million) allocated in 2024 for security and governance (European Commission, 2024). The EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, costing €82 million ($87 million) annually, has trained 9,200 Somali soldiers since 2010, enhancing a 22,000-strong security apparatus (EUTM Somalia Report, 2024). Economically, EU imports from Somalia, primarily fish and frankincense, totaled €98 million ($104 million) in 2023, a 19% rise from €82 million in 2022 (Eurostat, 2024). Strategically, the EU’s Operation Atalanta, with a 2024 budget of €14.7 million ($15.6 million), conducted 108 counter-piracy patrols, protecting $1.3 trillion in trade (European External Action Service, 2024). The EU aims to stabilize Somalia to stem migration—1.2 million Somalis reside in Europe (UNHCR, 2024)—and secure energy routes, with 11% of its oil imports transiting nearby (European Energy Agency, 2024). The Trump administration’s re-entry in January 2025 introduces a seismic variable, rooted in a transactional ethos articulated in the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, which advocates leveraging African partnerships for U.S. gain (Heritage Foundation, 2024). Somalia’s $917 million budget in 2023 (Somali Ministry of Finance, 2024) and 4.4% GDP growth in 2024 (World Bank, 2024) pale beside its strategic value, with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) spending $1.6 billion on counterterrorism since 2017 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). Trump’s February 2025 airstrikes on Islamic State targets in Somalia’s Golis Mountains, killing 17 militants (AFRICOM, 2025), signal continuity in kinetic operations, with 42 strikes in 2023 costing $92 million (U.S. Air Force, 2024). Economically, a $200 million U.S. trade deal with Somalia, proposed in December 2024 by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, targets agriculture and tech, aiming for $450 million in bilateral trade by 2027 (U.S. Trade Representative, 2024). Geopolitically, Trump’s team eyes Somalia to offset China’s 18% regional trade dominance (UNCTAD, 2024), potentially redirecting $300 million in military aid from Somalia to UAE-aligned entities if Turkey’s influence grows (Congressional Budget Office, 2025 projection). This shift could destabilize Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab’s 132 attacks in 2023 (ACLED, 2024) already strain a $68 million Egyptian arms supply (SIPRI, 2024), presaging a fragmented Somalia under Trump’s pragmatic calculus. In this maelstrom, Somalia’s economic potential—$2.9 billion in fisheries revenue by 2030 (FAO, 2024 projection) and $1.1 trillion in trade adjacency—intersects with a geopolitical contest where each nation’s actions ripple globally. Trump’s policies, quantifiable in their economic and military heft, may redefine this landscape, amplifying or fracturing Somalia’s trajectory with precision yet to unfold. Debug lies news Qaran News

XAALADDA XAMAR OO BURBUR IYO KALAYAAC QARKA U SAARAN. xamar waxa afarta koone kaga soo dhawaaday kooxdii alshabaab waxay u badantahay bilaha soo socda xaaladdu inay Weji kale yeelato. Waxa xuduudka Buuhoodlle ee itoobiya ka soo gubay ciidan iyo gaadiid dagaal oo u badan majeerteen (BICIIDYAHAN) iyo ogaadeen ciidankaasi wuxuu ku yimid talo daarood oo laga taakulaynayo killaka shanaad ee itoobiya iyo xamar sidii caadada u ahayd s. Land waa in shicib iyo dawladbba loo diyaargaroobaa difaaca qaranka s.land. Mandaqadda waxa ku sii xoogaysanaysa xasiloonidarro ay dabada ka wadaan dawlado taas oo sababtay inay ku xoogaystaan kooxo maafiya ah oo kala ujeeddo ahi soomaaliya iyo s. Land oo ay ka midaysanyihiin inay ka carqaladeeyaan aqoonsiga caalamiga ah horumarka iyo nabad gelyada dalka s. Land. Arrimahaas waxa lagaga bixi karaa isku duubnni iyo feejigo gaar ah, dawladdu waa inay si gaar ah ula socotaa shaqsiyaadka uu dheefta u yahay burburku ee ku sugan s. Land. MAHADSANID. CABDI BACAW. GUUL ALLE. LONDON. Qaran News

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Taliska Ciidanka Asluubta Soomaaliyeed oo fulinaya amarka Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh oo dhammaan Ciidamada Qaranka faray inay aadaan furimaha dagaalka oo Khawaarijta ay wajahaan ayaa maanta Muqdisho ka diray boqolaal askari. Taliyaha Ciidanka Asluubta Jeneraal Mahad Cabdiraxmaan Aadan (Taliye Shub) ayaa galabta ciidankaan ka sagootiyey Muqdisho, waxayna u jiheysteen furimaha dagaalka. Ciidanka Asluubta waxay ka shaqeeyaan ilaalinta xabsiyada iyo maxaabiista iyo shaqooyin kale oo fudud, balse hadda waxaa loo diray furimaha dagaalka, taas oo ka dhigan in dowladdu ay ciidankeeda isugu geysay furimaha dagaalka. Taliyaha ayaa ciidamada intii aysan ka bixin Muqdisho kula dardaarmay inay si dhab ah uga qeyb galaan dagaalka dalka looga ciribtirayo Khawaarijta. Ciidankaan ayaa loo diray Shabeellaha Hoose, halkaas oo Al-Shabaab ay culeys badan soo saareen, iyadoo Awdheegle ay weli ku jirto gacanta cadowga. Tobanaan gaadiidka waaweyn ah ayaa galabta ciidankaan ka qaaday Muqdisho, waxayna ku baxeen wadada Afgooye, berri ilaa caawa waxaa suurtagal ah inay wajahaan Al-Shabaab oo ka buuxa Shabeellaha Hoose. Dagaalkii shalay ka bilowday Awdheegle ayaa weli si teel-teel ah uga socda xaafadaha degmada Awdheegle, halkaas oo Al-Shabaab ay diideen inay ka baxaan, iyagoo ka baqaya in la duqeeyo, hadii banaanka ay uga baxaan magaalada. Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa ciidamo iyo diyaarado dagaal u dirtay Shabeellaha Hoose, kuwaas oo xalay u gudbay Jilib, kuna duqeeyey madaxdii Al-Shabaab oo la aaminsan yahay in dhimasho iyo dhaawac badan uu gaaray, inkastoo weli ay socoto qiimeynta iyo isku dubba-ridka xogaha sirdoonka. Dowladda ayaa diiday in Shabaab lagu dhex duqeeyo degmada Awdheegle oo ah magaalo dhisan oo bulsho badan ay ku nooshahay, si looga baaqsado khasaaraha shacabka. Hoos ka daawo Taliye Shub oo ciidanka sagootinaya The post Daawo: Taliye Shub oo ciidankii ugu dambeeyey ee Asluubta u diray dagaalka appeared first on Caasimada Online.

WAREEGTO: Wasiirka Wasaaradda Horumarinta Caafimaadka Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland Dr.Xuseen Bashiir Xirsi ayaa Wareegto ku amray in cusbitaalada gaarka loo leeyahay ay si lacag la’aan ah ugu adeegaan Askariga yimaada goobahooda ee dhaawac soo gaadhay isaga oo qarankiisa difaacaya. Sidoo kale wasiirka ayaa dhakhaatiirta takhasuska sare leh ugu baaqay in xiliyadda gurmadka deg dega ah looga baahdo ay yimaadaan Xarumaha Caafimaad ee dawliga ah. Halkan ka akhriso wareegtada Wasiirka. Allaha mahad leh Abdishakuor Faahiye Xafiiska Warbaahinta Wasaaradda Horumarinta Caafimaadka JSL. Qaran News

Mandera (Caasimada Online) – Mas’uuliyiinta dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa dib ugu celiyay dowladda Kenya laba qori oo laga qaatay askari Kenyan ah oo lagu dilay weerar lagu qaaday bar kontorool oo ku taalla xadka Kenya iyo Soomaaliya, gaar ahaan Mandera. Labada hub—qori G3 iyo AK47—ayaa lagu wareejiyay saraakiisha ammaanka Mandera subaxnimadii Sabtida. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, booliska Kenya waxay sheegeen in la waayay qeybo ka mid ah rasaasta la socotay. Inkasta oo labada qori markii hore ay wateen 90 xabbo oo rasaas ah, kaliya 10 xabbo ayaa la soo celiyay. Dib u celinta hubkan ayaa timid saacado un kadib markii koox hubeysan oo la rumeysan yahay inay ka tirsan yihiin hay’ada sirdoonka Soomaaliya ee NISA ay weerar ku qaadeen ciidanka Kenya ee ku sugan Border Point 4 ee Mandera. Sida lagu sheegay warbixin booliska Kenya soo saareen, ilaa 20 nin oo hubeysan ayaa Jimcihii, Maarso 14, si lama filaan ah u weeraray shan askari oo ka tirsan guutada Booliska Xadka. Intii uu weerarka socday, waxaa isla goobta lagu dilay askari Dennis Omari, halka mid kale uu dhaawac ka soo gaaray gacanta bidix. Askariga dhaawacmay ayaa marka hore lagu dabiibay Isbitaalka Mandera Referral, ka dibna loo qaaday Nairobi si loogu sii daaweeyo. Weeraryahannadii ayaa la sheegay inay la baxsadeen qoriga G3 ee askariga la dilay, kaasoo lahaa 60 xabbo oo rasaas ah, iyo qori AK47 oo wata 30 xabbo, ka hor inta aysan goobta ka baxsan. Baaritaanka iyo suurta-galnimada aargoosi Saraakiisha ammaanka ayaa rumeysan in weerarka uu salka ku hayo aargoosi. Sida ay muujinayaan baaritaanno hordhac ah, dhacdadani waxay la xiriiri kartaa xarig dhawaan loo geystay eedeysaneyaal lagu tuhunsan yahay inay ku lug lahaayeen isku day afduub oo lala damacsanaa shaqaale Shiinees ah oo ka howlgalayay Mandera. Booliska ayaa aaminsan in weerarka uu suuragal tahay inuu abaabulay qof la sheegay inuu yahay sarkaal ka tirsan hay’adaha ammaanka Soomaaliya, islamarkaana uu qaraabo la yahay mid kamid ah eedeysaneyaasha la xiray. Saraakiil sare oo boolis ah ayaa booqday goobtii weerarku ka dhacay iyaga oo baaritaanno dheeraad ah ka sameynaya. Dowladda Kenya ayaa dalbatay in dib loo celiyo hubkii laga qaatay askarta la weeraray iyo in gacanta lagu soo dhigo kuwii ka dambeeyay weerarka. Saacado yar kaddib dalabkaas, dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa la xiriirtay dhigeeda Kenya, iyada oo ku wargelisay in ay dib u soo heshay labadii qori, islamarkaana diyaar u tahay inay dib u celiso. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, raggiiii weerarka fuliyay weli lama hayo. Ciidamada milatariga Soomaaliya ayaa la sheegay inay bilaabeen hawlgal lagu baadi-goobayo eedeysaneyaasha weerarka ka dambeeyay. The post DF oo dib u celisay hub ay ciidanka NISA ka qabsadeen Kenya – Sidee wax u dhaceen? appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya waxaa ka dhexeysay cadawtinimo dheer, waxaana suuragal ah in ay qarka u saaran yihiin dagaal sidaasina waxaa ka digay saraakiisha gobolka saldhiga u ah dagaalkaas. Hadii dagaal dhaco, waxay keeneysaa xaalad kale oo bani’aadannimo oo ka dilaacda geeska Afrika. Dagaal toos ah oo dhexmara labada dal ee Afrika ugu militeriga badan waxay soo afjareysaa heshiiska taariikhiga ee raysalwasaare Abiy Ahmed ku muteystay abaalmarinta Nobel Peace Prize sanadkii 2019-kii sidaasina waxaa qaba dadka ka faalooda siyaasada. Dagaalka wuxuu sidoo kale kaga sii darayaa xiisadaha kale ee gobolka oo hore gargaarkii laga jartay uu keenay culeys ay dareemeen malaayiin ka soo barakacay dagaalada Sudan, Somaliya iyo Itoobiya. Maxaa keenay cabsida laga qabo in dagaal dhaco? Xigashada Sawirka,EDUARDO SOTERAS Walaaca in markale uu dagaal qarxo waxaa keenay xiisada gobolka Tigray ee waqooyiga Itoobiya halkaasi oo intii u dhexeysay 2020-kii ilaa iyo 2022-kii ay ku dhinteen kumanyaal. Jimcihii, 14-kii bishan ayey koox falaago ah oo xiriir la leh xisbiga siyaasadeed ee ugu weyn gobolka waqooyiga Itoobiya ee Tigray la wareegeen xafiisyada duqa magaalada iyo raadiyaha gobolka Mekelle. Arrintan waxay keentay cabsida laga qabo dagaal sokeeye. Qof deggan magaalada Mekelle ayaa BBC-da u sheegay in dadka ay bilaabeen in ay lacagtooda kala baxaan bangiyada iyagoo ka baqaya in xaalada ammaanka ay ka sii darto. Intii uu dagaalka socday, ciidamada Itoobiya ayaa gobolka soo galay iyagoo dagaal la galay falaagada ay horkacayaan xisbiga gobolka ugu weyn ee TPLF. Dhinaca kale, heshiiska nabadeed ee Nofember 2022-kii la gaaray wuxuu si weyn u kala qeybiyay Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya oo aan wadahadalada nabadda qeyb ka aheyn. Heshiiska kaddib TPLF way kala qeybsantay. Kooxda mucaaradka ee toddobaadkan qabsatay magaalada Adigrat waxay sheegeen in ay difaacayaan danaha Tigray halka dowladana ay ku eedeysay in ay u shaqeynayaan Ereteriya Labada dhinac way beeniyeen eedahaas. “Dagaal in uu ka dhex qarxo Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya ayey qarka u saaran yihiin” ayuu yiri janaraal Tsadkan Gebretensase oo ah madaxweyne ku xigeenka dowladda Tigray oo hadalkaas u qoray Isniintii wargeyska Africa Report. Khubaradu waxay sheegayaan in xiisadan ay keeneyso in Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya ay taageeraan kooxaha iska soo horjeeda ee Tigray taasna waxay horseedeysaa dagaal toos ah oo dhexmara labada dal. Sida laga soo xigtay ilo diblomaasiyadeed oo gobolka ah, Ereteriya waxay amartay in dalka oo dhan la diyaariyo ciidamada halka Itoobiyana ay ciidamo u dirtay xadka dhanka Ereteriya. Wakiilada labada dal weli kama hadal arinaas. Taariikhda xiriirka Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya Xigashada Sawirka,Google Ereteriya oo ah dal Talyaanigu uu soo gumeystay waxaa xoog ku soo galay Itoobiya sanadkii 1962-dii. 30 sano uu dagaal socday, waxay falaagadii Ereteriya ee uu hoggaaminayay Isaias Afwerki xornimo heleen 1993-dii. Xiriirka labada dal markii hore wuxuu ahaa mid saaxiibtinimo maadama xukunka laga tuuray taliskii militeriga, dalkana ay qabsadeen falaago Tigrey ah. Labada dal ayaa ku dagaallamay cidda iska leh magaalada Badme sanadkii 1998-dii. Dagaalkii ka dhashay lahaanshaha magaalada wuxuu socday labo sano. Sanadkii 2018-kii ayey si rasmi ah heshiis u galeen labada dal markii labada madaxweyne isku raaceen in ay soo celiyaan xiriirkii diblomaasi iyo kii dhaqaale. Heshiiska wuxuu keenay in ay dib u midoobaan qoysaska dagaalka uu kala qeybiyay mudada 20-ka sano iyo in ay bilowdaan duulimaadyo toos ah oo u dhexeeya Addis Ababa iyo Asmara. Waxaa sidoo kale la sameeyay ballanqaadyo in laga shaqeynayo dhismaha dakadaha Ereteriya. Goormuu xumaaday xiriirka Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya? Xiriirka labada dal wuxuu xumaaday dhammaadkii dagaalka gobolka Tigray markaas oo Itoobiya ay heshiis kula gashay Pretoria TPLF kaas oo lagu dhameynayay dagaalka gobolka Tigray. Dadka ka faalooda waxay sheegayaan in Ereteriya ay ka carrootay in heshiiska laga saaray kaas oo TPLF ogolaatay. Qaar ka mid ah askarta Ereteriya ayaa sii joogay dhulka Itoobiya inkastoo heshiisku dhigayay in ay ka baxaan gobolka dhammaan ciidamada shisheeye. Madaxda Ereteriya waxay sidoo kale ka hadleen sida aysan ula dhacsaneyn hadalada joogtada ee ka soo baxayay raysalwasaare Abiy ilaa iyo 2023-kii ee ahaa in itoobiya ay xaq u leedahay in ay bad hesho maadaama ay go’doon tahay Hadalkaas Ereteriya waxay u aragtay hanjabaad militeri maadam ay tahay dal leh badda ay Itoobiya raadineyso. Bishii sabtembar ee sanadkii tagay, diyaarada Itoobiya ayaa joojisay duulimaadyadii Ereteriya. Waxayna taasi iftiimisay xiriirka sii xumaanaya ee labada dal. Wararka waxay sheegayaan in akoonka bangiga shirkadda ee Ereteria la joojiyay. Bil kaddib Ereteriya waxay heshiis dhinaca ammaanka la gashay Masar iyo Soomaaliya. Dhowr dal oo ay ku jiraan Mareykanka, Britain yio Midowga Yurub ayaa ka digay xaalada oo ka sii darta iyagoo sheegay in dagaal uusan markale qarxin. Khamiistii ayey Faransiiska u sheegeen muwaadiniintooda jooga Ereteriya in ay keydsadaan waxyaabaha daruuriga ayna taxadaraan. Source bbcsomali Qaran News

Washington (Caasimada Online) – Fal-celin aan caadi ahayn ayaa ka dhalatay go’aanka madaxweynaha Mareykanka Donald Trump oo haatan qorsheynaya inuu soo rogo xayiraado safar oo ballaaran, taasoo saameyn doonta muwaadiniinta dalal badan oo ay ku jirto Soomaaliya, sida laga soo xigtay ilo-wareedyo xog-ogaal u ah arrinta iyo warqad ay aragtay wakaaladda wararka Reuters. Warqadda ayaa xustay in 41 dal loo kala saaray saddex qaybood. Kooxda koowaad, oo ka kooban 10 dal—Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela iyo Yemen—ayaa lagu wadaa in gebi ahaanba laga joojiyo bixinta fiisaha. Kooxda labaad, oo ka kooban 5 dal—Eritrea, Haiti, Laos, Myanmar iyo Koonfurta Suudaan—ayaa la filayaa inay wajahaan xayiraado qayb ahaan ah, taasoo saameyn doonta fiisayaasha dalxiiska, ardayda, iyo kuwa socdaalka, inkastoo ay jiri doonaan wax ka reeban. Kooxda saddexaad, oo ay ka mid yihiin 26 dal sida Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Pakistan, Republic of the Congo, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, East Timor iyo Turkmenistan. Dalalkan ayaa la tilmaamay inay wajihi doonaan xayiraad qayb ah oo lagu joojin karo bixinta fiisaha Mareykanka, haddii dowladahooda aysan 60 maalmood gudahood wax ka qaban “ciladaha la xiriira habraacyada baaritaanka iyo amniga.” Mas’uul Mareykan ah oo codsaday in magaciisa aan la shaacin ayaa sheegay in liiskan uu isbeddel ku imaan karo, isla markaana uusan weli helin oggolaanshaha maamulka, oo ay ku jiraan Xoghayaha Arrimaha Dibadda Marco Rubio. Tallaabadan waxay dib u soo nooleynaysaa xayiraaddii safarka ee uu Madaxweyne Donald Trump hore ugu soo rogay toddobo dal oo Muslimiin u badan intii lagu jiray xukunkiisii ugu horreeyay, taasoo marar badan la beddelay ka hor inta aysan Maxkamadda Sare ansixin sanadkii 2018. Haddaba sidee looga fal-celiyay go’aanka TRUMP ee saameynaya Soomaaliya? Yaasir Yoonis Muuse “Eber miyaa eber miyaa Lottery-ga sugeyney ilaashaneyney eber miyaa?” Sadiiq Khaan Cali “Isagana Soomaaliya inuu soo galo halaga mamnuuco fitna aan isaga aheyn dalkeena ma heysato ee isagana hala bixiyo”. Saacid Xirsi “car sheeg wadan uu Mareykan dhisay? ama uu xasiloni ka abuuray ma jiro?” Maxamed Shire Aadan “Mareykanka isaga oo baati ka jilicsan ayuu Soomaaliya hoos imaan doonaa, haddi ay isku tashato”. Sharmaarke Cabdullahi Xasan “Alxamdulilaah waaye haddi nalala qabo kaligeen ceeb ah”. Cabdirashiid Maxamed Cabdullahi “Isku darajo maaha xataa Soomaaliya waxay ugu jirtaa khadka cas”. The post Fal-celin xooggan oo ka dhalatay go’aanka Trump ee ka dhanka ah Soomaaliya appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Muqdisho (Caasimadda Online) – Xiisadda siyaasadeed ee dalka ayaa haatan kasii dartay, kadib tallaabadii uu shalay qaaday guddoomiyaha golaha shacabka Soomaaliya, Sheekh Aadan Madoobe, oo soo saaray warqad uu ku eryay Xildhibaan Cabdullaahi Xaashi Abiib. Guddoomiye Aadan Madoobe ayaa shaaca ka qaaday in Xildhibaan Abiib uu lumiyay xubinimadiisii Golaha Shacabka, sababo la xiriira inuu soo xaadiri waayay laba fadhi oo xiriir ah oo uu yeeshay baarlamaanka Soomaaliya. “Haddaba Dr Cabdullaahi Xaashi Abiib ma uusan soo xaadirin Golaha Shacabka in ka badan laba fadhi oo xiriir ah, mana soo gudbin sabab macquul ah oo ku saabsan maqnaanshihiisa,” ayaa lagu yiri qoraalka kasoo baxay xafiiska guddoomiyaha. Waxaa intaas lagu daray: “Sidaas darteed wuxuu lumiyay xubinimadiisii Golaha Shacabka si waafaqsan qodobka 59-aad, faqradiisa (d), iyo qodobka 8-aad faqradiisa (4) ee xeer hoosaadka Golaha Shacabka.” Guddoomiyaha ayaa sidoo kale faray in si degdeg ah loo soo buuxiyo kursigan oo tirsigiisu yahay HOP#201, kaas oo deegaan-doorashadiisu tahay gobollada waqooyi (Somaliland). Intaas kadib arrintan ayaa dhalisay buuq wayn oo hareeyay baarlamaanka dhexdiisa, waxaana ka horyimid xildhibaanno badan oo sharci darro ku tilmaamay go’aanka Sheekh Aadan Madoobe ee ka dhanka ah Xildhibaan Cabdullahi Xaashi Abiib. Xildhibaanno kor dhaafaya illaa 100 mudane ayaa soo saaray warqad jawaab ah oo ay ku caddeeyeen mowqifkooda, kuna sheegeen in tallaabada guddoomiyaha ay ka hor imaaneyso dastuurka iyo xeer hoosaadka u degsan golaha shacabka Soomaaliya. Dhinaca kale, xildhibaan Cabdiraxmaan Gureey oo wareysi gaar ah siiyay Shabelle Tv ayaa sheegay in arrinta dhacday ay uga sii dareyso xaaladda uu waddanka ku jiro, isaga oo guddoomiyaha baarlamaanka ku eedeeyay inuu ku kacay khaladaad waa wayn. “Guddoomiyuhu wuxuu galay khaladaad waa wayn oo ku saabsan in maanta oo uu dalka xaaladdiisa meesha ay mareyso qof weliba uu ogyahay ayuu buuq siyaasadeed sii furay,” ayuu wareysiga ku yiri Xildhibaan Cabdiraxmaan Gureey. Sidoo kale wuxuu tilmaamay in go’aanka uu soo saaray guddoonka uu yahay sharci darro, loona baahan yahay inuu ilaaliyo dastuurka iyo xeer hoosaadka u yaalla golaha shacabka. “Guddoomiyuhu xaq uma lahan inuu warqad qoraa oo xildhibaan isaga lamid ah uu go’aan ka gaaraa, marka waa arrin sharci darro ah,” ayuu sii raaciyay hadalkiisa. Waxaa kale oo uu intaasi kusii daray “Waxaa leenahay guddoomiyaha waa inuu usoo laabtaa sharciga, laguna kala baxaa xeer hoosaadka golaha iyo dastuurka qaranka”. The post Xiisadda siyaasadeed oo ka sii dartay kadib tallaabadii uu qaaday Aadan Madoobe appeared first on Caasimada Online.

Mogadishu, Somalia — The United States has dismissed reports that it evacuated staff from its Mogadishu embassy, countering rumors of escalating security threats in Somalia’s capital. The U.S. Embassy in Somalia issued a statement debunking claims of a staff withdrawal as “baseless and fabricated” following fears of an imminent security crisis. “These reports have no merit,” the embassy declared, insisting operations remain unaffected. The rebuttal came after Puntland’s regional government claimed on Saturday that U.S. diplomats had left Mogadishu. Puntland’s Information Minister, Mahmoud Dirir, tied the alleged exit to clashes at Aden Adde International Airport, near the Halane compound housing international personnel, including Americans. Terror warnings fuel tensions The denial follows a March 5 embassy alert warning U.S. citizens of “credible intelligence” signaling possible attacks in Somalia. Details on the threats were scarce, but risks were flagged at key sites, including Mogadishu’s international airport. Per the notice on its official website, the embassy ordered staff to suspend all movements. “The U.S. Embassy in Somalia reminds Americans that terrorist groups are still planning kidnappings, bombings, and other attacks here,” the alert read. It warned of sudden strikes targeting airports, checkpoints, government buildings, hotels, markets, and areas frequented by Westerners or military convoys, often with minimal warning. U.S. ramps up airstrikes The U.S. State Department has upheld a Level 4 travel advisory for Somalia since July 2024, citing terrorism, crime, and instability—a stance unchanged, the embassy said. The alert coincides with intensified U.S. military action since President Donald Trump’s January 2025 return to power. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reported that a February 1 airstrike—the first of Trump’s second term—killed several ISIS militants, with no civilian losses noted. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has since launched multiple strikes alongside Somali forces, hitting ISIS and Al-Shabaab targets in Al-Kowsar, Ceel Baraf, Dadar, and Boulo-Burte. A recent International Crisis Group report pegs ISIS numbers in Somalia at hundreds, primarily entrenched in Puntland’s Cal Miskaat mountains—a remote stronghold in the Bari region. Somalia’s fragile security landscape The U.S. plays a pivotal role in Somalia, backing the federal government against Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate that has plagued the country since 2006. Mogadishu, home to over 3 million, hosts the fortified Halane compound within the airport zone, a nerve center for diplomatic and military efforts. Sporadic fighting near this area highlights Somalia’s fragile stability despite years of international intervention. Al-Shabaab remains a potent force, controlling rural zones and striking cities—evidenced by a March 11 hotel attack in Beledweyne that claimed seven lives. Puntland’s assertion of a U.S. exit—swiftly denied—underscores tensions with Somalia’s central government. The northeastern region, semi-autonomous and often at odds with Mogadishu, may leverage the claim for political gain. The embassy offered no further comment beyond its rejection, signaling a resolve to stay put. The post U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu rejects pullout rumors in Somalia appeared first on Caasimada Online.