Thriving under Al Shabaab, if your lamentations at how the peace of Kismayo was being destroyed by the Kenyan invasion are to be interpreted. Seems they made their peace with the 'Keligii Muslims'. Business above all else, eh?

On a side note, it's scary how every Tom, Dick, and Harry is becoming familiar with internal Somali clan/sub-clan dynamics...

More foreign, intractable wars being drawn into the Somali quagmire.

This article raises the same question I asked a week ago regarding the looming conflict between Madoobe and Gandhi (if the operation is succesful). Gandhi has French support but doesn't seem to have the grassroots touch and 'laandheernimo' of Madobe (as inept as Madoobe seems dealing with non-Somalis). The Gedo constituency seems to be waiting in the wings waiting to see which way the initial ball rolls. Not to mention your 'Caanoole' boys who have been quiet lately.

Kenya's political gamble in Somali border regions Francois Ausseill 15 November 2011 Agence France Presse English Copyright Agence France-Presse, 2011 All reproduction and presentation rights reserved. Kenya's hopes of creating a border buffer zone in southern Somalia called Azania have been raised by its military incursion there last month, but analysts warn of high risks of such a political gamble. While the Kenyan government has said it sent its troops and tanks across the border to target Islamist Shebab rebels, analysts say the move appears to be aimed at setting up a proxy administration and region of control. "It is understandable why the Kenyan government would want a buffer between themselves and the chaos in Somalia in general and any spillover of Al-Shebab’s militancy in particular," said J. Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council think-tank. Creating some stability in Somalia's border region would also provide Kenya with a strong argument to relieve the vast Somali refugee population it hosts including Dadaab, the world's largest refugee complex. "I think that the strategic objective for Kenya is basically to see those camps shut down and the people go back to their country," said Rashid Abdi of the International Crisis Group. "Kenya is a signatory to the refugee convention and the humanitarian laws, so it cannot force refugees back home." For over two years Kenya has trained troops supposed to form the backbone of a new security administration inside Somalia, covering the southern regions of Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, together also known as Jubaland. The head of that administration in waiting is former Somali defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed -- also known as Gandhi -- a French-educated academic. "He has a very huge challenge in front of him. ... Gandhi has credibility and his name has not been tarnished, but he has not done enough grassroot political networking," Abdi said. "He is very much disconnected," he said, adding: "Now there is a security reason for that: he cannot travel as much as he wants inside Somalia." The declaration of Gandhi as leader and the formal establishment of Azania was announced in Kenya in April, a month after Kenyan-backed troops failed to make military headway in southern Somalia. But Ghandi, who not only comes from the diaspora but also a minority sub-clan in the area, faces potential reluctance of neighbour Ethiopia and the Somali government to back his efforts. "This is not someone who has blood on his hands as others have, but in Somalia, I'm not sure he carries much political weight," said Roland Marchal of the Paris-based National Centre for Scientific Research. "The fact that he has been a member of the diaspora for many years, belongs to a minority clan and is very secular in what he says" could weaken his position in a Somali context, Marchal said. "So Gandhi needs a helping hand from the Kenyan army," he added. Even if he can win a partial victory over the Shehab, Azania would face the rivalry of other powerful militias, including the Ras Kamboni fighters of Ahmed Madobe, from the main ‘ONLF’ clan branch in the region. To complicate matters further, senior Kenyan military officials have close links with Madobe -- who sees supporting minority clans, including the ‘ONLF sub-branch’ of Gandhi, as a potentially risky move. Until Gandhi "actually raises a credible military force that can take control of the region’s claimed territory away from the militants, "Jubaland" remains nothing more than a fantasy played out by ineffectual Somali politicians marooned in Nairobi," Pham said. Then in Gedo, an anti-Shebab militia from the ‘Gedo’ clan called Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa -- backed financially and military by neighbouring Ethiopia -- have indicated they would reject the authority of an Azania "government." In addition, the potential lucrative income from the Shebab-held port city of Kismayo could trigger fierce battles between rival militia armies -- if ever the Shebab fighters are indeed driven out as Kenya hopes. Pham also noted that even if a buffer zone is established, its creation is already too late, warning that the Shebab had operatives inside Kenya. "Even if the ‘government’ of ‘Jubaland’ helps seal off the Kenyan border, how much that would actually improve the security situation remains to be seen given that the threat is already in place." Agence France-Presse

Key targets The ability to listen to al-Qaida in East Africa’s phone calls paid big dividends. “It [the phone monitoring] definitely led to us being able to have much more precise information about what was going on, what actually was happening,” the senior intelligence official said. “Those operations gave us pretty good insight into what al-Qaida was doing in East Africa. … They saw it as another safe haven, they saw the opportunity to establish training camps and they did. And it allowed us to start to plan CT [counterterrorism]-like operations against a couple of the key targets.” Those targets included Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of the original al-Qaida in East Africa leaders, as well as two senior figures in Somalia’s al-Qaida-linked al-Shabaab militia: Aden Hashi Ayro, who allegedly trained in al-Qaida’s Afghanistan camps, and Ahmed Abdi Godane, the group’s leader from 2009 to 2010, according to the intelligence official. (After Ayro was killed in a 2008 cruise missile strike, al-Shabaab reportedly suspected the U.S. had tracked him via his iPhone and banned the use of similar devices.) But monitoring al-Shabaab and al-Qaida phone traffic did more than help U.S. intelligence officials with their manhunts. It also gave them a deeper understanding of how interlinked some of the violent Islamist groups were, according to the intelligence official. “There were [telephone] communications between Pakistan and Somalia,” the official said. “It was the communicators for the key [al-Qaida] guys [in Pakistan], and also from Yemen and from Iraq and from North Africa. So we really saw this blossoming of their network start to grow, and that’s really, really when we began to realize just how much they were franchising the movement out of Pakistan. And all these guys, all these leaders, at one time or another, all met in the training camps of Afghanistan. And, to a degree, some — not many — met with bin Laden when he was in his days in Sudan.” The phone-monitoring gear is probably still operating, the intelligence official said. “I’ve got to believe it’s still there, because it was a pretty capable system,” the official said, adding that now, “It’s probably better.” However, the official said, publishing the history of the cellphone monitoring system would not compromise ongoing operations. The targets in Somalia know their phone conversations are being monitored, but unlike their counterparts in Pakistan’s tribal areas, they are not constantly reminded of the dangers of using their phones. “They’re not hearing the Predators overhead all the time,” the intelligence official said. “It’s like guys in Iraq and Afghanistan — they know it … [but] they can’t help themselves.” (However, the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn said that the al-Qaida cell began to move its communications to the Internet. And with reports that the U.S. is increasing its drone activity around the Horn, Islamists in Somalia may soon become more aware of Predators overhead.) Training camps Not all U.S. intelligence efforts were aimed at Mogadishu. American operatives were also interested in potential al-Qaida activity in Ras Kamboni, a coastal town about two miles from the Kenyan border. In the first years after 9/11, there were persistent rumors of al-Qaida training camps in the town. “We were throwing people at Ras Kamboni … in late ‘01, early ‘02,” the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn said. Then interest in the town abated before picking up again in late 2003 to early 2004, when U.S. personnel flew over Ras Kamboni but saw no sign of any training camps, the source said. In addition, case officers in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi “ran numerous unilateral assets against” Ras Kamboni, the source said. These were “Somalis who had businesses in the region, Somalis who had reason to be there,” the source said. “People we could depend on.” The U.S. paid the spies roughly $1,000 to $2,000 a month to enter southern Somalia and report what they observed. But even these local hires found little evidence of al-Qaida in Ras Kamboni, according to the source. It was not until 2007 that the U.S. became convinced that “hundreds” of fighters were training in camps in and around Ras Kamboni, the senior intelligence official said. “We observed two that had at least 150 personnel per [at any one time],” the official said. Al-Qaida in East Africa’s tentacles spread beyond Somalia. The group’s “center of gravity” was clearly Mogadishu, “but there was a huge support cell split between Nairobi and Mombasa,” a port city in Kenya, said the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn. However, the source added, it wasn’t clear whether al-Qaida in East Africa was planning attacks in Nairobi or whether its presence in the Kenyan capital was a holdover from the 1990s. “We were tracking several targets in Nairobi,” the source said. “A lot of our operations in Nairobi were technical operations — phones and computers.” http://www.armytimes.com/mobile/index.php?storyUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.armytimes.com%2Fnews%2F2011%2F11%2Farmy-clandestine-somalia-missions-yield-al-qaida-targets-111411%2F

Cellphone monitoring Working with the warlords required extraordinary care and judgment. “Much of what the warlords told us was true,” the intelligence source said. But, the source added, before running operations against targets based on what the warlords had told them, U.S. intelligence and special ops personnel always checked that information against what unilateral spies being run by U.S. intelligence said. In an effort to develop targets, the CIA, supported by TF Orange, ran a series of missions into Mogadishu to “seed” the city with devices that monitored cellphone traffic, according to a senior military official. This required repeated trips to Mogadishu, said the senior military and intelligence officials. “You’ve got to reposition [the devices] as they add cellphone towers or reposition them,” the military official said. These missions allowed the Orange personnel to come into their own. Close-in signals intelligence is an Orange specialty, but on the first forays into Mogadishu, the Orange personnel, who were “really good ground tactical guys,” functioned primarily as security, said the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn. “Initially the Orange guys were strictly protection, [although] they always thought their role was much larger,” the source said. The missions to install the monitoring gear allowed them to put their unique skills to use. (The “Orange” name comes from the color code traditionally assigned to the Fort Belvoir, Va.-based special mission unit’s personnel when they formed part of a larger Joint Special Operations Command task force. The unit has gone by many other names, including the Intelligence Support Activity and the Mission Support Activity, and is often referred to by JSOC insiders simply as “the Activity” or “Orange.”) While the Orange troops were on the missions because of their technical expertise, the CIA personnel were the ones talking to the warlords. “They knew these guys,” the senior intelligence official said. “They were in charge of the handling [of the warlords], any kind of negotiations that were being done. It was a good relationship, actually.” ‘Hundreds of bad guys’ In a country in which any operation carried major risks, “some of these sensitive missions in downtown Mogadishu” were the most dangerous carried out by U.S. personnel in Somalia during the past 10 years, said the intelligence official. “We could have had two or three U.S. citizens [taken prisoner] and they could still be held hostage today,” the official said. “And there would have been no doubt who they were or what they were.” No aircraft monitored these missions. “We had very, very few imagery assets available — everything was still dedicated to Iraq,” the official said. That left each team of operatives reliant on shaky deals with ruthless warlords in an anarchic city of roughly 2 million overrun by competing militias. “All these bad guys had not a couple of bad guys with them but hundreds of bad guys with them,” said a military targeting official. “If you put somebody in there … you’re going to be in the middle of hundreds of bad guys almost instantaneously, and if you don’t have this thing just absolutely soup to nuts, you’re probably going to wind up with a lot of dead people, including friendlies, including our guys. You could never quite get around that.” But unbeknownst to all but a few not directly involved, there was a force ready to come to the rescue, in case the teams in Mogadishu got into trouble. That force was the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Horn of Africa, based at Lemonnier. Led by Col. Rod Turner, a Special Forces officer, the force was tasked to be prepared to conduct personnel recovery missions, code named Mystic Talon missions, in the event that the CIA/JSOC forays into Mogadishu ran into problems, according to a special operations source with firsthand knowledge of operations in the Horn. If the order came to launch the rescue force, the task force’s four Air Force special operations MH-53 Pave Low helicopters would take off carrying as many members as possible of the Special Forces company assigned to Central Command’s Crisis Response Element, a special ops force available to Turner for certain missions. That company was a commander’s in-extremis force, or CIF, company, which is specially trained and resourced for direct-action missions. Each Pave Low was manned by a crew of six and equipped with an air-to-air refueling probe, rapid-firing mini-guns in the doors and a .50-cal machine gun mounted on the tail. “They were flying arsenals but with this big layer of armor blankets in them,” the special ops source said. But the weight of that armor, plus the heat of Somalia, severely limited the number of SF soldiers who could take part in the mission. That number also depended on how many personnel needed to be rescued: the more Americans in trouble on the ground, the fewer SF troops the helicopters could carry. Most scenarios for which the task force planned would see about six SF soldiers — and no more than 10 — aboard each helicopter, the special ops source said. “It would be based on the information provided at the time of notification,” the special ops source said. If the message from the team on the ground was, “We are decisively engaged, we can’t get out of where we’re at, and we need as much firepower as we can to save our lives,” then the priority for the rescue force would be to put as many guys on the ground as possible, rather than “getting in and extracting them,” the source said. In such a worst-case scenario, the thinking went, “maybe we can get a ship up the shore or something and get something in off the ship,” he said. On the other hand, the special ops source said, “If it was, ‘Hey, we’re hauling ***, heading west, there’ll be five of us,’ then it would probably be maybe a five-man package per bird. Just something to go in, lay down a quick base of fire, go in and pull these guys out and then leave.” In addition, Turner ordered that plenty of space be left on the helicopters in case one or more of them did not make it back, and the task force planned every personnel recovery mission with the requirement that it could still be accomplished if a helicopter was lost. “The plan was to launch all four with the expectation that [the task force] would have to do self-recovery if one of them went down,” the special ops source said. “When that aircraft went down, one aircraft would have to stop and pick them up and would turn around and bring them home. So you basically have maxed out that aircraft if you have five or six SF guys on it and a crew of five guys. … [We’re then] sticking another 10 guys on an already almost overloaded airplane, trying to limp it back to Djibouti. So it was a very slim package.” If two helicopters went down, the mission would be aborted, but everyone on the four outbound helicopters flights would fit on the remaining two, if need be, according to the special ops source. As it was, despite the extraordinary risk involved, no mission into Mogadishu ran into the sort of trouble that required the rescue force from Djibouti.

Clandestine Somalia missions yield AQ targets BY SEAN D. NAYLOR - STAFF WRITER | POSTED : MONDAY NOV 14, 2011 12:45:15 EST Starting in 2003, small teams of U.S. operatives would clamber aboard a civilian turboprop plane at a Nairobi, Kenya, airfield to embark on one of the most dangerous missions conducted by U.S. personnel in Somalia since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The teams combined CIA case officers and “shooters” from a secretive special operations unit sometimes called Task Force Orange, said an intelligence source with long experience in the Horn of Africa. “There were always at least two CIA case officers, and there were always at least two shooters,” the source said. “Everybody was armed.” Those first secret missions were all about gathering human intelligence — “collecting information, validating information,” said the source. But they soon expanded to include working with warlords to hunt al-Qaida members, tapping cellphones, purchasing anti-aircraft missiles and, ultimately, developing a deeper understanding of al-Qaida’s East African franchise and how it fit into the wider al-Qaida network. The Mogadishu missions became one of the most successful U.S. intelligence operations in the Horn. The Secret War The teams would hop a commercial flight that departed Nairobi every morning bringing the day’s supply of khat — the plant whose leaves are chewed as a narcotic stimulant by Somali men — to the Somali capital of Mogadishu, the intelligence source said. “The safest flight you can be on in Somalia is the khat flight,” the source said. The plane would land at the K50 airport, about 50 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu. The operatives set out to build relationships with the warlords who had held sway in Somalia for the previous 12 years in hopes of enlisting the warlords in their manhunt for the members of al-Qaida in East Africa. That organization had been responsible for the Aug. 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and it remained a potent threat in the eyes of some U.S. officials. Since al-Qaida’s eviction from Afghanistan in late 2001, U.S. intelligence had tracked personnel and money moving from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to the Horn of Africa with growing alarm. But with the ill-fated 1992-1994 U.S. military intervention in Somalia fresh in policymakers’ minds, there was no appetite in Washington for committing significant numbers of troops to the country. “The United States still has a hangover from ‘Black Hawk Down,’ “ the intelligence source said, in a reference to the book and movie about the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu that cost the lives of 18 U.S. soldiers — almost all of whom were part of a Joint Special Operations Command task force. “Nobody had the stomach for it,” agreed a special ops source with firsthand knowledge of military operations in the Horn. Instead, the CIA ran the U.S. effort against al-Qaida in East Africa out of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. But the name given to the venture was a deliberate reference to the 1993 battle: “Operation Black Hawk.” John Bennett, the agency’s highly respected Nairobi station chief, was in charge, said the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn. (Bennett now heads the CIA’s National Clandestine Service and is no longer under cover. He declined to be interviewed for this series.) Operation Black Hawk’s aim was to kill or capture the 20 or so main members of the al-Qaida cell in East Africa. But rather than use U.S. forces to do this, the CIA’s plan would have Somali warlords capture the al-Qaida personnel before turning them over to the U.S. to send — or “render” — them to an American ally or one of the agency’s secret prisons, said sources who served in the region. From 2001 on, U.S. operations in the Horn “were focused on extraordinary rendition,” said the intelligence source with long experience there. “Extraordinary rendition” means “you’re going to deliver that person to a foreign country and/or use foreign assets — a surrogate force — to conduct the operation,” the source said. Thus small teams composed of CIA case officers, TF Orange special operators and what a senior intelligence official called “really high-end interpreters” would land at K50 and travel to and through Mogadishu in small convoys escorted by fighters loyal to one warlord or another. The convoys’ routes crossed the boundaries between several warlords’ territories, so a lot of coordination was required between the U.S. personnel and the warlords and among the warlords themselves, according to the intelligence source. Key to the missions was Bennett, the experienced station chief who “was very professional,” said the special ops source with firsthand experience of military operations in the Horn. “He’s a really unbelievable team player,” said the senior intelligence official. Bennett did not go on the missions because, according to the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn, “[He] didn’t need to — it was unnecessary risk.” But his personality was critical to the effort. “The relationship with the warlords was built through … Bennett,” said the source. “It was through his sheer willpower and force of personality. He could do it and nobody else could.” Bennett laid down some ground rules for operating in Somalia, the intelligence source said. These included: • “We will work with warlords.” • “We don’t play favorites.” • “They don’t play us.” • “We don’t go after Somali nationals, just [foreign] al-Qaida.” The last stipulation was key because “the warlords were in it just for the money,” the intelligence source said. “They had no problems knocking out non-Somalis.” (However, this rule applied only to operations conducted by, with and through the warlords, the source said. It did not apply to U.S. “unilateral efforts,” nor to bilateral operations with the Kenyans, which in each case sometimes targeted Somali Islamist militants.) The CIA worked with “just about all” the warlords, said the intelligence source. “The warlords really didn’t have a dog in the fight,” the source added. The Americans used a carrot-and-stick approach, offering the warlords cash if they helped, with the implicit threat of U.S. air power if they didn’t. “They were risky missions,” the intelligence source said. “You could never actually trust the warlords — they’re subject to the highest bidder. That’s why we wanted to have that stick.” But the warlords’ fear of being whacked by U.S. air power was groundless. There were no U.S. aircraft overhead. “We really didn’t have a stick,” the source said. “Not in a hundred years. But it worked.” At first the CIA-TF Orange teams would fly in and out of Somalia on the same day, but as their relationships with the warlords became more comfortable, they began visiting at least once a week and staying overnight in the Somali capital, the source said. Those relationships were paying off by late 2003, when the CIA persuaded Mohammed Farah Aideed Jr., the warlord son of the late militia leader whose forces the U.S. military had fought in 1993, to sell it 37 SA-7 and four SA-18 man-portable surface-to-air missiles, according to the special ops source. “The 18s were brand-new, in a crate,” he said. The intelligence source with long experience in the Horn confirmed that Aideed Jr. provided the CIA with “about 40” surface-to-air missiles. “To this day I don’t clearly understand what his motives were, but it worked for us,” the intelligence source said. Both sources said the CIA paid Aideed Jr. about $360,000, which the intelligence source described as “peanuts,” for the missiles, any one of which could bring down a civilian airliner. After the agency bought them, the missiles were stored briefly at an arms depot at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, before an Air Force C-17 flew them away, the special ops source said.

This is where official recognition would come in handy. Big infrastructure projects such as road building are usually paid for with donor dollars in Africa. Look at how the one road built by the Chinese from the South to the North still stands today after 40 yrs. Insha'Allah, kheyr.

Where did the 4.5 formula come from originally? From Ismail Omar Geelle of Djibouti during the Arta Conference where Abdiqasim Salad was coronated President. It certainly didn't come from the stakeholders. Careful with the revisionism.

This effort funded by the U.A.E. and contracted to a subdivision of XE (formerly Blackwater in the U.S.A.) will ultimately fail, me thinks. Delivering water/food deliveries is all well and good, but the force was created and funded to stop piracy (or so we're told). But the pirates are not some foreign force but an integral part of Puntland society that has further insinuated itself into the local society through the enormous financial clout they hold vis-a-vis the rest of Puntland society. An effective way to counter this on the ground is when more money is put on the table to fund the anti-piracy forces than the pirates are willing to pay in bribes and protection rackets (he who pays more is KING!). Thus far, the aid/support has not been to that generous level. The pictures show an impressive collection of second-hand pickup trucks bought at a discount from Dubai, but no sign of the expensive maritime equipment needed to police the waters. What happened to the equipment of the Hart Group, another much-advertised Puntland coast guard group from the administration of Abdullahi Yusuf?

More likely the French warships directly off that coast currently. That's if the reports of the streaking missile across the water reportedly seen by residents is true. But on the other hand, it's hard to know what to believe. All the wire services report from Nairobi(none on the ground in Somalia) and claim to be interviewing a local in 'Village Heblaayo-Hebel'. How did they get in touch with that village local, how do they verify they truly are speaking to that individual rather than a propagandist who wishes to convey a particular viewpoint to the world? How is it that we hear of Al Shabaab controlling every aspect of villagers lives with draconian methods yet not able to control these same villagers communicating with Western news organizations? Somethings don't add up. I wonder as to the accuracy of some of these wire stories.

Paranoid much? Relax, the question was to be followed by a follow-up question, if you agreed with him. Given your heightened state of paranoia, I see the exercise would've been futile.

Carafaat;758345 wrote: and the TFG's mandate is soon to be ending and donors will definely pull the plug out in August 2012. This will definetly mean there is chance for Somali's to get the initiative back in own hands. Don't be so sure of this. There are other, more influential interests at play here as well. The AMISOM countries see their presence as a revenue & influence multiplier in the African geopolitics/Western interests. The Western donors where ready to pull the plug on the TFG during the last squabble (when Farmaajo was still PM), but Uganda threatened to pull out all of its troops and leave the ground for Al Shabaab. The donors had no choice but to rethink and continue to support the TFG sham. Uganda brokered(within the TFG factions) a continuation of the game with the resignation of Farmaajo. Now Kenyan interests are directly involved within Somalia proper further complicating the picture. Somali interests are last on the back burner when it comes to what system will be implemented!

Incredibly proud of Shukri Haji Bandere! If people only knew of the sacrifices she made when she left a promising life in the West to return to her homeland more than 15 years ago. Hope she makes good, productive contacts at the award ceremony. The Sec of State is known to be a huge supporter of women's issues.

Question for Xiin: Why did you post this opinion piece? Do you agree with Dr. Weinstein's analysis on Somali issues? He's been publicly writing on Somali-related affairs since his days at the 'Power & Interest' website.

Gentlemen, Leave Puntland alone. It's been a responsible stake-holder under Faroole. None of the adventurism of the previous administrations.

Compared to most other sub-Saharan African states, Ethiopia severely limits access to Information & Telecommunications technology for the general populace - very difficult to get and available only through state-owned companies. While the private ICT sector is one of the most dynamic in other African states, in Ethiopia it's practically non-existant. The regime understands the danger this poses to its hold on power. The original Maoist-orientation of the ruling clique is a subject seldom explored or understood by Somalis.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/72108572/LEA-Letter

Saalax;756193 wrote: "waxaanay aaminsanyihiin in xalku dibadda uga iman doono." 2 years later and same mentality still dominates.

And Ciid Wanaagsan to All Muslims.

Che -Guevara;756197 wrote: Where's this nigga been? The emotions Somaliland brings out in some...

International Edition Don’t Say You Weren’t Warned; Kenya is likely to find more than it bargained for in Somalia. Just ask the Americans. By Andrea Bohnstedt; Andrea Bohnstedt Is Publisher Of Ratio Magazine, Which Covers East African Business, And Works As An Independent Country Risk Analyst For Several International Firms. Newsweek International Newsweek - Print and Online November 7, 2011; ; International Edition Volume 158, Number 19, ISSN 0163-7053 English Copyright © 2011 Newsweek Inc. All Rights Reserved. In retrospect, Kenya might have done better to wait until after the rainy season before sending tanks, aircraft, and troops into Somalia. Now those troops are quite literally mired down. All the same, muddy roads may ultimately turn out to be the least of Kenya’s problems, as it risks being bogged down far more substantially in its neighbor’s civil war. Kenya can scarcely be blamed for running out of patience. Two decades of runaway civil war in Somalia had already sent hundreds of thousands of desperate Somalis fleeing across the border into Kenya—and that was before the Islamic extremists of Al-Shabab began blocking emergency food deliveries to their own countrymen in Somalia’s famine-ravaged countryside. The devastation is reflected 100 kilometers inside Kenya, at the tent city of Dadaab, which is now the world’s largest refugee camp, with more than 400,000 Somali refugees. Besides presenting massive humanitarian concerns, those newcomers constitute a serious security risk: mixed in among the throngs of legitimate refugees are smugglers, arms merchants, and militia members. As if that weren’t enough, there are Somalia’s pirates, elusive at sea and practically untouchable on land, who pose a relentless threat both to Kenya’s cruise tourism and to commercial shipping throughout the region. And then the kidnappings began. One night in mid-September, Somali gunmen invaded a Kenyan beach resort, murdered an English tourist, and hauled his wife away with them. Less than three weeks later, a group of armed Somalis abducted an elderly Frenchwoman from her seaside winter home on the Kenyan island of Manda. And just 12 days after that, two Spanish relief workers from the medical NGO Doctors Without Borders were grabbed from the Dadaab refugee camp. The Frenchwoman, a wheelchair-bound cancer patient, died after a few days without her medication. The other three hostages are believed to be held prisoner deep inside Somalia. Kenya’s military has spent years preparing for a showdown with Somalia’s militants. In the wake of the kidnappings, the Kenyans went into action. The exact scope and intent of their intervention remain difficult to ascertain. The Kenyan military says it’s classified information, and public statements from civilian officials haven’t done much to clarify things. At first the plan seemed to be to establish a buffer zone along the border, but the troops kept pushing on toward Kismayo. The Somali seaport town is controlled by Al-Shabab, which receives significant revenues from port fees. Cutting off that income might help to weaken the extremists. Al-Shabab issued dark threats of retribution. Early last week, more than a dozen people were injured in a grenade attack at Mwaura’s Bar, an after-hours pub in downtown Nairobi. Hours later, a second grenade attack killed one and injured 16 others at a nearby bus stop. Although Al-Shabab issued a statement denying any involvement in the attacks, police in Nairobi soon arrested a man who confessed in court to the bus-stop attack, claiming to be a member of Al-Shabab. But such small-scale attacks aren’t typical of Al-Shabab, and in fact the group was not impressed: Shabab leader Sheik Muktar Robow called for “big, painful blows” against Kenya rather than hand grenades. Somalia’s nominal government publicly objected to Kenya’s military presence. Sharif Ahmed, the president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as it’s called, said that although Kenya’s logistical support and other advice were appreciated, Kenyan troops were not welcome. But Kenyan officials insisted that the troops were invited. Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, who narrowly avoided a Shabab bomb attack during an Oct. 19 official visit to Mogadishu, said the TFG had explicitly asked Kenya for assistance against the extremists. “We have not invaded Somalia,” he said at a press conference in Nairobi. “We are only giving backup to the TFG soldiers whom we have trained here in Kenya.” Government spokesman Alfred Mutual told the press that the military would hunt down the kidnappers, but that it also aimed to track down and destroy Al-Shabab. The worry is that the military intervention in Somalia may be too little, too late—and not sufficiently thought through. Rooting out a militant group like Al-Shabab is no easy job, as America has painfully and expensively learned in its recent land wars. If pressed, the militants will almost surely resort to guerrilla tactics. And the danger won’t be limited to Kenya’s troops in Somalia: Kenya itself has a large ethnic-Somali community in Nairobi and elsewhere across the country, as well as in Dadaab. Security officials express legitimate concerns that Al-Shabab and associated groups are already operating inside Kenya—and that’s by no means a new development. But despite the risk of terrorist attacks ever since Al Qaeda’s 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing, Kenya still has not built a domestic intelligence network that can counter the threat. The sad truth is that Kenya has been consistently slow to confront dangers to the country. Shippers and security firms have long warned that the sea raiders might “diversify” from attacks on ships and begin abducting tourists. The first kidnapping proved that the government had taken no precautions. The second proved that even the first incident had not kicked local security forces into action. And that’s the worst of it: none of Kenya’s security risks are new. In fact, most have persisted for years. While it would be impossible to address all the threats that emanate from Somalia, Kenya hasn’t even managed to secure its border. Unlike other Kenyan security forces, the military is widely respected for its professionalism, despite its limited combat experience. But as long as the pirates can make a good profit—and as long as Somalia has no central authority strong enough to stop their attacks—the Kenyan military has little hope of solving that problem on its own. Even if Kenyan troops do somehow manage to wrest control of Kismayo from Al-Shabab, practically everyone else in southern Somalia will be gunning for a chance to take the place over. They know what a valuable piece of commercial real estate the seaport is. Handing it over to the TFG would be no answer, either. The TFG may be officially recognized by the international community, but it’s notoriously ineffective and corrupt, with little domestic support. To the people of Somalia, it’s only one among many competing interest groups. Both America and Ethiopia, by far the region’s biggest military power, have tried and failed to tame Somalia. The conflict is too protracted and complex, not least because of the persistent fragmentation of Somalia along clan lines, with fiercely contested financial and political agendas. Many Somalis would dearly love to see the last of Al-Shabab and all its bloodthirsty intolerance. But no one should suppose that the group’s demise would magically bring peace. Somalia has more than enough armed factions that will continue to battle anyone who gets in their way for the foreseeable future. The longer the Kenyans stay in Somalia, the more likely they are to learn what America and Ethiopia already know: outsiders will be fought—no matter how pure they may think their intentions are. Andrea Bohnstedt Is Publisher Of Ratio Magazine, Which Covers East African Business, And Works As An Independent Country Risk Analyst For Several International Firms. Newsweek, Inc.

Somali Youth Rated Happiest Despite War On Al-Shabaab by Mwaura Samora 2 November 2011 © 2011 AllAfrica, All Rights Reserved Nov 02, 2011 (The Nation/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX) -- The recent surge in explosion incidents and the invasion of Somalia by Kenyan Defence Forces have once again brought the lawless country back to the limelight, albeit for the wrong reasons. Under the prevailing circumstances, the mere mention of this war ravaged Horn of Africa nation conjures up images of exploding grenades, gun fights, piracy, Al-Shabaab, starvation, warlords, mayhem and anarchy. But, apparently, Somali youths are not perturbed by the chaos and turbulence that have rocked their country for the last two decades for, according to a recent survey, they are a most optimistic lot around the region. The research -- conducted by Data and Research Solutions (DARS) in conjunction with Kenyan research firm Synovate as part of a drive to demystify stereotypes against Somali and provide a credible database on the country -- claimed that more than 80 per cent of Somali youth consider themselves happy. "One of the main reasons we established DARS is to verify facts and figures generated by the media and NGOs which sometimes gives the wrong perception and information," explains Liban Egal, a DARS director. "A lot of data coming from Somalia is from companies without offices there, which makes the information they generate questionable." DARS has offices in Hargeisa in Somaliland, and Mogadishu. Somaliland, a semi-autonomous region that broke away two decades ago, has been one of the rare islands of peace in this sea of turmoil, with her citizens going about their business without the worry of suicide bombers and gunfights that their kin from the south have to contend with daily. "Unlike the Kenyan youth who have business and study opportunities that most of them still take for granted and grumble about, the only motivation for survival for the Somali youth amid the harsh environment is the positive outlook," explains Mr Egal. "Believing in a better future is a key motivator for existence in Somalia." Mr Egal said this during a presentation of the report entitled Somaliland Youth Study Report October 2011 in Kenya two weeks ago at the Sankara Hotel in Nairobi. The company's principle objectives, he said, is to create a database where organisations or individuals interested in Somalia can access credible information. The survey, a first of its kind in the troubled nation, presented a glimpse of Somalia starkly different from the chaos and violence that is portrayed on the international media. Iranian leader Targeting an audience between the ages of 15 and 35, the findings revealed that US President Barack Obama beats deposed Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi and firebrand Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as the most admired foreign figures among the youth in this predominantly Muslim nation. Besides political figures, others who scored a high mark as influencers are parents, religious and community leaders. "Of interest is the fact that Argentine soccer superstar Lionel Messi scored only two per cent of admiration by the local youth despite the fact that public recreation spots in Hargeisa are always packed to capacity when Barcelona is playing," observed Egal. "Fame is not always a sign of popularity here." This is contrary to trends in other countries across the region like Kenya and Uganda where footballers, musicians and movie stars are idolised and worshipped as social icons by urban youths. However, 40 per cent of those surveyed did not pick any foreign figure as a role model which, perhaps, is an indicator of a limited knowledge of the outside world among the Somali youth. But the volatile political situations surrounding the country have not dented the feel good attitude among the youth in Somaliland since 85 per cent of them claimed they were "happy". Even more intriguing is the fact that 79 per cent believe life would get better for the next generation with only five per cent saying things would turn out for the worst. This is way above any other country across the region where young people are perpetually complaining about lack of jobs and economic opportunities. Although the survey did not define what kind of happiness was being tested, it takes a great deal of courage and optimism to exude any form of joy in this territory sandwiched between turmoil and hostilities. A bloody war raging in southern Somalia, piracy in the Gulf of Eden and the occasional skirmishes with the other internationally unrecognised breakaway region of Puntland are some of the constant nightmares residents of Somaliland have to live with. Of note is the fact that, like their peers across the region most youths in Somaliland, 23 per cent, are scared of unemployment than the outbreak of a civil war, 17 per cent, of Al Shabaab and terrorist attacks, eight per cent. This goes against the general perception that war and lawlessness is the biggest fear. The survey also indicates that Kenya fares poorly among nations that Somaliland youth admires or would like to live in. Unlike people from southern Somalia who pay dearly to cross the Kenyan border either as refugees or illegal immigrants, only 32 per cent of Somaliland youth would like to live here while a huge majority, 62 per cent, preferred the tiny Red Sea nation of Djibouti. Generally, countries from the Horn and East Africa fared badly compared to Islamic states in the Middle East. "Most of the youth in Somaliland admire Saudi Arabia, 76 per cent, followed by United Arabs Emirates (UAE), 72 per cent, Egypt, 62 per cent, and Djibouti, 61 per cent," the research stated. "Djibouti being so high up on the list is not a surprise as the two countries are neighbours... whose people share language, religion, culture and have for the most part lived harmoniously." Strangely, despite there being strong indicators of ignorance to the outside world, the findings indicated that Somaliland has one of the highest mobile penetrations in the region at 85 per cent. Kenya stands at 51 per cent according to statistics from 2010. This is attributed to need to communicate and transact money with the next of keen in the huge Somali Diaspora. All Africa Global Media

^^ Somali ownership of Somali problems is what's being argued here, in case you're losing the plot. While the building of a school here and there, the passing out of medicine and the holding of small children makes for great photo-ops, it's been done for the last 20 years by countless global leaders, starting with George Bush, Sr.(then the sitting President of the U.S.). Once the feel good of such imagery quickly fades, the reality sinks in for a nation hemorrhaging its way to a drawn out suicide. In short, stop looking for saviors and realize solutions can be found only through Somali mechanisms with Somali hands. This is the point that others are dancing around in their new found love affair with the Turkish. And given the track record, tomorrow it will be another country!