Its 1985 and you're a senior advisor to the President of Somalia

[AfricaOwn]

Picture yourself in that role and draft a moving forward strategy for the President.

[Coofle]

I would stash some cash to live on for the next 10 years and start investments in Kenya and Uganda....if it was 1985...at that point civil war was inevitable every wise man could have seen it coming....

 

My plan would have changed only if it is 1978 when our defeated army retreated from Ethiopia...That is where "sartu ay ka qudhuntay"

I would have started to distract the people from the recent War, By creating mottos like "somalia is a lone country" ,,, Making somalia an oasis open for business, encouraging foreing investors to come the country, Hell I would have given passports like canjeero to make who don't like me just leave the country instead of joining jabhado....

In summery, If someone only was wise enough and knows how to manage post-war defeated nation, matters would have changed...

[Carafaat]

-Demobilize, demiliterize and cut on defense

 

-lift the curfew in Hargeysa

 

-promise free and democratic local elections in 1985, Parlementary elections in 1986 and Presidential elections 1986.

 

-Allow polititical parties and movements. Invite oppostion groups.

 

-Negoitiate with Ethiopia and reach same deal as in 1988

 

-privatize livestock export and other sectors.

 

-fight corruption by arresting arresting high level politicians and public court hearings

[Somalia]

1985 is too late for things to change, if you'd chosen 1984 then maybe there could be a chance.

[Sensei]

Abdulqadir Xaaji Masale was the political adviser to the then president M. S. Barre. My understanding: His counsel was rather dismissed at times when Somalia could have used better judgement. The more hawkish members of the XISBIGA KACAANKA ran havoc in those days, especially given that Abdulqadir Xaaji Masale's own brother was sitting in jail for dissidence. The man is said to have been very reasonable politician, former army officer and of the same lineage as Barre. Regardless, of the circumstances Barre had few other hawkish folks he relied on. And this is strictly my view based on what we have heard of the people running the country then.

 

Folks would tell you that Dafle, Mohammed Sheikh Usman & Abdulrehman Jama Barre were probably the folks that counselled on security, treasury and foreign affairs respectively. So, basically if you were not Dafle & cohorts, your advise probably fell on deaf ears. Not even Samatar or Kulmiye matter then. Nin walba wuu gabanayee, naftooda bay u baqaayeen.

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

A group of prominent elders had done exactly what some of you are advocating in Juun, 1990, some six months before dagaalada Xamar ka bilowdeen.

 

In 1990 a group of traditional leaders, former politicians of Somalia's post-independence, civilian government, civil servants and intellectuals signed a Manifesto calling for the late Somali dictator, Mohamed Siyad Barre, to admit that his regime had put Somalia on the road to self-destruction, and support a Conference of a National Reconciliation and Salvation.

 

The number of Manifesto signatories was 110. Written in a language that showed candour, the Manifesto made it clear that Siyad Barre's days as Somali president were numbered. The Manifesto sought to bring to the attention of Siyad Barre the civil war raging in many parts of Somalia; the bankruptcy of the former Commercial and Savings Bank - people used to line up in front of the Bank's branches early in the morning to withdraw their savings after the Somali government turned blind eye to irresponsible loan giving spree and the deteriorating security situation in capital - armed robbery and assassinations were on the increase. A thirteen member committee, headed by the late president of Somalia's first democratically elected government, Adan Abdulle Osman, was appointed.

 

The committee was tasked to prepare the reconciliation conference that would put in place a caretaker government. The Manifesto signatories suggested the venue of the conference to be neutral country, preferably Djibouti. Djibouti recognised the United Somali Congress-installed interim government in 1991; in 2000 it sponsored a reconciliation conference that brought to the scene Transitional National Government of Somalia and the flawed 4.5 power-sharing formula only to be replaced by Transitional Federal Government of Somalia after Ethiopia and Kenya put their weight behind a new conference held in Kenya in 2004 as the mandate of the TNG was coming to an end.

 

The military government detained some members of Manifesto signatories but released after it realised the public sentiment was on the side of the Manfiesto group. The detained men –no woman was member of the manifesto signatories refused to be intimidated because they knew parts of Mogadishu were already a no-go-area for the government; parts of the Somali regions were under armed opposition groups.

 

Judging by the urgency and the timelines of the Manifesto, the signatories made a patriotic attempt to save Somalia from a civil war and gave the leaders of the Somali revolution a chance to salvage their accomplishments and allow a return to a parliamentary democracy, a chance the military regime did not the give the civilian government the junta ousted in bloodless coup on 21 October1969.

 

Eight months after the publication of Manifesto, Somalia's military dictatorship was defeated by armed, clan based opposition groups. Key members of the signatories joined the United Somali Congress ( USC) government whereas some signatories were brutally murdered in Mogadishu controlled by victorious opposition group, USC.

 

The optimism of the signatories and their faith in their abilities to solve Somalia's political problems evaporated; Hashi Weheliye and Haji Muse Boqor two of the signatories were killed at the height of war between the government forces and the USC militias in 1991, Ibrahim Mohamud Abyan a signatory and former president of now-defunct Somali National University, was murdered along with Abdi Tuhe, a chemist and Muse Yusuf, educationalist in Mogadishu controlled by a government set up the USC. It was the beginning of the betrayal with which many people associate the Somali Manifesto movement.

 

In January 1991 Mogadishu fell into hands of the USC forces after the Somali government forces were defeated in a four week battle, forcing Siyad Barre to flee to his home region, Gedo. The USC had two wings, a Rome based group led by Hussein Ali Shiddo who was arrested in Ethiopia over leadership struggle with General Mohamed Farah Aideed who was in charge of the military wing of the USC.

 

The Manifesto group was oblivious to the impact the wording of the document would have had on the power struggle brewing among armed opposition groups. Implicit message in the Manifesto was that military regime did not honour it promise to return to barracks but clung onto to power longer to a point where Somalia was falling apart.

 

This message did not sit well with the supporters of the military wings of armed opposition groups especially the United Somali Congress whose Rome based wing elected Ali Mahdi Mohamed Mohamed , manifesto signatory, the Interim president of Somalia after USC captured Mogadishu in January 1991. Although the Manifesto signatories gave the armed opposition groups a role in the proposed national reconciliation conference they did not see the groups as the sole representatives of Somalis who wanted to see an end to the military dictatorship. Were the capabilities of armed, clan-based opposition groups ignored in the efforts to avert major clan warfare? Did the multi-clan make-up of the manifesto signatories make the tone of Manifesto too patronising for the armed opposition groups to respond to calls for national reconciliation conference favorably?

 

Somalia's armed opposition groups either felt Siyad Barre was too weak to go into negotiation or they thought he would not be serious about reconciliation given his initial response to the Manifesto or they looked on the clan based nature of the armed opposition as a handicap Siyad Barre would exploit to his advantage. Not all signatories of the Manifesto had the interests of Somalis at heart; some were secretly members of clan based opposition groups; it is this group who made Somalia’s 1990 Manifesto more controversial than the very military dictatorship the signatories wanted to persuade to leave the political scene peacefully.

 

Another important lesson from the Somalia 1990 Manifesto is the impact carelessly planned, internationally driven reconciliation conferences held outside Somalia have on the Somalis trust in shared political institutions that could help Somalia emerge from the abyss of lawlessness. Just as the leaders of Somalia's failed revolution thought the future of Somalia lay in one man, one party rule because of the failure of parliamentary democracy, the armed opposition groups thought the future of Somalia was in the in hands of clan based political organisations.

 

The writers of Somalia's 1990 Manifesto were aware of the fact that the Somali revolution's leaders did not learn from the mistakes of civilian leaders they had deposed in 1969 nor had the opposition leaders learned from the mistakes of the revolutionary leaders they were plotting to depose. The lessons of the Somalia's 1990 Manifesto are as relevant today as they were twenty years ago.

Xigasho

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Waxaa yaab weyn ah Maxamed Sh. Cismaan oo Kacaankii maalintuu bilowday ilaa dhamaadkiisa ku jiray, jagooyin waa weyna ka qabtay Xamar ayuu ku socon jiray, free, in 1991, while kuwii Siyaad Barre mucaaradka weyn ku ahaa, oo Manifesto ku jiray qaarkood la dilay, sida aqoonyahankii weynaa Prof. Abyan (Rabi ha u raxmadee). All because in the name of qabiil. Qabyaalad qurunkeeda.

 

Dagaaladaan waxee la degi la yihiin nabsigaas, xaqdaraas, caddaaladdaradaas dalkeena iyo dadkeena heysto.

[Sensei]

MMA-

 

Gracias for the read! Alas, not everyone will agree with what actually transpired in those last days. But more importantly, we, Somalis, will have to look no further than the distant past to know what & how things went wrong.

[Garnaqsi]

Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar;799355 wrote:

A group of prominent elders had done exactly what some of you are advocating in Juun, 1990, some six months before dagaalada Xamar ka bilowdeen.

1990? That's laughable from nothern perspective.

[Garnaqsi]

Somalia;799337 wrote:

1985 is too late for things to change, if you'd chosen 1984 then maybe there could be a chance.

I agree. I think a really good time would have been at the beginning of 1977, though.

[A_Khadar]

Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar;799356 wrote:

Waxaa yaab weyn ah Maxamed Sh. Cismaan oo Kacaankii maalintuu bilowday ilaa dhamaadkiisa ku jiray, jagooyin waa weyna ka qabtay Xamar ayuu ku socon jiray, free, in 1991, while kuwii Siyaad Barre mucaaradka weyn ku ahaa, oo Manifesto ku jiray qaarkood la dilay, sida aqoonyahankii weynaa Prof. Abyan (Rabi ha u raxmadee). All because in the name of qabiil. Qabyaalad qurunkeeda.

 

Dagaaladaan waxee la degi la yihiin nabsigaas, xaqdaraas, caddaaladdaradaas dalkeena iyo dadkeena heysto.

Exactly! Qabyaalad iyo qudhunkeeda..

[Sensei]

The saddest part being the sentiments of Garnaqsi & Somalia. Little bit of history may be detrimental to your cause, plagiarizing from the old proverb.

[Naxar Nugaaleed]

may he rest in peace, if I was in that position I would tell the president that the tree of the revolution needed some watering. rather then then backing down and demilitarizing, I would suggest actually the opposite: Double down in building that capability of the state, be a serious member of the none alliance states at least until the US would be serious about winning the Horn, find away to engage dissidents on all fronts (their would be a lot of ambassadorships to nowhere) and to actually address their grievances, democratize and prepare able leaders of the future, vilify clanism and that if it all fails, grab a tusbah and macawees on your way out and head to the bushes.

[Abwaan]

1978<---------------bay ku habboonayd in laga dhigo....Odayga iska tag baan dhihi lahaa....

[Garnaqsi]

Sensei;799397 wrote:

The saddest part being the sentiments of Garnaqsi & Somalia. Little bit of history may be detrimental to your cause, plagiarizing from the old proverb.

An empty objection if I ever saw one. It would have been better to explain your problem with our sentiments rather than the above.