Armchair Politician

Nomads
  • Content Count

    184
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by Armchair Politician

  1. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-somalia_nu_salopekoct18,1,4312084.story?ctrack=1&cset=true
  2. http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnBAN729195.html http://africa.reuters.com/country/SO/news/usnBAN738875.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7048395.stm Are they using starvation as a tactic, to starve Mogadishu into submission? This goes beyond merely harsh, this is evil.
  3. The UN wanted negotiations when the UIC was winning, but as soon as the UIC started losing those calls for negotiations stopped. UN just wants to delay Somaliland so Puntland can regroup.
  4. The UN's agenda is peace and peaceful resolution of disputes, so it's not surprising that they would ask both parties to this conflict to stop fighting and hit the negotiating tables. However I can't help but notice that the UN never asked everyone to chill and talk about things when Ethiopia was invading the UIC. They were in fact conspicuously silent. Now when Puntland is losing control over Sool all of a sudden they are concerned.
  5. Geedi has established deep roots in the TFG's governing apparatus, and it is not a simple matter of substituting Ali Mahdi for Ali Geedi. Also, Geedi is the linchpin for foreign and Ethiopian support in Somalia. Ali Mahdi is no diplomat or statesman, he is simply a warlord and ex-hotelier, and is incapable of the political maneuvering necessary to maintain the TFG. The current non-tribalist TFG support is almost entirely behind Geedi, and this is the only solid base the TFG has, the tribal support being largely ephemeral and based on clan politics. By replacing Geedi with Mahdi, the TFG will not only not gain any new tribalist support (same tribe) but lose all their civil society and intellectual support. Geedi's new cabal (Geedi-Mohamed Dhere-Abdi Qeybdiid) basically control Benaadir and Middle Shabelle, and are likely to form a rival administration instead of "going quietly". The whole situation is deteriorating rapidly.
  6. Every regional capital outside of Bay is either under local administration, or plagued by insurgent attacks. Geedi and Yusuf are feuding, and the bastion of the TFG's strength, Puntland, is losing its war with Somaliland. Attacks now occur daily in Marka, Beledweyne and Jowhar as well as Mogadishu. Galgadud, Lower Juba, Gedo and Middle Juba are wild and ungoverned regions where al-Ittihad, Hizbul Shabab and the UIC mass their armies while local tribal groups vie for power and influence. Puntland's years of mismanagement under Adde Musa has weakened Puntland noticeably. Once a match for the breakaway republic of Somaliland, Puntland has become an embattled and feeble state, rife with internal divisions. This is nothing compared to the TFG however, which has all the hallmarks of a dying administration. Always plagued by infighting, the TFG looks poised to kill itself in a rehash of the early 1990s tribal feuds. Great change is in store for Somalia, who like the ancient Chinese curse, is living in interesting times.
  7. I wasn't implying anything my friend, relax. I was just pointing out differences in policy. Bringing in "foreign Mujahids" was opposed by the UIC on political grounds, not because they couldn't have helped. The UIC consistently wanted to at least appear to be entirely a grassroots Somali organization, and bringing in foreign fighters gives their adversaries reasons to criticize them. Sharif Ahmad's consensus driven approach was discredited in July 2006 because it wasn't getting anywhere, and Aweys switched policy to a more aggressive stance. It will be up to history to decide which was the correct and incorrect path.
  8. The Hizbul Shabaab is only very tenuously linked to the UIC, and none of their top leaders have seats in the Asmara group. Adan Ayro and Mukhtar Robow lead the Hizbul Shabaab. Hassan Turki leads a seperate organization, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which is essentially al-Qaeda in Somalia. The UIC forces are led by Mohamed Bilal and Indha'adde. They were sort of disagreeing on principles when the Ethiopians invaded, and have now each essentially taken a different path. Ayro and Robow do not agree with Sharif Ahmad's consensus driven policy, and Hassan Turki wants Somalia to be like Afghanistan, full of foreign Mujahids.
  9. This isn't good news, this is officially Baghdad by the Sea. Green-Zone: check Security Checkpoints: check Endless "crackdown" on civilians: check Open warfare in the city: check
  10. http://www.galmudug.com/galmudug_hobyo.html
  11. The Ugandans actually do some good there, they try to help the civilians in Mogadishu and let them use their hospital facilities, so I support Uganda's mission in Mogadishu. It was a good idea for AMISOM to not take part in the fighting.
  12. The 1600 Ugandans already there barely do anything other than shuttle people to hospital after the fighting is over. I guess Mogadishu could use another 1600 ambulance drivers. I don't understand why the Ugandans are in Mogadishu, where there isn't any peace to keep, rather than in the countryside where there is peace to keep, but noone's there to keep it.
  13. Hassan Turki is the leader of al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, an allied organization to the UIC, but he doesn't take orders from Sharif Sheikh Ahmed or Dahir Aweys. Aden Hashi Ayro and Shabbab are the same. UIC wasn't a monolithic thing, even the allied courts didn't always agree on things. The only place that had any unity was Mogadishu, because they created a Banaadir administration. So for instance it is not at all contradictory for the UIC to say "we don't have foreign fighters" and al-Ittihad to have lots of them. Turki isn't the UIC's military command in the insurgency. The UIC's commanders are Bilal and Indha'adde.
  14. Well I suppose what I'm getting at is that there are a lot of allegations out there, for and against all parties to the conflict, yet very little reliable proof. Noone seems to be accountable for anything that happens in Somalia.
  15. Ethiopia has been violating the arms embargo forever, they never respected it. * Invading Gedo to go after al-Ittihad (1995-2002) * Crossing the border to give Hiraan client-clans weaponry (2004-2005) * Arming Mogadishu warlords and creating the ARPCT (2005-2006) * And now fully invading the country (2006-2007) I do however find it extremely convenient that the UIC is accused of a whole host of connections to international terrorism JUST WHEN the USA and Ethiopia need them. Ethiopia didn't even get a slap on the wrist for violating a security council resolution, North Korean sanction, and the Somali arms embargo a dozen times. In fact, they've been rewarded with multimillion dollar gifts from the USA ever month or two.
  16. Hey what can I say, I like cartography and I'm stuck inside on a rainy weekend.
  17. Well for one thing that document didn't exactly ring true. They threw in the Ethiopian support for the TFG (which was an open secret than anyone with a camera in Baidoa could prove true) in order to achieve two things: a: make the article seem as though it was impartial b: make their allegations appear to be true Other than the initial report however, literally no evidence has appeared for any of their accusations. It's the whole WMDs in Iraq all over again.
  18. Isn't that the same document that claimed the UIC was fighting in Lebanon? And that the whole Arab world was giving UIC weapons? That document?
  19. The border between Somaliland and Puntland along the highway is at Adhicadeeye, which is surprisingly far east. The border between Adhicadeeye and the Maakhir border is somewhat less distinct than it would appear on this map, and should perhaps properly be a dotted line.
  20. The Duke, I have looked over the evidence in Cayn, and it is clear for instance that the Puntland-Somaliland border is at Bohoodle, so this at least will be changed. The difficulty is it is also at Adhicadeeye, significantly to the east. So which towns in between Adhicadeeye and Bohoodle belong to each side? In regards to western Bari, it is difficult to determine which claims of Maakhir are "idle claims" or "controlled claims". For instance Carmo, Maakhiri or Puntlander? For Ceerigaabo I may need to do a "west Berlin" situation, where east Ceerigaabo is a little "island" of Maakhiri control, as the area between definitely appears to be Somaliland territory. Perhaps it is connected via the southeast, but more investigation is needed.
  21. The Duke, Puntland, Somaliland and Maakhir all claim territories they do not control. Often the same territory is claimed by all three, such as Sanaag. I have chosen to draw in the borders as the actual line of control, or at least attempt to do so. This does not mean for instance that Ceerigaabo is not politically important to Maakhir, as it is the administrative seat of their Sanaag province. For instance Puntland and Somaliland both claim to administer Sool and Cayn, yet the armies are piled up on opposite sides of Adhicadeeye. Many could argue in fact that Puntland stops at Garoowe, and noone but the local people control the land from there to Adhicadeeye, where Somaliland administration begins. These are all issues that will require deeper investigation and thought.
  22. Caamir & Koora-Tuunshe, Which areas would you say Maakhir should be extended into? In my discussions in regards to the status of Ceerigaabo, it was clear that Somaliland controlled the territories east of the city at least as far as Midisho, making Ceerigaabo inside Somaliland territory. Western Bari is difficult to determine. Puntlanders I have talked to insist that Carmo for instance is still part of Puntland.
  23. PM me your email and I'll email it to you. I'm especially interested in your opinions Caamir, as I have attempted to draw in Maakhir.
  24. http://216.147.5.35/northsomalia1.gif 7000px by 6000px 700kb map To do: * More accurate borders village-by-village * Explore status of Sool * Villages and small towns on map as well