GAAROODI

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Posts posted by GAAROODI


  1. this is what i mean, Duke...talk is cheap mr. "the future is bright the future is buttland". This is the beauty of international relations, and what does an NGO being told to leave and chaos have to do with each other. Do you know how many NGO's operate in Somaliland. More than 120 with offices. Interpeace is but one. Your beloved 2 regional entity is were the real chaos is, human trafficing, piracy, counterfiet money making machines in peoples homes. Super Super inflation.

     

    Somali's will always amaze you with their *********, just because you want Somaliland to be disarry, so your 2 region semi state could look good, it isnt in dissary at least we pay our teachers and police a wage. which is better than puntland has ever done.

     

     

    looooooooooooooooool .


  2. Its all in the mindset. Some somali's just dont have the mindset to lead or participate. The Somali's are like 5 major groupings.

     

    1 - mugdisho residents, they just have to high of a population and deep mistrust of one another due to false perceptions of rivalry amongst them

     

    2- the puntlanders, who in all respect have no real land, no real government and are power hungry and will do anything to get power because they simply cant live in puntland its not bearable.

     

    3 - You have the somalilanders who in all respect started the very notion of somalinimo and came into Somalia with genuine desires to work together, however no longer have trust in somalia, to the extant that they dont wanna participate in anything to do with Somalia.

     

    4 - you than have Djibouti which simply just looks after its own interests

     

    5 - the NFD and 5 region of Ethiopia and these are really colonies of naibouring states with no real power or will.

     

    So the somali problem is very complex, its a combination of history,mistrust and animosity and shear ********* in some areas. They only solution is 2 countries, letting the dream of greater Somalia die and finally put it to rest. move on, develop as seperate countries, use the expertise of others, let Somaliland negotiate peace between the many warring factions, then develop seperately and join the rest of the world.


  3. loool, delusional indeed. I think the money is better spent on water and the starving and impoverished population, maybe you should pay your police officers instead of being delusional.The only reason why puntland is making this a big deal is because it sees somaliland celebrating like crazy every may 18, puntland is really an immitation state in name only, in my opinion.

     

    What ever somaliland does they gotta imitate it... which is really funny.


  4. Naxar Nugaaleed, if i understood you correctly, phantom "imaginary enemies" took over las anod".

     

     

    wow, the waters Bari must effect peoples brians man.

     

    Naxar Nugaaleed, saxib the truth is puntland is an extortion racket were everything and anything in criminal circles is legit. human trafficing,smuggling ,piracy.

     

    Ask yourself, why is there no human trafficing in Somaliland, why is there no piracy off its waters?

     

    because it exists as a real power and is capable of stoping such activities, but in your circumstances if george w bush or obama was your president i dont think the insititutions and foundation to conduct there wishes are there, they just dont exist.


  5. A number of factors contributed specifically to the success of the series of meetings leading to the Burao

    conference:

    • Initially, the SNM’s military dominance in the Northern Regions was clear, providing an unequivocal

    focus for negotiation between clans;

    • The SNM policy of non-recrimination against the non-SNM northern clans enabled a meaningful

    dialogue between adversaries, in which clans that had supported the Siyaad Barre regime were able to

    play a genuine part in negotiating the terms of peace;

    • The civil war had been fought between the SNM and the Siyaad Barre regime, rather than being a clan-

    based conflict. This can be a difficult distinction to analyse, because Siyaad Barre clearly employed a

    policy designed to accentuate divisions between clans in an effort to sustain his own rule. However,

    the fact that the eastern clans and far western clans played such an important role in post-war reconciliation and

    peacemaking is perhaps an effective illustration of this;

    • When divisions within the SNM flared into conflict, the system of customary leadership remained

    sufficiently strong for elders to apply traditional conflict resolution procedures;

    • Events in the south served as a powerful reminder of many of the things that were most despised about

    successive governments after the union in 1960. The announcement by Ali Mahdi of the establishment of a government in Mogadishu without consultation with the SNM and in violation of agreements

    between the SNM and USC was probably the single most important of these.

    There were also a number of more general factors that can be said to have contributed to the broader process

    of reconciliation in the Northern Regions. One of these is undoubtedly the sense of local ‘ownership’ of the

    process. Negotiations occurred largely away from the view of external actors. There was some awareness

    and some limited support for conferences, but the peace process was overwhelmingly an indigenous one.

    The reconciling parties were therefore familiar with the conflict resolution traditions that formed the basis

    for meetings and negotiations. Traditional elders, who were known to their clans-fold and largely trusted

    by them, played an important role, and the influence of external factors (individuals or organisations) with

    foreign agendas was limited.

    This ‘localisation’ of the process extended to funding: the vast majority of the resources required to run the

    meetings and conferences was sourced from local people, or from Somaliland diaspora. This undoubtedly

    constrained the process at times, but more significant was the effect it had in sustaining the sense of

    local ‘ownership’ and focusing the minds of those taking part on the resources available for negotiation.

    There is an apposite Somali proverb: haddii la doonayo in cid nabadda la ogoleysiiyo daankaa lagu dilaa,

    meaning ‘if it is intended to make one side accept the peace that side should be burdened with feeding the

    guests’. There was always an awareness of who was paying, how far the resources would stretch and the

    implications for the process itself (Rashiid Gadhweyne in APD, 2007b).