I was chatting with some extremists Kulmiye supporters and they were so disappointed that the UDUB might win the coming elections coz of the recent developments.

Aniguna weliba waxbaan ku darayaa ,,,,,,,,,

Ibti, yes i've an account at Dahabshiil for the moment but the organization has one at Oomaar. One is official and other is personal ,,, DD ,,, i think we're already in a meeting ,,,

Yes we do have checks and i don't wann show you now coz my salary is secret ,,, There are private banks and you were wrong to go to the central back ,,, We simply use OOmaar Bank ,,,,,,,,,

Speaking about Snakes ,,,,, Well, it is not always real

There is a Voters registration act ...... I'll post it here soon IA ,,,,,,,,

Why translate an article that is bogus anyway. Look at the source horta

who is lying here now ?? ,,,,,, where is the promised translation of the article ?? just admit Suldaanka posted the right translation and that is it. You can't do it ,, stop the galgalashada and you would be better off ignoring the topic ,, we would understand ,,

Originally posted by me: quote:Originally posted by J.a.c.a.y.l.b.a.r.o: So you have no choice but to ignore the current topic and post two more topics from nowhere just to cover up ............ I sometimes feel for you sxb ..... Jbro you lied and your source was weak. I read the article posted by Suldaanka and the fantastical story you posted. Your source is weak to put it mildly. So read horta waxa meesha ku qoran. ps. You have been caught lying 3 times now Waar ilayn Indho Adayg waa kanoo kele ,,,,,, show xataa in yar oo qajilaad ah ma lihid. Maxaa ku dhacay article kii aad lahayd waan translate garaynayaa ??

So you have no choice but to ignore the current topic and post two more topics from nowhere just to cover up ............ I sometimes feel for you sxb .....

5 years is not too young to know ,,, better educate them now than regretting later. He will hear this from the school/kindergarden in another applauding form and you will never erase that in his mind. Tell him now, explain to him it is a bad thing and he will believe that for the rest of his life.

Peter T. Leesona, aGeorge Mason University, MSN 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA Published: Feb 2008. Originally Published at Association for Comparative Economic Studies on Dec 2007 Abstract: Could anarchy be good for Somalia's development? If state predation goes unchecked government may not only fail to add to social welfare, but can actually reduce welfare below its level under statelessness. Such was the case with Somalia's government, which did more harm to its citizens than good. The government's collapse and subsequent emergence of statelessness opened the opportunity for Somali progress. This paper investigates the impact of anarchy on Somali development. The data suggest that while the state of this development remains low, on nearly all of 18 key indicators that allow pre- and post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government. Renewed vibrancy in critical sectors of Somalia's economy and public goods in the absence of a predatory state are responsible for this improvement. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 689–710. "[O]ppression by the government … has so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institutions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states of social union so imperfect as to border on anarchy: but no countries in which the people were exposed without limit to arbitrary exactions from the officers of government ever yet continued to have industry and wealth." John Stuart Mill (1848, pp. 882–883) In 1991 Somalia's state collapsed, creating anarchy in its wake. Although, as I discuss below, there have been a handful of attempts to resurrect central government in Somalia, to date these have been unsuccessful, leaving the country effectively stateless. Somalia therefore provides an interesting natural experiment to explore the hypothesis that if government is predatory enough, anarchy may actually prove superior in terms of economic development. There has been much hand-wringing over what to do about the situation of anarchy that has characterized Somalia since 1991. Reports from international organizations commonly express fear about the “chaos” of Somalia without a state. According to the International Relations and Security Network, for example, under anarchy Somalia has had “no functioning economy.” Instead, “clan-based warfare and anarchy have dominated” the country (Wolfe, 2005). Shortly after Somalia's government collapsed, the United Nations was similarly “Gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration” of Somalia and expressed serious “concern with the situation prevailing in that country” (UN, 1992, p. 55). The popular press has tended to go even further in its condemnation of the “internal anarchy … [that] has consumed Somalia for the last 15 years” (Gettleman and Mazzetti, 2006). The view commonly presented by these observers is that Somalia “been mired in chaos since 1991” when statelessness emerged (Hassan, 2007). To be sure, this concern is not without cause. In the year following the state's collapse, civil war, exacerbated by severe drought, devastated the Sub-Saharan territory killing 300,000 Somalis (Prendergast, 1997). For a time it seemed that Somali statelessness would mean endless bloody conflict, starvation, and an eventual descent into total annihilation of the Somali people. Thus, conventional wisdom sees Somalia as a land of chaos, deterioration and war, and is certain that statelessness has been detrimental to Somali development. The reason for this belief is twofold. On the one hand, popular opinion sees government as universally superior to anarchy. Government is considered necessary to prevent violent conflicts like those that erupted when Somalia's state first crumbled, which disrupt economic activity. Government is also considered critical to supplying public goods such as roads, schools, and law and order, which are important to the process of development. From this perspective it is easy to conclude that Somalia, which has no central government, must have been better off when it did. Second, there is a tendency upon observing problems in distressed regions of the world to see only on the “failure” of the current situation, ignoring the quite possibly even worse state of affairs that preceded it.2 This is especially easy to do for Somalia, which by international standards is far behind indeed. Educational enrollment is abysmally low—a mere seven percent for combined primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Average Somali income is less than $1000 (PPP), and preventable diseases like malaria are a genuine threat to Somalia's inhabitants. These facts, however, say nothing about the status of Somalia before its state collapsed. Thus, forgetting Somalia's experience under government, it is easy to imagine that nothing could be more damaging to Somali development than the current state of anarchy.... Somalia remains a country with severe problems. But it appears to have fared better under recent statelessness than it did under government. A comprehensive view of the data that allow pre- and post-anarchy welfare comparisons suggest that anarchy has improved Somali development in important ways. Contrary to our typical intuition, in Somalia it seems that social welfare has improved because of, rather than despite, the absence of a central state. Somalia's government was oppressive, exploitative, and brutal. The extent of this predation created a situation in which social welfare was depressed below the level it could achieve without any government at all. The emergence of anarchy in 1991 opened up opportunities for advancement not possible before government's collapse. In particular, economic progress and improved public goods provision in critical areas flourished in the absence of a monopolistic and corrupt state. Recognition of this is not to deny that Somalia could be doing much better. It clearly could. Nor is this to say that Somalia is better off stateless than it would be under any government. A constitutionally-constrained state with limited powers to do harm but strong enough to support the private sector may very well do more for Somalia than statelessness. Further, Somalia's improvement under anarchy does not tell us whether continual improvement is possible if Somalia remains stateless. It is possible that past some point, to enjoy further development, Somalia might require a central government capable of providing more widespread security and public goods. De Long and Shleifer (1993), for example, show that while pre-industrial European countries under “feudal anarchy” performed better in some ways than those under absolutist autocracies, countries under limited government performed better than both. But this was not the type of government that collapsed in Somalia 15 years ago. The relevant question for Somalia's future is thus whether or not a government, were a stable one to emerge, would be more like the constrained variety we observe in the West, or more like the purely predatory variety that systematically exploited Somalis between 1969 and the emergence of anarchy in 1991. In the latter case, even if Somalia's ability to improve is constrained by statelessness, Somali development would still be better served under anarchy than it would be under government. If “good government” is not one of the options in Somalia's institutional opportunity set, anarchy may be a constrained optimum. Among the options that are available, ultra-predatory government and statelessness, statelessness may be preferable. In August of 2000, select Somali clan leaders gathered in Djibouti at the urging of the international community. At this meeting they established the Transitional National Government (TNG) in an attempt to reestablish formal government in Somalia. The TNG, while remaining in name for three years, failed to establish authority. It was crippled by a lack of popular support and an inability to raise tax revenues. The terms of the TNG expired in 2003. This gave rise in 2004 to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The plan was for the TFG to go to Mogadishu and set up the center of the new central government. However, strong divisions within the members of the TFG initially prevented this. Instead of creating a new government, the TFG effectively fractured into two new rival faction groups that did not fundamentally differ from the “warlord”-led factions it sought to replace. In May of 2006, the TFG and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), which provided the basis of Somalia's private legal system, entered a conflict over control of Mogadishu and other key areas in Somalia. With Ethiopia's assistance, in early 2007 the TFG succeeded in taking control of the capital city where it now resides. The SCIC continues to mount small-scale resistance, but for the moment at least, is not in a position to regain control of Mogadishu. The renewed violence this most recent attempt to reestablish formal government in Somalia created has undermined the relative peace and stability that preceded it in the earlier period of Somali anarchy. Despite the TFG's victory over the SCIC and movement to Mogadishu, Somali statelessness persists. The TFG enjoys the support of the international community, but like the TNG, lacks the domestic support needed to establish genuine authority. Surprisingly, it seems that Somalia's private sector and has not totally collapsed in the face of the new violence. As one Mogadishu-based electronics store owner commented, for example, even “After the fighting between the Islamists [the SCIC-backed militia] and the warlords [the TFG-backed militias], people are still buying computers. The security [situation] is very, very good” (quoted in Tek, 2006, p. 31). Further, while it is certain that the renewed conflict has been harmful to the progress Somali achieved leading up to this, what little updated data we have on Somalia suggests that this conflict has not totally reversed the strides toward improvement Somalia has made since 1991. The only two development indicators from Table 1 available for 2007, infant mortality and life expectancy, both show improvement not only over their levels under Somali government, but also over their levels in 2006. The improvement has been minimal in only one year, but is present nevertheless. Infant mortality has fallen from 114.89 to 113.08 and life expectancy has risen from 48.47 to 48.84 (CIA World Factbook, 2007). Whether or not this improvement is part of a larger trend remains unclear. However, it provides at least some reason to be less pessimistic about the possible impact that recent Somali fighting has had on the progress Somalia achieved under anarchy before this fighting. Harold Demsetz (1969) famously cautioned economists to avoid committing the “nirvana fallacy,” which compares an imperfect reality with a hypothetical ideal state. Instead we should compare the situation we confront with the relevant alternatives actually available to us. The plans for a path from here to there must be grounded in an assessment of how things were, how they are, and how they realistically could be. His caution is especially useful when considering reforms in the developing world and, as Coyne (2006) points out, for Somalia in particular. A consideration of the relevant alternatives based on realistically assessing Somalia's past and present suggests it is unlikely a new central government, at least in the near future, would resemble anything like a constrained, supportive state. The history of Somalia's experience under government, as well as the ongoing experiences of its neighbors, implies less optimism than is often projected by the advocates of recreating government in Somalia. The factional disagreements that led to civil war in the few years after government's collapse remain strong. Any ruler to come to power from one of these groups would likely turn the state's power against its rivals rather than to the good of the country, much as Barre's regime did before it ended. The TFG has sparse domestic support precisely because of this and because faction leaders recognize the strong possibility that any one faction gaining too much power could mean the virtual annihilation of the others. Indeed, thus far in the stateless period, the three greatest disruptions of relative stability and renewed social conflict have occurred precisely in the three times that a formal government was most forcefully attempted—first with the TNG, later with the TFG, and finally most recently when the TFG mobilized violently to oust the SCIC. In each case the specter of government disturbed the delicate equilibrium of power that exists between competing factions, and led to increased violence and deaths due to armed conflict (Menkhaus, 2004). At the moment at least, it seems that in upsetting this delicate balance of power the attempted reestablishment of government in Somalia will lead to more conflict and obstacles to progress rather than less. . web page

pardon ?

KoolKat is extremely RICH ........

any solutions ??

So what do u think Mr. Me ??

still have the damn check in my pocket ,,,,, don't wanna sarrif it till the end of the month ,

Originally posted by -Lily-: I was gonna watch that, my little brother refused to sleep and he started shouting 'I know what that reads, Transexual in Iran!'. Well, I had to change channels obviously or face questions about 'what is a transexual'?. loool ,, why you are running from such questions ? you should explain everything to the little child and tell them in your own way before he/she hear from other ppl next day ..........

Waxaa maanta lagu aasay sidii loogu talo galay saacadu markay ahayd 11:00 maanta Garaad Ismaaciil Ducaale Guuleed alla ha unaxariistee oo habeenimadii xalay ku geeriyoodfay magaalada Laascaanood iyadoo ay maanta aaskiisa kasoo qayb galeen dad aad ufara badan. Waxaa isugu soo baxay dad kor udhaafaya kumanaan qof oo kamid ah shacabka reer Laascaanood dadkaas oo ah dad si wayn uga naxsanaa geerida ku timi Garaadka oo dhamaanba shacabaka SSC ku reebi doonta xasuus lama ilaawaan ah Garaadka oo ahaa Garaad si wayn looga jeclaa deegaanka. Waxaa dhanka magaalada Hargeisa ee xarunta Somaliland ka yimi wafdi balaadhan oo ah masuuliyiin ka socda Dawlada waxaana sidoo kale ka ymi maamulka Puntland ee Somalia wafdi uu hogaaminayoGudoomiyaha Gobolka Sool Cumar Jaamac Saleebaan. Dhanka maamulka Puntland ayaa waxaa kamid ahaa masuuliyiintii timi Gobolka gaar ahaan magaalada Laascaanood Xildhibaan Aadan Xaaji Xuseen,Xildhibaan Faroole Dhabayaco,Gudoomiyaha Gobolka Sool Cumar Jaamac Saleebaan iyo qaar kamid ah shacabkii SSC ee ku sugnaa Garowe. Iyadoo aysan imaan ilaa hadda magaalada Laascaanood masuul sare oo ka socda maamulka Puntland kana qayb qaata aaska marxuum Garaad Ismaaciil Ducaale Guuleed iyadoo sidoo kalena aysan imaan Isimada SSC oo qaar kamid ah shacabku ay saadaalinayeen inay imaan doonaan. Hadaba isku soo wada duuboo aaska Garaad Ismaaciil Ducaale Guuleed ayaa waxa uu u dhacay si wayn iyadoo dhamaanba shacabka magaaladu ay si wayn uga qayb qaateen aaska Garaadka lagana dareemayay xabaalaha guud ee magaalada wax lagu aaso oo ay ku sugnaayeen dad kumaakun kor udhaafaya.

Subxanallah ! ! ! !

loooooool ,,,

It is the payday here today ,,,,,,,,,,,

Morinig CL and Malika .........

Originally posted by Femme Fatale: ^Or have it in the masjid with maxaadaro & salah. You wouldn't believe how many people will say they have a headache or have no one to take care of the kids Thanks for making my day ,,,,,,,,,, looooooooool

dariiqii hore ee uun bay weli hayaan ma is tidhi ,,,, they never learn from history