cubano

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  1. An interesting book about Siad Barre regime. In Part 1 of the book, Jess provides a summary of Somali’s historical background, from a personal account, from the struggle for Independence to the formation of the Somali republic, in what he describes as the process of “pan-Somalism.” He joined the Somali National Army in 1969 and served as the commanding officer for various divisions until he was appointed the head of Military Directorate. Throughout the years, the prevailing situation of the capital city was entirely tense, which Jess attributes to the political environment. The book traces the history of the birth of Somali state back to 1901 during the “Dervish Movement,” which resisted the British, the Italian, and the Ethiopian occupation. The movement was led by Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan. The North of Somalia was a British Protectorate, while the South and the Western Somali were under Italian and Ethiopian rule respectively. Due to the success of this movement, Abdullah Hassan is regarded as the pioneer of Somali nationalism. The Somali Youth Club was later formed in 1943 and it evolved to the Somali Youth League. According to the author, SYL strived relentlessly for Independence and it was the main representative of the Somali interests at the United Nations. The key interests of Somalis at this time was the establishment of a United Somali, a plea that was highly disregarded by the international community. Somaliland and Somalia eventually unified after independence in 1960. Jess argues the events in the region during this time were rooted in the spirit of Somali nationalism, which unfortunately formed the ground for clan and sub-clan politics later. As Jess contends, the country is a perfect expression of “nationalism that was not well-nurtured”. Jess says after the birth new Somali Republic, there emerged disputes at the top echelons of leadership. Besides the scarcity of resources, other difficulties facing the young nation included the international order and the Ethiopia challenge. By 1963, there were armed movements referred to as “Nasullah” led by Garaad Mukhtar Dahir, and in the nationalism spirit, Somali went into war with Ethiopia and later with Kenya (Shifta War, 1963-67). President Sharmarke and the Prime Minister held conflicting perspectives regarding the conflicts, which led to the appointment of a new Prime Minister Abdi Razak. In October 1969, there was a coup and the Armed forces resumed power. Jess notes the coup was supported by the North and the Southern populations, who were dissatisfied with President Sharmarke’s leadership. The Supreme Revolutionary Council was formed, and a number of milestones were realised in the education, agriculture, and health sectors. Regardless of the unification, the North and the South operated as distinct entities and SRC (which later dissolved in 1976) played a critical role in uniting the two regions. The book further explores the cause of failure during this time and highlights that President Siad Barre’s failures and faulty decisions formed the immediate triggers of the conflict. Jess cites confrontation with Quran teachings, expulsions of USS military experts, and decision to join the Arab League as some of the bad decisions. In Part 2, Jess describes the immediate events that led to the collapse of the Somali state. He singles out the 1977 war between Somalia and Ethiopia as an important aspect of the country’s history. Jess notes that many sources that document the war oversimplify issues to fit into the values regarded as acceptable by the majority. He, however, goes against the norms by narrating the actual events surrounding the war. He says President Barre’s failures made a significant contribution towards Somalia’s defeat in the War. According to him, it was more prudent to focus on negotiated peace than pursuing an ambitious military victory. Another mistake by the president was the expulsion of USSR, which accelerated Ethiopia’s regional power. As Barre’s regime became increasingly repressive, he ordered the execution of the military officers who opposed his handling of the conflict with Ethiopia. This led to the 1978 attempted coup. Jess explores how the 1988 civil war played a critical role in the collapse of the Somali state. In his analysis of the causes of the civil war, Jess argues that the agreement betweenBarre and Ethiopia’s dictator Haile Mariam on how to handle Ogaden and Isaak sub-clans as well as the SNM (armed movement) instigated the conflict. The opposition movements in Somalia continued to gain more power. The most popular among them was the SNM, which mainly comprised of the Isaak sub-clan. Barre’s regime continued to use oppressive means to respond to the opposition such as curfews, execution, and detention. As the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Jess provides a precise account of the happenings, and he asserts the situation got out of hand when the President’s confidential report was leaked in 1988. Over the years, Jess grew to become a key player in the armed opposition against the ruling regime, which led to Barre’s eventual fall. The attacks by the opposition military forces played a key role in weakening Barre’s regime. In Part 3, he addresses factional politics in Somalia, and why they left a divided country after the fall of Barre. Jess narrates in appreciable detail the general situation of the country immediately after Barre was defeated and forced to flee to Kenya in April 1992. All the armed groups united to form the Somali National Army, which controlled a large proportion of the country. He assesses various factors that weakened the possibility of cooperation between the clans. One key aspect he notes is the KaDhashay policy by President Barre, which required people to be in regions populated by their clans. He notes that the efforts to unite and regain stability in Somalia failed because various attempts occurred co-currently. Part 4 of the book is about external interventions in the 1990s to restore order in Somalia, which failed disastrously. Part 5 highlights the initiatives by foreign forces led by the UN between 1992 and 1996. Jess also includes into the narrative how war impacted on natural calamities, including the famine in 1991. He argues that the primary cause of the famine was the return of Barre to Baidoa in his attempt to regain power. He elaborates further on Barre’s return and the consequences. In the last part of the book, the writer provides a reflective view of the Somali crisis, noting that the worst damage to the republic occurred during Barre’s misrule. He also reflects on other aspects which may have greatly contributed to the collapse of Somali state. The Roots of Somali Crisis is an informative source that sheds light on the genesis of the major challenges facing Somali today. The protracted civil war, cycles of famine, piracy, and attacks by extremists have destroyed the country’s economy, and forced millions to free and seek refuge in other countries. Jess is , however, is optimistic about the future. “There is hope for Somali”, he says. In the search of potential paths, Jess’s book is of great value to policy makers, leaders, conflict resolution experts and peacemakers, security agents, and the international community whose support is essential in ensuring Somalia rises again.
  2. WSLF and SALF insurgencies destroyed by Cubans and Ethiopians. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92088/3/Teshale_Semir_Y_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf I want to see your opinions about the thesis.
  3. I dont understand why Ethiopian troops dont crush ONLF. ONLF is very weak now and is not a serious military threat to Addis.
  4. An interesting link about WSLF and SALF and how Cubans and Ethiopians crushed both insurgencies. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92088/3/Teshale_Semir_Y_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf
  5. This is an interesting video about Ogaden War. I dont understand somali and perhaps someone could tell me something about the conversation.
  6. I would like to watch a movie about Ogaden War.
  7. This topic is about 1982 war. Why are you talking about other issues?
  8. Cuba has never defeated United States. Cuba has never defeated South Africa. South Africa Border war ended in a stalemate. I want to talk about Somalia-Ethiopia Border War in 1982
  9. Why do you change the issue of the topic? This topic is not about me but Ethiopian-Somali war in 1982. Just do me favour if you have information about this issue you are welcome, but if you dont know anything about the issue, it is not for you. Do you understand my words?
  10. This is a topic about Ethiopian-Somalia war in 1982. Do you have any information about the issue?
  11. Siad Barre troops pushed back Ethiopian/SSDF attack, but Mengistu captured two Somali towns. HORN OF AFRICA: CONTINUED TENSIONS IN 1983 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84S00552R000100090003-8.pdf
  12. But an interview with Cuban POW did not change the outcome of 1977 war. Did it change it?
  13. This is a somali video: Could anyone tell me what he is talking about?
  14. I understand you, Mr Old Observer. I just want to know the history of WSLF, his battles against Ethiopia and SNM and his decline after 1989. https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/bitstream/10071/8479/1/Ylonen_JAHPS_Vol-I_No-I_2015.pdf After the war, the WSLF had remained as the main armed opposition organization in the Somali region, but during the course of the early 1980s it lost much of its strength and by 1989 it was largely defunct.
  15. I want to know the history of WSLF insurgency. Is there any problem with my request? I think many somalis would like to know more about their history.
  16. What I am trying to say is WSLF rebels were crushed by Ethiopia after 1978 debacle. The same happened to SALF (Somali Abbo Liberation Front).
  17. WSLF was an somali insurgency in Ogaden. This movement was defeated by Ethiopia. UWSLF signed a peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2010.
  18. Tallabo: I think Fidel Castro's communist manifesto is a more suitable book for you. Please leave our warlords alone Thank you for the advice, but I prefer Yusuf book. If you are not useful, dont be a problem.
  19. I know SNM was very strong, but I didnt know they defeated WSLF. Are you sure?
  20. Former warlord Abdullahi Yusuf wrote his memories several years ago. Have anyone read this book? I would like to know something about his life, battles and other topics. Title of the book: ("Struggle and Conspiracy: A Memoir")
  21. But WSLF continued armed struggle after 1978, they received somali support after 1977.
  22. The reality is Barre made a huge mistake killing these officers in 1978.
  23. WSLF alone would have brought Derg to his knees WSLF was not a serious threat after 1977 debacle.