Originally posted by rudy-Diiriye: lol! dagar qabey dulka u dagaaga! lol. what is that?? ,,

I thought you were all saying there was no "Somaliland Government" existed in those days ,,,, what has changed now ??

hadaa kaasi anaga namuu soo gaadhine ,,

Walee xiin waa loo yaabaa markuu A&T meel la soo fadhiisto ....... waar iskaga fogow ninka go'aan ahayne ,,,

This past week, as the “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of Somalia continues to lose what little ground it has left in the face of an onslaught from Islamist insurgents who have increasingly shown their penchant for brutality, it has emerged that President Barack Obama’s administration has been supplying arms to the regime. The decision has been defended on the grounds that, as Congressman Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told the Associated Press, if the goal is “to bring some semblance of order to Somalia,” then “there is only one game in town – and that is the government that is there.” A closer examination of the actual situation on the ground, however, not only belies such claims, but points the way to a more realist approach that stands a far better chance of delivering maximum security to the greatest number of Somalis as well as satisfying the legitimate concerns of neighboring states and the achieving the realistic strategic objectives of the United States. As the TFG held a subdued ceremony in Mogadishu on Wednesday to commemorate the 49th anniversary of the independence of the former Italian colony of Somalia (the northwestern British Protectorate of Somaliland had become independent as the State of Somaliland a week earlier on June 26, 1960), the situation in the city had clearly gotten worse on several different levels. Fighting between Islamist insurgents and those forces still loyal to the TFG persists in the city with heavy shelling and clashes, especially in the contested Qaran and Hodan districts, continuing to take its toll on the civilian population. According to a report from the United Nations released on Tuesday, more than 170,000 additional Somalis have been displaced from the city since the current round of conflict broke out in early May. An even more dramatic sign of the TFG’s weakness is the fact that al-Shabaab (“the youth”), the al Qaeda-linked group formally designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the U.S. Department of State last year that is spearheading the opposition to the interim authority, is increasingly arrogating to itself the functions of government, even in the capital. Last Thursday, the group amputated the right hand and left foot of four young men in northern Mogadishu who had been accused of petty armed robbery – the first time a penalty of the kind had been carried out in Somalia. Then, this past weekend, Shabaab militiamen under the command of Sheikh Ali Mohamed Hussein, leader of the group in the region including Mogadishu, openly conducted inspections of shops in the famed Bakara market, the largest in the city, looking for evidence of expired food and medicine. However, as extremist as the ideology of al-Shabaab and some its allies may be, does it necessarily follow that, should they manage to totally defeat the TFG, the strategic situation will actually be much worse than it already is? Without a doubt, given the links which some al-Shabaab leaders have with al Qaeda and the attempt which I reported here three months ago of Osama bin Laden to opportunistically claim a share in the credit for toppling the regime, such an occurrence would be a propaganda coup for Jihadists worldwide. Nonetheless, as I argued in testimony last week before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, “even without taking Mogadishu, al-Shabaab and its allies have already succeeded in carving out a geographical space where they and likeminded Jihadist groups can operate freely…Thus, even without toppling the TFG, al-Shabaab has already achieved a major objective of Jihadists worldwide by securing a territorial base from which they can carry out attacks elsewhere, especially against targets on the Arabian Peninsula.” Thus, the reality is that, “bragging rights” aside, whether or not al-Shabaab and other insurgents sweep aside the TFG altogether does not fundamentally alter the strategic landscape. One could even make a credible case that the Obama administration’s decision, first reported by the Washington Post last week, to send of 40 tons of weapons and munitions to the TFG, while worth less than $10 million according a senior State Department official who provided a background briefing to journalists last Friday, not only addresses the wrong needs, but also is potentially dangerous for the interest of America and its allies in the subregion. First, as I reported here last week, the TFG’s problem is not so much the lack of arms as, rather tellingly, the lack of men willing to raise arms in its defense. A recruiting drive in May allegedly “enlisted” some 20,000 troops for the government. Even allowing for the typical padding of numbers by recruiters and officers eager to line their pockets with the funds designated for the new troops, the rate of desertion has been nonetheless startling given that total number of soldiers which analysts believe to still be fighting on the regime’s side at barely 1,500. Second, there is already evidence that many of those who signed up in May recruitment drive simply turned around and sold their weapons and uniforms to insurgents who have turned its own arms around on the TFG. The State Department briefer last week could offer no assurance that the munitions being sent by the United States won’t meet a similar fate. Sheikh Hassan Yaqub, spokesman for the insurgent-led Islamist regime controlling the southern port city of Kismayo, who was quoted in the Somali press describing the U.S. arms shipments as “a gift” and “a blessing [in disguise] that came from infidels who are enemies of Islam.” In a nutshell, the administration’s poorly thought-out gesture may have handed the Islamist extremists both the weapons and the nationalist (and anti-American) card to use in their fight against the TFG. In contrast to the hand-wringing over the prospects of the TFG’s collapse that is dominating this week’s 13th annual summit of the African Union in Libya, as I suggested here five weeks ago, actually gaining full control of all south-central and southern Somalia may well prove to be the insurgents’ undoing since their brand of Islam goes very much against the traditional practices among the Somali and, even were al-Shabaab itself not already divided into factions, the imposition of its Wahhābist religious strictures and grisly hudud punishments (like the stoning of an alleged rapist and killer Sunday in the town of *********, 90 kilometers south of Mogadishu), both inspired by its foreign sponsors – to say nothing to the presence of at least several hundred foreign fighters from everywhere from Nigeria to Kashmir in its ranks – would likelier than not turn most Somalis against them. In this respect, the loosely-organized Sufi militia, Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a (roughly, “[Followers of] the Traditions and Consensus [of the Prophet Muhammad]”), some leaders of which signed a “declaration of cooperation” with the TFG two weeks ago, may just be the first of several groups to organize themselves against the radicals. If the new danger posed by a complete takeover of southern Somalia by al-Shabaab – as opposed to the insurgents controlling the overwhelming majority of the geographical space while the TFG is boxed inside a few blocks within Mogadishu (and having that much only thanks to the presence of African Union peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi) – is not that different from the old danger, what is one to do? This is how I described current policy in my congressional testimony last week: The approach of the international community and apparently the policy of the United States have become ensnared in what is essentially a circular “logic.” For want of better ideas, the international community has opted to buy into a seductive, but nonetheless vicious, circle of its own manufacture whereby it must “stay the course” and continue to devote scarce political and material resources almost exclusively to shoring up the TFG because it has already invested too much time and resources into the regime to do otherwise. What this approach ignores, however, is that if the failure so far of no fewer than fourteen internationally-spon sored attempts at establishing a national government indicates anything, it is the futility – indeed, hubris – of the notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia, even if it is staffed with presumably moderate Somalis duly vetted and anointed by the international community. Instead, in the context of the decentralized reality among the Somali, the concerned international community in general and the United States in particular need to invest the time and resources to seek out local partners who are actually capable of partnering to create a modicum of stability – societal, economic, and, ultimately, governmental – rather than throwing money and arms at a “Transitional Federal Government” which, as a former U.S. ambassador who dealt with Somali issues told me last week, “is neither transitional, nor federal, nor a government.” Even more ironic – and counterproductive to the goal of providing security and stability for both Somalis and their neighbors – is the failure of the international actors, including the United States, to work with effective authorities in the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland State, the province of Gedo, and other areas of the onetime Somali Democratic Republic. Consider just the raw demographic data. Of the estimated 9 million Somalis in the world, more than one million of them are refugees or permanently living in the diaspora; 3.5 million live in the Republic of Somaliland; and another 2.4 million in Puntland. Thus, even if its writ were not circumscribed to a few pockets in Mogadishu, the unelected TFG could claim to govern at most one-fifth of the Somali population. How can failing to engage with the legitimate elected authorities – directly chosen in internationally-moni tored democratic elections with universal suffrage in the case of Somaliland, indirectly picked by the region’s House of Representatives in the case of Puntland, co-opted by traditional leaders in the case of Gedo – who actually govern two-thirds of Somalis be helpful? Going forward, the international community would do better to engage these nascent polities. Doing so not only recognizes the progress they have achieved, but also, by helping to strengthen the remarkable stability they have already secured, both reduces the “problem areas” which need to be of concern and wins Somali partners who are best positioned to show their own fellows how to they might get their act together. Building up the capacities of the functional parts of the former Somali state also has the additional advantage of standing up important allies in the fight against the two most pressing security challenges emanating from the failed state: maritime piracy and the spread of Islamist extremism and violence. Two months ago in this column space, I made the case that while “the problem of Somali lawlessness at sea will only be definitively resolved when the international community summons up the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of Somali statelessness onshore,” the stand-up of coast guards along the littoral would “both immediately lessen the current threat to merchant shipping in the region and contribute to ameliorating the security situation in support of building governance capabilities,” including control of natural resources. It would also be more fiscally sustainable proposition than maintaining the two dozen or so surface combatants from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Japan, and several other countries. Furthermore, the coastal patrols would also help clamp down on the flow of men and materiel coming from the outside to join al-Shabaab and other groups. In addition, as I have repeatedly emphasized, any workable solution to the crisis of governance and capacity in the Somali lands must embrace a “bottom-up” or “building-block” approach rather than the hitherto “top-down” strategy. This means that a truly realistic strategy must engage traditional clan leaders, members of the vibrant Somali business community, and civil society actors. Identifying the latter will not be an easy task since years of conflict have inevitably taken their toll on civil society. Nonetheless local groups exist do exist. At last week’s Africa subcommittee hearing, I mentioned one example: SAACID, the extraordinary nongovernmental organization founded and directed by Somali women, engaged in conflict transformation, women’s empowerment, education, healthcare, emergency relief, employment schemes, and development, comes to mind. Amid the current crisis and despite the fact that it had to move its main administrative compound because of the violence, SAACID is providing 80,000 2,000-calorie meals daily to residents of Mogadishu (because food is shared, meals are actually estimated to reach some 363,000 people daily). In short, while the news coming from Mogadishu continues to be disconcerting, it need not be the cause for exaggerated alarmism. After all, any policy must, at the very least, do no harm. Moreover, a sober look at the reality on the ground in the Horn of Africa points the way to what can realistically be done to ensure security for Somalis, their neighbors, and the overall international order.

So there was such thing called "Somaliland Government" isn't it ?? ,,

Originally posted by Meiji: JB, 1960-1991 in one line: Latent greatness not materialized Insha allah we will learn from our mistakes. It is good to learn from the mistakes ....... to avoid failures

What did i miss here now ?? ...... The Interim Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Somaliland

HERE Is where you can find some answers Mr. Caano geel.....

I just said Failure sxb ... never mentioned any area, country or region. Just evaluate from 1960 to 1991 ...... with one word and it is FAILURE

our = Somaliland ..... very basic indeed.

Funny people even want to dictate our own history ......

Yes i know ,,, was good you realized your statur ,, Meiji, we are not here to discuss whose fault or not .... Look where Somalia is today after 49 years ,,,,,

and ?? ,, ehem

.. funny but looks old ,....

Somalia: 49 years later Utter failure .....

If you have the misfortune of watching Somaliland TVs, you will get sick Good ... that is the point ....

Somaliland, a British Colony for nearly 80 years, became independent on 26th June 1960. However, it gave up its freedom after four days as reported in the Daily Herald Newspaper of London on 29th June 1960: “The Colony That Rejected Freedom – Somaliland, a British Colony for nearly 80 years, became independent last Sunday. And on Friday, after four days of freedom, this British outpost will surrender its sovereignty and merge with Somalia…Now it has become an area of historical significance. And the reason is that its merger with Somalia is unique, as Somalia itself is not yet free.” Here, I republish some of agreements between independent and recognized Government of Somaliland and Government of England. Somaliland’s first cabinet signed the agreements for Somaliland: http://untreaty.un.o rg/unts/1_60000/11/5 /00020248.pdf No. 5348 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and SOMALILAND Agreement regarding interim arrangements in respect of the Somaliland Scouts. Signed at Hargeisa, on 26 June 1960 Official text : English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 13 September 1960. ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D’IRLANDE DU NORD et SOMALIE Accord relatif à des arrangements provisoires concernant les Somaliland Scouts. Signé à Hargeisa, le 26 juin 1960 Texte officiel anglais. Enregistr par le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord le 13 septembre 1960. 348 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 No. 5348. AGREEMENT * BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND REGARDING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN RESPECT OF THE SOMALILAND SCOUTS. SIGNED AT HARGEISA, ON 26 JUNE 1960 The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Somaliland; Considering that the Government of Somaliland have informed the Government of the United Kingdom that the Somaliland Scouts as maintained and governed under existing legislation shall continue in being for an interim period of six months following the attainment of independence by Somaliland and that they are willing to provide funds within present limits for this purpose, and that the Government of Somaliland have requested the Government of the United Kingdom to provide certain United Kingdom military personnel to be seconded for service with the Somaliland Scouts during this interim period; Considering that the Government of the United Kingdom have indicated their willingness to make such personnel available, subject to the conditions hereinafter specified, as part of their general assistance to Somaliland in the interim period of six months following independence; Have agreed as follows: Article I In this Agreement : (a) “United Kingdom military personnel” means commissioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers of Her Britannic Majesty’s Armed Forces, seconded for service with the Somaliland Scouts under this Agreement; (b) “conditions of service” means the laws, rules, regulations, orders and other instruments that regulate the terms of service of United Kingdom military personnel including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, provision relating to their tenure of office, transfer, promotion, disciplinary control, salary (including salary scales), pension, compensation allowances, quarters, leave and passages. 1 Came into force on 26 June 1960 by signature, in accordance with article X. 350 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 Article II (1) The Government of the United Kingdom shall at the request of the Government of Somaliland and subject to the agreement of the personnel concerned, second commissioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers of Her Britannic Majesty’s Armed Forces for service with the Somaliland Scouts, within the present establishment, during an interim period not exceeding six months from the coming into force of this Agreement. (2) During the period of six months from the coming into force of this Agreement the Commander of the Somaliland Scouts shall be the senior British officer seconded for service with the Somaliland Scouts under this Agreement. Article III (1) The conditions of service of United Kingdom military personnel shall be similar to and not less favourable than those which were applicable immediately before the coming into force of this Agreement. (2) The emoluments of such personnel shall be paid by the Government of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Government of Somaliland. (3) The Government of the United Kingdom shall account to the Government of Somaliland for all payments made under this Agreement. Article IV (1) United Kingdom military personnel shall remain subject to United Kingdom Service law at all times and shall be dealt with under this law wherever applicable. (2) Notwithstanding that United Kingdom military personnel shall be an integral part of the Somaliland Scouts they shall, so that they may be dealt with under United Kingdom Service law, be formed into a unit called “United Kingdom Element, Somaliland Scouts” and the Commander of the Somaliland Scouts or, in his absence, the senior British seconded officer acting in his place shall be the commander of this unit. (3) If necessary a court martial under United Kingdom Service law may be held locally and British officers may be brought into the country as members of such a court. Essential witnesses may also if necessary be brought into the country for the purpose of giving evidence at such a couit. (4) United Kingdom military personnel shall be subject to the law of Somaliland other than Service law. No. 5348 352 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 Article V No United Kingdom military personnel will be required to take part in military operations against a third country. Article VI (1) The Commander of the Somaliland Scouts, and through him the other United Kingdom military personnel, shall receive their orders from the appropriate Minister of the Government of Somaliland and they will obey such orders, provided that such orders would, if given by anyone subject to United Kingdom Service law, constitute lawful commands under that law and do not conflict with the allegiance of such personnel to Her Britannic Majesty. (2) United Kingdom military personnel shall have power of command over all officers and other ranks in the Somaliland Scouts junior to them in rank or seniority or placed under their command. Similarly, other personnel in the Somaliland Scouts will have power of command over all personnel including United Kingdom military personnel junior to them in rank or seniority or placed under their command. (3) United Kingdom military personnel shall have the powers of discipline over United Kingdom military personnel junior to them in rank or seniority or placed under their command provided for under United Kingdom Service law. Power of discipline over all other members of the Somaliland Scouts shall be exercised by the Commander of the Somaliland Scouts. Article VII The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right to withdraw United Kingdom military personnel from service with the Somaliland Scouts should conditions arise where they consider such action necessary. Article VIII United Kingdom military personnel shall be indemnified by the Government of Somaliland for all sums paid or payable in respect of costs, damages and any personal costs awarded against them in civil proceedings arising out of accidents or incidents occurring during the performance of their military duty. Article IX United Kingdom military personnel shall have the right to approach the appropriate representative of the Government of the United Kingdom in the area on matters pertaining to their own Service or personal interests. Normally such an approach No. 5348 354 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 shall be made to the Commander, Land Forces, Arabian Peninsula, through the Commander of the Somaliland Scouts who will keep the Government of Somaliland in formed on those matters concerning their interests. Article X This Agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Agreement. DONE in duplicate at Hargeisa, this 26th day of June, 1960, in the English language. For the Government For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great of Somaliland: Britain and Northern Ireland: M. I. EGAL T. E. BROMLEY A. DUALEH A. G. JAMA Ibr NOOR No. 5348 No. 5349 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and SOMALILAND Exchange of letters constituting an agreement providing that, should the Government of Somaliland be a party to any agreement transferring jurisdiction over the Territory of Somaliland to any other Government, such agreement should provide that the obligations of the Government of Somaliland in respect of certain specified instruments are transferred to that other Govern ment. Hargeisa, 26 June 1960 Official text : English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 13 September 1960. ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D’IRLANDE DU NORD et SOMALIE change de lettres constituant un accord disposant qu’au cas o le Gouvernement de la Somalie serait partie un accord portant transfert de juridiction sur le territoire de la Somalie tout autre Gouvernement, ledit accord devra stipuler le transfert cet autre Gouvernement des obligations du Gouvernement de la Somalie touchant certains instruments d termin s. Hargeisa, 26 juin 1960 Texte officiel anglais. Enregistr par le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord le 13 septembre 1960. 374 – 24 358 United Nations — Treaty Series I960 No. 5349. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTH ERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND PROVIDING THAT, SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND BE A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT TRANSFERRING JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRI TORY OF SOMALILAND TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, SUCH AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN SPECIFIED INSTRUMENTS ARE TRANSFERRED TO THAT OTHER GOVERNMENT. HARGEISA, 26 JUNE 1960 Mr. T. E. Bromley to the Members of the Council of Ministers of Somaliland BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 Your Excellencies, I have the honour to ask you to confirm on behalf of the Government of Somaliland that, should they in any way be a party to any agreement for, or any instrument having the effect of, transferring, or confirming the transfer of, jurisdiction over the territory of the Government of Somaliland, to any other Government, such agreement or instrument shall provide that the obligations of the Government of Somaliland in respect of the following instruments are transferred to, and accepted by, that other Government, namely : (a) The Interim Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Somaliland for a United Kingdom Aid Mission ; * (b) The Public Officers Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Somaliland ; * 1 Came into force on 26 June 1960 by the exchange of the said letters. 1 See p. 331 of this volume. 1 See p. 339 of this volume. 360 United Nations — Treaty Sénés 1960 © The Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Somaliland regarding interim arrangements in respect of the Somaliland Scouts ; 1 (d) The lease entered into on the 12th of April, 1960, between the Government of the Somaliland Protectorate and the Minister of Works of the United Kingdom. I have the honour to propose that this letter and Your Excellencies’ reply giving the confirmation aforesaid should constitute an Agreement between the two Governments. Please accept, &c. T. E. BROMLEY II The Council of Ministers of Somaliland to Mr. T. E. Bromley Your Excellency, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOMALILAND Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day’s date, which reads as follows: [see letter /] On behalf of the Government of Somaliland, we have pleasure in giving the confirmation for which your letter asks and agree that Your Excellency’s letter and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments. Please accept, &c. M. I. EGAL A. DUALEH A. G. JAMA Ibr NOOR 1 See p. 347 of this volume. No. 5349 No. 5350 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and SOMALILAND Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the continued availability of currency of the East African Currency Board in Somaliland for a transitional period. Hargeisa, 26 June 1960 Official text : English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 13 September 1960. ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D’IRLANDE DU NORD et SOMAIJE Echange de lettres constituant un accord relatif au maintien, pendant une p riode transitoire, des livraisons la Somalie d’instruments mon taires de l’East African Currency Board. Hargeisa, 26 juin 1960 Texte officiel anglais. Enregistr par le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord le 13 septembre 1960. 364 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 No. 5350. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT 1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTH ERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALI- LAND CONCERNING THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF CURRENCY OF THE EAST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD IN SOMALILAND FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HARGEISA, 26 JUNE 1960 I The Council of Ministers of Somaliland to Mr. T. E. Bromley THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOMALILAND Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 Your Excellency, We have the honour to request that, following the attainment of independence by Somaliland, the currency of the East African Currency Board (hereinafter described as “the Board”) should continue to be made available for circulation in Somaliland for a transitional period until provision can be made for its replacement. We propose that if Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agree to this request, arrangements should be made on the following basis : {a) The duration of the transitional period shall be a matter for consideration by the Government of Somaliland and Her Majesty’s Government, shall be only so long as is practicable and necessary.and shall not in any event exceed 12 months beginning from to-day’s date. (b) During the transitional period : (i) the Board shall use their best endeavours to ensure that an adequate supply of currency notes and coins of the Board continues to be available to meet the demand in Somaliland; (ii) The Government of Somaliland shall not do any act or enact any legislation which might prejudice the interests of the Board and shall afford the Board such assistance as may be necessary. 1 Came into force on 26 June 1960 by the exchange of the said letters. 366 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 If the above proposals are acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government, we have the honour to suggest that the present letter and your reply to that effect should constitute an agreement between the two Governments in this matter. Please accept, &c. M. I. EGAL A. DUALEH A. G. JAMA Ibr NOOR II Mr. T. E. Bromley to the Members of the Coitncil of Ministers of Somalilana BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 Your Excellencies, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day’s date, which reads as follows : [see letter 7] I have pleasure to confirm that the above proposals are acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government who agree that your letter and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments in this matter. Please accept, &c. T. E. BROMLEY No. 5350 No. 5350 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and SOMALILAND Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the continued availability of currency of the East African Currency Board in Somaliland for a transitional period. Hargeisa, 26 June 1960 Official text : English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 13 September 1960. ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D’IRLANDE DU NORD et SOMAIJE Echange de lettres constituant un accord relatif au maintien, pendant une p riode transitoire, des livraisons la Somalie d’instruments mon taires de l’East African Currency Board. Hargeisa, 26 juin 1960 Texte officiel anglais. Enregistr par le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord le 13 septembre 1960. 364 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 No. 5350. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT 1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTH ERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALI- LAND CONCERNING THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF CURRENCY OF THE EAST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD IN SOMALILAND FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HARGEISA, 26 JUNE 1960 I The Council of Ministers of Somaliland to Mr. T. E. Bromley THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOMALILAND Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 Your Excellency, We have the honour to request that, following the attainment of independence by Somaliland, the currency of the East African Currency Board (hereinafter described as “the Board”) should continue to be made available for circulation in Somaliland for a transitional period until provision can be made for its replacement. We propose that if Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agree to this request, arrangements should be made on the following basis : {a) The duration of the transitional period shall be a matter for consideration by the Government of Somaliland and Her Majesty’s Government, shall be only so long as is practicable and necessary.and shall not in any event exceed 12 months beginning from to-day’s date. (b) During the transitional period : (i) the Board shall use their best endeavours to ensure that an adequate supply of currency notes and coins of the Board continues to be available to meet the demand in Somaliland; (ii) The Government of Somaliland shall not do any act or enact any legislation which might prejudice the interests of the Board and shall afford the Board such assistance as may be necessary. 1 Came into force on 26 June 1960 by the exchange of the said letters. 366 United Nations — Treaty Series 1960 If the above proposals are acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government, we have the honour to suggest that the present letter and your reply to that effect should constitute an agreement between the two Governments in this matter. Please accept, &c. M. I. EGAL A. DUALEH A. G. JAMA Ibr NOOR II Mr. T. E. Bromley to the Members of the Coitncil of Ministers of Somalilana BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL Hargeisa, June 26, 1960 Your Excellencies, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day’s date, which reads as follows : [see letter 7] I have pleasure to confirm that the above proposals are acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government who agree that your letter and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments in this matter. Please accept, &c. T. E. BROMLEY No. 5350 US Congressman Mr. Donald M Payne should understand that Somaliland was not part of Somalia, and it won’t be in the future. Mr. Payne don’t know much about Somali history, however he should read the history before saying against Somaliland. The final decision of Somaliland future rests at the hands of its own people: neither Mr. Payne nor warlords and pirates in Somalia like “Puntland” Leader Abdirahman Farole can force Somalilanders to reunite with failed Somalia.

and it is getting even worse ............ Allow sahal ...

1st july eh ? ,,, Hmmmm Hambalyo Somalia .......

As a democratically elected government, Somaliland’s government cannot allow itself to be perceived as one of the parties in Somalia’s conflict, because such behavior is unacceptable to Somaliland’s people who consider their country as sovereign country, not part of Somalia.

Really ?? ,, and what was all that fuzz about Pyane then ?? ,,, don't feel insecure now sxb ,, you can still win the game ,,

Just let the two governments settle the issue ,,,,,