Somalia: The Dynamics of Post-Intervention Political Failure

[Castro]

During the first three weeks of May, the cycle of political devolution in Somalia that had set in after the military defeat of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) in December 2006 by Ethiopian armed forces supporting the country's internationally recognized but weak Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) continue, with tensions persisting among opposing actors and fractures surfacing within them.

 

The collapse of the I.C.C., which had sought to unify Somalia in an Islamic state based on Shari'a law and had gained control over most of the country south of the breakaway sub-states of Puntland and Somaliland, as an organized political faction left the T.F.G. with the challenges of providing security and reconciling disparate political forces in the country, which it has not yet succeeded in meeting.

 

Facing determined resistance from a coalition of the ****** clan, I.C.C. militants and nationalists in Somalia's official capital Mogadishu, Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces launched a major offensive in late April that succeeded in breaking the armed opposition, but not in eliminating it. After a brief lull in violent conflict, the opponents of the T.F.G. -- particularly the jihadist wing of the I.C.C. -- switched their tactics from artillery attacks to roadside bombings and targeted assassinations that have continued on a nearly daily basis since May 5, including attacks on the T.F.G.'s prime minister and Mogadishu's mayor, former warlord Mohamed Dheere, who attributed them to ****** efforts to "sabotage" the government, which clan leaders denied. The Ethiopians and the T.F.G. have responded with weapons searches and arrests of suspected militants. At present, neither side has gained a decisive advantage.

 

Depending on external military support for its survival, the T.F.G. has relied on Addis Ababa as a stop gap pending the full deployment of a planned 8,000 member African Union (A.U.) peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), of which only a 1,400 member Ugandan contingent is on the ground. The mission suffered a setback and its future became clouded when, on May 16, a roadside bombing of an AMISOM convoy killed four Ugandan troops and wounded five others.

 

The tenuous situation of the T.F.G. is evidenced by the fragility of its military support. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, is eager to withdraw from Somalia because of the financial burdens of the occupation, growing domestic opposition to it, the heating up of an insurgency in Ethiopia's ethnic-Somali ****** region (Somali Regional State) and the unpopularity of the occupation in Somalia.

 

Addis Ababa, however, is under A.U. and Western pressure not to withdraw until AMISOM replaces its forces, which is an increasingly unlikely eventuality as African states that have previously pledged their troops to the mission -- Benin, Burundi, Ghana and Nigeria -- hang back, citing security concerns and inadequate funding from Western donor powers and the A.U. The May 16 bombing of the Ugandan convoy has increased reluctance to contribute to AMISOM and has activated domestic opposition to the mission in Uganda.

 

The Western donor powers are aware that Addis Ababa cannot sustain the occupation indefinitely and that the occupation is counter-productive to the T.F.G.'s legitimacy. They are using their diplomatic and financial leverage to try to convince the T.F.G.'s leadership -- President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi -- to hold a planned National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) quickly and to ensure that it represents all Somalia's significant political forces, including conciliatory elements of the I.C.C. and opposition sectors of the ****** clan. Although preparations for the N.R.C., which is scheduled to open in mid-June, are underway, its composition is yet to be determined and it is still uncertain whether or not it will be held.

 

The combination of a revived, though currently relatively low-level insurgency, half-hearted external military support and qualified diplomatic and thus far inadequate financial backing places the T.F.G. in the position of a weak protagonist. Its major advantage is the absence of a concerted opposition to it, yet that advantage is cut by the dispersion of independent power centers that attends the devolutionary cycle.

 

The T.F.G.: A Weak Protagonist

 

Although each conflict situation needs to be analyzed in terms of its own particular configuration of power and interest, developments in Somalia have fallen into a pattern that bears resemblance to the political dynamics of Afghanistan and Iraq. In all three countries, a regime or an ascending movement has been displaced by external military intervention followed by a foreign occupation propping up a weak central government that has not been able to control its territory and quell armed opposition to it. The three countries are also decentralized Muslim societies in which political devolution to regions, localities, sects, ethnicities and -- in Somalia -- clans occurs spontaneously when central authority deflates.

 

A post-intervention regime that is dependent on occupying forces and external financial aid finds itself under pressure from all sides. Domestic opposition mobilizes around a nationalist backlash against occupation and -- in contemporary Muslim societies -- around Islamism; local leaders strive to assert their control independently of the central authority; and external occupying and donor powers demand that the weak regime impose security and share power with disaffected sectors of the society. At the same time, the regime attempts to preserve itself intact as much as it possibly can, exacerbating opposition to it and alienating the protectors and donors on which it depends. Afghanistan and Iraq have been in this condition for several years with no end in sight; Somalia is in its early stages and there is no reason to believe that its prognosis is any different.

 

That the syndrome sketched above now characterizes Somalia is made evident in a series of interviews and press conferences by key players in the present conjuncture.

 

In an interview with Agence France Presse (A.F.P.) on May 21, Yusuf admitted that "terrorists" were still active in Somalia and then went on to criticize donor powers and international organizations for failing to support the T.F.G. adequately, complaining that the United States, the European Union, Western European governments and the United Nations had promised aid to reconstruct "a devastated country" but had failed to deliver and had confined themselves to performing "meager humanitarian work." Yusuf continued, saying that the T.F.G. needs US$42.2 million to hold the N.R.C. and has not yet received the funds despite promises that they would be forthcoming. He noted that Washington was appreciative of the T.F.G.'s efforts against "terrorism," but had not yet given "tangible assistance." A.F.P. reported that donors are reluctant to provide aid until they see the results of the N.R.C.

 

Yusuf's interview followed visits to Mogadishu by Italy's deputy foreign minister, Patrizia Sentinelli, on May 19, and U.N. emergency relief coordinator, John Holmes, on May 12, and the appointment of John M. Yates as U.S. special envoy for Somalia on May 17.

 

In remarks to the press after her visit, Sentinelli said: "I believe the transitional government cannot perform its duties due to lack of local support and the different political groups in the country do not feel represented in the government." Yet Sentinelli added that she was "optimistic" that the T.F.G. would implement "good governance" in Somalia and promised that Rome would provide "partial funding" for AMISOM and the N.R.C. She repeated the international consensus that the N.R.C. should be inclusive and that the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia is "unacceptable" in the long run, calling for rapid and full deployment of AMISOM.

 

In an interview with Rod Nordlund of Newsweek magazine, published on May 21, Holmes, whose visit to Mogadishu was cut short by bombings near the U.N.'s offices there, said that the situation in the city is "not absolutely normal" and confirmed that the T.F.G. had hindered the distribution of aid to 300,000 internally displaced persons (I.D.P.'s) by closing airports, demanding "visas" from aid workers and levying "taxes" on shipments. Holmes said that the T.F.G.'s claim that there were only 40,000 I.D.P.'s was "not helpful" and insisted that Somalia had undergone "the worst single displacement of people this year anywhere in the world."

 

He also criticized the T.F.G. for calling its opponents "terrorists," which does not "encourage reconciliation," and remarked that Addis Ababa is in the same situation that Washington confronts in Iraq -- unable to leave on pain of the T.F.G.'s "collapse" and "unable to stay without arousing more enmity and creating more terrorists."

 

In an interview with Voice of America on May 19, Yates said that he would try to "encourage" the ****** to participate in the N.R.C. and would "push" Yusuf to "continue political dialogue."

 

The disconnect between the T.F.G. and the donor powers is encapsulated by their differences over the N.R.C. Yusuf remains committed to a clan-based conference that will not threaten the T.F.G.'s present structure, whereas the donor powers -- while they have been constrained to acquiesce in the clan formula -- "push" for greater inclusiveness and a political agenda. The result of the dispute thus far has been the scaling back -- announced on May 19 -- of the N.R.C. from more than 3,000 participants to 1,325 due to, according to its chairman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, insufficient funding. Although the conference is scheduled to be held in less than a month, representatives, who are supposed to be selected by clan leaders and elders, have yet to be chosen.

 

As an insurgency takes root in Mogadishu, threatening the N.R.C., Yusuf has attempted to win support of segments of the ****** by negotiating separately with leaders of its sub-clans who have not been able to consolidate in a unified front. Yusuf has also reached out to Mogadishu warlords, who had not cooperated with the T.F.G. before the rise of the I.C.C., in order to broaden his base without impairing his control over the executive. None of these measures has either improved the situation on the streets or placated the donor powers.

 

The T.F.G. has also undergone splits in its own ranks. On May 12, Gedi fired Hussein Aideed, the T.F.G.'s deputy prime minister, who had joined the political wing of the I.C.C. and a dissident T.F.G. parliamentary faction based in Eritrea. He also fired Barre Hirale, the T.F.G.'s defense minister, who was the major warlord in the key southern port city of Kismayo before the rise of the I.C.C.

 

Hirale became disaffected with Yusuf after the latter's ********* sub-clan of the ***** clan took control of Kismayo's administration, marginalizing the ******* sub-clan, whose militias have since expelled the ********* leadership from the city, leaving it outside T.F.G. control. On May 22, the T.F.G. fired the first commander of the national armed forces, Col. Abdirisak Afgadud, after he had been accused of instigating the ouster of Kismayo's administration.

 

Conclusion

 

After a year's political roller coaster ride attended by many casualties, Somalia now and for the foreseeable future appears to be running along a bumpy track that has become familiar in Afghanistan and Iraq, on which a weak and dependent central government imposed by external powers and insufficiently supported by them attempts to preserve itself against a fragmented opposition and disparate local power centers, and strives to concede as little as possible to its protectors and donors, each of which has its own interests and none of which has the political will to change the situation.

 

With no strong unifying domestic force on the horizon, PINR expects continued devolution accompanied by half-hearted efforts to arrest it. At present, the hopes of the West rest on the N.R.C., which will be the 15th attempt in as many years to bring stability to Somalia through a clan-based formula. If the conference actually comes off and it is "inclusive," it will initiate a protracted process with uncertain results. If it is not held or it is not broadly representative, Somalia's political collapse will persist.

 

From the perspective of the West, the presence of radical Islamism in Somalia makes it more difficult to abandon the country as the great powers did after the fall of Siad Barre's dictatorship and the failure of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the early 1990s. Yet there is no sign that the new danger will trigger sufficient commitment to overcome it.

 

During the first three weeks of May, factional and inter-clan conflict continued to break out in various regions of Somalia, accompanied by crime and a spike in piracy that has imperiled the delivery of humanitarian aid. Tensions between the executive and parliament, as well as clan conflict, also surfaced in Somaliland and Puntland. PINR simply notes these developments without going into details, because they continue a pattern that has been documented in previous reports. [see: PINR's Africa Archives]

 

The T.F.G.'s protectors -- Addis Ababa and Kampala -- are in a bind and out on a limb, respectively. Their limited efficacy will diminish over time. Donor powers will not open their purse strings widely unless they see progress, but their caution will help ensure that progress is not forthcoming.

 

The problem is that Somalia is too strategically important for too many actors to be left to work out its own political destiny, yet not important enough to call forth whole-hearted commitment to its future.

 

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

PINR

[Castro]

The problem is that Somalia is too strategically important for too many actors to be left to work out its own political destiny, yet not important enough to call forth whole-hearted commitment to its future.

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Reading the monthly reports by Mr. Weinstein, one concludes how amazingly micro-informed he is about the Soomaaliya's political scene.

 

Runtii, considering him being a non-Soomaali, he is much better informed than most Soomaalis. He also accurately conveys what is on the ground, accompanied by as little an editorial comment as possible.

[General Duke]

and had gained control over most of the country south of

the breakaway sub-states of Puntland and Somaliland

What an exper on Somali affairs, they are lauding and are bringing to our attention:D

 

Another “well informed” Western, one who probably does not comprehend the language, understands the culture of the people he/she analyses to the micro level, most of these “experts” do not have a basic comprehension of the internal mechanisms and the fluidity of the situation. These fellows predicted a “regional war” which turned to have been less than a week. They predicted a “Baghdad” scenario which and a strong insurgency, yet we have had none of those terrible scenarios. For example this ***** talks of the TFG & Puntland as a separate grouping, Puntland like Bay, Bakool and Mogadishu are areas which the TFG has strength.

[Xoogsade]

Well written article by an infomed nonsomali. The future is bleak simply put. Mala yaabateen how warlord A/Y is asking for 40 million to reconcile unwarring somali clans?

 

- Rounding up elders who disagree with them at gunpoint = $20 million.

 

- Painting the old building allocated for the warlords and their kidnapped , and buying second hand furniture to sit on is another $ 20 million.

 

Warlord Yusuf and his henchmen need to get real and accept they are the only problem somalis have.

[General Duke]

Adeer the clans have been warring in Mogadishu since 1991, even in the dispute between Somaliland & Puntland has a clan axis to it, in Kismayu we have a clans at each others throats. and in every other region the issue is clan. Thus bringing the clans together under one roof, in their capital is the best option.

 

As for the author if he belives Puntland is a breakway region, then how can we trust his other assertions? An expert on Somalia or the Somali's he is not.

 

You would like us to waste time on Fake Shiekk's Xasan Dahir and IndaCade, they are nothing now

[N.O.R.F]

Duke

 

Apart from the redundent photo ops you post on these pages and the reconciliation conference, does the TFG actually have any form of a strategy? Heavy reliance on Addis is very evident but anything else underway? Are the militias roaming the country going to be curtailed? Is the piracy going to be stopped? Is the aid going to get through to the people?

 

Posting pics is very easy aa-kid.

[General Duke]

Northerner

 

Being negative is even easier saxib, and relaying on western and external "experts" to back up one’s falsehoods is quite easy. I am amused at the points you raised, the headline grabbing pirates and the militias “roaming” the country are only an operational headache for the government. The main strategy is the reconciliation conference, the stabilization of the capital and putting together the security apparatus to deal with, criminals, and violence political or otherwise.

 

In 2.5 years the TFG went from a basketball court in Nairobi to controlling Mogadishu and 15 out of the 18 regions of Somalia.

 

The TFG has used what ever method available, Adis, the AU, the EU, the US and so on are just several methods.

 

Oh you never heard a picture tells a thousand words, thus it will keep coming and the news will continue to flow.

 

Now I ask you. And I will like a frank answer as I have provided to you, what strategy do the secessionist have with regards to their dismal economy, when will Somaliland get its recognition, and when will it reclaim the lost lands it inherited from its mother Great Britian?

 

Duke

[Xoogsade]

If one is part of the problem, they can not provide a solution, therefore, the warlords of the TFG need to accept they are part of the ills that need to be cured.

 

Criminals with blood on their hands can hardly earn the respect of the people. From the man charged to appoint members of the reconciliation, Ali Mahdi, to the warlord calling himself a president, are all men with blood on their hands.

 

It is a tough sell. There can be co confidence in these men and they won't deliver the elusive peace and governance people yearn for. You need patriotic clean men who demonstrated the love of country and people, respect for religion to bring solutions to troubled people. We don't have men with such characters, they are wasting time and money of the donors(if it comes).

[N.O.R.F]

A predictable response. Glad you didnt disappoint.

 

So far the TFG have done nothing to win supporters in Somalia let alone people in the diaspora. They are weak and depend on Ethio military support without which they would be back playing Michael Jordan in Nairobi. People are living under trees at a rate of x dollars a day and yet they thwart aid attempts by not being able to control the militias who are charging astronomical fees to let trucks pass. Aid ships are not venturing into Somali waters for fear of being hijacked.

 

No, without shouting the tired old line of SL is this or that, what is the TFG doing to address these issues? Are we waiting for a reconciliation conference to decide on helping the displaced people (who havent returned home for fear of being killed/raped etc)? I mean what are the priorities here?

 

To your questions, i simply dont know!

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Originally posted by Xoogsade:

Well written article by an infomed nonsomali. The future is bleak simply put. Mala yaabateen how warlord A/Y is asking for 40 million to reconcile unwarring somali clans?

 

- Rounding up elders who disagree with them at gunpoint = $20 million.

 

- Painting the old building allocated for the warlords and their kidnapped , and buying second hand furniture to sit on is another $ 20 million.

 

Warlord Yusuf and his henchmen need to get real and accept they are the only problem somalis have.

Thta is called anabashed tuugsiness. Xishood ma jiro, every single darn occasion tuugsi ayee ku jiraan, led by the Stooge Father of Xabashadda.

 

"Ar caalamka ha naga soo gaaro, oo musqulaha dhaqidtooda hal milyan ku baxeyso ee na siiya ... War caalamka aaweya oo jikada alaabta taalo laba milyan ku baxeyso, ee noo soo dira ..."

 

Magac Soomaali ayaa la rabaa in lagu qaraabta that never buuxsamaayo jeeb.

[General Duke]

Xoogsade

 

Adeer if I was in your shoes I would only have used words as a wepon just like you are doing.

 

However one who gave the benefit of the doubt to petty criminals and alleged drug barons like IndaCaDE, Xasan Dahir and others and even pretend that these men were religious holly men. One should not lecture others about warlords and such things. We are more mature than that now saxib.

 

Anyhow lets see how many elders refuse to attend this grand conference or what short commings our "Somali experts" point out.

 

Its the hottest ticket in town

[N.O.R.F]

^^so you simply cant answer my questions?

 

refering to SL/Indacade etc is a very 'mature' way of discussing things.

[General Duke]

Ah well, it’s a case of moving the goal post a bit further.

Yesterday it was all about “they can not control” the capital.

Now its about the reconciliation conference, we shall have to wait a little while to see of its success. Remember President Yusuf went through two important reconciliation conferences one in Garowe which created Puntland state the other abroad in Nairobi which put in place the Federal charter and this government.

 

Thus he has the experience in such matters. Anyhow it matters not what the donors give, it will go to Mogadishu, for food, accommodation and transport, but you neo-nationalists would like it to be held in Asmara in order to help the economy of Mogadishu, amusing.

 

Northerner

 

You seem to have lost your composure and are sounding ever more desperate with regards to the success of the TFG. I am surprised that you are now an expert on the south.

Let me give you some truth, Mogadishu is calm, and if the likes of known trouble makers like Ahmed Diriye, Goobanle, Cirfo and Qare and not being harmed then the average innocent person will fare better.

 

You see how Puntland has been quite and Jowhar was quite, Mogadishu insha Allah will be even more secure and it is being transformed by the minute, the evidence is even on SOL, one only has to open the eyes and the heart and go beyond one’s prejudices.

 

PS: I am disapointed you have no answer to the questions I posed, thus highlighting the bankruptcy of the secessionist movement today.

[Xoogsade]

^ Everyone knows somalis wouldn't refuse to sit under a tree to settle disputes without asking for money to come to the shade of reconciliation. This is no reconciliation between somali clans but warlords and their sponsors desperately seeking legitimacy they won't get.

 

It is who is who among career criminals jockeying for a position and or holding a job already in this wretched crew, Somalis are doomed in Ilaahay kasoo gaaro maahane.

 

 

lol@tuugsi, miskiin, had they asked for five million, at least, they would find donors. Forty is too much and everyone knows why that much money is being asked. There is donor fatigue already but A/Y and the warlord crew have no shame.