Latest information from Mogadishu, alleges Marxuum was passing highly sensitive info to SL, and was caught, NSA carried out execution. Some of these information SL used against the airlines.

Who is killing these people?

Yes and whatever he signed, despite all the excitement and euphoria, Somali issues must be resolved by Somalis, including external threats Those who think Turkiya will fight for them are daydreaming

It is escalating,

So Silaanyo didn't want secession?

The same players from late 1970s , when fighting against SSDF, to SNM, in 1980s, to clan wars in early1990s, to SSC 2023, and Laascanood, same.players Evil people don't die, good people die young

Who?

The SL Ethiopia deal is death sentence for Djibouti

extremely rushed, majority Somalis are very excited, but i think in the long run, not much will come out We can not outsource our issues, Somalis problems can not be fixed by other countries for them, they have to find solution for them internally

Who will pay for it?

It is hard to believe but I think Turkiya will abuse this deal, it is rushed, the good part is illegal fishing can be controlled or replaced with legal one via Only Turkey I have my doubts to think Turkiya has magic bullet to our problems , don't depend one country alone Somalia's issues is internal issues

Turkey will attack Ethiopian ships if they come close to Somali waters https://x.com/YonisYasin1/status/1760240007653232798?s=20

why do some reports suggest he was killed one of the Duriyada, what is going in this hell hole Mogadishu

Reminder of the Habro infighting for power, the whole project is fake, and this may return, 3.1 Fighting Between Clans Many observers predicted a war between the Isaaq and the other clans in the North, namely the Warsengele, the Issa, the Gadabursi and the Dulbahante. These clans were reluctant to support the secession of the North, particularly because, in the eyes of the Isaaq, they had been associated with the Siad Barre regime (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 22 June 1991; Africa Events June 1991). Instead, war erupted among the various Isaaq clans. In January 1992, following violent clan fighting between the Habar Jelo and the Habar Yunis in Burao, several dozen people were killed, and a number of others were forced into exile (Le Monde 13 Feb. 1992; The Indian Ocean Newsletter 25 Jan. 1992). This fighting began after the firing of Minister of Defence Mohamed Ali Kahin, who had apparently been preparing a military coup to overthrow the current president. The struggle between the two men arose out of the fact that the head of state, Abdirahman Ali Tour, had given precedence to civilians at the expense of former guerrilla fighters. According to Kahin, it was inconceivable that the number of military representatives in the Abdirahman Ali Tour government be limited to two (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992). A source "close to the official representation bureau of Somaliland in Europe" and quoted by The Indian Ocean Newsletter reports, however, that the friction resulted from an attack led by dissident members of the military against the Burao garrison (25 Jan. 1992). Kahin is a member of the Habar Jelo clan, like the former president of the SNM, Mohamed Silanyo. Silanyo recently criticized President Abdirahman Ali Tour for his overly hasty proclamation of the North's secession (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992). The opposition also accuses the head of state of "dictatorial tendencies, corruption and clan favouritism," as the former minister of water and minerals asserts: There are no collective cabinet decisions. There hasn't been a single law that has been signed. He (Tour) is hardly in the office, but this is where the buck stops (Inter Press Service 16 Mar. 1992). At the end of March 1992, fighting broke out in Borama and, a few days later, spread to Berbera, the North's principal port and sole generator of government revenue. Berbera is under the control of the Issa Moussa. The fighting involved the army of the current president and the forces of General Abdillahi Ibrahim, also known as Dheega Weine (Big Ears), who is very close to Kahin, the former minister of defence (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992; Africa Confidential 3 Apr. 1992). These conflicts are the logical consequences of the spirit, structure and objectives of this movement. According to the UNHCR, 90 percent of the population (70,000) has left Berbera for neighbouring towns or villages (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6). The Vice-President and Minister of Defence stated in March 1992 We have given negotiations every chance, so now we have full public backing to enforce the full thrust of the law. ... No matter what the casualties are going to be, every government is entitled to use legitimate force. Either they (the rebels) put down their arms and surrender or they'll be run over (IPS 16 Mar. 1992). Following this declaration, women and children demonstrated against the war in the streets of Hargeisa (Ibid.).

Warning, this may even be back, if the secessionist crazy project does not end. inter clan fighting between Somalilanders 3.1 Fighting Between Clans Many observers predicted a war between the Isaaq and the other clans in the North, namely the Warsengele, the Issa, the Gadabursi and the Dulbahante. These clans were reluctant to support the secession of the North, particularly because, in the eyes of the Isaaq, they had been associated with the Siad Barre regime (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 22 June 1991; Africa Events June 1991). Instead, war erupted among the various Isaaq clans. In January 1992, following violent clan fighting between the Habar Jelo and the Habar Yunis in Burao, several dozen people were killed, and a number of others were forced into exile (Le Monde 13 Feb. 1992; The Indian Ocean Newsletter 25 Jan. 1992). This fighting began after the firing of Minister of Defence Mohamed Ali Kahin, who had apparently been preparing a military coup to overthrow the current president. The struggle between the two men arose out of the fact that the head of state, Abdirahman Ali Tour, had given precedence to civilians at the expense of former guerrilla fighters. According to Kahin, it was inconceivable that the number of military representatives in the Abdirahman Ali Tour government be limited to two (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992). A source "close to the official representation bureau of Somaliland in Europe" and quoted by The Indian Ocean Newsletter reports, however, that the friction resulted from an attack led by dissident members of the military against the Burao garrison (25 Jan. 1992). Kahin is a member of the Habar Jelo clan, like the former president of the SNM, Mohamed Silanyo. Silanyo recently criticized President Abdirahman Ali Tour for his overly hasty proclamation of the North's secession (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992). The opposition also accuses the head of state of "dictatorial tendencies, corruption and clan favouritism," as the former minister of water and minerals asserts: There are no collective cabinet decisions. There hasn't been a single law that has been signed. He (Tour) is hardly in the office, but this is where the buck stops (Inter Press Service 16 Mar. 1992). At the end of March 1992, fighting broke out in Borama and, a few days later, spread to Berbera, the North's principal port and sole generator of government revenue. Berbera is under the control of the Issa Moussa. The fighting involved the army of the current president and the forces of General Abdillahi Ibrahim, also known as Dheega Weine (Big Ears), who is very close to Kahin, the former minister of defence (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992; Africa Confidential 3 Apr. 1992). These conflicts are the logical consequences of the spirit, structure and objectives of this movement. According to the UNHCR, 90 percent of the population (70,000) has left Berbera for neighbouring towns or villages (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6). The Vice-President and Minister of Defence stated in March 1992 We have given negotiations every chance, so now we have full public backing to enforce the full thrust of the law. ... No matter what the casualties are going to be, every government is entitled to use legitimate force. Either they (the rebels) put down their arms and surrender or they'll be run over (IPS 16 Mar. 1992). Following this declaration, women and children demonstrated against the war in the streets of Hargeisa (Ibid.).

everything is recorded by UN, and other agencies, how the secession was only HABRO project, they fabricate stories that SSC, Maakhir or even Awdal agree to it, the whole project was fake. if you not lazy and able to read , anybody can find out the truth. The lie is directly responsible what happened in in SOOL 2023, Kalshaale etc and now giving access to Ethiopia --- 4. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS Future prospects for the North remain sombre. The newly-created Republic of Somaliland remains unrecognized by the international community, and anarchy and insecurity prevail. Clan politics and socio-economic conditions are basically the same as those of southern Somalia: the same catalysts are present, although they are not yet as intense as in the south, where the cycle of inter-clan violence has grown to frightening proportions. Social prospects for the North depend on a number of factors. First, clan favouritism exhibited by the government of Abdirahman Tour has created discontent both among rival clans and sub-clans and among the leaders who have been ousted from power, particularly former SNM guerrilla fighters who have argued for a greater military presence within the government (Gilkes July 1992, 54). The proclamation of the secession of the North was not unanimous (Current History May 1992, 233). Some non-Isaaq clans still resent the Isaaq for the devastation the region has experienced since 1988 and for the SNM's unilateral take-over in 1991. As well, "while there is no ideologically based opposition to the administration in Somaliland, its domination by the Isaaq-supported SNM has led to resistance from some members of non-Isaaq clans" (Ibid.).