The self-declared Republic of Somaliland has announced its readiness to host a US military base in the strategic port city of Berbera, provided such an arrangement aligns with the mutual interests of both nations. Source: Hiiraan Online

The governments of Russia and Somalia have agreed to settle the African nation’s debt to Moscow. Source: Hiiraan Online

The continuing war in Ukraine is causing hunger thousands of miles from the battlefields, most notably in African countries such as Somalia, according to a study released today. Source: Hiiraan Online

Wasiirka arrimaha dibedda ee Jarmalka Annalena Baerbock ayaa sheegtay inay lama huraan tahay in maleeshiyada Kurdiyiinta ee Suuriya hub ka ka dhigis lagu sameeyo oo ay ku biiraan ciidamada ammaanka ee dawladda cusub ee Suuriya. ka dib wada-hadal ay kula yeelatay dhiggeeda Turkiga magaalada Ankara ayay Annalena Baerbock xoogagga kurdiyiinta Suuriya ugu baaqday inay hubka dhigaan oo ay qeyb ka noqdaan laamaha nabad-gelyada maamulka cusub ee Suuriya. Kooxaha Kurdiyiinta ee YPG ayuu Turkigu argagixiso u aqoonsanyahay, balse Mareykanka ayaa taageero hub iyo tababarba siiya, waxayna gacanta ku hayaan dhul ballaaran oo ku yaalla waqooyi bari ee dalka Suuriya. Source: goobjoog.com

Madaxweynaha Faransiiska Emmanuel Macron ayaa booqasho rasmi ah xalay uga bilaabatay dalka Jabuuti kaddib markii uu gaaray caasimadda jamhuuriyadda Jabuuti. Wefdiga uu hoggaaminayo madaxweynaha Faransiiska Macron ayaa waxaa garoonka diyaaradaha Jabuuti ku soo dhoweeyay Madaxweynaha Jabuuti Ismaaciil Cumar Geelle. Madaxweyne Emmanuel Macron iyo wefdigiisa ayaa booqasho ku joogi doona Jabuuti mudda laba cisho ah waxaana madaxda wadankaasi uu kala hadli doonaa colaadaha ka jira Soomaaliya iyo Suudaan. Madaxweynaha Faransiiska ayaa sidoo kale u duuli doona magaalada Addis Ababa halkaasi oo uu kula kulmi doono Ra’iisul Wasaaraha Itoobiya Abiy Axmed. Faransiiska ayaa taageero ka raadinaya wadamada geeska afrika kadib markii uu xumaaday xiriirka uu lalahaa dalalkii uu horey u gumeysan jiray ee ku yaala galbeedka qaarada afrika. PUNTLAND POST The post Madaxweynaha Faransiiska oo xalay booqasho rasmi ah uga bilaabatay dalka Jabuuti appeared first on Puntland Post.

Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud oo kulan la qaatay qaar kamida ganacsatada Soomaaliyeed ayaa ku bogaadiyey sida ay u doonayaan hirgelinta qorshaha Muqdishada cusub oo beddeli doonta muuqaalka caasimadda. Madaxweyne Xasan ayaa tilmaamay in mashruucani uu yahay mid dhammaan ganacsatada Soomaaliyeed ay qayb muhiim ah ku yeelanayaan, taas oo xaqiijinaysa in qorshahani uu noqdo mid Soomaali leedahay, oo ay mustaqbalka ku faani karaan jiilasha soo socdaahi. Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda ayaa ganacsatada uga mahadceliyey kaalinta muuqata ee ay ku leeyihiin dalka, gaar ahaan doorka ay ka qaadanayaan kobcinta dhaqaalaha, shaqo abuurka, iyo xoojinta nabadda. Waxa uuna ku dhiirrigeliyey in ay si hagar la’aan ah u bixiyaan canshuurta, ugana qeyb qaataan dib u dhiska dalka. Ganacsatada Soomaaliyeed ayaa dhankooda ballanqaaday in ay kaalin weyn ku yeeshaan mashaariicda qaranka, iyagoo ka duulaya qorsheyaasha lagu xoojinayo dib u dhiska iyo horumarka dhaqaale ee dalka. Source: goobjoog.com

Golaha Wakiilada ee Mareykanka ayaa ugu dambeyn meel mariyay miisaaniyad kumeel-gaar ah oo lagu sii maalgelinayo dowladda federaalka Mareykanka ilaa bisha March. Codbixintii ka dhacday Golaha ayaa waxaa taageeray 366 mudane, halka 34 ka soo horjeesteen, hal xildhibaanna uu ka aamusay. Dhamaan mudanayaasha diiday miisaaniyadda waxay ahaayeen xubno ka tirsan xisbiga Jamhuuriga. Mudanayaasha Jamhuuriga ayaa isku raacay soo jeedin cusub oo la xiriirta miisaaniyadda. Shir dheer oo ay yeesheen xildhibaannada Jamhuuriga kadib, Afhayeenka Golaha Wakiillada, Mike Johnson, ayaa sheegay in la isku afgartay qorshe cusub oo looga fogaado xirnaanshaha shaqada dowladda. Tallaabadan degdegga ah ayaa timid kadib markii xildhibaanada Jamhuuriga ee Kongareeska ay Khamiistii ku guul-dareysteen in ay meel mariyaan miisaaniyad uu taageerayay Madaxweynaha la doortay Donald Trump. PUNTLAND POST The post Golaha Wakiilada Mareykanka oo ansixiyay Miisaaniyad ku meel gaar ah appeared first on Puntland Post.

Baydhabo (Caasimada Online) – Maamullada Jubbaland iyo Puntland oo si weyn uga soo horjeeda nidaamka doorasho ee Villa Soomaaliya ay wado ayuu guddoomiyaha golaha shacabka u direy baaq cusub. Sheekh Aadan Madoobe ayaa sheegay in nasiib xumo ay tahay in waqtigaan la joogo ay arkaan dowlad-goboleedyo diidan doorashooyinka qof iyo codka, isagoo ugu baaqay maamullada Jubbaland iyo Puntland inay aqbalaan nidaamkan doorasho. “Adduunka waa nala yaaban yahay sida ay Soomaalida oo dad Islaam ah ay ugu midoobi la’yihiin nidaam doorasho oo xor ah,” ayuu Sheekh Axmed Madoobe ka sheegay khudbadii xalay uu ka jeediyay munaasabadii lix sano guuradii markii Lafta-gareen loo doortay hoggaanka Koonfur Galbeed, taas oo uu goobjoog ahaa ra’iisul wasaare Xamza. Guddoomiyaha ayaa sidoo kale wuxuu ammaan u jeediyay Somaliland, oo ayadu si xor iyo xalaal ah doorashooyinkeedii uga qabatay deegaanadeeda, taas oo looga adkaaday Muuse Biixi oo hoggaamiyanayay maamulka in ka badan 7 sano. Baaqan ayaa imanaya xilli uu guddoomiye Aadan Madoobe uu baarlamaanka u marsiiyay Villa Soomaaliya shuruuc muhiim u ah nidaamka doorasho ee uu ku dhagan yahay madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh, taas oo hoos u dhigi karta culeyska baaqan. Maamullada Puntland iyo Jubbaland ayaa qeyb ka aheyn wada-hadallada ay dowladda Soomaaliya go’aan uga gaartay inay dalka guud ahaan ka hirgeliso doorasho qof iyo cod ah, waxaana labada maamul qabaan in hanaan sharci ah loo marin nidaamkan doorasho. Nidaamka doorasho ee muddooyinkii dambe ay sida weyn uga shaqeynaysay Villa Soomaaliya ayaa sidoo kale waxaa si adag uga horyimid oo qaadacay madaxdii hore ee dalka iyo siyaasiiyinta mucaaradka, oo ayagu sheegay in looga dan leeyahay “muddo kororsi sharci darro ah.”

Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Dec 18, 2024 – ISW Press Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Author: Kathryn Tyson Contributor: Liam Karr Data Cutoff: December 18, 2024, at 10 a.m. Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests. Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3] Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8] Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson. Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11] The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13] Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15] Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21] Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25] Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson. It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31] Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36] The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38] Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42] The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45] The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG. The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port. Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr. [1] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244 [2] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11 [3] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13 [4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02 [5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [6] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24 [7] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/ [8] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink [9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm [10] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union [11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports [12] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/ [13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525 [14] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo [15] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo [16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/ [17] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402 [18] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region [19] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03 [20] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525 [21] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9 [22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia [23] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia [24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia [26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn [27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions [28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia [29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa [30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9 [31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990 [32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa [33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK [34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal [35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port [37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/ [38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462 [39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them [40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec [41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828 [42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/ [43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia [44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116 [45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden [46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984 [47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com [48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683 [49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/ [50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/ [51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will Tags Terrorist Networks Project 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036 ph (202) 293-5550 ©2007 – 2024 THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR Skip to main content Search form Search Home Who We Are Research Publications Get Involved Planned Giving Donate Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Dec 18, 2024 – ISW Press Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Author: Kathryn Tyson Contributor: Liam Karr Data Cutoff: December 18, 2024, at 10 a.m. Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests. Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3] Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8] Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson. Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11] The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13] Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15] Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21] Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25] Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson. It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31] Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36] The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38] Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42] The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45] The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG. The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port. Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr. 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https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia [24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia [26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn [27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions [28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia [29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa [30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9 [31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990 [32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa [33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK [34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal [35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port [37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/ [38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462 [39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them [40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec [41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828 [42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/ [43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia [44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116 [45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden [46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984 [47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com [48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683 [49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/ [50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/ [51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will Tags Terrorist Networks Project 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036 ph (202) 293-5550 ©2007 – 2024 THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR ShareThis Copy and Paste Skip to main content Search formSearch Home Who We Are Research Publications Get Involved Planned Giving Donate AFRICA FILE SPECIAL EDITION: ANKARA DECLARATION REDUCES ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA TENSIONS BUT LEAVES UNRESOLVED GAPS Dec 18, 2024 – ISW Press Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Author: Kathryn Tyson Contributor: Liam Karr Data Cutoff: December 18, 2024, at 10 a.m. Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests. Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3] Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8] Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson. Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11] The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13] Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15] Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21] Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25] Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson. It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31] Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36] The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38] Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42] The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45] The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG. The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port. Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr. [1] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244 [2] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11 [3] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13 [4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02 [5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [6] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24 [7] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/ [8] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink [9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm [10] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union [11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports [12] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/ [13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525 [14] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo [15] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo [16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/ [17] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402 [18] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region [19] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03 [20] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525 [21] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9 [22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia [23] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia [24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia [26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn [27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions [28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia [29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa [30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9 [31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990 [32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa [33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK [34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal [35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port [37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/ [38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462 [39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them [40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec [41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828 [42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/ [43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia [44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116 [45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden [46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984 [47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com [48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683 [49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/ [50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/ [51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will Tags Terrorist Networks Project 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036 ph (202) 293-5550 ©2007 – 2024 THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR Skip to main content Search formSearch Home Who We Are Research Publications Get Involved Planned Giving Donate AFRICA FILE SPECIAL EDITION: ANKARA DECLARATION REDUCES ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA TENSIONS BUT LEAVES UNRESOLVED GAPS Dec 18, 2024 – ISW Press Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Author: Kathryn Tyson Contributor: Liam Karr Data Cutoff: December 18, 2024, at 10 a.m. Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests. Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3] Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8] Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson. Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11] The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13] Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15] Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21] Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25] Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson. It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31] Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36] The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38] Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42] The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45] The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG. The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port. Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr. 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https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will Tags Terrorist Networks Project 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036 ph (202) 293-5550 ©2007 – 2024 THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR ShareThis Copy and Paste Qaran News

Garbahaarey (Caasimada Online) – Wasiirka amniga gudaha ee xukuumadda federaalka Soomaaliya Cabdullaahi Sheekh Ismaaciil Fartaag ayaa maanta la kulmay maamulka degmada Garbahaarey iyo hoggaannada qeybaha kala duwan ee bulshada ee magaaladaasi. Kulankan ayaa waxaa wasiirka amniga gudaha ee xukuumadda federaalka Soomaaliya ku wehlinayay wasiiro iyo xildhibaano ka tirsan baarlamaanka federaalka Soomaaliya. Kulanka ayaa looga hadlay arrimo muhiim ah oo ay kamid yihiin xoojinta amniga, kor u qaadista adeegyada bulshada iyo horumarinta wada-shaqeynta u dhaxeysa dowladda iyo bulshada deegaanka. Wasiirka iyo wafdigiisa ayaa dhageystay sidoo kale warbixinno ay soo bandhigeen maamulka degmada iyo qeybaha bulshada, kuwaas oo ka hadlay baahiyaha iyo caqabadaha haysta degmada. Sidoo kale, wasiirka ayaa bulshada ku boorriyay inay door weyn ka qaataan sugidda nabadgelyada iyo taageeridda dadaallada dowladdu ku bixinayso amniga. Wasiir Fartaag ayaa ballan-qaaday in dowladda dhexe ay sii xoojin doonto wada shaqeynta kala dhaxeysa maamulka gobolka, kan degmada iyo in mudnaanta la siin doono baahiyaha muhiimka ah ee bulshada. Kulamada maanta dhacay ayaa qeyb ka ah qorshaha uu wafdiga wasiir Fartaag uu ku tegay magaalada Garbahaarey ee gobolka Gedo, si ay halkaas uga bilaabaan abaabul dagaal oo ka dhan ah Axmed Madoobe. Shacabka iyo maamulka gobolka Gedo ayaa muujiyey taageero badan oo ay u hayaan dhaq-dhaqaaqa dowladda federaalka Soomaaliya ay ka wado Jubbaland, waxayna sheegeen inay diyaar u yihiin in qorshe kasta oo dowladdu ay wadato ayna garab istaagayaan. Gobolka Gedo waa laga nacay Axmed Madoobe, waxaana hadda fursad ka heshay dowladda federaalka oo sida la sheegay maalmaha soo socda ciidamo badan geyneysa degmooyinka gobolkaas, si qorshaha dowladda ee Jubbaland loo meel-mariyo. Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa marka hore qorsheyneysa in guluf dagaal lagu bilaabo Axmed Madoobe, maadaama ay dowladdu ku guul-dareysatay kii Raaskambooni, hadii uu isdifaaco Axmed Madoobe waxaa la sheegay inay suurtagal tahay in maamul kale oo Jubbaland ah lagu dhiso gobolka Gedo.

Hargeysa (Caasimada Online) – Golaha Wasiirrada Somaliland ayaa yeeshay fadhigoodii labaad, kaas oo uu shir-guddoomiyay madaxweyne Cabdiraxmaan Maxamed Cabdilaahi (Cirro) oo uu wehlinayo madaxweyne ku-xigeenkiisa. Shirkan oo kusoo aaday xilli xasaasi ah ayaa waxa uu madaxweyne Cirro kula wadaagay golihiisa wasiirrada in isaga iyo ku xigeenkiisaba loo dhaariyey in ay difaacaan Somaliland, dadka iyo diintaba, ayna taas ka duulayaan. Cirro ayaa sidoo kale wuxuu golaha u sheegay in xukuumadiisu ay mudnaanta 1-aad siinayso wada-hadal, nabad iyo walaalnimo ay ku wada noolaadaan dhammaan bulshada Somaliland. Waxa uuna caddeeyay in xukuumaddiisa ay ka go’an tahay difaaca Somaliland, goor kasta iyo goob kasta. Dhinaca kale, shirka ayaa intii uu socday waxa uu madaxweynuhu dib-u-milicsi ku sameeyey arrimihii lagu balamay fadhigii 1-aad iyo waxa ka fulay, iyadoo kadib uu ka dalbaday wasiirrada inay mid mid uga warbixiyaan qaabka ay ula wareegeen wasaaradaha. Dhammaan wasiirada waxay sheegeen in muddadii loo qabtay ay kula wareegeen Wasaaradaha, marka laga reebo wasaaradda dib-u-dejinta iyo arrimaha bani-aadamnimada ee Somaliland, oo hore loo odhan jiray hay’adda qaxootiga qaranka iyo barakacayaasha. Sidoo kale, wasiirka maliyadda iyo horumarinta dhaqaalaha Somaliland ayaa golaha la wadaagay xaaladda dhaqaale iyo dardar-gelinta dakhli ururinta, iyadoo wasiirka gaashaandhigga iyo diaaca uu isna golaha warbixin ka siiyey xaaladihii ugu dambeeyey ee shaqaaqooyinkii magaalada Ceerigaabo dhexdeeda ka dhacay. Wasiirka waxa uu sheegay in guud ahanba ay Somaliland amaan tahay, isagoo tilmaamay in loo baahan yahay taxadir iyo feejignaan. Ugu dambeyntiina, waxa golaha si kooban ula hadlay wasiirka Madaxtooyada oo ka hadlay hawlaha hortabinta leh 100 maalmood ee u horeeya muddo xileedka xukuumadda uu gadhwadeenka ka yahay madaxwayne Cabdiraxmaan Cirro.

Somaliland proposes hosting US military base in exchange for independence recognition The self-declared Republic of Somaliland has announced its readiness to host a US military base in the strategic port city of Berbera, provided such an arrangement aligns with the mutual interests of both nations. “Somaliland would be ready to host a US military base in Berbera if it serves the mutual interests of our two nations,” Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s representative to the United States said, Caliber.Az reports via Russian media. He emphasized that this potential cooperation is not contingent on US recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, though he expressed hope that such recognition might come under President Donald Trump’s administration. “We consider ourselves an independent and sovereign state. Therefore, we evaluate any partnerships with friendly nations exclusively through the prism of our national interests,” Goth stated, addressing concerns about potential ramifications for Somaliland’s strained relationship with Somalia. Recent reports from the publication Semafor suggest that a Trump presidency could significantly accelerate US recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Such a move could enhance US intelligence operations in the volatile region, including monitoring arms transfers, observing Chinese activities from its military base in Djibouti, and tracking Houthi movements in Yemen. Thomas Wolf, a political analyst with Kenya-based research centre TIFA, indicated that recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty would provide the US with strategic advantages. “Trump, after assuming office, may declare recognition of Somaliland to leverage Berbera’s port on the Red Sea, including for military purposes,” he noted. Somaliland, located in the northwest of Somalia along the Red Sea, declared independence unilaterally in 1991 but has not received international recognition. It operates its own currency, military, and issues passports. In January 2024, Somaliland signed an agreement with Ethiopia granting lease rights to the Berbera port in exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence. This deal intensified tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia’s federal government, which refuses to acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereign status. On December 12, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced a breakthrough in negotiations between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Talks held in Ankara resulted in a joint declaration, committing the two nations to resolve their disputes through Turkish-mediated technical discussions by February 2025. A bilateral agreement is anticipated within four months of these discussions. Caliber.Az Qaran News

Washington (Caasimada Online) – Madaxweynaha la doortay ee Mareykanka Donald Trump ayaa Jimcaha maanta ah ugu hanjabay Midowga Yurub canshuuro, haddii ururka uusan dhimin farqiga “weyn” ee ganacsi ee kala dhaxeeya Washington oo aanu ka iibsan saliid iyo gaas. “Waxaan u sheegay Midowga Yurub in ay waajib ku tahay in ay kabaan nuskhaanka baaxadda leh ee ganacsiga kala dhaxeeya Mareykanka, ayaga oo si ballaaran u iibsanaya saliiddeena iyo gaaskeena,” ayuu Trump ku yiri qoraal uu soo dhigay bartiisa Truth Social, saacadihii hore ee Jimcaha. “Haddii kale, waa canshuur,” ayuu yiri. Sida ku cad tirooyinka Mareykanka, badeecadaha laga keeno Midowga Yurub waxay ahaayeen $553.3 bilyan 2022-kii, halka badeecadaha loo dhoofiyo Midowga Yurub ay ahaayeen $350.8 bilyan. Tani waxay ka dhigeysaa farqiga ganacsiga badeecadaha ee Mareykanka iyo Midowga Yurub $ 202.5 bilyan sanadkaas. Trump, oo xafiiska la wareegaya bisha Janaayo, ayaa ku hanjabay canshuur dharbaaxo ah oo uu ku soo rogayo saaxiibada ganacsi ee Mareykanka – oo ay ku jiraan Canada, Mexico iyo Shiinaha – taas oo gilgili karta dhaqaalaha adduunka. Isaga oo ku eedeeyay Canada iyo Mexico in ay ogolaadeen in Maraykanka lagu soo daadiyo daroogooyinka sharci darrada ah iyo muhaajiriinta aan sharciyeysnayn, waxa uu ku dhawaaqay 25 boqolkiiba canshuur ah oo la saaro badeecadaha ay usoo dhoofiyaan Mareykanka, halka uu sidoo kale wacad ku maray ugu yaraan 10 boqolkiiba oo ka dhan ah Shiinaha. Canada, Mexico iyo Shiinaha ayaa ah saddex ka mid ah saaxiibada ganacsi ee ugu weyn e Mareykanka. Horaantii bishaan, Midowga Yurub wuxuu soo gabagabeeyey heshiis ganacsi oo ballaaran oo uu lala galay afar waddan oo ku yaalla Koonfurta Ameerika – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay iyo Uruguay – kaas oo ujeedkiisu yahay in la abuuro aag ganacsi oo xor ah oo dhan 700 milyan. VOA

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud ayaa Madaxtooyada ku qaabilay wafdi sare oo ka socday dalka Aljeeriya, oo maanta booqasho rasmi ah ku yimid dalka. Wafdigan ayaa waxa hoggaaminayey Wasiirka Tacliinta Sare ee Jamhuuriyadda Aljeeriya Kamel Badari oo ay kulan gaar ah wada qaateen madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud. Madaxweynaha ayaa ka guddoomay wafdigan farriin iyo salaan ay uga sideen madaxweynaha dalka Aljeeriya Cabdilmajiid Tabbuune, iyagoo la wadaagay warbixin ku saabsan xaaladda dalkaas iyo sida ay uga go’an tahay madaxdiisa sare u qaadidda xiriirka ay la wadaagaan Soomaaliya. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh ayaa soo bandhigay sida Soomaaliya ay uga go’an tahay xoojinta iskaashiga labada dal iyo doorka muhiimka ah ee ay ka qaadanayso horumarinta midnimada iyo isdhex-galka Qaaradda Afrika. Caalamka ayaa hadda daneynaya Soomaaliya, maadaama ay tahay wadan qani ah oo dad furfuran ay ku nool yihiin, waxaana meesha ka sii baxeysa duruuftii lagu nici jiray Soomaaliya oo aheyd dowlad la’aanta. Diblomaasiyiinta Soomaaliyeed ayaa caalamka ka helaya casuumaad, sidoo kale farriimo iyo dhambaalo marxabo wata ayaa si joogto ah caalamka uga soo gaara madaxda Soomaaliya, waxaana lagu bogaadinaya soo kabashada deg degga ah ee socota iyo sida ay dowladdu ugu adkeysaneyso sharuucda caalamiga ah. Kheyraadka ceegaaga gudaha dalka oo hadda baaritaan lagu bilaabay, deyn cafinta, dib u habeynta maaliyadda dalka, kororka dakhliga dalka, ka soo kabashada dagaaladii sokeeye, maalgashiga iyo dalkaan dihan ee xogtiisu caalamka gaartay ayaa sababtay in aad loo daneeyo Soomaaliya.

Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud ayaa Madaxtooyada ku qaabilay Wasiirka Tacliinta Sare ee Jamhuuriyadda Aljeeriya Mudane Kamel Badari iyo wafdi uu hoggaaminayo oo booqasho rasmi ah ku yimid dalka. Madaxweynaha ayaa ka guddoomay wafdigan farriin iyo salaan ay uga sideen Madaxweynaha dalka aan walaalaha nahay ee Aljeeriya Mudane Cabdilmajiid Tabbuune, iyagoo la wadaagay warbixin ku saabsan xaaladda dalkaas iyo sida ay uga go’an tahay Madaxdiisa sare u qaadidda xiriirka ay la wadaagaan Soomaaliya. Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud ayaa soo bandhigay sida Soomaaliya ay uga go’an tahay xoojinta iskaashiga labada dal iyo doorka muhiimka ah ee ay ka qaadanayso horumarinta midnimada iyo isdhexgalka Qaaradda Afrika. Source: goobjoog.com

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Dowladda Federaalka ah Soomaaliya ayaa weli ku adkeysaneysa go’aankeedii hore ee ahaa in Ciidamada Itoobiya aysan ka mid noqon Howlgalka Taageerada iyo Xasilinta Midowga Afrika ee Soomaaliya (AUSSOM) ee soo socda, sida ay noo sheegeen ilo-wareedyo lagu kalsoon yahay. Dowladda ayaa amartay in ciidamada Itoobiya ay dalka ka baxaan ka hor 31-ka December, xilliggaasi oo uu ku egyahay muddo xileedka howlgalka ATMIS. Go’aankaas ayaa ka dhashay caradii ay Soomaaliya ay ka qaaday heshiiska Itoobiy iyo Soomaaliya. Hase yeeshee, labada dal ayaa dhowaan gaaray heshiis lagu soo afjaray khilaafka ka dhashay heshiiskii is-afgaradka ahaa (MOU) ee Itoobiya ay la gashay Somaliland bishii January, kaas oo soo jeediyay in dhul xeebeedka laga kireeyo Addis-Ababa oo ay ka dhigato saldhig ciidamada badda ah iyo dekad, taas beddelkeedna ay aqoonsato madax-bannaanida Somaliland. Heshiiskii 11-kii December, oo uu fududeeyay madaxweynaha Turkiga Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ayaa dib u xaqiijiyay ballanqaadyada labada waddan ee ku aaddan ixtiraamka madax-bannaanida, wadajirka dhuleed, iyo shuruucda caalamiga ah. Si kastaba, mas’uuliyiin Soomaali ah ayaa laga soo xigtay in mar hore la qorsheeyey ciidamada ka mid noqonaya howlgalka AUSSOM, sidaas darteedna, uusan jirin waqti ku filan oo hadda isbeddel loogu sameeyo. Golaha Nabadda iyo Ammaanka ee Midowga Afrika ayaa horay u ansixiyay AUSSOM, oo loo qorsheeyay in lagu beddelo Hawlgalka Ku-meel-gaarka ah ee Midowga Afrika ee Soomaaliya (ATMIS) laga bilaabo Janaayo 2025. Saaxiibada caalamiga ah ee Soomaaliya ayaa dowladda ku cadaadinaya ka qaybgalka Itoobiya ee hawlgalka cusub ee AU-da. Waxayna horey u qiimeeyeen in Itoobiya ay u badan tahay inay ku sii sugnaan doonto Soomaaliya. Balse arrintan ayey Soomaaliya sheegeysa in ay adag tahay. Soomaaliya ayaa horey Masar waxay bishii Agoosto 2024 la saxeexatay heshiis difaac. Masar ayaa qorshaynaysa inay ku dhowaad 10,000 askari oo Masaari ah ay geyso Soomaaliya, si ay u beddelaan ciidamada Itoobiya ee Soomaaliya jooga.

Ambassador Ashraf Swelam, assistant foreign minister for African Organizations and Assemblies, reiterated on Thursday Egypt’s unwavering support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and stability during the ministerial meeting of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). Source: Hiiraan Online

It is my objective in this article to highlight some of the daunting issues surrounding the recent flair of violence in the Eastern regions of Somaliland. In my opinion, the main reason for the hostilities against the Somaliland people is deeply rooted into the fabric of the southern (Reer Koonfur) Somalia people. It is the mistrust, conspiracy laden atmosphere, and the unruly combative behavior that has plagued Somalia since the fall of Dictator Siyad Barre, that is feeding their grudge and jealousy toward the accomplishment and the successful nation building in Somaliland. While the Southerners are engaged in a self-destructive cycle of violence, Somaliland has made long strides in reconciliation, economic recovery and the building of stable democratic institutions. This disparity between Somalia and Somaliland is nowhere more clear than in the difference of the leadership style, conflict resolution mechanism, and the honest, peaceful negotiations to reach consensus when conflicts arise. l Somalias development and progress is dampened by the desire to dominate one another. To dive a little into the history, Somaliland became independent from the British Colonial System on 26, June 1 960. Five days later it united with Italian Somaliland from the South which became independent on July 1st 1960. After thirty years of a failed union with South Somalia, Somaliland seceded from that union in 1 991 . In a referendum held in 1997, 97% of Somalilanders voted for a new constitution as well as to uphold Somaliland’s statehood and independence. Since Somaliland abolished the union with the South, it has held multiple municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections. I would like to emphasize here that, so far, there have been six (6) peaceful transfers of power from one president to the next in Somaliland. The latest set of elections was held on November 13, 2024. Somalilanders have elected a new government, headed by the opposition candidate, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, from the Waddani National Party. The presidential election was coupled with the election of the National Parties which is designed to select three political parties that challenge each other for the leadership of the country. In accordance with the Somaliland constitution, there can only be three political parties in the country. Therefore, a certain number of entities aspiring to become political parties must go through a decadal registration and election process in which the top three contenders will be certified to participate in the electoral process, whether it is municipal, parliamentary or presidential elections. That process of registration, election and certification of the political parties repeats itself decadally. It is an open secret that Somaliland became a beacon of hope and inspiration for many African countries as it is aspiring to attain international recognition as a sovereign state, managing its own national and international affairs. Somaliland with the meager resources it has has, thus far, played a major role in safeguarding and countering piracy off the Gulf of Aden, and the fight against international terrorism. The achievements of the past 33 years is, however, under attack by the failed Federal Government of Somalials attempts to disrupt Somaliland ls progress toward statehood and independence. The current Federal government, led by Hassan Sheikh, is deliberately Stoking tribalism and civil unrest in the eastern border regions of Somaliland, in order, to circumvent the progress in democracy and economic achievement in Somaliland. Somalia’s motivation seems to be: “if we are sinking, you should also sink with us, too!” Therefore, the hostilities in the Sool and Sanaag region of Somaliland is nothing but an attempt to degrade and tarnish Somaliland’s image of peace and tranquility. It is also obvious that the Federal government of Somalia is in a dire political situation. After thirty plus years of international support, South Somalis are unable to reach any political consensus on how to govern themselves. South Somalia is backsliding into anarchy and lawlessness. The Al-Shabaab terrorist insurgency in the country is regrouping and regaining strength, while Puntland and Jubaland regions of Somalia are growing more rebellious and disruptive. Presently, there is an open war between the forces of the Federal Government and Jubaland ls provincial military. I hereby appeal to the international community, especially, to those who invested time and money to support and stabilize Somalia, to see that it is high time to recognize Somaliland’s independence and statehood. The constant violence emanating from the eastern border regions with Somalia must be seen as a real threat designed to weaken and to destabilize the situation in Somaliland. FreelanceWriter. M Bashe A Elmigeydh Ottawa Canada Qaran News

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Ra’iisul Wasaaraha Soomaaliya Xamza Cabdi Barre, Guddoomiyaha Golaha Shacabka Sheekh Aadan Madoobe iyo Taliyaha Ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed Asad Cusmaan Diyaano ayaa maanta dhambaal hambalyo ah u direy ciifanka booliska Soomaaliyeed. Ugu horreyntii, Ra’iisul wasaaraha ayaa hambalyo ku aaddan sanad guuradii 81-aad ee ka soo wareegtay aas-aaskii ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed u diray Taliska guud ee Ciidanka, Hoggaannada kala duwan, Saraakiisha, Saraakiil Xigeennada, Alifleyda, Dablayda iyo dhammaan qeybaha kala duwan ee ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed iyo qoysaskooda. Ra’iisul Wasaaraha ayaa tilmaamay in Ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed ay yihiin hooyada dhammaan ciidanka qalabka sida ee dalkeennu leeyahay, sidaas awgeedna ay muhiimad gaara ah u leeyihiin Qaranka. “Booliska waa halbowlaha nabadda iyo dhowrista sharciga, waxaaan ku bogaadinayaa sida ay har iyo habeen uga feejigan yihiin dhagarta Khawaariijtu la damacsan tahay shacabka Soonaaliyeed,” ayuu yiri ra’iisul wasaare Xamza Cabdi Barre. Guddoomiyaha Golaha Shacabka Sheekh Aadan Madoobe ayaa isna waxa uu yiri “Waxaan saraakiisha, saraakiil xigeenadda, dableyda, alifleyda guud ahaan Ciidamada Booliiska Soomaaliyeed, xaasaskooda iyo caruurtooda la qeybsanayaa farxadda maalintooda oo kasoo wareegatay 81-sano ka dib markii la aas-aasay.” Guddoomiyaha ayaa sheegay in Ciidanka Booliiska Soomaaliyeed uu door muuqda oo firfircoon kaga jiro dowladnimada Soomaaliyeed, islamarkaana uu yahay adeegaha bulshada, waxa uuna bulshada Soomaaliyeed ugu baaqay in ay la shaqeeyaan Ciidanka Booliiska Soomaaliyeed. Taliyaha Ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed, S/Guuto Asad Cismaan Cabdullaahi oo qoraal soo saaray ayaa sidoo kale wuxuu yiri “Waxaan u hambalyeynayaa Sareeyayaasha, Saraakiisha, Saraakiil-xigeenada, Alifleyda, Dableyda, xaasaska iyo carruurtooda, sanadguurada 81-aad ee aas-aaska Ciidanka Boliiska Soomaaliyeed (1943 – 2024).” Ciidamadda Booliska Soomaaliyeed oo la aas-aasay 20-kii bishii December sanadkii 1943-dii ayaa maanta u dabaal-degaya sanad guuradii 81-aad ee kasoo wareegatay aas-aaskoodii.

Doha (Caasimada Online) – Agaasimihii hore ee Hay’adda Nabad Sugida iyo Sirdoonka Qaranka Soomaaliya Fahad Yaasin ayaa soo saaray qoraal uu cinwaan uga dhigay 𝐀𝐅𝐀𝐑𝐓𝐀 𝐋𝐀 𝐘𝐀𝐀𝐁 𝐄𝐄 𝐑𝐀𝐀𝐒𝐊𝐀𝐍𝐁𝐎𝐎𝐍𝐈, oo uu uga hadlayo dagaalkii ka dhacay magaalada Raaskambooni ee Gobolka Jubadda Hoose. Raaskambooni ayaa waxaa fadeexad culus ay ka soo gaartay dowladda federaalka kadib markii kadib markii ay Ciidamada Dowladda iyo kuwa Jubaland ay ku dagaalameen ugu dambeeyna keentay in ciidankii Dowladda ay qaar isku dhiibaan Jubaland kuwa kalana ay u baxsadeen dhinaca soodinta Kenya. Hoos ka aqriso qoraalka Fahad. 𝐀𝐅𝐀𝐑𝐓𝐀 𝐋𝐀 𝐘𝐀𝐀𝐁 𝐄𝐄 𝐑𝐀𝐀𝐒𝐊𝐀𝐍𝐁𝐎𝐎𝐍𝐈: 𝐊𝐎𝐎𝐖𝐀𝐀𝐃: In qof masuul ahi uu af buuxa ugu faano inuu galay danbiyada qaranka laga galo mid kamid ah, oo ah in Ciidanka Qaranka xabad lagu rido, misana lagu dhiirado in iyagoo maxaabiis ah sawir laga qaado. Waa mahadho taariikhda ku hari doonta. 𝐋𝐀𝐁𝐀𝐀𝐃: In Ciidankii Xoogga Dalka uu dal shisheeye iska dhiibay oo uu jab intaas le’eg ku dhacay, misana Madaxweynaha iyo Raysal Wasaaraha aysan qaadin tallaabo isla xisaabtan ah, oo ay ula fal galeen sidii dhacdo caadi ah. Waa mahadho taariikhda ku hari doonta. 𝐒𝐀𝐃𝐃𝐄𝐗𝐀𝐀𝐃: Askartii la geeyey Raaskanbooni waxaa isugu darsamay dayac nololeed, saanad yaraan iyo caqiido hoosayn. Qaarkood waxay is waydiinayeen talow labada dhinac keebaa xaq ah, oo aan u dhimannaa. Heerkaas yaa ciidanka gaarsiiyey? Waa mahadho taariikhda ku hari doonta. 𝐀𝐅𝐑𝐀𝐀𝐃: Madaxweynaha Kenya William Ruto wuxuu door bidayaa la macaamilka Dowladda Federaalka isagoo wax ka baddalay dhaqankii Uhuru Kenyatta. Hase yeeshee, dhacdada Raaskambooni baa is baddal weyn ku keeni karta isagoo ka eegaya dhanka amniga xuduudaha. Waa mahadho kale oo taariikhda ku hari doonta.

But there are reasons to be sceptical photograph: getty images For months a spat between Somalia and Ethiopia had been creeping towards a crisis. In June Somalia threatened to expel all of Ethiopia’s troops from its territory, where they have long spearheaded the regional fight against al-Shabab, a jihadist group. By October Somalia had formed a military alliance with Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s bitterest foes, as Ethiopia’s army chief mused openly about arming groups hostile to the Somali government. Many feared the tensions could set off proxy wars and draw in other powers in the vicinity or create a security vacuum in Somalia that al-Shabab might exploit. Perhaps they need not have worried. In a surprise announcement on December 11th Ethiopia and Somalia appeared to make up. After negotiations in Ankara, brokered by Turkey, a joint declaration was signed by Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia’s president, agreeing to “leave behind differences and contentious issues”. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, called it a “historic reconciliation”. But there are reasons to be sceptical. At the heart of the crisis is a memorandum of understanding (mou) signed on January 1st between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-governing statelet in northern Somalia. Under that agreement Ethiopia had offered to become the first country to recognise the breakaway republic, in return for a long-term lease of a strip of its coastline. This enraged Somalia, which considers Somaliland a renegade province and thus regarded the mou as a violation of its sovereignty. According to the joint declaration, Ethiopia will now seek “access to and from the sea, under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia”. It has also agreed to respect Somalia’s “territorial integrity”. Somalia argues that this implies the end of the mou. It will provide Ethiopia with an outlet to the sea for trade; in return, Ethiopia has rescinded its offer to recognise Somaliland. “The mou is retracted,” says an official in Somalia. Not everyone agrees. The vaguely worded declaration does not mention the mou and Ethiopia has not confirmed it has cancelled it. Somaliland, the other party to the mou, has greeted the news from Ankara with a shrug. Senior Somaliland officials say they have heard nothing from Ethiopia to suggest that the deal is off the table. Some experts suspect that Mr Abiy is still committed to the mou and is simply playing for time. Under President Joe Biden both Ethiopia and Somaliland have been under heavy pressure from America to kill the deal. But both expect Donald Trump’s administration to be more accommodating. “From what I understand, Abiy is not deterred by international pressure, and is determined to pursue the mou by any means necessary,” says Abel Abate Demissie, an Ethiopia-based analyst for Chatham House, a British think-tank. There is a darker possibility. Mr Abiy may not be satisfied with sea access for commerce, as promised by the deal with Somalia. What he may really want is a naval base. The mouwould have allowed him to build one on Somaliland’s coast. Another option would be somehow to take back Assab or Massawa, Eritrea’s Red Sea ports, over which Ethiopia lost control when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Just over a year ago, Mr Abiy suggested that Ethiopia could try to take the Eritrean ports back by force. His language was subsequently toned down. But recently the idea of reclaiming Assab has resurfaced on Ethiopia’s tightly controlled state media. Last week it was suggested that ceding the port to Eritrea had been unconstitutional and that Ethiopia was being “suffocated” as a result. Add other ominous signs that the two countries are preparing for a conflict, and the outlook looks bleak. “The mou was just an appetiser,” says an observer. “Assab is the main meal.” Source: The Economist The post Ethiopia and Somalia claim to have settled a dangerous feud appeared first on Puntland Post.

Washington (Caasimada Online) – Hay’ada Socdaalka iyo Kastamyada Mareykanka ayaa in ka badan 270,000 oo qof u tarxiilay 192 waddan muddo 12 bilood ah, taasoo ah tiradii ugu badnayd ee sannadle ah tobankii sano ee la soo dhaafay, sida lagu sheegay warbixin la sii daayay Khamiista. Warbixintan ayaa muujineysa qaar kamid ah caqabadaha maaliyadeed iyo kuwa shaqo ee Madaxweynaha la doortay ee Donald Trump uu wajihi doono si uu u fuliyo balan qaadkiisii ahaa masaafurinta dad aad u badan. Ha’yada ICE, oo ah hay’adda ugu weyn ee dawladda ee mas’uulka ka ah ka saarista dadka sida sharci-darro ah dalkan ku soo gala ayaa sheegeytey in 271,484 la masaafuriyay sannad maaliyadeedkeeda dhamaaday Sebtembar 30 keedii, ku dhawaad labanlaab marka loo eego 142,580 isla muddadaas sanad ka hor. Waxay ahayd tiradii ugu badneyd ee dad ah oo la masaafuriyey tan iyo 2014, markaasoo ay ICE dalka ka saartay 315,943 qof. Tiradii ugu badneyd ee mudadii hore ee uu xilka hayey Trump waxa ay aheyd 267,258 sanadkii 2019. Duulimaadyada masaafurinta ee kordhay, oo ay ku jiraan maalmaha fasaxa ah, iyo habraaca safarka ee dadka loo diro Guatemala, Honduras iyo El Salvador ayaa sare usii qaadey howlaha masaafurinta, sida ay sheegtey ICE. Hay’addu waxay duulimaadkeedii ugu horreesey ay ku tagtay Shiinaha muddo lix sano ah, waxayna sidoo kale diyaaraduhu ku hakadeen Albania, Angola, Masar, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Romania, Senegal, Tajikistan iyo Uzbekistan. Sidoo kale Khamiista, Hay’ada Kastamyada Mareykanka iyo Ilaalinta Xuduudaha ayaa sheegay in ay xireen 46,612 kuwaasoo si sharci darro ah uga soo gudbey xuduuda Mexico bishii Nofembar, tani waxay hoos u dhacdey 18% marka loo eego 56,526 bil ka hor iyo in ka badan 80% marka loo eego heerkii ugu sarreeyay abid ee 250,000 bishii Diseembar 2023. Dadka ka soo gudbaya xuduuda ayaa hoos u dhacay kala bar markii masuuliyiinta Mexico ay kordhiyeen adkeynta ka soo gudbida xuduudahooda sanad ka hor.

Sida uu sheegay website Axios kaaliyaha xoghayaha arimaha dibadda Maraykanka ee Bariga Dhexe Barbara Leaf ayaa lagu wadaa in ay tagto caasimadda Suuriya ee Dimishiq maalmaha foodda nagu soo haya. Tan ayaa noqon doonta boqoshadii ugu horreysay oo sarkaal sare oo ka tirsan waaxda arimaha dibadda ee Maraykanku ku tago dalka Suuriya muddo sanado ah. Booqashadan ayaa imaanaysa iyadoo ay socdaan dadaallo lagu cusboonaysiinayo xiriirka dublamaasiyeed ee Maraykanku la leeyahay xukuumadda kmg ah kadib ridistii xukunkii Bashaar Al-Asad. Wargaysa Financial Times ee ka soo baxa Maraykanka ayaa qoray in wafdigu la kulmi doono hoggaamiyaha hay’adda guud ee howlgaladda milatari Axmed Al-Sharci oo horey loogu yeeri jiray Abuu Maxamed Al-goolaani, waana xiriirkii ugu horreeyay ee dhexmara Maraykanka iyo hoggaamiyayaasha cusub ee Suuriya. Xoghayaha arimaha dibadda Maraykanka Anthony Blinken ayaa sheegay in dawladdiisu ku lug yeelan doonto xiliga kala guurka ee dalka Suuriya. Bbcsomali Qaran News

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online) – Diblomaasi sare oo u dhashay dalka Shiinaha Mr Xue Bing ayaa booqasho heer sare ah ku yimid magaalada Muqdisho, taasi oo muujineysa sida ay Beijing uga go’an tahay taageerada midnimada dhuleed ee Soomaaliya. Dowladda Shiinaha ayaa mar kale ku celisay inay taageersan tahay madax-banaanida dhuleed ee Soomaaliya, xilli ay sii kordhayaan baaqyada ka imaanaya Mareykanka ee ah in ay aqoonsadaan maamulka Somaliland. Loolanka diblomaasiyadeed wuxuu muujinayaa kororka tartanka awoodda weyn ee Geeska Afrika ee istaraatiijiyadeed ee muhiimka ah. Ergeyga gaarka ah ee Shiinaha Xue Bing ayaa booqasho ku tagay caasimadda Soomaaliya ee Muqdisho Talaadadii, isagoo muujiyay sida ay xukuumadda Beijing u taageersan tahay madax bannaanida Soomaaliya. Booqashadan ayaa ku soo beegantay iyadoo qaar kamid ah madaxda xisbiga Jamhuuriga ee Washington ay dabada ka riixayaan sidii loo aqoonsan lahaa Somaliland oo ku dhawaaqday gooni-isu-taagga sannadkii 1991-kii, balse aan cidina aqoonsan. Xafladdii caleema saarka madaxweynaha Somaliland ee 12-kii December ayaa soo jiidatey dareenka Shiinaha, kadib markii ay ka soo qayb galeen wakiilo ka kala socday jasiirada Taiwan iyo Maraykanka. Shiinaha ayaa si degdeg ah uga mudaaharaaday joogitaanka Taiwan ee xafladda, isaga oo ka soo horjeestay in Taiwan iyo Somaliland ay isweydaarsadaan xiriir dublamaasiyadeed. Xildhibaan Scott Perry oo ka tirsan Congress-ka Maraykanka, ayaa soo bandhigay sharci ku baaqaya in Somaliland loo aqoonsado qaran madax-bannaan, kaas oo lagu saldhig looga dhigay sida dimuqraadiyadda ah ee ay u maamulayso gobolkeeda iyo doorashooyin nabad ah. Soo jeedintu waxa ay la socotaa mashruuca muranka dhaliyay ee loo yaqaan 2025 project, oo ah liis siyaasaded oo loo arkay in uu yahay qorshe u samayn kara maamulka soo socda ee Donald Trump, in kasta oo Trump uu iska fogeeyay dukumeentiga. Dhaq-dhaqaaqa diblomaasiyadeed ayaa ka tarjumaya danaha istaraatiijiyadeed ee ballaaran ee Geeska Afrika, gaar ahaan agagaarka marin biyoodka Bab el-Mandeb, oo ah mid ka mid ah marinnada maraakiibta ugu mashquulka badan adduunka. Shiinuhu waxa uu saldhigii u horeeyay ee uu ku leeyahay dibadda ka dhisay dalka Djibouti, halka uu Maraykanku sahaminayo gelitaanka dekeda Berbera ee Somaliland isaga oo ballaarinaayo joogitaankiisa gobolka. Khubaradu waxay soo jeedinayaan in aqoonsiga Maraykanka ee Somaliland uu saamayn weyn ku yeelan karo saamaynta Shiinaha ee gobolka, isla markaana ay suurtogal tahay inuu xoojiyo mawqifka diblomaasiyadeed ee Taiwan ee Afrika. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, tillaabadan noocaan oo kale ah ayaa Soomaaliya ku riixi karta in ay ku sii dhawaato Shiinaha iyo Ruushka, inkastoo falanqeeyayaasha ay xuseen in xasillooni darrada Soomaaliya ee hadda jirta ay xaddidi karto iskaashigaas. Xaaladdu weli waa khatarteeda leh, iyada oo saamayn ku yeelan karta xasilloonida gobolka, amniga badda ee caalamiga ah, iyo tartanka istiraatijiyadeed ee u dhexeeya Maraykanka iyo Shiinaha ee Afrika.

Ciidanka Booliska Soomaaliyeed ayaa maanta sanad guuradii 81-aad ee ka soo wareegtay markii la aas-aasay, waxayna masuuliyiinta dowladda iyo saraakiishu dhambaallo hambalyo u direen qeybaha kala duwan ee ciidanka. Taliyaha Ciidanka Boliiska Soomaaliyeed, S/Guuto Asad Cismaan Cabdullaahi oo ka hadlay ahmiyadda maalintan ayaa u hambalyeynayaa Sareeyayaasha, Saraakiisha, Kormeerayaasha, Saraakiil-xigeenada, Alifleyda, Dableyda, iyo xaasaska booliska iyo carruurtooda. Boolisk Soomaaliya oo ah midka ugu faca-weyn ciidamada qalabka sida ayaa la aas-aasay 20-kii bishii December sanadkii 1943-dii, xilligaas oo gumeysteyaashii Talyaaniga iyo Ingiriisku dalka maamulayeen. Source: goobjoog.com