money

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  1. xidigo somali men don't care much about the plight of somali mothers and children. they are consumed by clan braggadocio, nepotism, corruption, mismanagement of funds, Qat chewing, mas murder, being warlords and getting ministrial and ambassadorial posts so they can milk the few handouts the world community planned to feed the starving. They finally grew bigger bellies, buy few suits, chew a lot Qat, die of diabetes, and high blood pressure...while millions of Somali kids die for curable diseases, starvation and malnutrition. I call you and other Somali sisters to start a radical revolution to gt rid of these men who destroyed our country and killed our people. It is time Somali women to rise up and demand their rights to life and prosperity.
  2. Al Basheer is accused for bankrolling the Janjaweed killers who aint that different of what yeey's militia and Meles Zenawi troops are doing in Mogadishu. Time will come sooner than you think when they too will be summoned to Hague... maybe it would be 2010 or 2012. Just wait and watch the news.
  3. he didn't file it but Somali human rights organizations and civil societies, and other NGOs ...Horn borther, there are more than the UN involved here. There are Somali activists working with other international activists, who got funds from foundations to just compile atrocities, document who did what, when and where. All is documented and there are many evidences. The UN envoy and the UN actually are promoting truth and reconciliation lies that everyone knows will not work here. As of today, in Huriwaa child soldiers trained in Ethiopia and led by some military dude slaughter close to 11 women and children who sought shelter from the shelling from Ethiopians and insurgency. The killing of the innocent people goes on... and brother it is all documented. Mogadishu has ears, eyes, pens and papers, camcorders and cameras. This was just done in Beledweyne. corpses litter in the streets ..Ethiopians are mercilessly and indiscriminately shelling the city <img src=" http://www.goobjoog.com/images/resized/images/stories/dad20ladilay_250_159.jpg " alt="" />
  4. BBC NEWS Against the Odds: Samiya Yuusf Omar The BBC's Against the Odds series is following athletes heading to the Olympics despite huge obstacles. Mohamed Olad Hassan, in Mogadishu, met a young sprinter representing conflict-wracked Somalia. Somalia is a country ridden by more than 17 years of lawlessness and civil war. Its institutions and national infrastructure have been destroyed, including most sporting facilities. Somali athlete Samiya Yuusf Omar is just 16-years-old. She comes from a destitute family with no breadwinner. Militiamen in this Muslim country often prevent her from training, saying women should not take part in sport. But for her and her relatives, athletics offers the chance of a route out of poverty and away from the violence; of a better life and prospects for the future. Insults and warnings But recently, Samiya has been coming under pressure from friends and some of her relatives, asking her to stay out of local training. The ill-disciplined militiamen intimidate her as she jogs on the streets of Mogadishu. There are insults, and warnings that her chosen path would affect her marriage. Samiya said: "Traditionally Somalis view the girls as corrupted if they join in with things like sports and music. "It's because they sometimes wear transparent clothes or shorts. Therefore I have been coming under pressure from all different sides." "Early in the morning... sometimes I come to a roadblock set up by either government troops along with Ethiopians or armed militia, who prevent me from going to the training," she added. Hopes for future When she can get through, Samiya practises on a track full of mortar craters at the Mogadishu Stadium, almost destroyed by the years of war. She lives nearby, in a shanty house, with her mother - a former national-level athlete, who brought her daughter up alone since Samiya's father died, "years ago". Samiya says it is only her mother's constant encouragement that enables her to ignore the taunts and keep on training. When she was named as part of Somalia's Olympic team earlier this year, the honour kindled her hopes for the future. She never expected to be picked because she is so young, and because she is from a minority ethnic group. Now the fragile dream of an athletics career is within reach, but Samiya still has a long way to go. She ran the 100m at the African Athletics Championships in May, but came last in her first round heat. This Olympics will be about taking part, rather than chasing medals. "I don't care if I win right now," she said. "But I am happy to represent my country within this big event, running the 200-metre race "I think right now I'm sure I'm on my way to a bright future because I can run with many all the way down. "I don't think it makes a difference whether I win a good title in the coming Olympic Games or the next," she said, cracking into a smile. Your comments on this story: Samiya, All the power to you! Your story is an inspiration. You one gold medal winner in my eyes. Julie, Palmdale Ca Good Luck Samiya! You may only be 16 but you are an inspiration to so many young women as you train against such difficulties. Angela Mosimann, Sherbrooke,Canada That is part of life that most of we africans go through be it Education!but we survive because we are hardworking and we need to survive .For Samiya, that is absolutely perfect and very good and I know that she is going to provide the suprises and the delight.am not a Somali but i like Africa any one who represents Africa represents me. Samiya am your fun and i pray for you,you will make it! I hope this message finds you Eddy , Kampala, Uganda Thank you for this very touching, beautiful story. lynn , usa There seems to be no obstacle to stop you from succeeding, Samiya. I will be looking forward to seeing you compete and win, without a doubt. Best wishes from America! Gabriel Garcia, Eagle Pass, TX (USA) I commend Samiya (a 16 year old girl) for continuing to practice and train when the militia or others try to intimidate and shame her. It can not be easy. I wish her well. Ana maristany, Baton Rouge, LA, USA Samiya, what a brave girl you are! I cannot imagine what it'd be like to be in your shoes and the fact that you are so determined to represent your country despite the crisis shows the extent of your commitment...it's a truly noble gesture! You go girl & I'll be rooting for you come the Olympics Jennifer Mwangi, Embu, Kenya Achievement is only made possible by the efforts of you and only you . It is a good start for a young lady like you. I would like to take this opportunity to express my heart felt wishes to u in this Olympics and your future carrier. Melkamu Hunegnaw , Malaysia This is what the Olympics is really about. Nevermind all the over the top national self-promotion (it was the Nazis who started the whole 'olympic torch' relay thing), commercialism, kickbacks and corruption. It is the stories and experiences of inspirational young athletes like Samiya which are truly representative of the 'Olympic spirit'. Good luck Samiya! Sam, Hong Kong Just to have had the heart to train and compete and to ignore the cultural implications of being a Muslim girl competing in athletics, makes her already an Olympic winner - it is the heart of the Games. Congratulations to you Samiya and your family - your mother has obviously been a great role model in your difficult circumstances. Helen Allen, Wapiti USA Samiya's story is inspirational. For someone so young, fighting against such odds takes a special kind of person and an immense amount of courage. I hope she stays strong and focused. The Olympic experience will be fantastic for her. Best wishes. Alison Ifill, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago. Samiya, i think you have prove all your critics wrong, so just hold your head up high and pursue your dream.As you said, you are running for experience but not for the medals, i will encourage you to also aim for the medal cos it will help you to work harder. more gress to your "elbows". perpetual annan-takyi, Accra,Ghana What do you think of Samiya's story. Do you have any questions for her in Beijing. Do you know anyone heading to the Olympics "Against the Odds"? Send us your comments using the forms below. Name Your E-mail address Town & Country Phone number (optional): Comments Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7492967.stm Published: 2008/07/21 14:26:51 GMT © BBC MMVIII
  5. Oh! gacmadheere is in big trouble! they are actually evidences (documents)signed by him that decreed to prevent humanitarian assistance reaching the displaced. They just waiting him in London and he knows that is why he is under Gabre's bed polishing his shoes!
  6. Somali human rights groups based in Mogadishu and in Nairobi submitted a long document to the International Criminal court. They have been compiling about crimes committed against civilians by all sides of the Somali conflict both during the civil war and now that there is an occupation Somali warlords, militia leaders, clan leaders, business men and armed thugs top the list as I have been informed. The UN Special rep for Somalis leaked the document to Somali groups in DC and Minneapolis where he yesterday urged Somali diaspora groups to work for peace and the restoration of the Somali nation and dignity. Ould Abdallah was asked about the war crimes being committed against innocent Somali people. He said they are working with human rights lawyers and already the ICC is working on modalities of how to arraign the war crimes perpetrators. But he said there must be first peace and security in Somalia. The compiled list is over 25 men and can you guess who tops the list? I am gonna get a copy soon and probably by that time it will be all over the Somali sites. But let us see if us in SOL can name of who is who in the list. I am sure that the oousted Mogadishu warlords are in the lis. But I heard that Abdi Qaybdiid and Darwiish are on the top just like Mohammed Dheere, and some of Yeey's militia leaders
  7. Allah ya raxmaha - ilaahayoow u naxariiso dadkiisana samir iyo iimaan ka sii... he was a legend walaahi...
  8. damn i am trying to find lowest gas prices in the twin cities now and you bring mr Amartya sen into the equation! you are making it harder for ... I feel like I am back in school now by just hearing Amartya Sen... he bugged us in geopolitics and political economy classes..not him as person but his books that we had to read. you learn and your whole mindset is enriched by his theories and thesis. Good recommendation..will order the book from amazon now. Thanx Maryan though it is gonna be tough to keep up with such deep stuff in these tough times...
  9. Khalilizad US ambassador http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2008/so080723am4.rm Kumalo of South Africa http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2008/so080723am3.rm More http://www.un.org/webcast/sc.html There is ould Abdallah, and others. This seems very promising at least... if they mean what they say and are fully committed to support the agreement in Djibouti. On a very important note members of the ARS were present in the meeting. Ould Abdallah is serious and did a lot of work to mobilize the international community to get serious. I hope something good will come out of this cos we are tired and fed up with the senseless bloodshed.
  10. Thanks Abtigiis. This reminds of guy in our hood who had "quatro bucco) afar dab aa afka looga dhajiyay si af qaloocnimo looga baabi'iyo asoo yar. anyways he went to UK and came back to marry a beautiful girl. Some poor guy stuck in the civil war was in love with the girl though. So he composed a gabay la dhaho afar dabloow ma inantaan arkaybaa iga afeeysan? it was too long and we used to recite it now and then. But I forget the lyrics ...it was 15 years ago.
  11. Nur Hussein (jeenyo) may allah bless your soul was a legend in our neighborhood, generous great uncle and dedicated sportsman. Sunari, have you ever heard the saying: Xamar waa barbar ka islaan sidii baati iyo laano?
  12. It is really sad to see him leave us specially in these bad times. He was playwright, broadcaster, anchor, talk show host, lyricist, sophisticated intellectual and above all a poet. His poetry and songs were simple and urban. you were never asked to decipher some abstract nomadic concept to understand his prose. He simplified and urbanized Somali poetry to people like me. Here is a youtube video of Abdalla Nuridin!
  13. professore -- dalka abaar xun aa ka jirta, starvation, famine and worst of the worst - a return to 1992-93 and city of death is on us. Dhoobleey Gaarisa aa laga xukumaa Dhuusamareeb-na kuwa waxaa jira America wadato oo sida awalba loo maleeyhayayo danaha mareeykanka u adeego. Marka waxaa la ii sheegay in dad labadaas dhinac oo waa fahmi kartaa Xasan Turki iyo Ceyroow isku dhinac ah in safaaradda Nairobi looga yeeray - lacag ilaa 10 Million ah la dhahay as Compensation aan idiin siineeynaa - odayaasha (easily corrubtible elders) ha ka soo celiyaan dhalinyaradda Al-Shabaabka- Amerika waxaa ka lunsan in Al-shabaab Soomaali oo dhan ku jiraan. Saaxiiboow arintaas aa socoto - hadaad ogtahay iyo hadii kale - Soomaaliya ma ka soconee waaye? hadeey Ciraaq ka shaqeeysay? midda kale Itoobiyaanka waa ka dhamaatay sheekadana Bush gebegebadiisa aa la maraa ...marka wax badan aa is bedeli doono. Nairobi week iyo labo ka hor waxaa joogay 6 congressmen oo democrats ah. Waxeey la kulmeen Faarax Macalin, Somali Business Community in Nairobi, Somali elders, Refugee Settlement Agencies, Somali civil society groups and so on. Arintaan dad ka qeyb galay aa ila soo socodsiiyay ... waxna Safaaradda aa wado, waxna Bush dhamaadkiisa sidi Itoobiya laga yeeli lahaa iyo sidii Soomaaliya loo habeeyn lahaa aa socda.
  14. Brofessor, the enemy has a lot of tools to use and can corrupt and influence people.
  15. MMA - i think Duke is beyond hope and I should ignore him from now on. I don't support indhaccadde or any warlord. I don't blong to his clan. how come you are so paranoid? and there is nothing wrong with belonging to any Somali clan. Do you hate that clan? You think everyone should be grouped into clans? Do you believe that ignorance that your clan is against some other clan? If I call you something it would be out of my nature , so I won't. Heal yourself ...mr. paranoid and I will ignore you like the rest from now no. I shouldn't bestow all this attention to you.
  16. The Djibouti TFG-ARS peace deal: A Critical review and some recommendations -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The National Civic Forum (NCF)[1] has organized this year a series of panel discussions for Somali professionals and intellectuals to analyze and contribute to the Somali reconciliation efforts. The first entitled Somalia: options for reconciliation was held in March. This was followed by The UN-led peace initiative: contributions and the way forward which was convened in April and focused specifically the then proposed initiative for the revival of the Somali peace talks outlined by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somaia, Ambassador Ould-Abdalla. The recent Agreement in Djibouti between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), called for an in-depth analysis of the content and implications of the agreement. The current document is the product of a panel discussion held in Nairobi 20-22, June 2008. It presents a critical reflection on the agreement, highlights its strengths and weakness, and offers some recommendations for a reconciliation outcome that considers beyond short-term political and diplomatic expediency. This document is meant to convey the views of the panelists to the negotiating parties and their allies, the UN mediator and the observers of the Djibouti peace talks. It constitutes an integral part of the wider civic action, in search for a lasting solution. 2. Significance of the agreement The Somali reaction to the Djibouti meeting is mixed, but on the overall it is considered positive and timely. The panelists identified several positive outcomes of the Djibouti meeting. a. Firstly, it is the most important reconciliation step undertaken since December 2006, and has allowed the re-opening of the peace dialogue and the first direct contacts between the two warring parties. b. Secondly, it showed that it was possible to break the deadlock and negotiate on critical issues through compromises, even when the Somalia case seemed hopeless. c. Thirdly, it has created a sense of hope for a cessation of the violence throughout the country, particularly in the South-central regions of Somalia. d. Fourthly, the reinvigorated mediation has played a crucial role in launching the negotiation efforts; furthermore, the unified leadership of the mediation under the UN, has reduced the chances for parallel initiatives by various international actors. e. Lastly, the reengagement of the international community reflects their increased commitment to the peace process as stakeholders in the crisis. The strengths of the meeting lie in the following: i. The development of a timeframe is an approach that ensures proper follow up. The 30 days given for the enforcement of the cessation of armed confrontation starting from the agreement signing date, provides an adequate time for the negotiators to brief, further persuade and consult their respective constituencies. The initial 90 days ceasefire period, is also of appropriate length and allows both parties to complete their respective assigned tasks within that critical period. ii. The meeting has addressed the most critical issue at the heart of the current dispute: the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia. It had accommodated the concerns of the TFG and its ally, Ethiopia, through a phased exit and avoidance of a vacuum, and had the ARS accept the deployment of international forces. At the same time it had given assurances to the ARS that there will not only be a withdrawal but a discontinuation of the Ethiopian troops’ involvement under any future international stabilization forces. iii. The meeting makes provisions for follow up mechanism, in the form of joint committees chaired by the United Nations. This arrangement seems to indicate that the Djibouti deal is preliminary for a subsequent more in-depth and focused dialogue on security, political and justice issues. The outlining of general mandates of the committees and the timeframe for the establishment of these are appropriate references for follow up. The chairing role of the UN is important at this stage of high mistrust; a neutral and impartial management of the mediation is most likely to impart credibility and legitimacy to the process in the eyes of the Somali people. iv. The acknowledgement by both parties of the need to allow unrestricted humanitarian access to the suffering people is a positive move. This should lead to a more systematic humanitarian dialogue that could open up of inaccessible areas and a safer environment for the local and international staff. 3. Shortcomings The Djibouti meeting has following shortcomings: i. The biggest limitation of the Djibouti agreement is that it suffers from the same shortfalls of the previous national reconciliation efforts: the boycott by a group. While the TFG was highly represented at the meeting and there have not been any official contradictions within its ranks, so far, the negotiating power of the ARS as the voice of the armed opposition was weakened by its internal dispute and split over its participation in the peace talks. This seriously undermines the full implementation of the agreed cessation of armed confrontation in the country. The best that can be expected from the agreement is a reduction of the violence not its cessation. ii. The agreement refers to allies, but these are not specified. There can be no reconciliation without a proper identification of the key actors and their involvement in the peace process. The Somali conflict is multifaceted encompassing national, regional and international dimensions. Through the observer participation of USA, UK and France, the meeting had fully covered the international dimension, but only partially factored the regional dimension. While Ethiopia was present in Djibouti and had a certain degree of direct involvement, the other regional conflict player, Eritrea, and its close ally were not party to the agreement. iii. Article 7 is the most important and yet most controversial. The whole peace compromise is founded on the assumption that the UN will resolve to authorize and deploy an international force that will replace the Ethiopian troops. This is envisaged to occur within 120 days from the signing of the agreement. Experiences from the UN operations do not support the feasibility of this deployment within the stated timeframe. Although it is most likely that the UN will pass a resolution to this effect and that it will be possible to raise required resources in time, it is very unlikely that the UN will manage to mobilize troops from countries and station them in Somalia within four months. It is clear that this is likely to delay the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and thus weaken the faith of the ARS and the Somali people in the agreement. This might also affect the balance between the two ARS factions, in favour of those who have rejected the peace negotiations. This makes the foundations very shaky. iv. There are four other flaws in Article 7. o Firstly, it does not clearly state that the TFG will request the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops; its statement “the TFG will act in accordance with the decision that has already been taken by the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN forces” is ambiguous and creates room for dispute over the implementation. It is incomprehensible that a government can act in accordance with the decisions of another government. o Secondly, the article assumes that the Ethiopian Government has one unequivocal position on the withdrawal of its troops. However, the fact is that the Ethiopian Government position has changed over time, from “two weeks” in January 2007, to “when international forces are deployed” reiterated on several occasions to a recent Prime Minister’s speech at the Ethiopian Parliament in which he stated that the troops will remain in Somalia until “terrorists are defeated”. o Thirdly, the article is conditional not only on the deployment of the international force but on the size of its contingencies. The “sufficient number” has not been specified. This might create disputes because of arbitrary judgments. o Fourthly, the article obliges the ARS to condemn any fighting from other opposition groups, but fails to demand the same from the TFG on any violations of the agreement by its troops and/or ally. The acceptance of this requirement by the ARS shows its commitment, but a fairness treatment is also crucial for the buying in by both constituencies. v. The agreement fails to address the fate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces currently present in Somalia. 4. Recommendations The panelists made following recommendations: (i) It is clear that so far, the Djibouti process has produced only: a) an understanding between the negotiating parties – i.e., the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), and b) a draft agreement that needs to be formally signed by the involved parties, including the observers who would also act as guarantors. The essence of the Djibouti meeting is the agreement on the critical issue of the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, which has been an impediment on peace talks. Since the implementation of the peace accord depends primarily on the implementation of Article 7, we believe that the responsibilities for the next steps are shouldered on the Ethiopian Government and the international community. We, therefore, strongly call for the Ethiopian Government to issue an official statement on the outcome of the Djibouti meeting. We likewise urge the UN Security Council to consider the effective utilization of the available limited time and undertake concrete measures towards a resolution on the immediate deployment of the international peace forces in Somalia. (ii) The renewed interest of the UN in the Somali reconciliation should benefit from its previous experience. All precautions should be taken to avoid a repeat of the United Nations Operations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) era of political miscalculations and biases as well as the associated malpractices. (iii) The peace process has a good start and the UN leadership is producing tangible results. However, the mediator should undertake all necessary measures to avoid further fragmentation within each negotiating party. It is also important that the mediator ensures the inclusivity of the process, and walks the extra mile to encourage that all armed groups participate in the peace talks. It is only when the guns are silenced that peace, tranquility and normalcy are restored and efforts can be concentrated on the reconstruction of the country. (iv) For the mediation to be effective, the mediator is advised to address also the international dimension of the conflict, and guarantee a cessation of external military interventions as part of the general ceasefire agreement that is sought. (v) The participation of the Somalis in a mediation capacity is also important. The panelists propose the formation of an advisory committee of eminent Somali personalities that assist the Special Envoy of the UNSG. These shall be selected on the criteria of intellectual caliber, experience, integrity and commitment to the national interest; they should come from both the Diaspora and those who remained in the country sharing the suffering with the people. (vi) The increased risk for indigenous humanitarian organization workers and national staff of international organizations calls for and adequate urgent response on the basis of a humanitarian dialogue with existing political entities. The mediator can play an instrumental role in facilitating that dialogue.
  17. war duke see wax laguugu sheegaa..aniga ma ka tirsani qabiil, or clan or sub clan and I don't support any militia or anything like that. So stop accusing me of things that I don't prescribe to. Ever heard of Anbar Awakening ..it is being planned in Nairobi, Garissa and Mogadishu. the powers that be who subdized and bankrolled this whole occupation adventure are thinking of alternatives and thinking beyond 2009. Politics are dynamic and the warlord-infested government is toothless and useless.
  18. Duke fadlan waa codsi iga jooji clankaan iyo qabiilkaan aa iga daba wadid ...qof meel oowsan rabin lagu riixaayo waa dhibaato weyn walaahi! Aniga qabiil maahi, qabiil ma rabo, qabiil ma ka soo jeedo , ma ju jeedo, mana u jeedi doono. hadaad qof waxgarad ah tahay, qofkaa rabto la jir laakiin dadka tixgeli fikirkooda shaqsiga ah hana u saarin ama u qafaalin meel kale. Dadka la jimcinaayana waa laga fiican yahay. No body ma jimciyo gobolkoo gooni ah. Taas waa laga fiican yahay. hadii laaqqoray la qabsado ama laas caanood la qabto, reer Soomaaliland oo dhan baa ka dhigtaa isku meel, hadii dawlad ku sheegtaan wax laga sheegana oo wadaadada ama shiikh shariif la taageerona , reer baad daba dhigataa...that is not good..iska bedel...shaqsi wax ka sheeg, ama dad jimcin ama gobol iska eddeyn waa laga fiican yahay. Fikrada challenge ku sameey, oo kaliya ..talo waaye!
  19. how about a government of the people, for the people, by the people. a government that works for the common interest of the people, a government that is just and that works to unite and dignify people, a government that is effective, transparent and can be held accountable? a government that has a mandate and program to work for the people? or you want us to support a warlord government beholden to our arch enemies, a warlord government backed by our enemies, a warlord government that is made up of war criminals? a government of nepotism and clannish agenda or leaning, a government that is there for name only but is run by enemies that displace people from their homes, that indiscriminately shell neighborhoods and massacre mothers and children, a government that prevents humanitarian agencies to reach and feed the starving and displaced. There is no government in Somalia. what we have is a governor Gabre and a punch of losers whose background and history is filled with brutality and barbarism. What you call TFG is nothing but a gang of warlords, the likes of Yeey, Mohammed Dheere, Qaybdiid, Darwiish and a gang of Qat chewing illiterate subordinates in Baidao. That is not a government and will never be a government. A government is led bu competent public servants, technocrats who know how build institutions and services, a government with distinct divisions and has the means and know-how of how to function and work. No that government is not yet born in Somalia and will take us perhaps years to have something close to it. At least Somali-land deserves to be acknowledged as an entity that is free of warlords and lets its citizens live in peace . maybe we should invite them to villa Somalia to run the affairs of Mogadishu instead of the god-forsaken and god-forgotten warlords of the South.
  20. Duke who is Olol? am I olol? fire? flames? the truth hurts. The latest gimmick from warlord backers is that they are arming the Mogadishu warlords again to extricate themselves out. A day, not that far from now, warlord supporters will be cursing and condemning Meles for uncle yeey's death. remember this, today is July 18, 2006. It is friday! mark this in the notebooks and calendars. I belong to no clan, no faction, no group. My loyalty is to the people of Somalia and to the nation of Somalia. I am SOMALI 100%, proud and powerful , no matter what happens or happened, I will stay true to my Somali-ness and let me tell you, I only oppose the occupation and the warlordism. why is that makes some people uncomfortable? why is it that if someone has a different perspective , some people personally attack them? why is it if someone criticizes this ineffective warlord-infested government, some people take it as personal attack? what is with those people? I know some have been here and others tried to reason with the die-hard loyalists to no avail, but I think deep down, the clannish warlord supporters could be rehabilitated and that rehab will come sooner as the Tigre enemy feast on uncle's warlord's whatever. They need to wake up and not delude their poor souls on fantasy and things that are unrealistic and detrimental to our comeback. Somalis of good judgment know that Ethiopia is our enemy, that our leaders are failed and disoriented clannish buffoons, that our future is with us, the younger generation, who are modern and educated. An awakening is needed here! quite honestly
  21. A Paper Cease-Fire Turns in to Ashes by Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Submitted by wadani1 on Fri, 2008-07-18 06:09. For the thirty days between June 9 and July 9, the attention of Somali political actors and particularly of the "stakeholders" in Somalia's conflicts - the United States, European powers, the United Nations, Arab states and states in the Horn of Africa and its neighborhood - were focused on the fate of the agreement, signed in Djibouti, between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and a faction of its organized political opposition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.). The heart of the agreement, which was reached under pressure from the Western powers working through the U.N., was a timetable of 120 days, of which the first thirty days were to be devoted to preparation for a cease-fire between the T.F.G. and the military wing of the A.R.S. that has been mounting an insurgency against the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia, and the remaining ninety were to be spent solidifying the cease-fire so that the adversaries could reach a political reconciliation and the conditions for the deployment of a U.N. stabilization mission that would replace the Ethiopian occupiers could be established. July 9 has come and gone, and it is starkly evident that the Djibouti peace process has been an abject failure. During the thirty-day run-up to the projected cease-fire, violent armed clashes between insurgents and Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces did not diminish, with the insurgents continuing to make impressive gains on the ground, achieving control of the capitals of several of Somalia's regions and setting up either Islamic administrations under their control or friendly "independent" local administrations in the many towns and districts where they had gained a foothold throughout the country. Unable to stem the insurgents' advance, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces responded with spasmodic counter-offensives that resulted in mass displacement of civilians who, because fighting had spread everywhere, had no place to seek refuge. Since July 9, the conflict has become even more severe and the humanitarian crisis has worsened, with no sign that the external stakeholders have any alternative plans to replace their failed stabilization policy. Diagnosis of Failure The Djibouti process was a result of a shift of Western policy in late 2007, when the Western powers realized that the Ethiopian occupation had proven to be ineffective in stabilizing Somalia and that the conflict within the T.F.G. between its president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, and its then-prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, had crippled the transitional institutions. As a consequence of that tardy awakening, the Western powers retreated diplomatically, moving to the fall-back position of trying to turn the T.F.G. in the direction of negotiations with the elements of the A.R.S. that were willing to participate in talks. The cornerstone of the Western powers' new strategy was the replacement of Gedi by Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein, a perceived political neutral without a domestic power base, who pledged to pursue initiatives to bring the A.R.S. into reconciliation talks. At the same time, the Western powers continued to rely on Ethiopian forces on the ground to prop up the weak and incapacitated T.F.G., because the going alternative, an African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), had failed to reach its projected strength of eight thousand troops, due to the unwillingness of African states, except Uganda and later Burundi, to commit forces to an active conflict zone with what they claimed was inadequate financial and logistical support from the West. The West's policy shift was by no means a reversal, but spelled instead the adoption of a dual-track strategy aimed at containing the predominantly Islamist military opposition through the agency of the faltering Ethiopians while co-opting the diplomatic wing of the A.R.S. into a power-sharing process that would isolate the insurgents and their backers. The flaws in that strategy quickly revealed themselves as the military opposition increasingly gained momentum; Nur Adde was constrained to support the occupation, weakening his legitimacy and credibility; political opposition to Nur Adde surfaced within the T.F.G.; and the T.F.G. was unable to exert authority in Somalia's regions, which continued to devolve into the hands of local clans and their militias, or of the Islamists. The decision of the A.R.S.'s diplomatic wing to engage in the Djibouti process, which caused a rupture in the alliance and the reasons for which remain obscure, was hailed by the U.N. and the Western powers as a "breakthrough," but it has turned out to be anything but that. From the outset, the West and the T.F.G. were fixated on the cease-fire, which they viewed as a pre-condition for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, and the A.R.S.'s diplomatic wing was focused on Ethiopian withdrawal, which it came to interpret as a binding commitment. That divergence of interpretations was based on the underlying balance of political and military forces in Somalia today. The T.F.G., which lacks popular support and exists only by virtue of the recognition that it receives from the "international community," the meager financial contributions that it gets from Western donor powers and international organizations, and the Ethiopian occupation, is otherwise defenseless against the insurgency and the resistance of local power centers. Making the Djibouti agreement's success contingent on a cease-fire could only benefit the T.F.G., which is what the West desired. In contrast, the A.R.S.'s diplomatic wing stood to lose all its credibility if it did not make Ethiopian withdrawal its top priority, so it stated from the beginning that it had chosen a "peaceful" path of liberation and was ready to revert to the military track if progress toward Ethiopian withdrawal did not occur within the agreement's time frame. The decision of the A.R.S.'s diplomatic wing to enter the Djibouti process was denounced by the alliance's militant faction, which pointed to the success of the insurgency as grounds for continuing on the course of armed liberation; the relatively independent military forces of the A.R.S. on the ground, which announced that they would carry on the insurgency while the Djibouti process went on; and the internationalist Islamic revolutionary al-Shabaab movement, which is organizationally independent of the A.R.S. and simply ignored the Djibouti process altogether. In light of the rejection of the Djibouti process by the militant faction of the A.R.S. and al-Shabaab, the West's hopes for a cease-fire were dashed from the start and the A.R.S.'s diplomatic faction was left hanging on a limb and has responded to its precarious situation by moving closer to the alliance's military faction and seeking to heal its rift with the latter by entering talks with it brokered by Yemen. On July 15, Garowe Online reported that Sheikh Yusuf Ali Aynte, a spokesman for the Islamic Courts, which dominate the A.R.S., had announced that an agreement had been reached between the two factions on "ending their differences." With no details of the agreement available, it is not possible to assess its political effects, but it is likely that the diplomatic wing of the A.R.S. will be drawn to take a harder line toward the T.F.G. and the withdrawal of the Ethiopians. There is little promise that a cease-fire will come into effect and that in its absence reconciliation will proceed or the U.N. Security Council will approve a stabilization force. Ethiopia will be pressured to continue to be exhausted by a war of attrition that it is losing. One can only conclude that the Djibouti process is already a thing of the past and that it will have little, if any, effect on the future political configuration of Somalia. Prognosis: A New Phase in Somalia's Political History The collapse of the Djibouti process opens up a new phase in Somalia's political history. Through the first half of 2008, the Western powers pursued their last hope for stabilizing Somalia half-heartedly, refusing to take the initiative and to back up their dual-track policy with sufficient pressure and resources, because they would not take the risk of providing support until "reconciliation" was underway, which served as the alibi for their inaction. Now the West has surrendered the role of protagonist and is likely to turn its back on conflict resolution in Somalia. The likelihood that the West will draw back leaves the insurgency with the initiative and momentum, the T.F.G. debilitated, and Ethiopia seeking to extricate itself from a morass of its own and the Western powers' making. Whether or not the A.R.S. has healed its rift is of secondary or little importance; the multi-dimensional insurgency will not surrender its gains even if a "peace process" restarts under the pressure of the dishonest brokers of the West. Ethiopia cannot repeat its 2006 invasion of Somalia and is a wasting or already wasted "asset" for the West. Local power centers, whether Islamist, clan-based or both, have become deeply entrenched and will be difficult, if not impossible, to displace by any "national" initiative, whether military, political or both. Somalia begins to look more and more as it did before the Islamic Courts movement undertook its 2006 revolution, which was aborted by the Ethiopian invasion - a patchwork of local power centers - with the difference that Islamism has now become the dominant political formula and its supporters have learned to adapt to Somalia's congenital localism, making them stronger than they were during their revolutionary ascendancy, though more limited in their ability to carry through their utopian aim of transforming Somalia into a Shari'a state. In return for being constrained to adopt a local strategy, the Islamists have become an integral force in Somalia's power configuration. Although it made a devastating miscalculation when it invaded Somalia and has since then been engaged in a brutal occupation that has turned the Somali people overwhelmingly against it, Ethiopia grasps the reality of Somalia's power configuration and its unfavorable position within it, and has begun to adapt, with or without the blessings of the Western powers, on which it has become dependent for military and financial support. Having had to open up a new front against the insurgency in Somalia's central regions, bolster its military presence in the country's southwest regions, and continue its counter-insurgency in Somalia's official capital Mogadishu, Ethiopia is reported to have broken with official Western policy by rearming Mogadishu's warlords, who had divided the city among themselves and had resisted the T.F.G. before the Islamic Courts routed them in 2006. In addition, the Somaaljecel website reported on July 15 that Ethiopian officers had held a secret meeting with the T.F.G.'s defense minister, Muhidiyan Mohamed Haji Ibrahim, and had told him that the T.F.G. needed to train its own forces to provide security, and that all T.F.G. units should be commanded by an Ethiopian officer to prevent T.F.G. troops from collaborating with the insurgents. Haji was reported to have responded that he was amenable to Ethiopian command, but that the T.F.G. had no funds to arm security forces or to pay them. Rearming the warlords would sound the death knell of the T.F.G. and demanding that the T.F.G. provide its own security is simply a cover for abandoning it, although Ethiopia has made efforts to train some T.F.G. forces in "counter- insurgency and counter-terrorism." Ethiopia's adaptive strategy appears to aim at extricating itself from Mogadishu and concentrating on protecting its border with central and southwest Somalia, leaving the country to localized power centers, even if the Islamists gain the upper hand in some of them, including Mogadishu after another civil war between the warlords and the Courts movement. If the reports of Ethiopia's recent moves are correct, it is reasonable to conclude that Addis Ababa has determined that the West lacks the will to take any further initiatives and that it has to and has the opening to pursue its own interest in fragmenting Somalia while hoping that the Courts can be held in check by countervailing factions. Wounded and battered by the malign neglect of the West and a brutal Ethiopian occupation, Somalia is likely to be left on its own to sort out its conflicts or revert to chronic civil war.
  22. Duke guy wants us to recognize these ragtag clan militia from Yeey's family and region as the national army. I sometimes wonder why Somalis fought against Siyaad Barre? it seems their plan was even worse than that of Siyaad Barre. He consolidated power through clannish means, nepotism, preying on opposition factions and their clans, bidding clan against clan, terror, using the national army to destroy cities and kill civilians. Those behind him, mostly his subordinates, were even worse, Aideed was as bad as Siyaad, forget ali mahdi, he was just dumb, and now we have this hard-headed warlord traitor and his ilk. with such people and with all these craziness, I don't think we will ever see Somalia back. it will get worse than this and I think the instability will continue for another two decades. America wants to kill you and then pay you and buy you with few dollars! Eastleigh and Nairobi is bustling with interlocutors. 6 US congresmen were there a week ago (including Keith Ellison and Donald Payne) as a fact-finding mission. Faarax macalin received them and that at least was good for decent Somali people.
  23. common sense is not in the books of some people. paranoia is an excellent term to describe these die-hard warlord supporters. Theirs is a dying cause and hopefully, we as the future leaders of Somalia, should do all that is in our ability to bridge the gap, build consensus and trust among our people and make sure that Qabiil blindness and loyalty is destroyed by any means.
  24. I am in minneapolis Duke, not Asmara and I don't LOL like whitey wannabee! and the TFG to me is like tired fake game! or tribal feudal gang! Duke i heard you are Omar Jamal? is that true? then if that is the case, I know you, when I see you, I will ask you.
  25. General Duke, first let us not got confused. I belong to no group, faction, clan and what you have. I am against warlords and Ethiopian occupation, that means I don't support any group wholeheartedly. Secondly, these are news that I heard from Nairobi, from reliable and authoritative sources. Thirdly the TFG is ineffective and toothless. They have been formed in Nairobi almost 4 years ago and so far accomplished nothing. They haven't even provided a cup of water to any Somali. It is based on Qabiil formula which can't build a viable modern nation, it is led by warlords and it is controlled by Meles Zenawi. Anyhow, its mandate is running out, accomplishing nothing. PM Nur Adde, seems to be doing his best but he deeply knows that warlords can't be worked with and that the whole power lies in the Corridors of Gabre. His plan was and still is viable, to circumvent around the Ethiopians, to marginalize warlords, to work with and solicit support and influence from European powers and to finally work the ultimate and inevitable removal of the Ethiopians from Somalia. The US is working with some Somalis to plan ahead and form the coming government. Dhoobleey is getting 5 million and so does the Dhuusamareeb. All you need to do is make calls to Virgina, D.C., Dubai, Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire of who is involved in the coming deal. By the way, Puntlanders are part of the new deal. It is just that your warlord uncle is history and excluded. But he aint the only one. The curse of the colonels are to be relieved of Somalis soon. Dahir Aweys is colonel, Riyale, Yeey and Nur are colonels too. So are the so-called generals who either rule a fiefdom or vying to rule. Two new candidates of Puntland are said to have been part of the former Siyaad Barre regime.