Beyond Non-Recognition: How Taiwan–Somaliland maritime pact challenges diplomatic norms amid global hegemonies

[Deeq A.]

The coast guard cooperation agreement, signed last month in Taipei by Somaliland Coast Guard Commander Admiral Ahmed Hurre Hariye (left) and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration Director-General Chang Chung-lung, aims to strengthen collaboration in maritime security, training, and joint exercises (Photo: Horn Diplomat)

Addis Abeba – Last month, Taiwan and Somaliland signed a landmark maritime security agreement aimed at enhancing cooperation in areas such as maritime safety, personnel training, and joint exercises. The coast guard cooperation pact was formalized in Taipei, witnessed by Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te and Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adam. This agreement represents a major turning point for the two diplomatically isolated yet de facto sovereign entities, as they move to strengthen maritime security ties.

The recent bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland represents one of the most compelling and unconventional developments in contemporary international diplomacy. These two de facto states—Taiwan, a diplomatically isolated yet economically prosperous East Asian democracy, and Somaliland, a self-governing polity in the Horn of Africa lacking international recognition—have forged a practical alliance that challenges the foundational principles of diplomatic legitimacy, sovereignty, and state recognition. Their partnership is not only a pragmatic convergence of mutual interests but also a deliberate exercise in norm entrepreneurship, redefining the parameters of legitimate state behavior in the absence of formal, de jure recognition.

Taiwan and Somaliland possess fully functioning political systems, conduct regular elections, uphold the rule of law, and maintain autonomous foreign policy institutions. Yet both have historically faced limited diplomatic freedom, having been excluded from formal multilateral bodies such as the United Nations. Taiwan’s isolation is largely sustained by the People’s Republic of China’s enforcement of the One China Policy, under which other states are pressured to sever official ties with Taipei in exchange for economic or political incentives. A parallel challenge confronts Somaliland through the so-called “One Somalia” doctrine, which asserts the territorial integrity of Mogadishu—despite the fact that Somaliland has maintained de facto independence since its unilateral declaration of statehood in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic.

It is within this broader context of systemic exclusion that the July 2025 five-day visit by a high-level Somaliland delegation, led by its foreign minister, to Taipei—and the subsequent signing of a formal maritime security cooperation agreement—should be understood. This was far from a symbolic gesture; it marked a significant step in the normalization and institutionalization of diplomatic relations between two unrecognized or semi-recognized democratic entities.

The signing of the coast guard cooperation accord not only deepens sectoral collaboration in maritime security, capacity-building, and the blue economy, but also sends a clear message: democratically governed and effectively sovereign entities assert their right to engage in diplomacy, irrespective of their formal legal status. Moreover, the implications of this agreement extend beyond the signatories themselves. It reflects a growing trend of recognition-resistant diplomacy, where cooperation among non- or limited-recognized actors emerges as a form of defiance against prevailing hegemonic principles of recognition.

This article analyzes the diplomatic, normative, and strategic dimensions of the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship, situating their engagement within the broader framework of international relations theory. Specifically, it draws upon constructivism and recognition theories, as well as contemporary scholarship on informal diplomacy and sub-state agency.

Through its analysis of this unique alliance, the article argues that Taiwan and Somaliland are jointly advancing an alternative model of diplomacy—one rooted in democratic legitimacy, identity-based solidarity, and functional sovereignty. To provide a solid foundation for this argument, the article begins by exploring three key theoretical frameworks that offer valuable insight into the Taiwan–Somaliland case: informal diplomacy and para-diplomacy; recognition theory and contested sovereignty; and constructivist approaches to diplomatic identity.

Informal diplomacy and para-diplomatic practice

Historically, diplomacy has been closely tied to the sovereign state system, wherein only fully recognized states enjoyed the legal and normative authority to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. However, this framework has significantly evolved in recent decades with the rise of informal diplomacy and para-diplomatic activity, expanding the scope of international engagement well beyond traditional boundaries. Informal diplomacy refers to diplomatic practices that are not anchored in formal treaties or agreements between recognized states. It often involves non-state actors, subnational entities, or polities with contested or no recognition. Para-diplomacy, by contrast, involves the external relations conducted by subnational governments or quasi-states, typically aimed at fostering economic development, asserting identity, or forming strategic partnerships.

Taiwan and Somaliland represent a more advanced form of horizontal informal diplomacy—two diplomatically marginalized yet politically autonomous entities engaging in mutual cooperation across technical, developmental, and security domains. Their partnership is neither purely symbolic nor entirely transactional; rather, it reflects a hybrid approach to diplomacy driven by shared governance capacities and a mutual interest in circumventing the constraints imposed by global recognition hierarchies. Unlike classical para-diplomacy, which operates under the authority of a larger, recognized central state, the Taiwan–Somaliland relationship is more radical in nature, as it exists entirely outside the framework of sovereign oversight.

The diplomatic engagement between Taiwan and Somaliland can be interpreted as a challenge to the dominant international recognition regime—one that conflates legal statehood with geopolitical alignment.”

This mode of engagement may be best described as post-sovereign diplomacy: a form of statecraft that operates beyond the traditional club of internationally recognized states, emphasizing collaboration in sectoral development, soft power, and normative legitimation strategies. Such diplomacy does not merely supplement conventional state-to-state relations—it challenges and redefines them, illustrating that functional legitimacy and shared democratic values can serve as viable alternatives to formal legal recognition.

Politics of sovereignty and recognition theory

At the core of the Taiwan–Somaliland relationship lies the issue of contested recognition. Although both entities exhibit the characteristics of sovereign states—as defined by the Montevideo Convention, which includes a permanent population, defined territory, effective government, and the capacity to engage in relations with other states—they remain constrained by the international legal order due to political factors beyond their control.

Recognition theory is commonly divided into two categories: de jure recognition (legal recognition by the international community) and de facto recognition (based on actual existence and governing capacity). As argued by Richard A. Falk, an American professor emeritus of international law, recognition is not a neutral legal process but is “highly politicized, hierarchical, and exposed to hegemonic interests.” Mikulas Fabry, associate professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, reinforces this view, noting that gatekeeping practices are not exclusive to powerful states but function as strategic tools to determine who gains entry into the international system—often guided more by geopolitical interests than by legal principles.

Taiwan provides a clear example of this dynamic. Its diplomatic isolation is largely orchestrated by the People’s Republic of China, which insists on adherence to the One China policy and persistently lobbies international actors to withhold recognition of the Taiwanese government. In Somaliland’s case, both the African Union and Western powers continue to uphold Somalia’s territorial integrity, despite Somaliland’s demonstrated stability, functional governance, and credible historical claims to independent statehood.

Thus, the diplomatic engagement between Taiwan and Somaliland can be interpreted as a challenge to the dominant international recognition regime—one that conflates legal statehood with geopolitical alignment. Their partnership, which also seeks to involve other democratic states, constitutes a form of counter-hegemonic diplomacy. It advances the argument that recognition should be based on performance and normative legitimacy, rather than on political expediency.

By signing agreements related to security and development—such as the 2020 Taiwan–Somaliland accord—both parties signal a shift in the understanding of sovereignty. These agreements assert that sovereignty need not be granted solely from above by powerful states but can also emerge from below—through effective governance and mutual, horizontal recognition.

Constructivism and development of diplomatic identity

Whereas materialist theories emphasize capabilities, boundaries, and recognition, constructivism lays stress on the way that international actors construct identities, norms, and interests on the basis of social interaction. The Taiwan-Somaliland relationship, according to the constructivist outlook, was more than a strategic affiliation; it had a profound ideational interest, which is synonymous with having collective experiences of marginalization, normative desire, and democratic self-rule.

These two actors claim that they both are functional democracies that exist in areas with either authoritarian or fragile regions. This self-perception is not accidental but part and parcel of how they behave in their foreign policy. As a result of repetitive engagement and reciprocal validation, Taiwan and Somaliland have developed a discourse of the diplomatic self as the democracies in exile, those nations that do not match the legal framework of the international system, yet the normative basis of their governance via rule of law, elections, and peaceful progress makes them legitimate actors of global affairs.

This identity-making procedure is supplemented by symbolic diplomacy, which involves a public celebration of common values, the visiting of high-level officials, and the conclusion of agreements that give cooperation a specific language of democracy. President Lai Ching-te’s description of Somaliland as a beacon of democracy, along with Somaliland’s portrayal of Taiwan as a partner in peace and democratic governance, should not be seen as mere political theater but rather as the enactment of a shared identity within a common normative world.

This is also an indication that both Taiwan and Somaliland are practicing what is so-called norm entrepreneurship, and it is the role of the actors to whom the rest of the existing orders of international practice are denied to create alternative non-traditional diplomatic norms. These include standards based on democratic legitimacy and recognition derived from mutual agreement rather than great-power endorsement. Their collaboration is an example of how marginalized actors can co-create meaning, assert agency, and construct legitimacy within a system that often denies them formal inclusion.

Functional diplomacy driving statehood through maritime cooperation

The bilateral compliance deal establishes a working relationship on maritime domain awareness, anti-smuggling, combined patrols, and training between the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration and the emerging maritime forces in Somaliland. Theoretically speaking, this project is a paradigmatic example of functional diplomacy, i.e., a diplomacy tool that allows marginalized actors of diplomacy to use sectoral cooperation to circumvent diplomatic restrictions on minimizing their de facto international legitimacy.

In the case of Somaliland, where the 850-kilometer-long seafront on the shore of the Gulf of Aden lies at one of the most strategic sea chokepoints in the world, maritime security is both a domestic prerogative and a sovereignty performance device. Through providing maritime policing and liaising with outside partners, Somaliland enhances its empirical right to successful statehood, a basic provision of the Montevideo Convention. De facto the agreement acts as a symbolic border control and a mode of real operation, which is increasing the territoriality that belongs to Somaliland and strengthening its juridical claim in recognition.

The alliance also offers Somaliland essential aid in materials and technical support in a region that has been ignored by the central government in Mogadishu long enough. The agreement accordingly turns into a security multiplier and proxy of recognition, allowing Somaliland to reveal the capacity of international engagement, which is a major feature of contemporary sovereignty.

To Taiwan, the deal serves as a strategic weapon for its diplomacy and positioning aspects in the globe. It enables Taipei to have its footprint in the Red Sea-Indian Ocean maritime route, which is considered one of the critical arteries in global trade and energy transportation. Such a shift is a manifestation of the developing foreign policy orientation in Taiwan to establish its position as the supplier of international public goods, especially in the vulnerable areas prone to security voids and geopolitical rivalry.

The partnership also reinforces to the democratic allies (such as the U.S., Japan, and EU states) the commitment to a value-based order…..”

Active participation in maritime capacity-building in Somaliland and Taiwan is not just trying to combat the PRC’s diplomatic lockout, but this helps it to place itself in the line of the liberal internationalism approach to the principles of regional stability, non-traditional security, and regional governance building. It is this quiet diplomacy of capacity that can help to counter Beijing’s narrative of Taiwanese isolation and help stabilize Taipei’s position as a relevant partner by use of soft power projection on the Global South.

Geostrategic signaling through regional autonomy, soft balancing

In addition to the multi-layered geopolitical signaling that accompanies technical cooperation, the pact is encompassed by multiple layers of varying geopolitical messaging to different audiences and stakeholders. Somaliland is claiming autonomy in its diplomatic abilities and has declared its autonomy to regional actors (especially Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Gulf countries), thus bypassing the constitutional right of the federal government of Somalia. The agreement shows a clear message that Somaliland is capable of negotiating security terms with foreign partners—especially where it pertains to the areas of its territorial and maritime integrity.

To the global powers, the Taiwan-Somaliland cooperation is a case of soft balancing where diplomatically hobbled members and interests collude to counter the influence of the hegemonic actors, in this case coercive diplomacy on the part of China and exclusive territorial claims of Somalia, but without explicitly resorting to military or ideological challenges. Such soft balancing is reflected in the nuanced dimension of the size of the pact: it is not formally recognized but allows cooperation with high impact in sensitive aspects.

The partnership also reinforces to the democratic allies (such as the U.S., Japan, and EU states) the commitment to a value-based order and prioritizes the following principles: self-determination, democratic governance, and functional sovereignty. The direct reference to the democratic solidarity and mutual legitimacy is addressed toward liberal democracies, which became sensitive to authoritarian intrusion in the region.

It is noteworthy that the agreement is not going on in a geopolitical vacuum. China has already opened a naval station in Djibouti and closely cooperates with Somalia, and due to its naval bases in the region, China is also extending its influence in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Peninsula. The Taiwan-Somaliland partnership serves up a balance of power, a kind of check, to the strategic monopolization of the Taiwan region in its maritime infrastructure and diplomacy.

Moreover, the agreement creates an additional depth to the developing Indo-Pacific security discourse, whose peripheral escalation of Taiwan and Somaliland involvements puts them indirectly in the circle of other democratic players striving to ensure the preservation of the freedom of navigation, maritime rule of law, and regional resilience. Although both sides do not make direct allusions to the Indo-Pacific strategy, the maritime pact places the two states, both geographically and normatively, within its zone of operations.

In sum, the 2025 maritime cooperation agreement exemplifies how non-recognized or diplomatically constrained actors can exercise strategic agency through sectoral diplomacy. It reflects a dual strategy of sovereignty assertion and soft balancing: Somaliland uses the pact to consolidate its functional statehood and regional role, while Taiwan leverages it to expand its diplomatic space, resist international marginalization, and contribute to regional public goods.

Both actors exploit the strategic ambiguity of informal cooperation: the agreement avoids the legal thresholds of recognition while producing real-world diplomatic, security, and normative dividends. In doing so, they reshape the margins of the international system, challenging the notion that recognition is a prerequisite for strategic relevance.

Expanding frontiers of democratic solidarity

Although conventional international relations are in many cases very strategic in their calculation, asymmetrical power, and material interest, the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship proves beyond doubt the rising importance of normative legitimacy and democratic identity as the basis of establishing modern diplomacy. The relationship represents an example of democracy-to-democracy diplomacy whereby the mutual recognition, symbolic alignment, and institutional cooperation are based not on international legal status but on the shared view of adopting liberal democratic values.

The description of Somaliland by President Lai Ching-te as a beacon of democracy in the Horn of Africa is a paradigmatic representation of what constructivist IR theory considers a norm-based diplomacy practice of a wholly ideational form, in which Somaliland is embedded in the transnational community of liberal democracies. These expressions are not purely ceremonial displays but are norm-reinforcing styles of diplomatic speech performance declaring a commitment of both parties to the identity practice of being democratic actors against the regional authoritarianism and world exclusion.

On the other hand, the Somaliland Foreign Minister has labelled Taiwan as a “reliable ally in peace and democracy, which is an intentional discursive construction of the relationship as based on the collective shared democratic legitimacy and not geopolitical utility per se. Such reciprocal pledges create a common normative script, or a type of global interaction by which legitimacy is a product of democratization performance, high-level governance, and rights-based orderings rather than formal statehood or approval through hegemonic approval.

This congruence represents an opportunity to exploit what can be theorized by Keohane and Nye, where both sides have access to what can be termed as transgovernmentalism or horizontal cooperation based on the bureaucratic and sectoral level with reference to institutions, possibly beyond the sight of conventional diplomatic treaties. In the case of Taiwan and Somaliland, this has occurred in the form of memoranda of understanding, security agreements, joint development programs, and reciprocated offices of representation that avoid the formalities of treaty making yet still hold the contents of bilateral relations.

Besides, this collaboration is an example of normative agency, which refers to the active presence of actors beyond the international system attempting to redefine the standards of international legitimacy. Interestingly, through their endorsement of common democratic standards and rule of law principles and the accountability of electoral politics, Taiwan and Somaliland have attempted to decolonize the predominant realpolitik calculation that global recognition regimes are driven by. Their collaboration is with the traditional view that international legitimacy is bestowed by the recognition of the great powers or membership of formal bodies such as the United Nations.

Instead, the model of democratic solidarity diplomacy suggests offering a counter-narrative: that legitimacy can be enacted, affirmed, and co-constituted around common norms, institutional procedures, and public diplomacybetween forgotten but democratic actors. The Taiwan-Somaliland relationship in this case transforms the situation of norm diffusion to a micro level where states that are not recognized play the role of norm entrepreneurs promoting an international system that looks at how good a government is rather than geopolitical loyalties.

This normative repositioning also speaks to the ethics of recognition. Scholars like Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor have argued that recognition is not only a legal process but also a moral imperative grounded in respect for identity, autonomy, and dignity. The Taiwan–Somaliland alliance leverages this moral grammar of recognition, making the case that democratic governance, peaceful engagement, and public legitimacy should be sufficient to warrant international partnership—even in the absence of formal diplomatic status.

In this light, their cooperation becomes not only a diplomatic strategy but also a form of international normative protest—a challenge to a system that routinely rewards authoritarian regimes with recognition while excluding democratic entities on procedural or geopolitical grounds.

Marginal Diplomacy: Challenges, opportunities 

The Taiwan-Somaliland arrangement takes place somewhere between changing international diplomatic realities and established stakes of sovereignty, recognition, and legitimation. The interaction of the two actors concerning the limitations they experience as a result of their contested status works as the crucial study of changes and tensions in contemporary diplomacy as experienced at the periphery.

Taiwan and Somaliland is a classic example of a post-Westphalian process of international diplomacy that challenges the borders of the traditional concepts of sovereignty and recognition, which were introduced after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The classical Westphalian model balances diplomatic relations on maximum sovereignty and legal legitimacy of states, but the dynamics of globalization, complex interdependence, and non-monopoly statehood have breached these hard boundaries.

The Taiwan-Somaliland arrangement takes place somewhere between changing international diplomatic realities and established stakes of sovereignty, recognition, and legitimation.”

In this regard, the collaborations between Taiwan and Somaliland serve as an indication of the trend in functional legitimacy and normative integration as substitute currencies of the diplomatic capital. Their relationship favors the proper governance, democratic moves, and the acknowledgment of each other rather than having the formal legal legitimacy in international law. This questions the orthodox distinction between the recognized and unrecognized states and purports a relative value in the field of diplomatic recognition to the point that effectiveness and values can override official sanction.

What is more, this dynamic indicates the appearance of a pluralistic diplomatic order that has room in it to include a variety of types of international agency such as international agency of quasi-states or self-proclaimed republics, as well as international agency of disputed sovereignties. It is echoed in new analyses that view sovereignty as the moral imperative of something like sovereignty as responsibility or the phenomenologically constructed and performative sovereignty. Taiwan and Somaliland are two prime examples of a reconfiguration of the post-Westphalian order through deep engagement in the governance, security, and normative community-building processes, indicating a general decentralization and diversity in the actors of diplomacy.

Although the symbolic and substantive progress—exemplified by the signing of the maritime security pact and recent diplomatic visits—holds promise for advancing the Taiwan–Somaliland partnership, significant geopolitical and legal obstacles continue to hinder the relationship.

The first challenge lies in geopolitical dynamics. Taiwan is once again being pushed into a shrinking international space due to China’s growing global influence and increasingly assertive foreign policy. Beijing’s use of diplomatic coercion, economic leverage, and pressure within multilateral institutions poses a persistent threat to Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen informal alliances, such as its ties with Somaliland. These realities necessitate a careful diplomatic balancing act by Taiwan to avoid escalation that could jeopardize its existing partnerships.

The second issue concerns the sovereignty claims of Somalia. Somaliland’s claim to statehood remains unrecognized by the African Union and most countries, including Somalia, which still asserts territorial claims over the region. This unresolved sovereignty dispute presents a constant risk of legal and political retaliation—ranging from multilateral interventions to potential interstate conflict. Arrangements such as the maritime pact may be perceived by Somalia and its allies as threats to national integrity, further complicating Somaliland’s quest for broader recognition.

Another pressing challenge is the legal ambiguity surrounding the agreement. The maritime security pact, being informal and non-binding, reflects the inherent weaknesses of collaborations formed outside any reputable international legal framework. Such agreements lack legal enforceability in international contexts and are vulnerable to shifts in political will or foreign interference. This precarious foundation limits the prospects for long-term planning and the institutionalization of cooperation.

Finally, there is the issue of international systemic resistance. The existing global order, which privileges established and recognized state actors, tends to ignore or marginalize entities lacking formal recognition. Taiwan and Somaliland, as unrecognized or partially recognized entities, operate within a normatively exclusionary system. Their ambitions are frequently constrained by the reluctance of dominant powers to challenge the status quo—even when it comes to pragmatic bilateral engagements.

Nonetheless, the positive impacts of the Taiwan–Somaliland partnership can also be seen in how diplomatic agency may be expanded through multilateral and coalition-based diplomacy. The first avenue is trilateral and coalition building. Both parties have expressed a clear intention to expand their cooperation into trilateral or broader multilateral relationships—particularly with the United States and other democratic nations. This coalition-based approach to diplomacy offers a pathway to strengthen their diplomatic legitimacy and enhance their security assurances by aligning with established powers that uphold democratic values and a rules-based international order.

Second is participation in global governance forums. Engagement in developmental and thematic multilateral platforms—such as those focused on the blue economy, maritime security, and climate change—provides Taiwan and Somaliland with opportunities to contribute meaningfully to international discourse. These forums allow informal actors to exercise soft power and exert normative influence beyond the confines of traditional diplomatic channels.

Third is the development of academic and technical networks. Expanding partnerships in education, research, and technical capacity-building fosters people-to-people connections and institutional linkages. These relationships help embed resilience and longevity into the partnership, reinforcing diplomatic efforts through knowledge exchange and social collaboration. Such people-centered diplomacy complements formal state-level engagement by establishing legitimacy through grassroots and institutional interaction.

Finally, there is normative identity. Taiwan and Somaliland can strategically leverage the interplay between normative identity and other elements—such as interests and power—to cultivate sympathy and support from international civil society, advocacy networks, and diasporic communities. By consistently framing their cooperation around shared values of democracy, peace, and self-determination, they can build an informal yet powerful constituency of global supporters.

In conclusion, the Taiwan–Somaliland partnership highlights both the transformative possibilities and persistent challenges of diplomacy conducted “from the margins.” As traditional norms of sovereignty and recognition face growing contestation, this relationship models a pragmatic, value-driven, and functional approach to international engagement that may increasingly characterize diplomatic interactions in the 21st century. AS

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Editor’s Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com

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