Fireside Chat: An African Affair

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Fireside Chat: An African Affair

 

 

07.26.2007

 

 

The United States’s strategic interests in Africa are getting larger, lending credence to the idea of establishing Africa Command (AFRICOM). At the same time, it would be a mistake to view military entities as the only means of engaging Africa. For the United States to make an impact, the U.S. government needs to have a closely coordinated policy that also involves its civil-affairs programs.

 

Of course, the United States remains consumed by Iraq. And until its diplomatic energies and military assets are relieved by a change in policy, it’s going to find it more difficult to immerse itself in other places of strategic importance. James W. Riley recently spoke with National Interest author Jonathan Stevenson about the evolution of U.S. Special Operations Forces and U.S.-African relations.

 

In "The Somali Model?" you mention the military commander’s increasing diplomatic role around the world and the need for increased military-to-military and civil-affairs programs. Could you expand on this?

 

It means closer day-to-day relationships between the U.S. military commanders who are deployed overseas and their counterparts. And that can mean training, or it can extend to other kinds of security relationships that are struck both bilaterally and multilaterally. I think those kinds of relationships, at least in respect to Africa, stand to become thicker and more intimate by virtue of the creation of AFRICOM, which is scheduled to be stood up in September 2008.

 

Why should the United States strengthen its presence on the continent through AFRICOM? And does AFRICOM increase the chances of actually generating a backlash and anti-Americanism on the continent?

 

Certainly, that is a possibility. I think we need to point out three basic interests or concerns of the United States and its foreign policy that favor the creation of AFRICOM. One is increased terrorist activity and recruitment on the continent. The second is securing access to hydro-carbons and diversifying oil supplies as much as possible outside of the Middle East. There are very clear interests here, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and west Africa, but also in east Africa the Sudan region. The third is the fact that Africa is becoming of greater geo-political significance because of China’s involvement there. So those are three very substantial strategic priorities that the creation of AFRICOM would service.

 

It is true that some commentators in Africa are worried that the establishment of a combat and command dedicated exclusively to Africa smacks of a kind of neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism that’s going to turn Africa into a geo-political pawn like it had been during the Cold War. I think that the way to counter that impression is for there to be a relatively small footprint in terms of the actual number of troops deployed and administrative infrastructure that’s there. And that we have people there to show a serious interest not just in security concerns, but also in political stability and the need to make African lives better—and to promote better governance.

 

You touch on the relationships between the U.S. government, private military firms (PMF) and their African clients. Is this a type model that could work?

 

I don’t think it’s an alternative to AFRICOM for a couple of reasons. One is that PMFs throw up red flags for an awful lot of African governments. Their viewed as mercenaries, and the mercenaries that some African countries have had experience with have been populated mainly by former South African soldiers, who are not met with sympathy. So, I think you have to be very careful about these PMFs in Africa. Having said that, the United States capacity is very limited, as is Africa’s. I’m sure there is a need and a place for some sort of outsourcing, but I think it has to be seen as being closely supervised by professional military staff, which would mean AFRICOM.

 

In your piece you say, "coercive, strictly military enterprises will not provide durable solutions to Africa’s political problems", but what will ? And is this in any way related to Fourth Generation Warfare?

 

Sure it is. And I think that a lot of the activities of the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa are engaged in, like drilling wells and providing certain kinds of emergency relief to people in the regions in which they operate, are testimony to the fact that the U.S. military in general is aware of the kinds of non-coercive, non-kinetic activities that SOFs can do in order to improve perceptions of U.S. power. This is not something which the U.S. military is institutionally unaware of. In fact, it talks about this a great deal in the context of "strategic communication", which is viewed as lacking in the War on Terror. We’ve really had a hard time conveying the message that our projection of military power is really intended to better people lives. And I think that as the military moves forward in meeting very stiff challenges today it’s going to be increasingly concerned with this issue. And there’s no question in that SOFs can help with strategic communications.

 

After the Black Hawk Down incident, many feel that the United States suffers from a lack of commitment and that this is a weakness. Are there any correlations to be drawn from our experiences in Africa and Afghanistan and Iraq?

 

I think that the Somalia problem is currently a lot different from Iraq and Afghanistan. I mean, in Somalia there really isn’t a coercive solution, even if you use the Ethiopians as a proxy. And the United States, in order to improve things, would have to engage in a diplomatic slog, which I don’t think is in the cards, as long as Iraq remains the consuming problem in American foreign policy alongside Afghanistan. If the United States does chose to re-engage in Africa it’s going to be with respect to Darfur, but I don’t think that’s going to happen.

 

Broadening out the comparison, Iraq is a much bigger problem than Somalia in military and political terms. I think it’s a dangerous oversimplification to derive from Somalia, or for that matter Vietnam, that pulling out or a strategic withdrawal is going to create the perception of America as a feckless or weak country because you have to look at what the alternatives are. If in Iraq there’s little basis that America’s continued involvement will improve things there, than there seems to me that there is a case for an orderly withdrawal. And those who oppose an orderly withdrawal by characterizing this policy choice as abandonment are creating a straw man and structuring their argument in a dishonest way. Most of the feasible suggestions have not involved complete abandonment—they’ve involved withdrawal to a lower number of troops with over-the horizon forces present for emergencies, along with a major diplomatic mobilization that is designed to try to contain the problems in Iraq.

 

Does the Somali Model apply to Darfur?

 

I think not. Sudan has a regime that controls the country. The thing that made encouraging the Ethiopians so easy is that Somalia didn’t really have a central government in place, which made breaching its sovereignty so easy. In fact, the Ethiopians tried to consolidate a government in exile that would be internationally recognized. So, Somalia was a unique situation from the standpoint of international law. You couldn’t send in a proxy force of any kind into Sudan without raising sovereignty issues.

 

The other point is that the United States isn’t inclined to support another sovereign government as a proxy force in Sudan. It would prefer to encourage the African Union, as part of a larger plan to encourage Africans to solve their own problems. The United States declared Darfur a genocide, but the United States doesn’t want to take part in anything that hints of colonialism.

 

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