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Amigos last won the day on June 23 2018

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  1. You clearly have comprehension problems. You stated: And yet, the source you have presented clearly stated that landmine use by Afweyne's troops was to terrorise the population. In fact majority of landmines in Somaliland was laid by Afweyne's troops. Your source further states that the SNM's use of landmines was small in scale and defensive: "The conflict spread to the port of Berbera where small numbers of mines were used to defend approaches to the town". You really ought to start reading the sources you present, it would have prevented you getting humiliated like this.
  2. Actually you are wrong again. And: The landmines laid by Afweyne were specifically targeting nomads with aims of terrorising the northern population and causing as much damage to life and property as possible. Did you actually read the source you brought to this discussion?
  3. No, the question is about who laid the majority of the landmines in civilian areas. You have made this claim: And yet the source you mistakenly brought up thinking it would support your statement turned out to clearly state that the majority of landmines were laid by Afweyne, and that the defensive mines laid by SNM were very small in number. You must feel like a right idiot
  4. Sometimes the lack of a solid education, or intellectual capacity to substantiate arguments can lead to such pathetic results as the post above. I don't know whether you suffer comprehension problems or its a case of a deficiency in honesty (probably a combination of the two), but the source you are citing does not actually support your argument. 1) it clearly states: "The conflict spread to the port of Berbera where small numbers of mines were used to defend approaches to the town." You have also dishonestly omitted: 2) "The majority of mines in northern Somalia were laid by Siad Barre's troops" Your source states that the majority of 1-2 million landmines found in the former Somali Republic is located in modern day Somaliland. And the majority of these mines were laid by Afweyne's troops. It even further goes to state that landmines laid by SNM were both small in number and defensive in nature, i.e. not targeting civilians, unlike the majority of landmines which were laid specifically to target nomads. Only a fool would present sources that actually contradict their statement.
  5. So you want to discuss history? If you are really interested in an open discussion about Somalis and subservience to colonial forces, then perhaps you can start by describing what made the supreme elder of the minor Makhir community eagerly travel all the way to Aden to meet and bend at the knees in front of the Queen of England as a loyal subject? Beyond that, explain if you will what compelled him to pen this disgraceful letter below to the same colonial forces you decry above: Your most senior figure is pleading, begging and publicly calling himself "obedient and respectful", and he swears by Allah SWT that he "should like to be under the orders of an Englishman". You of all people should avoid any discussion of history, for your forefathers did not leave you much to be proud of.
  6. On December 13, 2018, national-security adviser John Bolton, in a speech at the Heritage Foundation, unveiled the Trump administration’s Africa strategy, key components of which were, first, advancing trade ties to enable allies to thrive, and second, countering “radical Islamic terrorism.” It is ironic, then, that in the Horn of Africa, the Trump administration now doubles down to do the opposite. As China moves into Djibouti and Ethiopia and as the US-funded government in Mogadishu increasingly offers its strategic assets to China, the State Department has decided to break past precedent and turn its back on Somaliland, the only stable, secure, and truly democratic region in the Horn of Africa, even as Russia seeks to move in on the territory. More important, however, is that the US State Department is, through either neglect or malpractice, risking a resurgence of radicalism in the Horn of Africa. Most of Somalia descended into chaos in 1991 as warlords and politicians fought over and looted government agencies and foreign aid. Along the Gulf of Aden, however, Somaliland remained stable and has been de facto independent ever since. In effect, Somaliland is to Somalia what Taiwan is to China. In terms of stability, it is what Iraqi Kurdistan is to Iraq, although, unlike Iraqi Kurdistan, it has embraced a more democratic (and less corrupt) order. Somalia remains a mess. Just as in the run-up to Somalia’s initial collapse, the State Department’s policy seems simply to throw cash at the problem, apparently unaware that flooding failing governments with money exacerbates corruption and hastens collapse. (Perhaps it is time for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Oversight Committee to call US ambassador Donald Yamamoto to explain his direction of a policy that has cost US taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.) While the United States recognizes a Somalia federal government, which in turn claims authority over the entirety of the country, in reality the central Somali government does not control more than a few city blocks in Mogadishu, and even that depends on an African peacekeeping mission that should expire next year. In a worrying development, earlier this month the Somali National Army disintegrated in the face of an al-Shabaab attack on Balad, just 20 miles from the capital. Al-Shabaab also reportedly took Dhanaane, just ten miles south of the capital’s main airport, amid the federal government’s failure to pay its troops. On March 23, an al-Shabaab bombing killed the country’s deputy labor minister and at least nine others in the heart of the capital. Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, commonly known as Farmajo, appears helpless to do anything about Somalia’s spiral into the abyss and now seems more eager to travel outside the country on the international donors’ dime. The only thing worse than a sinking ship is a conscious decision to tie all lifeboats to it as it goes down. Alas, that seems to be Ambassador Yamamoto’s policy. Unlike previous American diplomats assigned the Somalia file, he has not stepped foot in the region. Security is no excuse: I recently visited Hargeisa, Berbera, and Borama in Somaliland and was able to stay in ordinary hotels and walk around without any security. And not only does Yamamoto refuse to distribute any support to Somaliland to enable it to continue to push back al-Shabaab, but the State Department and the US embassy to Somalia also oppose commonsense military liaisons and communications between AFRICOM (United Stats Africa Command), the Djibouti-based CJTF-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa), and Somaliland’s defense ministry and coast guard. It gets worse. While the United States supports reunification talks between Somalia and Somaliland, it has so far deferred responsibility for them to Turkey. Turkey, however, seems more intent on extracting as much money as possible for projects from Somalia’s corrupt leadership and on fanning the flames of radicalism in Somalia. Some Turkish journalists, for example, have reported that Turkish intelligence officials transferred $600,000 to al-Shabaab in 2012. More recently, the Turkish press has reported that SADAT — basically, an Islamist Blackwater founded by a military adviser of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan — has opened a facility in Somalia and is training Somali radicals. To trust Turkey to put democracy and US national-security interests above Erdogan’s penchant for radical Islamism represents the worst of State Department naïveté or policy inertia. So what should the United States do to triage Somalia and preserve the American interest in the Horn of Africa? Transparency in the expenditure of US aid to Somalia is common sense. Given that the embassy represents the United States to all of Somalia, US diplomats should visit all parts of it, including Somaliland, and funds should be expended only in those areas where audits are possible and where politicians can deliver. No US funds should support any entity that then turns around and opens its doors to China. Nor should US money go to the Somali government so long as its president prefers to travel abroad rather than manage the problems in his country. It will cost the United States nothing to assign a liaison at CJTF-HOA in Djibouti to communicate regularly with Somaliland’s defense forces. With only 1 percent of the current US allocation to Mogadishu, the Somaliland army and coast guard could fund its already successful operations to counter-piracy, deny al-Shabaab space, and stop weapons smuggling. In addition, given the scale of US assistance to Mogadishu, the State Department (or Pentagon) should take over or join the mediation to unify Somalia or define the relationship between it and Somaliland. Here, the State Department is lucky to have any number of former diplomats whom it can appoint as a special envoy for the purpose. (Peter Pham, an old Africa hand, is currently serving as special envoy to Africa’s Great Lakes Region but is intimately familiar with the Horn and perhaps can be dual-hatted.) One thing is clear, however. For the State Department and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to sit back and do nothing will embolden America’s adversaries, waste hundreds of millions of dollars, and enable al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups to expand and perhaps destabilize the remaining oases of security in the Horn of Africa.
  7. An Eritrean delegation has just completed an official visit to Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland. Somaliland, an unrecognized state in northwestern Somalia, declared itself independent at the time of the fall of dictator Siyad Barre in 1991. The Foreign Minister and the closest adviser to the Eritrean president spent three days in the country, with much publicity. Behind the testimonies of friendship, it is the recomposition of the balance of power in the region that is at work, against the backdrop of the big Ethiopian brother and the money of the United Arab Emirates. The red carpet and the fanfare had been deployed, and the great protocol means had been dispatched to Somaliland to receive the Eritreans. A good connoisseur of the Hargeisa government stresses that this is a tradition: as soon as a foreign official is visiting, one does not miss the opportunity to show that Somaliland, recognized by anyone, is not so isolated that we believe it. So, if it has given rise only to banal declarations of friendship, this visit is especially revealing, first of all the impact of the new slogan of Ethiopia, which made peace with the world. Eritrea, for the business climate and, therefore, for stability. But also the influence of the United Arab Emirates in the region, against a backdrop of war in Yemen. Somaliland, like Eritrea, is an obligated emirate, which secures a chain of commercial and military ports on the Red Sea. For Eritrea, it is also the end of its international exclusion. According to a source close to the Eritrean diplomats, it is reported that the envoys of President Issayas Afewerki came to affirm their willingness to play mediators in the divorce with Somalia, insoluble since 1991. It must be said that all the mediations have failed at this stage, including talks that were due to open in Ghana last Tuesday. Le Somaliland et l’Erythrée au cœur du nouveau rapport de force dans la région - RFI WWW.RFI.FR Une délégation érythréenne vient d'achever une visite officielle à Hargeisa, capitale du Somaliland. Le Somaliland, Etat non reconnu au nord-ouest de
  8. Latest defections from Xaare's camp, the East Sanaag community were not joking: Its all over 😀
  9. Its was very naive of you to take him at his word. He was a soldier who openly deserted his post and declared opposition to the democratically elected leadership, using the clan card in establishing a clan-based group of renegades. Even if he was "still a Somalilander soldier" (whatever that means.. one can not desert his post and remain a member of the armed forces), his actions were setting a dangerous precedent as Oodweyne outlined above for any disgruntled soldier to follow. The issues he declared are beside the point, he went about it in absolutely the wrong way, that much was very plain to see from the get go. Its alright, you made a mistake.. Dont be like Xaare, admit you got it wrong.
  10. You were attacking me for seeing him for the turncloak he was. I believe an apology is long overdue ...
  11. The people of East Sanaag declare Col. Tipsy aka Xaare persona non grata 😀
  12. We are not talking about mafrish stories here. There is an objective truth supported by numerous reputable and unbiased sources. Certain communities aligned themselves with the dictatorial regime of Afweyne, this would include the Awdal community. It is understandable, this was a safe bet at the time. We have actual reports of the Borama not being damaged by SNM by actual refugees from Borama. We have reputable sources clearly stating that the fighting in Dilla was between SNM and remnants of Afweyne's army stationed there. Everything points to SNM chasing Afweyne's army in Awdal (just like they chased them in Togdheer and Woqooyi Galbeed, Sool, Sanaag) and once that threat was eliminated inviting the people of Awdal to Berbera for peace talks (again, like they invited other communities). People of Awdal were forgiven their role as accessories to the genocidal regime of Afweyne. Claiming that "each community have their own reality" is just a weak attempt at obfuscating the issue. There is one reality, and one history that some simply choose to falsify because it does not fit their narrative.
  13. Literally every single statement made by @galbeediwas a lie, his ability to dish out these false statement is remarkable. Borama was neither shelled nor entered by SNM: "... the city of Borama was held by the SNM for only about 24 hours and did not suffer any damage." "In January 1991, SNM forces were on the verge of capturing Borama, the most important [Awdal clan] town. Instead of plunging into battle, they paused to negotiate a ceasefire, which was meditated by SNM Colonel Abdirahman Aw Ali, a [Awdal clan]." The SNM were actually giving chase to remnants of Siad Barre's forces: "in January 1991, in one of the final acts of the northern war, the SNM militia had pursued retreating government forces to the town of Dilla, where they fought a ferocious battle. SNM militia had then continued into the main [Awdal clan] town of Borama. However, because the SNM leadership believed that the [Awdal clan] wished to seek peace, they withdrew their units within 24 hours to allow discussions to take place without the shadow of occupation." "... Their [Awdal clan] minority status in the North made them ideal allies for Siad Barre and a very heavily armed [Awdal clan] militia was created for the defence of Borama. The [Awdal clan] were so heavily armed that they began to expand into [Djibouti clan] grazing areas. It was this that caused the [Djibouti clan] to support the SNM, who offered them protection, in the latter part of the 1980s." The history books will certainly not look favourably upon the actions of the Awdal clan during the civil war, particularly their despicable support of the Barre regime's war of obliteration against their neighbours of the Somaliland clan. They are partners in the crime against humanity that was the 1988 genocide. And just because the Awdal clan was forgiven their treasonous acts against both the Somaliland majority clan as well as the Djibouti majority clan in the spirit of starting afresh, does not mean that their deplorable role in the war was forgotten.