Insha-Allah, I intend to show that current problems with unity of Somalia actually are simply the products of unavoidable post-independence 'practical problems' associated with the dream of Somali unity.
------
SOMALI UNITY: Enforced or Earned?
The foundation of enforced unity is force, while the foundation of earned unity is mutual consent. Thus, from these two irreconcilable foundations, springs all flavours of unity- may that be between adult consenting individuals, or in our case, community of peoples. Between the types of unity, the former is unnatural and subject to eventual break-down, the latter, however, is naturally harmonic and subject to durability. Such being the nature of these types of unity, the wisest recommendation to all those who seek or are in dire need of it, is to rightly endeavour for the procurement of consent. They should always be advised against mistaking dissent for consent. If enough care is given to the feelings and aspirations of those from whom unity is sought, then the exercise should prove to be an advantageous project.
In instances where attention is not paid to the feelings and aspirations of others (even if the others concerned are simply in a vulnerable position), the imposition of unity upon them would eventually give them a lifetime dedication and determination to descent and be independent from it. In many cases, in world history, communities and societies have been subject to enforced unity. Although this unity has been maintained for many years afterwards through brutal force, this has not stopped oppressed communities and societies in their struggle to regain the right to be in control of their own affairs. Thus, the irrepressible natural urge in humans to regain their freedom should deter far-sighted leaders of nation-states from the promotion of enforced unity. The promotion of such a project will become, predictably, a failure. At times, an initially ‘earned’ unity may, due to unexpected ill-treatment, become a trap and a legally enforced unity. In the Somali nation’s case, this has been the outcome of unity that has been earned after the independence of two regions of country. This is the subject of this writing, which hopes to shed some light on the complexities and controversies related to the union of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.
In the complex and controversial subject of Somali unity and the concept of Greater Somalia, legal, territorial and moral questions arise. Chief among these questions is, on grounds is unity or disunity morally justified, legally abiding and territorially an absolute necessity? To provide a satisfactory answer to this question, it is absolutely crucial to (1) evaluate the morality; (2) the legality; and (3) the territorial implications of unity. Only when all these three criteria are fully considered, can the right and informed answer to the question be made available. In many discussions or political debates, some social and political commentators have chosen to use in their analysis one or two of the three criteria, thus reaching conclusions that suffer from narrow-mindedness. To treat this question with its deserved seriousness and importance, I will approach it with an open mind and critical evaluations of all three criteria.
1. What is the morality of Somali Unity or disunity?
An insistence on the stipulation that Somali unity is sacrosanct and morally justified is obviously very attractive. Likewise, anyone who advocates for the unnecessary disunity of the Somali nation would find him/herself in a social predicament. That stated, however, sometimes what is circumstantially probable, would dictate us to consider both the favourable and the unfavourable in rigidly rational manner. The unity that our nation has achieved, unparalleled in the whole of Africa, was the favourable social condition which our peoples aspired to in their most sincere desire. Enforced colonial disunity has conditioned our peoples to harbour such strong desires of yearning for unity with their brethrens. Like forcefully separated lovers, our peoples ran as fast as they could to the embrace of each other.
During the ten years that led up to the nation’s independence, marked by the Trusteeship decade, a process of preparation and institutions building has been initiated in the South of the country. The Italian colonial power responsible for this project has, to some extent helped put in place structures and a system of governance modelled on their own. In general, there was a ten year time to achieve the pre-requisites necessary for a state to gain independence and thereon govern its country. However, in the North of the country, under British rule, such project of preparedness and institution building were realized only when the northerners learnt of the date the southerners were to gain independence. The British, unlike the Italians in the South, have neglected their duty to prepare the North for independence. It was only in the last years prior to Southern independence that the British hurried to prepare the North for independence. So, by the time of independence and unity was sought by the Northerners, they were in much technical disadvantage to the South. This was to become the first weakness of the Northern region, making unity an institutional disadvantage.
Initially, the unconditional unity of both parts of country has been the dream of the nation. That dream, when it materialized into reality, came with its fair share of practical problems. What happens when two lovers longing for each meet but speak two difference languages? In addition, what if their long absence from each other, reveals upon proximity, differences that were unknown previously? The answer is that they become estranged and suspicious. This is what has happened. Here was Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, both recognizing each other as Somalis, but equipped with two different colonial approaches or attitudes to administrative and governing practices. Each side was suspicious of the suitability and effectiveness of other’s approach to rule the country. The country, therefore, found itself in a condition where there existed one constitution and one parliament adhered to subjects practising two incompatible approaches.
For sometime, the government was forced to legalize these two approaches in regions they were applied to. Such application was done through a handful, hard to find interpreters, who spoke both English and Italian. Still, considering the level of preparedness of the South and its higher population, the Italian approach started gaining prominence. Not to mention, it was in the South, Mogadishu, that was the home of the government. Hargeysa, which was the base of British Somaliland, proved, to some extent, to have become politically reduced in significance, and remote due to poor communication and infrastructure. This was to become the second political weakness befalling the northerners.
Also related, while the majority inhabitants of British Somaliland were the majority rule there, shortly after the union with the South, they came play a role much less significant in national politics. Even when they formed a coalition with minority clans from the North to pose a single effective block, the desired result could not be achieved. Their share in politics, economics and employment opportunities were not also satisfactory. For example, the level of pay civil servants received in the North was lower than those of the South. Such disparity has precipitated protests and strikes in the North, which later attracted the government’s attention and has led to some changes. Although the government made some changes, this disparity became the third factor that disadvantaged the northerners.
By mentioning these three factors, amongst many, it is reasonable to suggest that the practical problems associated with the beautiful Somali dream , sowed the seeds of future discontent among Somalis. There is no point blaming our founding fathers for their failure to overcome these practical problems, because at the time, limitations to their administrative and governing knowledge had made them handicapped. Although they have tried their best, limitations in knowledge and expertise was the legacy left behind by the colonial powers. This does not mean that was no corruption and mismanagement in the Somali government.
All in all, these were the factors that disadvantaged the northerners after their union with the southerners. They had no conditions on the unity but completely motivated by patriotic sentiments. Although highly praise worthy, their patriotism had had neglected their rightful pursuit of their interests. Their basis for unity should have been the advancements of their interests. In unity, they found their interests worse off than in disunity. From here arises the question of: is the pursuit of advancing one’s interests, the moral justification of unity or disunity? More specifically, if unity is not interest-dependent, what other moral justification does it depend on?
It is fair to argue that all types of agreements are subject to the pursuit of one’s interests. To advance one’s own interests without infringing on the interests of others, one is endowed with the moral justification to seek his own happiness. Applying this logic to the interests represented by the leaders of the North, weren’t they morally justified to engage in activities towards that end? In the leaders of the North’s pursuit of their subjects’ happiness, do Southern leaders equally representing the interests of their subjects but were better served in a prevailing political arrangement, have the moral right to stop them? These are the underlying moral questions that must be answered before unity or disunity of the nation is insisted upon. But as rationality prescribes, everyone has the moral right to seek that which he/she considered good in contributing to overall happiness. Such being the case, the decision of the northerners was morally justified.
Instead of denying them this moral right, the right cause would have been to admit that their grievances as valid, and that the regrettable wrongs done to them, later on, would be addressed. The next action would have therefore been to overturn all previous practical disadvantages and bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes committed against them. To further remedy the situation, a scheme of sincere negotiations and reconciliation should have been commenced, with the desirable of effect of forgiveness from the peoples of the North and the South. Of course, reconciliatory efforts such as these could have been hoped to avert the disunity of the country. Unfortunately, however, this has not been attempted and many are still in denial of what did happen before. As many pro-Greater Somalia proponents hold, whatever grievances northerners might have, this does not qualify them for secession from Somalia. Legally, they claim, the 1960 Pact of Union between the North and South of Somalia is still binding. Thus, grievances alone cannot justify northerners to declare independence. This legal aspect of the union is dealt with below.
B. The legality of Somali unity or disunity?
To be continued...
