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Everything posted by cubano

  1. WSLF was destroyed by Ethiopia. This is a fact.
  2. Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014 PAG 236
  3. Why nobody speak about WSLF history in Ethiopia? People should know more about this insurgency and its fate. WSLF and SALF were crushed by Mengistu.
  4. I think WSLF was crushed by Ethiopia in 1984. Siad Barre resigned Ogaden in 1988.
  5. Did Siad Barre resign Ogaden claims in 1988? Was WSLF destroyed by Ethiopia?
  6. This music reminds me Cuba. I want to visit Somalia and watch with my own eyes the glorious battlefields of 1977.
  7. Somalia lost 1977 because cuban troops helpd Ethiopia. Most somalis accept this opinion.
  8. I like this music. Soviet Union and Cuba in Ogaden.
  9. Ogaden will never be free. I will travel to Ethiopia very soon. You will see me near this monument in Addis Ababa.
  10. This dream will never come true. If somalis try to attack Ethiopia, Cuban troops crush Somalia again.
  11. Cuba is finished . Your era is over with the soviet . just keep away from Africa affairs. Somalia Giant will come back again . Sooner or later . inshalla . I dont see any somali giant now. Somalia lost 1977 war and nobody can change this fact.
  12. You forget to add other Arab countries. Soviet is dead now . Somalia will wake up again. Somalia ha nolato. Cuban troops and Soviet aid destroyed Somalia soul in 1978. If you invade Ethiopia again, Cuba crushes Somalia.
  13. That land is what lots of Somalis of all walks died for in 1977 war. Don't piss on their graves ungrateful kid. If they dont like the deal They can try to invade Ethiopia again. Cubans and Russians will be ready for another fight.
  14. Al Shabab is very brave with harmless Cuban doctors, but they ran like rabbits in 1977 war. Be careful somalis, because Cuban troops could return to Ethiopia and this time we will not stop on Somalia-Ethiopia border.
  15. This article is very funny. The Somali western Liberation Front (WSLF) Victory Over Invading Ethiopia Commemorated | WWW.WARANDHAABMEDIA.COM The article say Somalia special forces defeated Cubans, Ethiopians and Russians. God Sake, the guy should be intoxicated when he wrote the article.
  16. The 41st anniversary of karamara victory is commemorated. March 5, 1978 marked the victory of Ethiopian army over the invading Somalian army during the administration of Siad Barre. A group of young Ethiopians celebrated it in the capital Addis Ababa at Dilachin Statue near Tikur Anbessa Hospital, according to borkena sources from Addis Ababa. Siad Barre decided to invade Ethiopia with the calculation that Ethiopia was weakened during the time due to internal problems. During the war United States supported Siad Barre’s government while the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republic withdrew help to Somalia. As it turned out, Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia, up to 700 kilometers inside Ethiopia was under the occupation of the then Somalian troops, united Ethiopians during the early years of the Ethiopian revolution which toppled the imperial government of Haileselassie I. More than three hundred thousand militia forces were raised in a short time which was very crucial for Ethiopian victory. As well, tens of thousands of Cuban troops fought along side Ethiopian soldiers and many have lost their lives.
  17. I dont understand why nobody speaks about Omar Jess book. If you dont have anything interesting or new to say about the book, say nothing.
  18. If someone has read the book, he could share details of the book with us. Answer questions about 1977 war and its outcome.
  19. Thank you very much for advice, but you should respect my interest about 1977 war. I just want to know Omar Jess opinion on 1977. Is this desire so difficult to understand? My desire is to understand Omar Jess opinion. Could you do me a favour a show me his opinion about 1977 war?
  20. But I think the Omar Jess opinion is very interesting to understand 1977 war and Siad Barre-Mengistu agreement. I hope someone could show me excerpts of the book. I would like to know what he says about Ogaden War (1977.1978). I appreciate your help.
  21. I would like to know his opinion about 1977 war and Siad Barre-Mengistu peace agreement in 1988.
  22. An interesting book about Siad Barre regime. In Part 1 of the book, Jess provides a summary of Somali’s historical background, from a personal account, from the struggle for Independence to the formation of the Somali republic, in what he describes as the process of “pan-Somalism.” He joined the Somali National Army in 1969 and served as the commanding officer for various divisions until he was appointed the head of Military Directorate. Throughout the years, the prevailing situation of the capital city was entirely tense, which Jess attributes to the political environment. The book traces the history of the birth of Somali state back to 1901 during the “Dervish Movement,” which resisted the British, the Italian, and the Ethiopian occupation. The movement was led by Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan. The North of Somalia was a British Protectorate, while the South and the Western Somali were under Italian and Ethiopian rule respectively. Due to the success of this movement, Abdullah Hassan is regarded as the pioneer of Somali nationalism. The Somali Youth Club was later formed in 1943 and it evolved to the Somali Youth League. According to the author, SYL strived relentlessly for Independence and it was the main representative of the Somali interests at the United Nations. The key interests of Somalis at this time was the establishment of a United Somali, a plea that was highly disregarded by the international community. Somaliland and Somalia eventually unified after independence in 1960. Jess argues the events in the region during this time were rooted in the spirit of Somali nationalism, which unfortunately formed the ground for clan and sub-clan politics later. As Jess contends, the country is a perfect expression of “nationalism that was not well-nurtured”. Jess says after the birth new Somali Republic, there emerged disputes at the top echelons of leadership. Besides the scarcity of resources, other difficulties facing the young nation included the international order and the Ethiopia challenge. By 1963, there were armed movements referred to as “Nasullah” led by Garaad Mukhtar Dahir, and in the nationalism spirit, Somali went into war with Ethiopia and later with Kenya (Shifta War, 1963-67). President Sharmarke and the Prime Minister held conflicting perspectives regarding the conflicts, which led to the appointment of a new Prime Minister Abdi Razak. In October 1969, there was a coup and the Armed forces resumed power. Jess notes the coup was supported by the North and the Southern populations, who were dissatisfied with President Sharmarke’s leadership. The Supreme Revolutionary Council was formed, and a number of milestones were realised in the education, agriculture, and health sectors. Regardless of the unification, the North and the South operated as distinct entities and SRC (which later dissolved in 1976) played a critical role in uniting the two regions. The book further explores the cause of failure during this time and highlights that President Siad Barre’s failures and faulty decisions formed the immediate triggers of the conflict. Jess cites confrontation with Quran teachings, expulsions of USS military experts, and decision to join the Arab League as some of the bad decisions. In Part 2, Jess describes the immediate events that led to the collapse of the Somali state. He singles out the 1977 war between Somalia and Ethiopia as an important aspect of the country’s history. Jess notes that many sources that document the war oversimplify issues to fit into the values regarded as acceptable by the majority. He, however, goes against the norms by narrating the actual events surrounding the war. He says President Barre’s failures made a significant contribution towards Somalia’s defeat in the War. According to him, it was more prudent to focus on negotiated peace than pursuing an ambitious military victory. Another mistake by the president was the expulsion of USSR, which accelerated Ethiopia’s regional power. As Barre’s regime became increasingly repressive, he ordered the execution of the military officers who opposed his handling of the conflict with Ethiopia. This led to the 1978 attempted coup. Jess explores how the 1988 civil war played a critical role in the collapse of the Somali state. In his analysis of the causes of the civil war, Jess argues that the agreement betweenBarre and Ethiopia’s dictator Haile Mariam on how to handle Ogaden and Isaak sub-clans as well as the SNM (armed movement) instigated the conflict. The opposition movements in Somalia continued to gain more power. The most popular among them was the SNM, which mainly comprised of the Isaak sub-clan. Barre’s regime continued to use oppressive means to respond to the opposition such as curfews, execution, and detention. As the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Jess provides a precise account of the happenings, and he asserts the situation got out of hand when the President’s confidential report was leaked in 1988. Over the years, Jess grew to become a key player in the armed opposition against the ruling regime, which led to Barre’s eventual fall. The attacks by the opposition military forces played a key role in weakening Barre’s regime. In Part 3, he addresses factional politics in Somalia, and why they left a divided country after the fall of Barre. Jess narrates in appreciable detail the general situation of the country immediately after Barre was defeated and forced to flee to Kenya in April 1992. All the armed groups united to form the Somali National Army, which controlled a large proportion of the country. He assesses various factors that weakened the possibility of cooperation between the clans. One key aspect he notes is the KaDhashay policy by President Barre, which required people to be in regions populated by their clans. He notes that the efforts to unite and regain stability in Somalia failed because various attempts occurred co-currently. Part 4 of the book is about external interventions in the 1990s to restore order in Somalia, which failed disastrously. Part 5 highlights the initiatives by foreign forces led by the UN between 1992 and 1996. Jess also includes into the narrative how war impacted on natural calamities, including the famine in 1991. He argues that the primary cause of the famine was the return of Barre to Baidoa in his attempt to regain power. He elaborates further on Barre’s return and the consequences. In the last part of the book, the writer provides a reflective view of the Somali crisis, noting that the worst damage to the republic occurred during Barre’s misrule. He also reflects on other aspects which may have greatly contributed to the collapse of Somali state. The Roots of Somali Crisis is an informative source that sheds light on the genesis of the major challenges facing Somali today. The protracted civil war, cycles of famine, piracy, and attacks by extremists have destroyed the country’s economy, and forced millions to free and seek refuge in other countries. Jess is , however, is optimistic about the future. “There is hope for Somali”, he says. In the search of potential paths, Jess’s book is of great value to policy makers, leaders, conflict resolution experts and peacemakers, security agents, and the international community whose support is essential in ensuring Somalia rises again.