SOMALIA: A perspective for Conflict Analysis

[Koora-Tuunshe]

long but timeless analysis on the real conflict in Somalia.

 

SOMALIA: A PERSPECTIVE FOR CONFLICT ANAYLYSIS

A Presentation in Absentia to the first Meeting of "Finding a Way Out of the current Somali Crisis’ Columbus, Ohio

March 11 & 12, 2007

 

By: Abdalla Hirad

 

Madame/Mr. Chairperson,

 

Three issues rank high among the causes of political stagnation in Somalia for most of the 16 years past in which Somalia has remained without an effective government.

 

The Question of Warlordism:

 

I am sure you will all agree with me warlordism is an extreme form of political militarism where as political actors resort to violent means to gain and maintain power. But warlordism is not limited to the notoriety associated with a few of the Somali military leaders including General Aideed’s, the General Yusuf’s, the Yalahows, the Qanyares, the General Morgans and colonel Jess’. Warlordism is rooted in our political culture. It only manifests itself as the highest spire of the militaristic chart of the political behavior of our elite. Both the warlords and their arch rival, whom I call the "Assemblists" (some call them the "Manifesto”), have used military power to seek jurisdiction and control. It can be safely argued that, in the particular case of Somalia, warlordism, at its extreme, describes a situation where a strongman not only attain attains political and economic control of his own clans territory, but seek to attain the same in the territory of other communities.

 

Generally speaking, however, both of the two groups of the political clan elite, the Militarists and the “Manifesto”, have used the same methods as an avenue for attaining power—the use of military power, manipulation of clan differences and the search for foreign recognition as a means as a means of power and legitimacy to national power. If the militarist camp (the warlords) have had claim to excel in the use of the military muscle, the "manifesto”, the assemblists, have had claim to excel in manipulating clan differences and seeking international recognition. In fact, barring “Somaliland”, in which the SNM was emasculated by the late Mr. Egal, the rest of country was invariably controlled by the militarist camp in their disjointed fashion. By some stroke of luck, so far, the Transitional Federal Government seems to be succeeding in obtaining international recognition and militarily gaining control of the Capital and other major population centers.

 

The Question of clan Hegemony and Occupation

 

Marauding militia controlled by warlords have over the years occupied the triangle between Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo. In the warlord of politics in Somalia, it is assumed that the more land one controls the greater the power and claim to national leadership. But it seems that the propensity for this attitude has been greatest with the strongmen from the Central land of Somalia, than in other places.

 

In this view, the capital and the areas between it and the cities of Kismayo and Baidoa have been considered a no mans land by these strongmen. I am of the strong view that Mogadishu has remained under the hegemonic control of these strongmen from the North and their marauding militia, who denied all Somalis including the natives and age old Benadiri society to have the say in running the affairs of the city and re-usher in all Somalis into the city to, once again, become the peaceful and beautiful Capital city it used to be—until the end of December 2006, when the TFG supported by Ethiopian forces took the city back from the Islamists, which I consider the offshoots of Hegemony and Occupation.

 

The Question of "Somaliland":

 

"Somaliland" is a quasi hegemonic edifice, in which the political elite of one clan, "Issac", claims the control of the boundaries of the former British Somaliland, on the grounds that they have the right to separate the Somali Republic along the lines of the old colonial boundaries between the two colonial Somali lands—the British and the Italian—thus having declaring a unilateral secession in 1991.

 

The preposterousness of the proposal lies not only in the fact the communities of Sool, Sanaag and Awdal, whose traditional kinship claim to land allocates more than have the territory to them, do not agree with the secession, but that the Issac community are in themselves divided on the issue. Indeed, the Issac clan is equitably represented in the Transitional Federal Government. Hence, peace and unity in Somalia and its future has partially remained hostage to the whims and skims of a small group of men who claim to be the overlords of peace and democracy in the region. Despite the claim of peace and democracy, they have generally refused to allow for open political dialogue within the region or open discussion on the question with other Somalis elsewhere in the country.

 

A Reflection on the Post Embagathi Period

 

The forces of warlordism, clan hegemony and secessionism have over the years conspired against reconciliation and peace and have been the main reason for the failure of 13 internationally sponsored reconciliation conferences, and continue to oppose the enemy of the fruits of the latest which was commenced in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002, to culminate in Embagathi, Kenya, 2004, resulting in the fortunately existing Transitional Federal Government. The trio forces were being manipulated by politicians from an assortment of clan elite from the areas I mentioned above occasionally supported by opportunists, war profiteers, misguided intelligentsia from other parts the country.

 

Lately, and in the wake of the conclusion of the 14th National Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi, those forces have once again tried to abort the efforts at establishing national government in Somalia as was the goal of the international community spearheaded by IGAD and supported by the peace loving Somali people everywhere—who, although voiceless, make up the forces of unity against fragmentation and separatism; the forces of freedom and liberation against occupation and hegemony and the forces of democracy and rule-of-law against warlordism and tyranny. Today, the forces of unity and peace are by far greater and bigger in number than the forces of fragmentation, occupation and separatism but they also constitute the silent majority. Fortunately, today they are united by the hope that the Transitional Federal Government will bear fruition for their side to win. They also have the conviction that their side is the majority and that it will win. However, the forces of division and fragmentation have adopted some new strategies to pursue their sinister goal.

 

1. The Exploitation of Islam as a Political Tool:

 

The forces of occupation and hegemony have lately tried to exploit Islam as a political ideology merely to abort the national efforts at reconstituting government in Somalia. Political opportunists, the same old war profiteers and misguided intelligentsia—sometimes not without a vested interest or political motivation—have joined the band wagon to support the new endeavor. But there has been an abundance of evidence that the scheme stems from those forces of occupation and hegemony. “Somaliland”, although staunchly averted to Islamism because they know that the so-called Islamists would still keep the nation united, if to flimsily extend the boundary of their strategy of occupation and hegemonic rule, which by all standards is only fascist in its nature and style and which is alien to the rule-of-law as the world knows it today.

 

“Somaliland”, therefore, while feeling abhorrent of the onslaught of Islamism, was also appreciative of the development in Mugadishu and much of the south under the Islamists, if that would some how delay the formation of an effective government in the Somali Republic. Here, we find a text book example of symmetrically opposed forces working together to strangely achieve asymmetrical and incongruent goals—hence the failure of both.

 

2. Launching a Diplomatic International Offensive to Fail the TFG:

 

After the defeat of the UIC, the forces of hegemony and division immediately toured the world to claim that Somalia requires fresh talks for reconciliation. In oblivion of the fact that they are trying to frustrate the outcomes of the two-year long international and local endeavor to restore government in Somalia, some international actors have received these crocodile tears with open ears. In any case, the TFG accepted the proposal as per its mandate to complete and consolidate the reconciliation process under the Transitional Federal Charter, which brought it into place. The subject of “reconciliation” will be briefly discussed a little later in this paper.

 

3. Mimicking the Insurgency in Iraq

 

As we speak, these forces are terrorizing people in Mogadishu to fulfill their promise that they would melt into to the Mogadishu population. Consequently, they have been targeting civilian, military and government structures, causing people to die from direct hits and in the cross fire. They have also been conducting assassinations in the name of what some call the “resistance” or the “insurgency” to mimic the Iraq situation.

 

However, the Somali situation is very different from that of Iraq in many ways. The Somali situation is not denominated by significant ethnic or religious conflict. People of different clans do not intermingle in most of the country except in a few rural and urban population centers. The only area in which the competition for resources comes to mind is in the riverine area which has been occupied by the forces of hegemony and occupation, and in which they have been grapping land and used forced labor mechanisms to profit from the processes of community subjugation and emasculation.

 

Hence, how convenient that the propaganda machine of occupation, hegemony and secession characterizes the TFG in a number of ways to discredit it as a uniting umbrella for the forces of peace, unity and Somali rebirth? They try to label the government as illegitimate; that it comprises of warlords; that it is a puppet government for Ethiopia and the West or that it is anti-Islam. I will try and make remarks in relation to these characterizations:

 

1. on the Question of the Legitimacy of the TFG:

 

Ever since the defeat of the Islamists, the TFG’s popularity has been improving. The people of Puntland, the people of Digil and Mirifle of the inter-Riverine area, the people of the lower Jubba, the unionist segment of the people of “Somaliland” and the people of the central lands, including a majority of the population of Mugadishu, see the TFG is the only way for Somalia to emerge from the reigning dark forces and hegemony and disunity and the situation of anarchy. Indeed, that is why the so-called “resistance” is fighting the government and the international forces supporting it to eventually free these communities from their grip. These forces of darkness must already miss that fact that they are no longer in control of national infrastructure such as the air ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the sea ports along the southern coast line, including Mogadishu, Marka, Barava, and Kismayo, to mention the major ones. To speak to the subject of the TFG legitimacy, however, with due justice and dispel queries about its mandate, one needs to revisit the process which produced the Transitional Federal Government, under international support and supervision. Some tend to forget that the TFG was a product of a two-year process of reconciliation, which went through many stages for it to form into its current complete form:

 

In the first stage, delegations representing all clans, including traditional leaders, political leaders and civil society were invited. Those delegations had engaged in dialogue and bridge-building activities to initially produce agreements committing all to peace, ceasefire between hostile parties, the disarmament and demobilization of the armed militia and even an a priori separate agreement between all the militarized factions to call in international forces to disarm the population.

 

In the second stage, the clan delegations mutually recognized each other as equitable entities to empower the Conference well enough to transform into a Constitutional Assembly representing the whole of the Somali Republic. In other words, the hitherto segmented moral force of the traditional authority and the disjointed political authority of the regional faction/political leaders have somehow been meshed together to gradually evolve and merge into the Constitutional Assembly.

 

In the third stage, the Constitutional Assembly, as recognized, by then, by IGAD and the rest of the international community—the sort of which existed no where else in Somalia to challenge its authority—could now, in principle, produce negotiated agreements between equitable delegations representing all the people of Somalia.

 

In the fourth stage, the negotiated agreements produced by the Constitutional Assembly could now translate into bonds of law, as is now envisaged in what we now know as the Transitional Federal Constitution.

 

In the fifth stage, the mutually recognizing delegations representing all the political constituencies (unfortunately, clans) of the Somali Republic could now, on the powers provided by the Transitional Federal Charter—and I defer, here, to constitutional lawyers—each appoint their respective members of parliament to the New Legislative Assembly (the Transitional Federal Parliament) as envisaged in the new Transitional Federal Constitution. As we all know, the representatives to the Parliament were selected—because they could not be elected under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the list of representatives for each Transitional Constitutional Unit of the people of Somalia (clans) was finally produced as a result of negotiations and agreements within each constituency or sample thereof, if you like, (recognized clan delegations) and on the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter.

 

In the sixth stage, the 275-member Parliament (Legislative Assembly), representing all the clans of Somalia, was built on the basis of a rationalized equitable distribution of power in accordance with the infamous 4.5 formula.

 

In the seventh stage, the Parliament was convened to elect its own leadership (the Speaker and deputies) and then elect the President of the Republic who then appointed the Prime Minister (the head of the Transitional Federal Government) in consultation with, as strictly demanded by, the Parliament, as history records it.

 

2. Using Ethiopia as a Scapegoat:

 

The adversaries of the TFG have made a number of allegations about the role of Ethiopia since the formation of the TFG in 2004. First, they allege that Ethiopia had masterminded the formation of the TFG. Second, Ethiopia has transgressed the national borders of Somalia; and as an old enemy of Somalia it seeks to occupy and even to annex parts of Somalia. Therefore, the argument goes, the TFG comprises a bunch of traitors hand-picked by Ethiopia, who have been illegitimately installed in the Capital. The supporters of the TFG are rebuffing the allegation by making the following argument.

 

The allegations, by the adversaries of the TFG, that Ethiopia unfairly masterminded the Embagathi process, have been but a flawed excuse to justify their breach of the Embagathi agreements. Those initially included the Mogadishu warlords, some civilian politicians and the so-called Islamists, all of whom were adequately represented in that process. They also had more supporters within the ranks of the IGAD countries in that process, than just Ethiopia which they allege was instrumental in single-handedly masterminding the formation of the Transitional Federal Government. The governments of Djibouti, Eritrea and. to some extent, the government of the Sudan, and Egypt, to name but some, would not let Ethiopia to have its way. The tug of war between the interests of those countries played an equal role, as to the wrangling between the two Somali political groups to delay the time it took—two years—to conclude the process. Thanks for the efforts of those countries’ opportunism on the one hand, and to the patience of a benevolent world on the other. The TFG was forcefully delivered, if post-maturely, for obvious reasons. Or, so it was intended!

 

By the same token, the characterization of Ethiopia, as an invading power to occupy or annex Somalia has also been as unfair an allegation as it has been baseless. If Ethiopia had any covert or overt intentions to do so, she would not, logically, come to the rescue and defense of the TFG or any other Somali government for that matter. In all probability, it would be easier for the predator to pursue its goal by encouraging the balkanization of the Somali Republic into Bantustan style mini states, such as has been the natural trend, begotten by the prevailing political circumstances of division in the country. Or, even better, it would let the UIC destroy the TFG first, so that Somalia would fall in its palm like a rotten apple. It would then invade Somalia on the grounds that the UIC was a threat to its existence—a situation fortunately averted by the mere luck that the TFG was here at the right time. Indeed, only by having a central government could we avert the likelihood of this scenario and we could only change the disastrous direction we were heading to the better. Hence, the characterization of Ethiopia as an invading force with ulterior motives does not bode well with the events on the ground. But, even if remotely so, Ethiopia never had the warewithal, the international political clout or the administrative capacity to achieve the alleged goal. In the end, it was the UIC aggressively pursuing a hostile political program which caused the Ethiopian intervention rather than the opposite.

 

The characterizations have all been but political smears by the adversaries of TFG to exploit the once negative history of relations between the two neighboring countries. However, those ploys do not auger well for the fact that almost all of those clan-based military fronts, which had proliferated in the 1980s—with the goal of removing Barre’s Regime—all had their inception in Ethiopia and had operated in cahoots with the Mingistu Haile Mariam’s regime of that day. The majority of us (Somalis) condoned those acts of hitherto unforeseen violation of the nationally sanctified code of conduct and rationale of our Somaliness up to then. Since that code was broken, everything between the blue sky and the green grass has significantly changed. Hence, what makes it so illegal or blasphemous for the TFG to seek the cooperation of Ethiopia in the goal of bringing the State on its feet again?

 

Fellow Somalis lets all come respect logic. Let’s all sit back and relax to quietly examine our emotions a little deeper. Ethiopia, as a member of the IGAD countries which sponsored the Embagathi process, remained committed to the letter and spirit of the agreements and has continued to respect the outcome of that process. Period. Indeed, Ethiopia ought to be commended for the honorable role it has played in this regard, together with some other IGAD countries. Furthermore, there are precedents of the sort in the international experience. Tanzania’s liberation of Uganda from Edi Amin is a case in point. The ECOAS liberation of Liberia and Sera Leone are other examples.

 

3. ON Accommodating the Warlords:

 

The TFG has also been unwisely criticized for having accommodated the warlords, after it defeated the UIC, which is only a very conveniently crafted gadget by the adversaries of the TFG. It emanates from the desperate hopes of the forces of division and fragmentation for the government to fail. Objectively considered though, the accommodation should have easily been considered a positive step on the part of the TFG, even at the risk of it being deviously sidelined by the these veterans and masters of deception. It is very strange that this is not considered an act of good will or an attempt at reaching out on the part of the government. In any case, there were a number of reasons for which the Mogadishu warlords could not be excluded.

 

First, in the absence of an alternative leadership in Mogadishu, the warlords have remained the real political leaders to contend with. Second, given that the UIC threatened to eliminate, as they did, the warlords, for good or for bad, the latter have become natural allies of the TFG in the aftermath of the defeat. The fact some of the warlords assisted the government to win the war has been a plus. Third, besides being the de facto community leaders, these warlords are members of Parliament, who, under the existing Charter cannot be removed, without the request of their respective clans. Fourth, and most importantly, given that they renounce violence and are willing to surrender their militia and weaponry, as they have done, they deserve a second chance—an opportunity which I doubt the UIC leadership would ever be willing to give after everything is said done by the international community. But most importantly, the word “warlord” is only a misnomer as long as these characters have not occupied the land of others, given the definition adopted earlier in this paper.

 

4. On Reconciliation:

 

Upon arrival in Mogadishu, the TFG leaders started talks with the leadership of the community of Mogadishu, including politicians, traditional elders, religious leaders, and civil society groups and, even the former warlords, with a view to obtaining total community support and commitment to peace and security. Of course, after so many rounds of talks, a community-based plan of stabilization and peace in Mogadishu was reached, where many committees were formed to handle the required tasks. It has been the intention of the TFG adversaries in Mogadishu to abort this plan. Hence, the mortar and heavy artillery shelling of the population, for the mere claim that the TFG cannot secure peace in Mogadishu!

After 16 years of chaos, anarchy and lawlessness, there has been enough proof that Mogadishu required an overwhelming force to pacify and ensure the security in its surroundings.

 

Add to this the fact that UIC had melted down within the population and had promised Iraqi-style resistance, announced in the person of Mr. Sharif Ahmed, now being hailed by many as a “moderate”. Despite this declared continuation of war by the UIC, even after their defeat, the response of the TFG has not been commensurate with the treats the government faced. Rather than taking the tougher option of militarily cleaning up the remnants, which they could do reasonably well, the TFG opted for a peaceful approach.

 

In unison with their vow to continue the war, the adversaries of the TFG have been calling for a new process of reconciliation. Some international quarters have, conveniently fallen for the gadget, the purpose of which clearly has been to wipe the TFG out of existence, deepen the division and fragmentation, continue the occupation and hegemony of southern Somalia and dismember the Somali Republic. It can be said that, the international community, perhaps, unable to conceive any new post-war ideas and plans towards Somalia, has been repeatedly reiterating pre-war buzz words and sound bites, calling for “reconciliation between all sides to the conflict”. It has never been understood in full, which “sides” were meant, given that there has been no organized opposition to speak of, after the fall of the UIC.

 

Making those calls, on the part of the international community, seems to have been the politically correct clichés to make, during this early watch-and-see period, and by a world stunned by the speed of events which unexpectedly placed the TFG in Mogadishu—a matter which remains incredible in the unpredictable situation of the politically volatile Somalia.

Nevertheless, the TFG accepted the proposal as part of its mandate to complete the process of reconciliation it was mandated as per the Transitional Federal Charter. The proposal provides an opportunity for this minority of spoilers, bent on failing all opportunities to restore government of Somalia, to join their brethren and to complete the process of reconciliation badly needed to prevent the State of Somalia from annihilation and death. However, they shall be required to renounce violence and to provide guarantees that they will abide by the laws of the land in the future. Surely, they must be demanded to do so from here to fore.

 

A Word of Caution for the International Community:

 

Imposing conditions and resource constraints or delivering ultimatums, on the part of some international actors, has been disingenuous, if not deliberately humiliating to the TFG. As such, those attitudes do neither encourage meaningful reconciliation nor do they foster the spirit of cooperation between the TFG and its partners towards the desired goal of peace in Somalia.

 

In the end, it seems that the “African Solution”, earlier in 1994, suggested by President Clinton, is bearing fruit—although a little too late, I must add The IGAD countries had painstakingly contrived the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), despite the differences between them, over the Somali question—not without help from the rest of the world. Ethiopia, as a member, also, has now, single-handedly managed to install the government in the Capital, against all odds. The African Union is willing to contribute with a stabilization force to replace the Ethiopians. It seems that once again, the usual suspects are working against the possibilities—Italy, Egypt and others of lesser status and influence in the fore front. The world must come to realize that for Somalia and the Somalis:

 

(1) The line between the Italian influence and a control of Alqaeda is very thin. But there can be a third viable alternative—Somalia having its own government in a manner independent of both.

 

(2) In Somalia, today, the line between Islamism and secularism is very thin. But there can be a choice between the two, if allowed by the West and the Arabs; for the Somalis have not been afforded the choice to sort it out between themselves, under the circumstances. Allowing the TFG to do it its way is the next best thing possible, if at all—the African way that is.

 

(3) The line between anarchy and good governance is very thin. However, too much interference by the outsiders—especially, in the current manner—can only do away with the TFG, which has lately been the only hope for a government to come to place in Somalia. The double-standards of the West has been striking, especially in as far as the European Union is concerned. Fighting what is considered terror in the western countries with an iron fist, while, in all probability, condoning the killing of innocent civilians on a daily basis in the shelling of Mogadishu by the same forces of terror. How typical of a dichotomy of the “rich man’s war”—coined by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, in 1992—and poor Somalia’s war, against terror!

 

(4) In particular, the Arab world must know that Solomon’s Justice applies to the question of Somalia. It is question of whether one wishes to divide the baby or keep it intact, in the end. One cannot beat a dead horse. I am sure, Somalia existing as a State is more beneficial to all than without. Those who wish Somalia whole and on its feet will first agree to the restoration of its government. The TFG remains to be the only opportunity in sight, for the foreseeable future.

[Fabregas]

Hadi been iyo dreams la iska dhaadhiciyo waa..........

[Koora-Tuunshe]

^walaahi, the article is still timeless.

 

. Launching a Diplomatic International Offensive to Fail the TFG:

 

After the defeat of the UIC,

the forces of hegemony and division immediately toured the world to claim that Somalia requires fresh talks for reconciliation.

In oblivion of the fact that they are trying

to frustrate

the outcomes of the two-year long international and

local endeavor to restore government in Somalia, some international actors have received these crocodile tears with open ears.

In any case, the TFG accepted the proposal as per its mandate to complete and consolidate the reconciliation process under the Transitional Federal Charter, which brought it into place. The subject of “reconciliation” will be briefly discussed a little later in this paper.

[Fabregas]

this article is indeed priceless , for it shows the odd position that you, O kore, and many others like yourself find yourself in today:

 

Today Arabs are your new best friends!

 

Ethiopia is no longer your friend and today she is all of a sudden bad!

 

The weak Opposition, who the author said were incapable of waging a war, are taking over the country!

 

Today there is no "cabinet" and "government", according to you.

 

 

lol

[Koora-Tuunshe]

^u are not making any sense. Be straightforward and well intentioned in lieu of using heavy and unwated irony and spin to make yourself appear a boob.

Of course, some of the points the author makes quite veer away from the latest developments but the concept curls in uniform direction with perfect illustration of Somalia's quagmire.

 

TFG's lack of success is twofold: Reconcliation with leaderless, powerless and rudderless opposition of varying interests and agenda. And

the insistance by the UN and United States to withhold enough funding and support until the moderates come aboard in a power-sharing agreement. However, this extended period of reconciliation has hampered the TFGs mandate to implement the nation-building institutions; Likewise, it has given the real opposition, the Islamists who wish to install an Islamic State, a broad space to maneouver and ensure that access to armamaents and funding from Eritrea, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, goes smoothly.

 

It's time the option of the president be taken into consideration. He wants to fight the Islamists and render them ineffective and powerless again like he did on Dec 2006. A boat can't have two captains. He is the captain and the international community should allow him to exericise his constitutional authority.

[Mintid Farayar]

^^Fight them with what? Ethiopian troops? The Ethiopians say they are reluctant to do anymore of the heavy lifting. A/Y clan militia can only maintain his personal safety at times(with the help of the armored AU troops).

 

So where are the troops to exercise his option? Have some respect for the intellect of fellow readers!