Decades after separation, the question of Somali-Somaliland recognition remains unanswered

[Deeq A.]

More than three decades after it declared independence, Somaliland remains in a diplomatic grey zone—functioning as a self-governing state, yet officially treated as a region within Somalia. The standoff between Somalia and Somaliland is a complex web of historical grievances, political contradictions, and stalled peace efforts, all compounded by regional sensitivities and international caution.

Somaliland, located in the northwestern part of present-day Somalia, was once a British protectorate. It gained independence on June 26, 1960, becoming the State of Somaliland. Just five days later, it voluntarily united with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. However, many Somalilanders argue that the union was never formalised through a legal treaty.

The 1961 Somali Constitution, which was passed in a nationwide referendum, was rejected by the majority in Somaliland. Many viewed the process as rushed and southern-dominated. This perceived imbalance fueled decades of resentment, culminating in Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991, following the collapse of the Somali central government during a brutal civil war.

Since then, Somaliland has operated autonomously. It has its own government, parliament, judiciary, military, and currency. It conducts elections, maintains internal stability, and enjoys a degree of political pluralism that has often drawn praise. Yet no country formally recognises it as an independent state, and the United Nations still considers it part of Somalia.

From Somaliland’s perspective, it does not consider itself a breakaway region but rather a restored sovereign state. Its leaders argue that the original union between Somaliland and Somalia, formed in 1960, was never legally ratified. With the eventual collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991, they maintain that Somaliland had every right to reclaim its independence. The region points to its consistent track record of peace, institutional stability, and democratic reforms as evidence that it is capable of self-governance. Moreover, Somaliland insists that its case is unique—it does not seek to inspire secession elsewhere, but simply to correct a historical anomaly.

On the other hand, Somalia views Somaliland as an integral part of its territory. Under Somalia’s 2012 provisional constitution, the federal government maintains that national unity must be preserved at all costs. From Mogadishu’s standpoint, recognising Somaliland would undermine Somalia’s sovereignty and could trigger fragmentation across other regions. The Somali government strongly prefers resolving differences through dialogue within the framework of federalism, rather than entertaining any form of secession.

No state has formally recognised Somaliland’s independence, though informal relations have been growing. Countries like Ethiopia, the UAE, the UK, and Taiwan have engaged with Hargeisa in areas such as trade, infrastructure, and security.

The African Union has taken a cautious stance. While it sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005 and acknowledged the uniqueness of its case, it has refrained from supporting formal recognition, fearing it might encourage other secessionist movements across the continent.

The United Nations and key Western powers continue to support Somalia’s territorial integrity, aligning their policies with the African Union and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Efforts to Resolve the Impasse
Efforts to resolve the longstanding impasse between Somaliland and Somalia have been ongoing for years, marked by intermittent dialogue and mediation attempts facilitated by both regional and international actors. While these engagements have occasionally produced optimistic headlines, they have largely failed to deliver lasting or substantive progress toward reconciliation or mutual understanding.

One of the earliest milestones came in 2012 during the London Conference, where both sides signed the Chevening Declaration. This agreement committed them to continue dialogue through peaceful means. It was followed by the Istanbul talks between 2013 and 2015, facilitated by Turkey. These sessions focused primarily on technical cooperation and confidence-building, laying out frameworks for future engagement but falling short of addressing core political disagreements.

In 2020, a more structured dialogue was hosted in Djibouti under the leadership of President Ismail Omar Guelleh, with Ethiopia and the United States observing the process. That meeting concluded with a renewed pledge to resume formal negotiations. Since then, there have been sporadic informal engagements in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, backed by regional actors—most notably Ethiopia—but the talks have lacked consistency and urgency.

Despite these efforts, the most critical issues remain unresolved. Chief among them are questions of legal sovereignty, mechanisms for resource sharing, representation in international forums, and the broader role of external actors in defining and facilitating a credible mediation framework. Both sides continue to stand firmly behind their positions, with little willingness to make the difficult compromises that a durable settlement would require.

A number of roadblocks have consistently hindered progress. One major challenge is the divergent political mandates held by leaders in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Each faces domestic political pressures that often make concessions politically untenable. In Somaliland, any hint of retreat from independence is seen as betrayal, while in Somalia, accepting separation could be interpreted as capitulating to fragmentation.

International ambiguity has also slowed momentum. Although global and regional actors routinely voice support for dialogue and peace, few are willing to take firm stances or apply pressure toward a clear outcome. This cautious diplomacy often leaves the negotiations in a cycle of polite but ineffective engagements.

Compounding this is the frequent disruption of talks due to domestic electoral calendars. Both Somalia and Somaliland have had contested elections and internal political disputes that draw attention away from external dialogue. The instability and unpredictability of these political cycles create inconsistent timelines for engagement.

Perhaps the most persistent barrier is the deep trust deficit between the two parties. Decades of marginalisation, armed conflict and political betrayal have made it difficult for leaders and citizens on either side to fully trust the other’s intentions. Building bridges, therefore, requires more than summits—it demands long-term, sustained confidence-building that is yet to take root.

Recently, new dynamics have emerged within the region, particularly following a controversial meeting between former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi. Their discussions,widely seen as supportive of Somaliland’s quest for recognition, have added another layer to the already sensitive diplomatic chessboard. President William Ruto’s own engagement with Somaliland further complicates Kenya’s official position, which has traditionally aligned with Somalia’s insistence on territorial integrity.

The Somaliland question continues to sit at the crossroads of international diplomacy, historical grievance and political caution. While Somaliland has demonstratedn the capacity to function as an independent state, its path to formal recognition remains blocked by geopolitical realities and the rigidity of post-colonial borders.

Until either Somalia is willing to renegotiate the terms of union or the international community rethinks its approach to self-determination ,the status quo is likely to persist. For Somaliland, that means continuing to operate in a state of diplomatic limbo: sovereign in practice, but invisible in law.

Thekenyandiaspora

Qaran News