Routine disinformation is common in such period;one therefore, should take extra precausions in mixing clan propaganda with facts on the groud; facts are stubborn, as some say, soon it would resist all denials. Advantages of wadaadada Courts, unlike worlords, anticipate another better world; Jannah, this fanaticims have shown us time and again its instrumentality in victory; however, this only happens when it is combined with clan loyality; for instance; when Itihaad fighters confronted with SSDF in Puntland, they lost because they were not assisted by a clan, if they were assisted by a clan; they would have had the advantage of the clan and religion. a lethal mix. SSDF therefore, defeated them because it had clan advantage; Erudite scholars tell us that particularism always defeats universalism; meaning tribalism, in Somalia, would defeat Somali nationalims: whoever fights for a clan would win against whoever fights for common Somali cause. Exposition of the reasons for this proposition is unnecessay a this stage, for you can use your own reflection to confirm them. with this in mind, Courts would win only if they continue to enjoy their religious and moral superiority and at the sametime enjoy a clan support that is greater than the one enjoyed by their opponents. Put it simply; if Northern Mogadisho clans view this as southern naked aggression, the balance of power would be on the side of the worlords unless southern MOgadisho unites in similar fashion, if latter is the case, then it would be all out war that would have its own dynamics. Advantages of Worlords The dynamics could change in favor of northern mogadisho, if outsiders who harbor anxiety about the rise of Islamic fundemntalism join the fray; this scenerio would be a blow to south Mogadisho clans and courts. if however, outsiders realize the unpopularity of worlords, and decide to support Baydhabo, which has more popularity, and more legitimacy, then outsiders would have another means to deal with the rise of power in Mogadisho. however, this scenerio may be construed as Clan conflict, hence once again Mogadisho would enjoy a mix of clan and religion; it is not known whether such mix would save them from Sunni fate in Iraq. Nothing is more sexier and yet harmful than a compitition of men for power and wealth; we are witnessing an epitome of such premative prennial struggle in our own time.

Alle-ubaahane, you support use of vulger language in public; what Islam allows you to use whore, dick, even in non Muslim societies such words are not allowed to be used in public; where is your diin, or you change the Islamic values as it suits you; in other words, you insult others if you do not like them, yet you do not allow your children, or even relatives to use such language in public; what a change of standard. Hypocracy in its ideal form.

1- Salman Rushdie - Dickhead. 2- A trashy woman who looks like a mildly rehabilitated crack-whore 3- Muslims as 'goat******s'. The Quraan says: wala yajrimanakum shanaanu qowmin calaa tacdiluu, icdiluu huwa aqrabu li taqwaa Rough transilation Do not be forced by animosities you have for a commuity to abonden justice; do justice, that is very close to peity The language you used lacks civility; this forum has edited some of your work. So, moderate your tone and attack opponents with some reservation. Do not comfirm the thesis of your opponent: you are dominated by irrational emotions and dogmatic assertion coupled with fanaticim. Gaalka dil, gartiisan sii

Xoogsade, when has to have access to power and resources in order to make a genuine contribution, since power and resources is now excercised within a clan-based society, we see no reason, why we will not use such resources and power, if we can access them, to advance the interests of the clan and that of Somalia. The central chellenge, as we see it, is that of reconciling between the interest of Somalia and that of the clan. I wish to persue a norrow tribalism to help Somalia: use tribalism for good reasons. I have seen with clarity this: people act on the basis of their shifting loyality. So, I said to myself, why not follow the current rather than act against it. whenever Islam and Somali nationalism compete for narrow tribalismm, regionalism, and other particularims, particularim wins the day. We have seen this triumpth of tribalism over and over again. So, it goes, why not openly advocate for your clan or region to improve the conditions of your tribe and in the processes do good for Somalia. I am now planning to advocate for this idiology: pure clan idiology. I ask, please be a committed tribalist; be secretive about it, however, and then whenever you serve the clan also serve, if the circumstances permit,common Somali interests. Observation It has been observed that Somalis admire dynamic and repressentive state, yet they admire their clan to dominate the state; in other words, they continue to be loyal to their clans, yet they wish a dynamic state, what a contradiction? when the two compete for loyality, they support, without reservation, the clan. If I advocate for tribalism or any other narrow particularism, I am only advocating for what is working, hoping that we may ride this tide to build rather than distroy.

hi

Duke When did you abonden your support to Ethiopian backed Jowhar faction; you are forgeting your unmoderated support to Ethiopian intervention in Somalia; now all of the sudden you are worried about nation's values and provacation of Bashiir Raage:interesting indeed. your loyality to your clan and Islam are clearly theaterical and themsleves seem to deserve an anthropological study. The problem is not you Duke, good freind, it is the delimmma we Somalis face. One hand, we are committed to our clan and worlords, hoping that if they win we will get jobs and prestige; on the other hand, we would like to have to dynamic and strong state that promotes not only our materail condition but also upholds our charished values; the two clash constantly; you behaviour documeneted in this website, I say with sadness, embodies such contradictions found in Somali charecter

How did you know that qanyare or islamic courts have killed this or that; it takes years of police work to identify the individual who committed a murderer; since non of you have the means to investigate the matters, your veiws appear to based on your passionsn or religious beliefs rather than on cold reason and evidance; I was reminded this: person's interest or group's interest rules supreme in political matters. WHy not be clear on that?

This is the general plan: Yusuf was unable to freely act while in Jowhar. Mohamed Dhere mantained a ralation wiht Mogadisho and they agreed to keep Yusuf in Jowhar, so that Jowhar will develop and MOhamed Dhere will be rich; Mohamed Dhere rejected Mogadisho to be isolated. Yusuf was planing way out, so he consulted with Sanaa group, so they invented this confernce in Baidhobo so that Yusuf could have a reason to move to Baidhabo; Baidhabo, unlike, Jowhar, harbors a tendency to isolate mogadisho and remove south Mogadisho influence in the south; if this is so, there are two possibilities; either Yusuf has Ethiopian support or South Mogadisho support to hold this conference. Otherwise, DHere and Indhacade may actually overwhelm RRA millitia in Bay. So, suppose Yusuf does not have SOuth Mogadisho support or Ethiopian support, then if this is true, Yusuf is committing a suicide; allied Dhere and Indhacade and other Mogadisho leaders may actually chase him out of Bay and bakool; since they also have influence in Kismayo, he may not be able to go there ; however, he may incite clan sentiment, thereby inclining Hiiraale and RRA and Puntland Army to unite to put pressure on Mogadisho factions; in any case such move is very dangerous because it can incite a corresponding clan feeling in Mogadisho which is very close to the battlefield unlike Puntland ; there is also reason to anticipate that Yusuf does not have much Ethiopian support, recently, Mohamed DHere went to Ethiopia and secured a weapons, the militia that has secured the materials were those of Mohahmed dhere, this suggests that Mohamed DHere is armed to the teeth, thus, he may be the favored man of Ethiopia, although one could view this as tactical move, because if Yusuf's men were to go to Ethiopia to secure weapons, Mogadisho would have cried provoking anti-ethiopian inflamatory statements; if however, Dhere's men do the same thing, which they did, they are less likely to provoke similar reaction, interesting indeed, this theory is particularly tempting if one assumes that Yusuf has south MOgadisho assent to hold this conference in Baydhabo. Since Ethiopia does not like south mogadisho and its links to Islamists, it may support Mohamed dhere and other disfrenchised Mogadisho Worlords to finish Yusuf if Yusuf is defying Addisababa suggestions. IF however, one assumes that Yusuf has secured both the blessings of SOuth mogadisho and Ethiopia then, north mogadisho and MOhamed dhere and the PM would be isolated; Yusuf would in fact go ahead and choose South mogadiisho secular PM and hence this would be happy choice for Addisababa, South Mogadisho and for Yusuf and for Baidhabo, since this time Baidhabo would have chacne to develop, however, this can triggere another political fragmentation which can combine with Jowhar and other secular and rejectionists Mogadishho worlords; but I do not think it would be disasterous; since foreign minister and Bay and Bakool people may resent South Mogadisho coopting, they may be soothed to the fact that this is necessary tactical move; if this succeeds, Yusuf would survive and possibly thrive; if however, he attempts to play Somali nationalim and never prepared for the worst case scenerio, meanaing if he does not get South Mogadisho and/or Ethiopian support, then he may be exposed to Jowhar and Mogadisho wrath which can assentially finish him, however, it is possible that he may have sufficient resources to defend himself and Bay and Bakool people from united front of Mogadisho, if he deoes not, and he deos not have the Ethiopian backing, and if united front of mogadisho emerges, then we have a trouble. This is enough bad theory.

Wadasheekaysigii Fakhri iyo Dagaal Samatalis Xussein Xayle Friday, September 16, 2005 Sheekadaan soo socota waxay ku salaysan tahay cilmi baaris( iyo qiso run ah) dhowaan daabacay, cilmi baarintaan oo af-ingiriisi ku qoran halkaan ka fiiri; (http://www.markacadeey.com/maqaalo/maqaal_samatalis_20050911.htm.) Sheekadan, laakiin, waa qayaali, naxurkeeduse waa cilmi iyo wax anfac leh. Waayihii dagaalada socdeen waxaan u dhexeeyay Xamar iyo Kismaayo, waagaas wax camal ah ma haynin, reerkaygu waxay ahaayeen sabool aanan awoodin in ay iga bixiyaan lacagta iskoolka, sidaa darteed, iskool ma aadi jirin; marka, waxaan fariisan jiray subax iyo galabba meel shaah lagu kariyo, halkaas ayaana wakhtiga ku dhamasayn jiray, bacdi sidii aan saas u ahaa, ayaa waxaan jeclaaday gabadh shaah karin jirtay, oo hadda, sida la ii sheegay, ku nool qaaradda Yurub, ayadana sidaas oo kale ayay ii jeclaatay, waa sidaan gadaal dambe ka ogadaye; muddo ka dib waan isku dan sheeganay, waana is fahanay, waxaan bilaabay, bacdmaa aan shaqo la’aan ahaa, in aan la shaqeeyo, oo aan shaaho la kariyo lana qabto wixii kale oo ay u buaahantahay si aan quutul-yoonka ula soo baxno. Ayadoo xaal saas yahay, ayaan maalin maalmaha ka mid ah, waxaan arkay labo nin oo ilaahay haybad u dhaliyay, oo wada shakeesanaaya, bacdi labadii nin waa nagu soo leexdeen, waxay dhaheen Buushka( waa meeshii aan shaaha ku karin jirnaye) in loo faaruqeeyo ayaan rabnaa, showr aan maanta qabnaaye. Marxaba aan dhahnay, laakiin lacag dheereed ah ayaad bixinaysiin, waxba kama qabno, ayay dhaheen, soo dhawaada, aan dhahnay. Labdaii nin waxay bilaabeen in ay fariistaan oo ay shaah cabaan, bacdina ay sheeko iyo waayo waayo ay galaan, labada nin, hadaan gadaal dambe ka fikiray, waxay iila muuqdeen labo nin oo xabiib ahaan jiray oo muddo dheer kala maqnaa; sheekadii markii ay sii wateen, ayaan waxaan aad ulaha dhacay waxay ka hadlaayeen, meeshaan waxaan rabaa inaan ku soo bandhigo waxii ay ku hadleen intii aan ka xasuusto; sheekadooda waxay ahayd sheeko ayaga kawayn oo dad badan oo Soomaali ah samaamaynaysay: waa tan sheekadii. Labadaan nin waxay iskugu wacaayeen Dagaal iyo Fakhri; Dagaalow( D) Saaxiibkaygiyow, waad ogtahay in aan abaal badan kuu galay Fakhri( F); Saaxiibkaygiyow, waan ilow badanahay, oo aduunyo waa xumaatay, marka i xusuusi bal abaalkii aad ii gashay, xumaanna ha u qaadan D waxba kama qabo, ee, een, waad lo socotaa, ayaan filayaa, in aan dalkan burburiyay, oo dadkii kala burshay, oo xataa, ilaa yowminaa hadaa waxaa jira dad iga carararaaya oo badahaas ku maanshooba F waa runtaa D ninyahow marka dhibaato badan ayaan dhaliyay F waa runtaa D Haddana waxaan jeclahay in sidaan wax ahaadaan F makula yaabaayo, nin dantiisa yaqaan ayaad tahay D waa sidaas D seddex qolo ayaa laakiin fara kulul igu haaya, oo run ahaantii raba in ay iga takhalusaan F bal ii kala sheeg D Marxabba D kuw ahore waa Soomaalida qurbo jooga ah, waxaa la iisheegay in ay rabaan in ay soo noqdaan, laakiin angia arintaas ma ogili, maxaa dhacay dheh, waxaan akhbaar ku helay, in kastoo aan khaldanaan karo, in ay wax soo barteen waxna soo fahmeen, sidoo kale waxay haystaan lacag marka ganacsiyo iyo iskoolo iyo waxaaas ayaa laga yaabaa in ay furaan. F waa gartay D bacdina waad fahmi kartaaa waxa arintaas ka dhalan kara; waxaa dhaci karta in ay iskoolo furaan, oo ganacsiyo furaan, oo bacdi waxbarasho iyo shaqooyin abuuraan, arintaan haddii ay dhacdo, waxaan u badinaayaa ina ay naga duufsanayaan dhalinyaradii noo dagaalami lahayd F waa arin aad iyo aad u macquul ah D war haddii anaga dadkii noo shaqayn lahaa ay shaqo kale helaan, shaqadaas oo aan halis ahayn, ama iskoolo iyo buug qaadasho bilaabaan, oo ay hawo gasho, sidaa guur, ilaahay haddii uu kuu idmaayay, guri iyo mustaqbal, waxaas haddii ay ka fekiraan, yaa noo shaqaynaaya oo shaqeedeena halista ah oo aan mustaqbalka lahayn, yaa qabanaaya, anaga ma dabaal ayay na moodeen, mo ogalaanayno in ay soo laabtaan, sida kaliya oo aan ku xaqiijin karno, in aysan soo laabanna waa in aan amaan darada sii wadnaa , ilaah baa nalehe. F walaahi, waa arin fiican, amaan darada sii wad, meel amaan xumo ka jirto ma imaanaayaan, waxay leeyihiin oo kaliya, “marka ay nabad dhacdo ayaan soo laabanaynaa†iyo wax saas oo kale ah D nabad ma imaanayso inta aan noolahay, xoogaa laakiin waa duqoobay, marka maalin walba dagaal ma kacin karo, laakiin cabaar markii la joogaba, hadii ilaahay yiraa, mid baan kicinaa, bacdi idaacaahaa ayaa laga sheegaa, bacdi waxay leeyihiin meeshii dagaal ayaa ka jira, mana soo laabanayaan. F qorshe xun ma aha, midda labaad, oo aad necebtahay, ii sheeg, ilayn seddex ayaan isku ogayne in aad necebtahay D shisheeyaha waaye qolada labaad, waxaa la ii sheegay, xaqiiqatan aniguba aan arkay, in ay sameeyaan waxyaalo aad u xunxun, oo aniga iyo adigaba aanan dan noo jirin; mashaariic horayumarineed aan samaynaynaa ay ku leeyihiin, heye, kanaalo ayaan dhisaynaa ay ku leeyihiin si beeriha loo qoto, haye, waxay leeyhiin, oo ba ka sii daran, iskooladii ayaan furaynaa, anigu waaba yaabay, waxaan is iri, war nimankaan, waa Soomaalida qorbo jooga ah iyo shisheeyaha ma isku waxyodaan, hal wax ayay rabaan: waxay rabaan in ay dhalinyaradaan naga mashquuliyaan; sidaa darteed, ma ogaalan karo in ay soo laabtaan oo mashaariicdooda qurunka ah bilaabaan, walaahi waaba la igu kacaa, marka aan maqlo horay umarin, iyo sheeko sheekadaas, aniga iyo adiguba horayumar ma ogalin, Soo sax ma ah, saaxiib F run ayaad ku sheegtay, haddaan ogaalano waxaa na badalayaa nabad iyo barwaaqo, fakhri iyo dagaalna waa dhimanaayaan, waxaas yaa ogaaln kara D Marka, widaayow, shisheeyaha, waan laynanaynaa, waan qafaalanaynaa, wax alaala iyo wixii aan samayn karno ayaan samaynaynaa, si aan u hubino in aysan soo laaban. F waa fikrad fiican, laguma eedayn karo, waayo danahaaga ayaad ilaashanaysaa F midda seddexaad D Saaxiib, sidaa aad la socotid, anaga horayumarka ma ogoli, marka aan wayraxo waxaan caan ku ahay wax burburinta, waxaan burburiyaaa, bilmatalan, guryaha, cusbitaalada,iskoolada, xafiisyada Dowladda, warshadaha, dekadaha, airporyada iyo waxwalba, wax aan dhaafo ma jiraan. F saxiib taas been kuma sheegin, anaa markhaati kaaga ah. D sow ma garan, waxaa kaleeto oo aan kala eryaa booliska iyo maxkamadaha, iyo xataa dadka waalan magaalada ayaan u ku sii dayaa, bacdi nin waalan oo qori iyo madfac wata, oo boolis iyo maxkamad iyo gaalshire aan ka cabsanayn, oo waali u dheertahay iyo maskax faluuq, waad garan kartaa waxa uu samaynaayo. F sharku cowdu bilaah D waa sidaas, waxba ma dhaafaayaan. D, saaxiib, laakiin waxaa jira kuwo aanan qorba jooga ahayn oo dalka jooga oo maalin walba raba ina ay iga takhulusaan, ama marka aan wayraxo i qabqabta, kuwaan ayaa I dhibay, haa F kuwaan kuma jecla, oo xaasid ayay kugu yihiin, sida aan maqlay, laakiin waxba kaama qaadi karaan, sidaa aan ka arkay, waa qayliyaan oo kaliya, markaas ayaa waxaad u qabtaa, marka hore, nin xoog leh oo wayraxay, marka aad bururkooda iyo wayraxooda aragtid, marka saad isku leedahay, hadda ayay ku soo galaayaan, oo aad difaac ugu jirto, ayaad waxaad arkee mid walba oo ayaga ka mid ah oo gurigiisa iska aaday; war aaway, aad leedahay, dadkii weerarka soo qaadi lahaa, waaba meel lagu kala tagay, marka saaxiib kuwaan waa bartay, marka kuwaan waxaa li yiraa towtowlayaal aa la dhahaa, oo waxaa ka mid ah, kuwaan la yiraa xuquuqul insaanka, iyo bulshada riyadka iyo aqoonayahada, beesha caalamka iyo waxyaabahaas, waa iska qayliyaan, kurbana waana galiyaam, laakiin, waxaan baranay in ay afka kaliya ka tahay. D waxaan u fahmay, warkooda gacan kuma xigto F mayya, maya, dagaalow, walaalkaygiyow, aadaa waxaagu gacan yihiin, adigu ma qaylisid marka aad wayraxdid, yadda ayaad ka hadahsaa, saas ayaan kugu jeclahay D arintaas caan ayaan ku ahay, sida aan maqlay F waa saas F Marka, saaxiib, waxaa kaleetoo jira, een een, in aad aniga, fakhri ah, aad abaal ii gashay, oo dadkii fakhriga ahaa waad badisay, dadka fakhriga ah maanta, ma sha’alaah, aad iyo aad ayay u badan yihiin. D inkastoo aysan fiicnayn, in banii’aadamka lagu degto, haddana aad bay ii farax galinaysaa in aan dowr wayn ka cayaaro wanaagaaga, F saxiib jira ayaad tahay, D Marxabba F bacdii markii aad na badisay, anagana waxaan garanay in aan kuu abaal gudno D dad qiima leh ayaad tihiin F saxiib haddii aan fakhri ahay waxaan nolosha aan ku dhibaa dadka saboolka ah D la yaab ma leh, howlahaagii ayaad ku jirtaa, in aad badatid ayaad rabtaa oo aadan dabar go’in, marka howlahaaga waan fahmi karnaa F waa sax F markaas ayay qoyayska fakhraga ah waxay cadaadis ku saaraan wiilashooda sidii loo soo heli lahaa wax caloosha la galiyo; waxay leeyihiin, oo aniguba aan maqlay; war waan ku soo kurinay, orod oo wax la cuno noo keen, gabdhahana, saas ayaa lagu dhahaa, laakiin dagaalow waxaad jeceshay wiilasha, D waa runtaa, sida aad araktayba, aniga wiilsha da’da yar ayaa ii shaqeeya, gabadhaha ma jecli. F waa saas, wiilsha markii saas lagu dhaho, kurbo ayaa galaysa, D waa wax dabiici ay in ay kurboodaan F marka waxay leeyihiin, waxwalba waan samaynaynaa, sidii aan waalidkeen raashin iyo dhar aan ugu keeni lahayn D xaq ayay u leeyihiin in ay saas dhahaan F laakiin, dagaalow, shaqo aad iyo aad ayay u adagtahay in ay helaan, maxaa dhacay dheh shaqooyinkii adaa eryay diidana in ay soo laabtaan, maadaama dagaal la soo taagantahy D waa runtaa, mana ogoli in dadkii iyo hantidii baxday in ay soo laabtaan, maxaa dhacay dheh, haddii ay soo laabtaan oo ganacsi iyo warshado ay furaan, dhalinyarda shaqadayda ma lagu soo karaayo, waxay leeyhiin, war maxaan ku falaynaa shaqadaada qurunka ah, oo halista ah, oo aan mustaqbalka lahayn, maan u shaqo doonano warshadaha iyo ganacsiyadaan hadda la furay, markaasaa howo ayaa galaysa, aroos, guri iyo, haye hee, mustaqbal waxaas ay bilabayaan in ay ka fekiraan; marka saaxiib ma isbiimeeyaa, oo ma ogaladaa in dadka raba in ay I dilaan in ay soo laabtaan? Ma ogalaanaayi, waa ogahay, waxa ay necebyihiin, waxay necebyihiin nabadgalyo daro iyo dagaal, marka aniga dagaal lee aan aburaa, bacdi ma soo laabanaayaan waligood, haa saas ayaan samaynaayaa; F marka dhalinyardii haddii aysan shaqo haysan, dagaalow, ma ku huraanyaan D waa sax, in kastoo ay tahay wax laga xumaado, haddana dan ayaa igu kalifaysa, maxaa dhacay dheh, aniga sidaa aad lo socotidba, howshayda dhimashada iyo dhaawaca ayaa ku badan, waxaa kaleeto ku badan dadka marka ay cabaar joogaanba igu sanifaaya, oo bacdi iska baxaaya, marka si aan howshayda u wato waxaan u baahanahay dad fara badan o shaqadayda raba in ay qabtaan si markii mid u baxaba( ama uu dhinto, dhawaacmo ama uu isanifo) waxaan rabaa mid kale oo miishiisa aan ku badalo . Shaqaala diyaar ahna ma heli karo haddii dadkii ii shaqayn lahaa ay fursado kale ay haystaan; marka waa inaan xaqiijiyaa in aysan jirin fursado kale oo aan tayda ahayn, qaabka ugu fudud oo aan taas ku xaqiijin karana waa in aan xoojiyaa nabad la’aanta guud si dalka, si dalka sida maanta uu yahay uu u sii ahaado. D Marka fakhriyow, haddi dadkii ku wiiqi lahaa aan kaa eryay, adna dadka aad dhibaatada ku badasid sidii ay shaqo iigu soo raadsanlahaayeen, waxay iila muuqataa in aan nahay dad tol iyo qaraaba ah F Waa runtaa D waliba hadda ka dib waa in aan saaxiibnimadeena aan xoojinaa oo aan cishow milic naqonaa D waa saas saaxiib, keen gacanta( waa la is gacan qaaday oo bacdi waala is mucaanaqeeyay) qosol,Qax, qax, qax, qax, F qosol,Qax, qax, qax, qax. D war nin yahow waa waqti dambee, marka sidaas iyo nooli ku lantay F I laa laaqin aakhar( ow afcarabi ku dhahay, macneedu yahay, kulan dambe) D Waas saas saboolow F Waayahay, dagaalow Lacagtii shaaha ay bixiyeen bacdina waa mirqeen ayagoo sii balamaaya oo siii waramaaya oo gacmaha taagtaagaaya sharaxaad iyo farxad daraadeed, ayaa iigu dambeeysay. Dhamaad Qoraaga markii qormadaan uu dhameeyay ayaa waxaa ku soo dhacay arimahaan soo socda Dhalinyada u dhexeeysa 12 ilaa 22 jir, ayaa ah kuwa ugu badan ee ka qayb qaata dagaalda, qoladan, nasiib daro, ma haystaan shaqooyin, ama iskoolo ay isku mashquuliyaan, sidaa darteed rajo badan kama qabaan mustaqbalka, la yaab ma leh marka in shaqo walba oo banaan in ay qabtaan, bacdamaa ay u baahanyihiin wax ay caloosha galiyaan, qoyskoodana ku caawiyaan; shaqoooyinka yaala ee looga baahanyahay waxaa ka mid ah shaqada dagaalka; shuyuukhda dagaalka aad ayay u jecel yihiin in ay shaqaalo ka qortaan. Waxaan fiicnaan lahayd, si dagaalka uu waayo shaqaale, in la soo tarxiilo hantida taala Kenya iyo Imaaradka Carabta oo ay Soomaalidu leadahay, si shaqooyin loogu abuuro dhalinyarada, ganacsatadana ay u maalaystaan, dawladii markaas jirtana ay u hesho meel ay canshuur ka urursato, si ay amaanka dalka u sugto, laakiin, tan ma suurta galayso nabad galyo la’aanta awgeed: meel bariba dagaal ka dhico karo, dadka badankiis ganacsi maka bilaabaayaan, sidaa darteed, waa in dagaalka uu marka hore istaagaa, si hantida iyo baniiaadamkii dalka katagtay dib loogu soo celiyo. Sidii arintan lagu gaari lahaa, qormada soo socota ayaan ugu hadlaynaa; Laakiin xiliga dhow maxaa la samaynkaraa, ayaa ah su’aal haboon ah. Bacdamaa ay adagtahay in shaqooyin la furo, waxaa la furi karaa iskoolo, sababaha soo socda awgood; 1) arintaan wax la’aan ayay dhaantaa, 2) dhalanyaradii dagaalami lahayd waa mashquulaayaan; 3)shuyuukhda dagaalka waxaa ku adkaanaysa in ay helaan dad u dagaalama, bacdamaa dadkii u dagaalami lahaa ay qarkood ku mashquulsan yihiin waxbarasho; 4) dhalinyarada haddii ay wax bartaan dhaqankooda ayaa isbadalaaya; dad fiican ayay u badantahay in ay noqdaan. Sidee bacdi iskoolo lagu samaynkaraa 1- waxaa la bilaabi karaa iskaashi dhex mara dadka toolooyinka, dagmooyinka dagan, qurba jooga Soomaaliyeed iyo dadka shisheeye ee wanaagga jecel, seddxdan kooxood waxay abuuri karaan sidii loo furi lahaa iskoolo dadka danta yar, oo loo badan yahay, siiya fursad ilmahooda ay wax ku bartaan 2- arinta iskaashiga u dhexeeya shisheeyaha, Soomalaida gudaha iyo kuw dibadda ma aha arin cusub; tusaale, gobalada Buntland hadda, waxaa ka socda qorsho lagu doonaayo in Iskoolada lagu badiyo, arintan shisheeye, wanaag doon ah, iyo maamulka gobolka ayaa iska kaashaday, aad ayay u fiicnaan lahayd, in qurbo jooga Soomaaliyeed ay aritnan taageeraan si barnaamijkan uu u guulaysto; sidoo kale, waxaa la ii sheegay, In kanal biyaha celiya ee Jawhar, ee Gobalka Shabeelaha Dhexe, in ay iska kaashadeen dadka gobolka iyo hay’ado shisheeye, kanaalkan waxuu ku kukacay aduunyo dhan malyuun dollar, lacagtaan waxaa bixiayay shihseeye iyo dadka gobolka. Gobolo kale oo fara badan ayaa jira oo arimahan oo kale ay ka socdaan, sida Dhuuse Mareeb, Caasimadda gobolka Galgaduud iyo meelo kale oo farabadan; marka waxaan muxtaaj u nahay in qorshayaasha noocan ah la badiyo, lana xoojiyo kuwa socda si loo wiiqo dagaalka, Nabadda iyo barwaaqada iyo horayumarkana gacan loo siiyo. Waa dhamaatay. Samatalis Xayle Waxaa uu ka qalin jabiayy, Jaamacadda Minnisota, ee Dalka Maraykanka, asagoo bartay Culuumta Bulshada iyo Falsafadda Kala xiriir: haille60@yahoo.com ama hail0029@umn.edu

Animal Farm, thanks good freind, I have already posited the artilces in diverse websites. As to Caaqil, poverty does not cause a war, it it a risk factor, just like cigerates and obisity do not cause cancer or any other disease, but if some body is an obese, smoker and leads a sedentary life, we say this person is in a high risk of a heart attack because major risk factors are present; however, these factors are not sufficeint to cause a heart attack. They can interact, to be sure, with other forces and together cause serious problems. Poverty does not a cause civil war, however, it incrases the risk of civil war initiation, it also favors the prolongation of the civil war; further, it weakens the state. It is a structural feature of Somali society, that is why I chose to examine it first, before I examine other factors such daispora, clans and external interventions. It is true that there was a poverty, say 1950s, but we did not have a civil war; what we had however, was a foreign patrons, like Italy, later Soviets and finally US, these patrons were paying the salaries of state employees. (Somalia was a never a sustainable state, look to the refencees provided for evidance for this proposition of sustainability).However, when they( our patrons) withdrew the funds, the employees of the state, as might be expected, stopped working and looking for other ways to boost their income so that they can help their families; Now, although, poverty was not a cause of Somali state collapse, neverthless it contributed to the state collapse and subsequent inability to reincarnate it, because we either lack sufficient taxbase, owing to our abject poverty or we do not have an institutions to harness local resources, in either case poverty is factor, weak states are also underfunded, underfunded judges and police officerrs will be less inclined to apply the role of law, their concern is primarily to sustain life by paying the bills, so the state would be weak and therefore, less effective in mediating societal tensions and restraining armed conflicts, owing to its weak institutions. You can see here with clarity, the role of poverty in Somali predicament: we are poor and poverty is linked to wars and not to development and peace, hence the vicious cycle of war and poverty, as explicated in the paper.

Samatalis Haille September 01, 2005 NB: This is a polished version of the previous draft Critical Inquiry on the Forces that Sustain Somali Predicament This paper investigates the nature of dynamics, conditions, and forces that prolong civil war duration in Somalia. It suggests, utilizing vast research on this matter, that poverty, a structural feature of Somali society, prolongs civil war duration. As poverty prolongs civil war duration, civil war further generates and sustains more poverty; this process, as researchers have noticed constitutes a cycle that feeds itself to generate poverty and wars. A myriad of internal and external forces, also, aid this dynamics thereby assuring its capacity to deliver more poverty and more wars. This first part of the paper, concentrates on the link between poverty and war, and suggests mechanism to weaken the link between them; in subsequent sections, I shall examine other factors that aid war prolongation and its attendant misery (such as external interventions, clans, interest groups and Diaspora communities). Poverty [1], as research shows, prolongs civil war duration [2]. Somalia is a poor country in civil war [3]; poverty, therefore, would prolong civil war duration [4]. One possible mechanism through which poverty prolongs civil war duration is that it limits educational and employment opportunities available to young males: this group constitutes the vast majority of warriors in Somalia and else where [5]. Facing limited alternatives, as shall be shown below, they are cheaper to recruit and retain as soldiers, thereby easing the cost of initiating and sustaining war operations. Employment and educational opportunities, in Somalia, are extremely limited. Reasons as to why this is the case is as follows; education is limited because less than 2% of secondary school aged population go to school; the rest do not [6]. Moreover, unemployment among urban population is 65%, whereas its corresponding figure for the non-urban population is about 40% [7]. This would suggest that rural populations are better off than their urban counterparts, not so, conditions in rural and nomadic areas( here after referred to just as rural areas) are worse for two reasons: First, urban areas house administrations( be it local or regional), businesses, schools, and in some cases aid organizations, while rural areas do no house these entities. Consequently, they lack opportunities offered by these entities; Second, extreme poverty ( a condition under which individuals are incapable of meeting basic needs such as food, clothes and shelter) predominates rural areas: more than half ( 53.4%) of extremely poor in Somalia, live in rural areas, whereas less than 25% of these destitute population live in urban areas( 23.5% to be exact)[8]. Relative lower unemployment in rural areas, therefore, belies the prevalence of extreme poverty. Under such rural and urban conditions, one anticipates the existence of large, extremely poor, unemployed and unschooled young population struggling to survive in harsh environment. If this is the case, war chiefs would have easier time recruiting and retaining these young men as soldiers; Moreover, as long as these economic and social conditions exist, war chiefs would continue to have access to cheap labor provisions that can sustain their operations for an extended period of time. When recruits are killed or injured, for instance, others would be hired to replace them. This is likely not to generate any major complications, because there is always recruits who lack alternatives to earn an income or occupy themselves; the availability of these populations, therefore, solves recruitment problems that war chiefs face. The resolution of this problem ,partly, makes wars more sustainable processes. And once wars are easier to sustain, they may be initiated and sustained for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and sustained, for instance, to protect or acquire income generating source or even capture or bargain about the nature of post-conflict state (see page 3, paragraph 2 of this paper). Poverty also prolongs civil war duration by making ‘governments’ established in neighboring countries (during reconciliation conferences) less sustainable; government being less sustainable survives only in so far as it manages to secure and sustain funds from outside entities, failing to secure or sustain these funds, however, would force the government to cease operations and start collapsing, As the state collapses, war continuation becomes a default condition. In this sense, then, poverty prolongs civil war duration by making formed governments less sustainable. One possible mechanism through which poverty weakens the state and contributes to its collapse is by limiting potential revenues that can be extracted by the state through taxations [9] Potential revenues is limited, in Somalia, because majority of the people are poor (73% of the them) [10]; Moreover, the country is among the poorest in the world and was getting poorer as the civil war persisted [11]; Suppose, however, that some segment of the population say, relatively richer 30% of the population, would be able to fund core state operations through taxations; under such circumstances, one may anticipate that the state would have access to limited funds that can be used to sustain its operations should the outside funds dry, for whatever reasons. I contend, however, that even this limited fund will not reach its intended destination, rather collection agents and their associates would appropriate these funds as they see proper( they may take the money for themselves because they are under-funded or perhaps they are simply greedy folks or both) . Reasons for this proposition are as follows: Somalia lacks, at this time, state institutions, be it security, judicial or revenue-collecting institutions; they will, therefore, need time to develop to the point where they are effective in doing their jobs. Since this takes time, they will go through a transitory period in which they are weaker, weaker in the sense of being under-funded, in addition to being in their earliest stage of development. Under such circumstances, judicial and security institutions, like any other institutions of the state, would also be weaker; thereby lacking capacities to investigate and punish those who appropriate collected funds; if this is the case, collected revenues, are less likely to reach their intended destination; in this scenario, the state will not only lack potential resources to tax but would also lack means to acquire them. Somali state facing these funding problems has traditionally relied on foreign support to sustain its operations; it is likely that the state had collapsed, when it was unable to secure these funds from its traditional patrons [12];Consequently, the state might have been unable to pay its employees, thereby, encouraging them to cease operations and leave. It is likely, also, with a benefit of hindsight, that rebels, in 1990s, had easier time defeating the state owing to the bankruptcy of the state, thereby assuring themselves reasons to celebrate; but their celebrations did not last long. They faced the same problems that previous governments had faced: limited funding or lack of means to extract revenues or both; failing, just lack their predecessors, to secure outside sources of funds, they followed suit. Many ‘governments’ that were further established in reconciliations conferences that took place in neighboring countries (during 1990-2002), followed similar path: the path to collapse and irrelevance. It remains to be seen whether the current government will succeed in resolving these funding problems. As poverty continues to favor wars, through weakening the state and easing the cost of initiating and sustaining armed conflicts; wars, in return reciprocate [13]: wars generate more poverty by displacing populations and capital, destroying infrastructures, and by increasing insecurity [14]. Some evidence is available indicating that poverty-war dynamics is at work in some parts of Somalia; A socioeconomic survey carried in 2002, suggests a general link between peace and better levels of income [15]. Conditions under which poverty and wars predominate, wars would be easier to initiate and sustain for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and prolonged: 1) for idiosyncratic reasons such as personal vengeance and family feuds [16]; Or for attaining or protecting an income generating source, such as ports, airports, road blocks, or plantations [17]; (3) They may also be initiated and prolonged for bargaining about or even capturing post-conflict state [18]. All these purposes, and many others, will be pursued so long as they are profitable, and they are profitable in so far as the cost of war is low relative to the profits that can be attained as result of initiating and sustaining armed conflict[19]; As more wars are waged for variety of reasons, as more society becomes poorer, and as more society becomes poorer, as more society becomes vulnerable to more and more wars in the future; under such scenario, society appears to be trapped; trapped, in part, by two powerful forces feeding one another: war and poverty. Societies lacking means to escape from this trap continue to experience violent upheavals and abject poverty for extended period of time. Recommendations 1- One way to make wars less sustainable is to build more schools; doing so, would decrease the number of potential recruits available for armed mobilizations and would increase the cost of recruiting them; research also links education to lower a risk of civil war [20] This is probably because, as Paul Collier and his team suggest, schools either occupy young people or change their attitudes towards life [21]; in either case education would make wars less sustainable. 2- How do you build schools?; one way to build them is to mobilize funds from Diaspora populations, local populations( people in villages, districts, and towns in Somalia) and international well-wishers so that they can be used to establish more sustainable and more affordable public schools. 3- Do not wait peace to build schools, the phenomenon of war and poverty is likely to be cyclical; that is to say poverty and war feed one another. Hence, they can survive for extended period of time. Building more schools in conflict zones disrupts the vicious cycle of war and poverty, by making wars costly to initiate and sustain. Moreover, less sustainability of war is likely to incline fighters and their chiefs to appreciate peace. 4- This paper recognizes that more schools are, at best, insufficient to terminate war, precisely, for this reason; I shall discuss other factors that sustain armed conflicts and make pertinent recommendations. Reference: 1- Poverty is, sometimes, measured by low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita; GDP per capita is “the value of all goods and services produced in the economy divided by the population†, (Accessed 28, 8, 2005). 2- Paul Collier., et al, “The Duration of Conflict in the Literature on Civil War†On the Duration of Civil war, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, 253-273 (2004). See also Nick Donovan. “Poverty is Strongly Associated with Civil Wars,†Countries at Risk of instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability, February, 2003, PP 27. <http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_ris /1factors.pdf,> (Accessed July, 10, 2005.) 3- Reputed organizations that rank countries on the basis of income alone or income and other factors such as life expectancy and literacy, place Somalia, consistently, at or close to the bottom of the world; See ;The World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 2004, Central Intelligence Agency,. Accessed Augost, 16, 2005. See also Somalia’s poverty in relation to the world; Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, PP 1, (Accessed June, 2005). Again See Somalia’s position in relation to the world, “Relevance of Human development in Somalia Contextâ€, National Human Development Report 98-Somalia, 1998, PP 21, (Accessed September 2005). See also Somalia’ poverty in relation to its neighboring countries, “Trends in Human Development†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 46, <http://www.so.undp.org/PDF- 2001/Chapter1.pdf>( Accessed June, 2005). 4- Researchers estimate that average civil wars (which persist by about seven years) tend to slow down the growth of the economy by about 2.2 percent. [Pual Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003), 84.] In so doing they make per capita income much lower (by about 15%) than what it would have been had the civil war not been sustained [Collier, 84.]. And as per capita income becomes lower than what it would have been, it tends to increase the duration of the conflict( by about 6%) and also increases the risk of another armed conflict in the future( by about 17%)[ Collier, 84]. I think Somalia is not like average civil wars, it is worse for two reasons; first, Somali civil war was going on for twice the average of civil wars (about 15 years); Second, the impact of the civil war on the economy was quite substantial [see this document; Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] (accessed September, 2005). If so, the impact of the civil war on the economy, and vice versa, is higher than the impact of average civil wars on economy. This would suggest, on the basis of the research cited above, that the Somali civil war would be prolonged and the risk of another one starting is higher should the current one terminate. 5- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, October 21st, 2001, pp 12-16. (Accessed September, 2005). 6- Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, PP 203, (Accessed June, 2005). 7- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 20, (Accessed July, 2005). 8- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 28, (Accessed July, 2005). 9- Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, “The Nature of the Collapse of the Central State -- the Politics of Centrifuge†Political Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia, Somalia Task Force Issue Paper #3, Aprill 1995. (Accessed May, 2005). See also Jamil Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 75. 10- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, (Accessed July, 2005). 11- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, ( Accessed July, 2005).See, also, this document for the impact of war on poverty [Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] ;Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal “Trends in Human development†National Human Development Report - Somalia, 2001, PP 46-48 ( Accessed June, 2005). 12- AllRefer, “Foreign Military Assistance†Country Study & Guide (Accessed September 5) 2005. See also William Reno, “Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and Start of State Collapse†Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of global Economy February 2003. PP 14-17. (Accessed April, 2005). 13- Pual Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford: University Press and World Bank, 2003), 1.. (Accessed July, 2005). 14- Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, “Introduction†Civil wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights, and Eonomic Growth February, 1999, PP 1, (Accessed June, 2005). 15- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 23, (Accessed July, 2005). 16- Stathis N Kalyvas, “Theory of Civil War†The Logic of Violence in Civil War March, 2000, Pp, 7-11. (Accessed, March, 2005). 17- Paul Collier “Who gains During Conflict†Doing Well out of War April 10, 1999, PP 8-11. (Accessed, April, 2005). See also, Sabrina Gross-Kettler, “Funding War Economy†External Actors in Stateless Somalia, A war Economy and its Promoters 2004, PP15-28, (Accessed, May, 2005). 18- Collier, On the duration of Conflict, 254. 19- Collier, On the Duration of the Conflict, 256. 20- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler : “Interpretation and Conclusion†Greed and Grievance in Civil War October 2001, pp 16. Accessed September, 2005). 21- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler “Interpretation and Conclusion†Greed and Grievance in Civil War march, 2002, pp 34. ( Accessed, March 3005).

Samatalis Haille Friday, September 09, 2005 O Good folks, I need your comments The Role of Poverty dynamics in Somali Predicament Introduction Wars have prolonged and people have died, O people come to our rescue, says, a Somali Rapper, in his celebrated songs. This paper resonates with this call. Taking war prolongation as its departure, it attempts to answer fundamental questions relating to the nature of the forces that sustain Somali predicament; it asks, what is it that contribute to the recurring wars and their attendant misery? In its attempt to answer these questions, the paper is organized in sections. The first section, which is essentially this entire paper, examines one of the structural features of Somali society that feeds war prolongation: poverty. It further examines the impact of wars on poverty, it concludes, utilizing vast research on this matter, that the two (wars and poverty) aid one another to sustain themselves; under such circumstances, societies will find themselves living in an abject poverty and recurring armed conflicts; to assuage the matter, the paper makes pertinent recommendations and mechanism through which these recommendation can be implemented. Poverty [1], as research shows, prolongs civil war duration [2]. Somalia is a poor country in civil war [3]; poverty, therefore, would prolong the civil war duration [4]. One possible mechanism through which poverty prolongs civil war duration is that it limits educational and employment opportunities available to young males: this group has historically constituted the bulk of the population who do the fighting jobs [5]. Facing these limited alternatives, as shall be shown below, they are cheaper to recruit and retain as soldiers; under such conditions, civil war would be easier to initiate and sustain owing, in part, to the ease through which these potential recruits can be mobilized to carry out war operations. Employment and educational opportunities, in Somalia, are extremely limited. Reasons as to why this is the case is as follows; education is limited because less than 2% of secondary school aged population go to school; the rest do not [6]. Moreover, unemployment is high, about 65% in urban areas, whereas its corresponding figure for the non-urban population is about 40% [7]. This would suggest that rural populations are better off than their urban counterparts, not so, conditions in non-urban areas are worse for two reasons: First, urban areas house administrations( be it local or regional), businesses, schools, and in some cases aid organizations, while rural areas do no house these entities. Consequently, opportunities offered by these entities wll not be available to them; Second, extreme poverty ( a condition under which individuals are incapable of meeting basic needs such as food, clothes and shelter) predominates in rural areas: more than half ( 53.4%) of extremely poor in Somalia, live in rural areas, whereas less than 25% of these destitute population live in urban areas( 23.5% to be exact)[8]. Relative lower unemployment in rural areas, therefore, belies the prevalence of extreme poverty. Under such rural and urban conditions, one anticipates the existence of large, extremely poor, unemployed and unschooled young population struggling to survive in harsh environment. If this is the case, which is likely to be, war chiefs would have easier time recruiting and retaining these young men as soldiers; Moreover, as long as these economic and social conditions exist, war chiefs would continue to have access to cheap labor provisions that can sustain their operations for an extended period of time. When recruits are killed or injured, for instance, others would be hired to replace them. This is likely not to generate any major complications, because there is always recruits who lack alternatives to earn an income or occupy themselves; the availability of these populations, therefore, solves the problems of recruitment that war chiefs face. The resolution of the recruitment problems partly makes wars more sustainable dynamics. And once wars are easier to sustain, they may be initiated and sustained for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and sustained, for instance, to protect or acquire income generating source or even capture or bargain about the nature of post-conflict state (see page 3, paragraph 2 of this paper). Poverty also prolongs civil war duration by making ‘governments’ established in neighboring countries (during reconciliation conferences) less sustainable; government being less sustainable survives only in so far as it manages to secure and sustain funds from outside entities, failing to secure or sustain these funds, however, would force the government to cease operations and start collapsing; as the state collapses, war continuation becomes a default condition. In this sense, then, poverty prolongs civil war duration by making formed governments less sustainable. One possible mechanism through which poverty weakens the state and contributes to its collapse is by limiting potential revenues that can be extracted by the state through taxations [9] Potential revenues is limited, in Somalia, because majority of the people are poor (73% of the them) [10]; Moreover, the country is among the poorest in the world and was getting poorer as the civil war persisted [11]; Suppose, however, that some segment of the population say, relatively richer 30% of the population, would be able to fund core state operations through taxations; under such circumstances, one may anticipate that the state would have access to limited funds that can be used to sustain its operations should the outside funds dry, for whatever reasons; I contend, however, that even this limited fund will not reach its intended destination, rather collection agents and their associates would appropriate these funds as they see proper( they may take the money for themselves because they are under-funded or perhaps they are simply greedy folks or both) . The reasons for this proposition is as follows: Somalia lacks, a this time, state institutions, be it security, judicial or revenue collecting institutions; they will, therefore, need time to develop to the point where they are effective in doing their jobs; since this takes time, they will go through a transitory period in which they are weaker, weaker in the sense of being under-funded, in addition to being in their earliest stage of development. Under such circumstances, judicial and security institutions, like any other institutions of the state, would also be weaker; thereby lacking capacities to investigate and punish those who appropriate collected funds; if this is the case, collected revenues, are less likely to reach their intended destination; in this scenario, the state will not only lack potential resources to tax but would also lack means to acquire them. Somali state facing these funding problems has traditionally relied on foreign support to sustain its operations; it is likely that the state had collapsed, when it was unable to secure funds from its traditional patrons [12];Consequently, the state might have been unable to pay its employees, thereby, encouraging them to cease operations and leave. It is likely, also, with a benefit of hindsight, that rebels, in 1990s, had easier time defeating the state owing to the bankruptcy of the state, thereby assuring themselves reasons to celebrate; but their celebrations did not last long: they faced the same problems that previous governments had faced: limited funding or lack of means to extract revenues or both; failing, just lack their predecessors, to secure outside sources of funds, they followed suit. Many ‘governments’ that were further established in reconciliations conferences that took place in neighboring countries (during 1990-2002), followed similar path: the path to collapse and irrelevance.It remains to be seen whether the current government will succeed in resolving these funding problems. As poverty continues to favor wars, through weakening the state and easing the cost of initiating and sustaining armed conflicts; wars, in return reciprocate [13]: wars generate more poverty by displacing populations and capital, destroying infrastructures, and by increasing insecurity [14]. Some evidence is available indicating that poverty-war dynamics is at work in some parts of Somalia; A socioeconomic survey carried in 2002, suggests a general link between peace and better levels of income [15]. This is consistent with aforementioned research. Conditions under which poverty and wars predominate, wars would be easy to initiate and sustain for variety of purposes; they may be initiated and prolonged: 1) for idiosyncratic reasons such as personal vengeance and family feuds [16]; Or for attaining or protecting an income generating source, such as ports, airports, road blocks, or plantations [17]; (3) They may also be initiated and prolonged for bargaining about or even capturing post-conflict state [18]. All these purposes, and many others, will be pursued so long as they are profitable, and they are profitable in so far as the cost of war is low relative to the profits that can be attained as result of initiating and sustaining armed conflict[19]; As more wars are waged for variety of reasons, as more society becomes poorer, and as more society becomes poorer, as more society becomes vulnerable to more and more wars in the future; under such scenario, society appears to be trapped; trapped, in part, by two powerful forces feeding one another: war and poverty. Societies lacking means to escape from this trap continue to experience violent upheavals and abject poverty for dxtended period of time. Recommendations 1- One way to make wars less sustainable is to build more schools; doing so, would decrease the number of potential recruits available for armed mobilizations and would increase the cost of recruiting them; research, further, shows that education is linked to low a risk of civil war [20] this is probably because schools either occupies young people or change their attitudes towards life [21]; in either case education would make wars less sustainable. 2- How do you build schools?; one way to build them is to mobilize funds from Diaspora populations, local populations( people in villages, districts, and towns in Somalia) and international well-wishers so that they can be used to establish more sustainable and more affordable public schools. 3- Do not wait peace to build schools, the phenomenon of war and poverty is likely to be cyclical; that is to say poverty and war feed one another. Hence, they can survive for extended period of time. Building more schools in conflict zones, therefore, disrupts the vicious cycle of war and poverty, by making wars costly to initiate and sustain. Moreover, less sustainability of war is likely to incline fighters and their chiefs to appreciate peace. 4- This paper recognizes that more schools are, at best, insufficient to terminate war, precisely, for this reason; I shall discuss other factors that sustain armed conflicts and make pertinent recommendations. Reference: 1- Poverty is, sometimes, measured by low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita; GDP per capita is “the value of all goods and services produced in the economy divided by the population†, (Accessed 28, 8, 2005). 2- Paul Collier., et al, “The Duration of Conflict in the Literature on Civil War†On the Duration of Civil war, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, 253-273 (2004). See also Nick Donovan. “Poverty is Strongly Associated with Civil Wars,†Countries at Risk of instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability, February, 2003, PP 27. <http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_ris /1factors.pdf,> (Accessed July, 10, 2005.) 3- Reputed organizations that rank countries on the basis of income alone or income and other factors such as life expectancy and literacy, place Somalia, consistently, at or close to the bottom of the world; See ;The World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, 2004, Central Intelligence Agency,. Accessed Augost, 16, 2005. See also Somalia’s poverty in relation to the world; Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, PP 1, (Accessed June, 2005). Again See Somalia’s position in relation to the world, “Relevance of Human development in Somalia Contextâ€, National Human Development Report 98-Somalia, 1998, PP 21, (Accessed September 2005). See also Somalia’ poverty in relation to its neighboring countries, “Trends in Human Development†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 46, <http://www.so.undp.org/PDF- 2001/Chapter1.pdf>( Accessed June, 2005). 4- Researchers estimate that average civil wars (which persist by about seven years) tend to slow down the growth of the economy by about 2.2 percent. [Pual Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003), 84.] In so doing they make per capita income much lower (by about 15%) than what it would have been had the civil war not been sustained [Collier, 84.]. And as per capita income becomes lower than what it would have been, it tends to increase the duration of the conflict( by about 6%) and also increases the risk of another armed conflict in the future( by about 17%)[ Collier, 84]. I think Somalia is not like average civil wars, it is worse for two reasons; first, Somali civil war was going on for twice the average of civil wars (about 15 years); Second, the impact of the civil war on the economy was quite substantial [see this document; Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] (accessed September, 2005). If so, the impact of the civil war on the economy, and vice versa, is higher than the impact of average civil wars on economy. This would suggest, on the basis of the research cited above, that the Somali civil war would be prolonged and the risk of another one starting is higher should the current one terminate. 5- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, October 21st, 2001, pp 12-16. (Accessed September, 2005). 6- Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, PP 203, (Accessed June, 2005). 7- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 20, (Accessed July, 2005). 8- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 28, (Accessed July, 2005). 9- Ken Menkhaus and John Prendergast, “The Nature of the Collapse of the Central State -- the Politics of Centrifuge†Political Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia, Somalia Task Force Issue Paper #3, Aprill 1995. (Accessed May, 2005). See also Jamil Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 75. 10- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, (Accessed July, 2005). 11- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 25, ( Accessed July, 2005).See, also, this document for the impact of war on poverty [Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal, “Human Development Indicators†Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, 2001, pp 194-222.] ;Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhause and Ronald Marchal “Trends in Human development†National Human Development Report - Somalia, 2001, PP 46-48 ( Accessed June, 2005). 12- AllRefer, “Foreign Military Assistance†Country Study & Guide (Accessed September 5) 2005. See also William Reno, “Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and Start of State Collapse†Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of global Economy February 2003. PP 14-17. (Accessed April, 2005). 13- Pual Collier et al,. Breaking Conflict Trap (Washington: Oxford: University Press and World Bank, 2003), 1.. (Accessed July, 2005). 14- Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, “Introduction†Civil wars and Poverty: The Role of External Interventions, Political Rights, and Eonomic Growth February, 1999, PP 1, (Accessed June, 2005). 15- World Bank/UNDP, “Employment and Income†Socio-Economic Survey 2002, 2002, PP 23, (Accessed July, 2005). 16- Stathis N Kalyvas, “Theory of Civil War†The Logic of Violence in Civil War March, 2000, Pp, 7-11. (Accessed, March, 2005). 17- Paul Collier “Who gains During Conflict†Doing Well out of War April 10, 1999, PP 8-11. (Accessed, April, 2005). See also, Sabrina Gross-Kettler, “Funding War Economy†External Actors in Stateless Somalia, A war Economy and its Promoters 2004, PP15-28, (Accessed, May, 2005). 18- Collier, On the duration of Conflict, 254. 19- Collier, On the Duration of the Conflict, 256. 20- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler : “Interpretation and Conclusion†Greed and Grievance in Civil War October 2001, pp 16. Accessed September, 2005). 21- Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler “Interpretation and Conclusion†Greed and Grievance in Civil War march, 2002, pp 34. ( Accessed, March 3005).

Par III Young, sanguine-like intellectual who was reticent(quite) made this puissant( powerfull) lecture: ancients used to say, he said, speaking in pellucid( clear voice) manner, that rural populations show a greater tendency to repeatedly affirm prosaic( unimaginative, dull) discourses, perhaps, to break from their boredom and familiar routines, but this tendentious character never liberates them but only habituates them to engage in a cliché or violent engagements. Violent episodes are pursued to break, presumably, the familiar cycle of rural life and experience new mode of human experience: the mode of aggression, group feeling, nepotism, discrimination, and solidarity, albeit at the expense of some: the dead and the wounded. Oreheru, another aspiring thinker, said, this is taking us too far, why not propitiate (gain their good will or conciliate) them rather than infuriate. He continued, while paying no attention to this moderate thinker: their sedulous (busy) endeavor merited, according to ancients, some help. So they did invent for them some dances, songs, instruments and games to enable them to break from their familiar routines without destroying themselves and others. As a result, the cultural varieties available to you were part of provident material intended to enrich life. Your claim that wars between groups were planned and sponsored by alliances of literate and ruling classes is essentially sententious( moralistic), that is to say the belief that your problems is caused by others is belief that is intended to relieve you from blame and therefore achieve certain degree of psychological stability. This does not sit well with corpus of knowledge that is available to us. I wish to tell that we are not puerile (immature or childish), as many of you think after you look to our quixotic objectives, which you rightly accuse us of having a foolish and impractical ideals; surely, we pursue a quixotic objectives, but that is not puerile, rather it makes our queries (questions) much more valuable. By aiming high we always attain some good which is useful not to us alone but to the general population as well. Pursuit of rarified (refined) knowledge is not something that is to be rescinded (recanted, retracted) regardless of its quixotic character. You should not rue about our quixotic objectives in so far they lack sanctimony (self-righteousness). It may be true that individuals perusing something that is ostensibly quixotic may develop scurvy( despicable, contemptible) characters, nevertheless they have, I assure you, their own qualms (reservations) about their quixotic objectives; these scientists are not pusillanimous( cowards) about confronting their realities and paradoxes; however, if you visit their labs surely they have pungent( sharp) adore which would incline you that they work with putrefying( decaying) material in their homes: you might ask, what is this unknown stuff that is producing this pungent adore? How in the world do they manage to live in such conditions? You ask, now the pungency increases and you see what appears to be a lying Home-fish, you surely do quail (shrink because of fear) thinking that scientist eat homofish, you too should be eaten to day! O peasants, you should not rail (complain) about the living conditions of scientists, for your living conditions are no better, because you have pungent adore too in your living quarters which scientists cannot stand for: they wonder how these poor peasants withstand to these pungent material; both of you have something in common, you both quaff (drink deeply), so it is possible that your pungent adore may actually be a product of your traditional beer.

Part II The Story of the River Some people have the tendency to offer an officious material( meddlesome: supply of un-requested service), no wonder their work is not appreciated. I, however, think your meddlesome( impertinent) material is result of you overweening( immoderate) tendencies to palliate( moderate) something just to display your pedantic( show of knowledge) urges. Your penchant(strong inclination) for demonstration is self-defeating; your tendencies to display your extensive knowledge hence differentiate your self from the bulk of the population, actually exposes your unimaginative nature and your obsession with details and formal rules. However, I admit that you show less peremptory (admission of no contradictions) and we do appreciate this character of yours. Your living conditions affect your work: you produce ostensibly perfunctory work: a work done with less interest and care. Had you dedicated your work, you would have produced a better work. Your perspicacious (having a key discernment) mind is not reflected in your perfunctory work: because you do not have the time needed to perfect your work. In any case, Science, o homofish, is not pernicious as many of you think. Your claim, however, that science community is dominated by philistines (materially not intellectually motivated) individuals who are phlegmatic (impassive or showing no emotions) to your suffering may have some merits; I have observed that some scientists admire to sit in pied picaresque rogues and enjoy classical music. Your tendency, therefore, to pillory (punish in public, scorn) these scientists rather than reward them with grants, is understandable; moreover, your pining (yearning) for pious scientists who are less petulant (rude) with you is further justifiable. I must admit, however, that the needed reconciliation is petrous one. Your plangent (woes) and plaintive (melancholy) mood demands something that is hard to placate because your ennui (restlessness) rests on a pique: hurt pride. Although your bith is piquant (spicy) it does not lack a platitude (superficiality) and because it does not lack platitudes it affords your opponents a plethora of grounds to make a counter argument against your pith which you have packaged it in a pithy (precise) manner. Since both arguments display a greater degree of plascity (malleability), I believe we have less energy to dwell on those disputes hence the need for pluck, spunk, fortitude and courage to forget the past and even the future differences and dwell on what we can do to improve our conditions; this, I believe, is the challenge that we face now and in the future. Such then, said one Homofish, is nothing but the usual peroration (concluding part of the discourse).

The Story of Shebele River Young man who recently finished his high school in Baladwayn city of Somalia left to see his family who were residing on the other side of the mighty river: shebele. The city is divided by a river, upon crossing the river early in a Friday morning he saw some half fish and half human herd sitting in a circular fashion; a big one was sitting on an elevated chair listening to various fishes who were addressing the survival issues of their humofish species. Five individuals asked his majesty to allow them to present their studies and analysis about the conditions, resources and skills that are needed to enhance the survival of the species. As the audience listened to the lectures, some of the audience were fervent (zealous or intense feeling) about the speeches, others thought the speeches were facetious (not serious), still others thought the survival would be assured by some fortuitous (fortunate) as they did in the ancient times. The latter groups thought that what was needed from the species was just doing what they were doing in the ancient times and their survival would be assured as they were assured before. While listening the lectures, a fracas( noisy quarrel) among some audience and subsequently participants were divided into two groups, those who thought the gathering were used to charm the opposites and not advance the interest of homfish population and those who thought genuine discussion and analysis would advance the interest of the population. The king asked to separate into groups and conduct a lively debate about their views so that he could finally make some verdicts. Proponents of scientific analysis expatiated( discussed at length) about their findings and recommendations, while doing so they exonerated Shark predators by claiming that sharks were doing what we homofish were doing to the smaller fish species: consuming them to assure our survival. A young homfish, whom I think was among those who started aforementioned fracas, lost his equanimity( self-possession) and said loudly: you scientist should be finding, if you have the interest of homofish population at heart, some ways to extirpate( exterminate) our sworn enemies: sharks and human beings; however, your recurring tendencies of exculpating( exonerate or free from blame) our opponents in the evolutionary struggle, shows your superficial interest in homofish survival and prosperity. That is a felicitous( very well expressed) statement, said by an old homofish sitting next to the young Homoffish who was fulminating( denouncing loudly) the proponents of science: you have exposed, he said, while laughing sarcastically, their gossamer( insubstantial) work, well done young homofish, he said while rubbing his beard. The fulminated group complained about the flip (impertinent) remarks of their opponents. The king, therefore, asked groups to restrain and not lose their equanimity and doing so forestall( hinder) genuine discussion about the future of homfish population; I do not mind denouncing others, he said, in so far as one does not deprecate (belittle) his fellow homofish. All groups accepted the king’s request. While the king was lecturing about the moderation of behavior, both groups were reorganizing themselves to put a good fight, some audiences within both groups who were observing the preparations of both groups for intellectual and possibly for military confrontations were distrated (distracted due to anxiety) for they thought, homofish population would never learn to work together, they would always prefer to divide themselves and fight over every thing even the future of the homofish. a dilettante scientist started to lecture: some of my colloquies have previously claimed that one way to assure the future of homofish population, to which I belong, is to find some food for their predators( sharks and possibly humans) ;this, he said, is quixotic notion (impractical idea). How can we find food stuffs for others while we are having a hard time securing for ourselves, or do you expect us, o homofish kinsmen, to fawn( flatter) you and dissemble( conceal) the realities that you face a biological community. I do not wish to flout( show contempt) your miserable conditions, nor expatiate( discuss at length) upon epithets( disparaging word) that your circumstances merits, as some do, expiate( amend) me if I sound harsh. Some of you have the tendency to distribute doggerel( trivial) material which is full of gauche( awkward, tasteless) propositions; I speak to you in glib( informality) fashion, for you are my kinsman. I, however, exact from the so- called intellectual class to expurgate doggerel material from their work, and in so doing produce highly polished and well though material: such material, I believe, would be useful to our population. Some of you may accuse me of being effusive( demonstrative) so as to charm the king’s daughter, which is, accidentally, present at this political assembly, and other beautiful homofish girls; however, It is clear if you pay attention to my expatiation at the subject matter you will conclude that it is not extemporaneous( improvised) presentation, but rather premeditated material intended to enrich and inform populations, if so, my efforts and contribution to the subject matter suggest that I aim more than beautiful girls, to think otherwise, however, is to be fatuous(silly) and not be facetious( serious) about grave matters in question. He sat down quietly while people were still digesting what he said. While the discussion between the groups were heating, a similar discussion has started among the audiences, and this debate among the audience unfolded, one of the audience lost his equanimity and very loud fracas erupted; the noisy quarrel soon degenerated into actual fight lead to the death of 20 and wounding 50 others. In the process, the king was powerless so he went to the bank of the river and sat down under tree, reciting ancient wisdoms about human nature. Two hours later the fighting has subsided and the dead were berried in a fell (high barren field) adjacent to the river banks and the wounded attracted predators that finished them although some were saved, however, their survival chance seems to be limited, given the limited resources available to the population as whole. Ennui (restlessness or dissatisfaction) ensued and dominated the mental state of the population. The young high school graduate left the scene some times during the afternoon while thinking that modern human species were no more different than the homofish viewed from their capacities to moderate their impulsive tendencies to destroy. While leaving the scene he saw what appeared to be an elegy and funeral dirge ( a song or poem expressing sorrow or lamentation) followed by dulcet music that was so beautiful it made every body, including in this case the human observer, forget their ennui state; Capturing this state of emotions, the king made his verdict: this shows, he said, O Homfish population, your varying capacities: On one hand you have capacities to create and enjoy a wonderful work; on the other hand, you have capacities and tendencies to engage in the most egregious( conspicuously bad) acts that we can reasonably imagine ; I wish, he said, I could find a way or a means to boost your propensities for good so that you could be better placed to moderate you tendencies for destruction and obliteration. The group adjourned while shouting long life for homofish, long life for homofish. The young boy left and joined his family on the other side of the river.

The Story of Shebele River Young man who recently finished his high school in Baladwayn city of Somalia left to see his family who were residing on the other side of a mighty river: shebele. The city is divided by a river, upon crossing the river early in a Friday morning he saw some half-fish and half-human herd sitting in a circular fashion; a big one was sitting on an elevated chair listening to various fishes who were addressing the survival issues of their humofish species. Five individuals asked his majesty to allow them to present their studies about the conditions, resources and skills that are needed to enhance the survival of the species. As the audience listened to the lecture, some of the audience were fervent (zealous or diplaying an intense feeling) about the speeches, others thought the speeches were facetious (not serious), still others thought the survival would be assured by some fortuitous (fortunate)forces as they did in the ancient times :what was needed from the species, they said with confidence, was just doing what they were doing before and their survival would be assured as they were assured before. While listening the lecture, a fracas( noisy quarrel) erupted among some audience and subsequently participants were divided into two groups: those who thought the gathering was used to charm the opposites and not advance the interest of the homofish population and those who thought genuine discussion and analysis was necessary for survival. The king asked to separate into groups, since this was their displayed tendency, and conduct a lively debate about their views, so that he could judge them. Proponents of scientific analysis expatiated( discussed at length) about their findings and recommendations, while doing so they exonerated Shark predators by claiming that sharks were doing what we homofish were doing to the smaller fish species: consuming them to assure our survival. A young homfish, whom I think was among those who started aforementioned fracas, lost his equanimity( self-possession) and said loudly: you scientist should be finding, if you have the interest of homofish population at heart, some ways to extirpate( exterminate) our sworn enemies: sharks and human beings; however, your recurring tendencies of exculpating( exonerating or freeing sharks from blame) our opponents in the evolutionary struggle, shows your superficial interest in homofish survival and prosperity. That is a felicitous( very well expressed) statement, said by an old homofish sitting next to the young Homoffish who was fulminating( denouncing loudly) the proponents of science: you have exposed, he said, while laughing sarcastically, their gossamer( insubstantial) work, well done young homofish. The fulminated group complained about the flip (impertinent) remarks of their opponents. The king, therefore, asked groups to restrain and not lose their equanimity and doing so forestall( hinder) genuine discussion about the future of homofish population; I do not mind opposing others, he said, in so far as one does not deprecate (belittle) his fellow homofish. All groups accepted the king’s request. While the king was lecturing about moderation of behavior, both groups were reorganizing themselves to put a good fight. Some members of the audience who were observing the preparations of both groups for intellectual and possibly for military confrontations were distrated (distracted due to anxiety) for they thought homofish population would never learn to work together, they would always prefer to divide themselves and fight over every thing even the future of the homofish. A dilettante scientist started to lecture: some of my colloquies have previously claimed, he said, that one way to assure the future of homofish population, to which I belong, is to find some food for their predators( sharks and possibly humans) ;this, he said, is quixotic notion (impractical idea). How can we find food stuffs for others while we are having a hard time securing for ourselves, or do you expect us, o homofish kinsmen, he said in a serious tone, to fawn( flatter) you and dissemble( conceal) the realities that you face as biological community. I do not wish to flout( show contempt) your miserable conditions, nor expatiate( discuss at length) upon epithets( disparaging remarks) that your circumstances merits; I, however, expiate( amend) if I sound harsh. Some of you have the tendency to distribute doggerel( trivial) material which is full of gauche( awkward, tasteless) propositions; I speak to you in glib( informality) fashion, for you are my kinsman. Neverthless, I exact from the so- called intellectual class to expurgate doggerel material from their work, and in so doing produce highly polished and well prepared material: such material, I believe, would be useful to our population. Some of you may accuse me of being effusive( demonstrative) so as to charm the king’s daughter, who is, accidentally, present at this political assembly, and other beautiful homofish girls; however, It is clear if you pay attention to my expatiation at the subject matter, you will conclude that it is not extemporaneous( improvised) presentation, but rather premeditated material intended to enrich and inform populations, if so, my efforts and contribution to the subject matter suggest that I aim more than beautiful girls, to think otherwise, however, is to be fatuous(silly) and not be facetious( serious) about grave matters in question. He sat down quietly while people were still digesting what he said. While the discussion between the groups were heating, a similar discussion has started among the audiences, and this debate among the audience unfolded, one of the audience lost his equanimity, again and very loud fracas erupted; the noisy quarrel soon degenerated into actual bloody fight which killed 20 and wounded 50 others.The king was powerless so he went to the bank of the river and sat down under tree, reciting ancient wisdoms about human nature. Two hours later the fighting has subsided and the dead were berried in a fell (high barren field) adjacent to the river banks and the wounded attracted predators who finished them although some were saved. Ennui (restlessness or dissatisfaction) ensued and dominated the mental state of the population. The young high school graduate left the scene some time during the afternoon while thinking that modern human species were no more different than the homofish viewed from their capacities to moderate their impulsive tendencies to destroy. While leaving the scene he saw what appeared to be an elegy and funeral dirge ( a song or poem expressing sorrow or lamentation) followed by dulcet music that was so beautiful it made every body, including in this case the human observer, forget their ennui state; Capturing this state of emotions, the king made his verdict: this shows, he said, O Homfish population, your varying capacities: On one hand you have capacities to create and enjoy a wonderful work, as the music and poetic language attests; on the other hand, you have capacities and tendencies to engage in the most egregious( conspicuously bad) acts that we can reasonably imagine ; I wish, he said, I could find a way or a means to boost your propensities for good so that you could be better placed to moderate you tendencies for destruction and obliteration. The group adjourned while shouting long life for homofish, long life for homofish. The young boy left and joined his family on the other side of the river.

What fascinates me the most about tribal politics in general is the propensity for ethnocentrism: to always take a position that is favorable to your clan, only this tendency never fails, perhaps, there is real biological force behind it, how else can we explain it, Abdullah sheikh, it is argued is spy, others no he is not, he is credible person, both sides, as usual fail to grasp what is obvious: the document displayed depicts DDR, which stands for disarmament demobilization and reintegration’s, a concept or rather tool which is very popular in post-conflict societies. If so, the document cannot bea map of invasion, but rather a map of locations and means of organizing militia; consequently, the argument of the former spokesman of USC/SSA is questionable, on the other hand, why Mogadishu websites exaggerated this proposition, I think they did so as to talk about something they were unable to talk about; why Mogadishu was not given the privilege that it used to have, why did the president and his prime minister fail to visit Mogadishu, why other cities, since the question lacks an answer, they assume the worst case scenario; they are planning to attack us; they are planning to isolate Mogadishu and so on, under this worst case assumption, every thing whether it is true or not, would be exaggerated to support their worst case scenario hypothesis; namely they are about to attack us, such assumption seems to be a reasonable if one were to believe that his survival is at stake; moreover, systematic exaggerations of rumors is intended to be used as instrument to mobilize a fighting force that can be deployed, in case the possibility of deploying a Ethiopian army in Somalia becomes a reality. Is this explanation pluasible or another explanaiton that becomes a victim to what it was fighting against. This is what ethnic conflict theorists tell us; they say, socialists, liberals, attemp to refrain from ethnic politcs, only later to degenerate into ethnic romantics,:Acuudi Bilaah.

Mr Caamir, thanks for the question. The answer is yes. But I am believer of incentives, in politics particularly Machiavellian politics what matters is incentives, so long there is incentives for peace all leaders would pursue peace, if however, there is incentives for conflict, conflict would be pursued. What do I mean by incentives, I mean reason ( such as fear of prosecution or consequences) to pursue peace. So long as peace is more profitable than war, peace would be pursued, the opposite is also true. That is why I advocate of more neutral peacekeeping force, and more international involvements, so that spoilers of peace could face an international court and some other consequences. Thus, if there are incentives to peace, warlords would be inclined to negotiate peace rather than pursue confrontational policy. Moreover, the question of land and clans in the south, under the circumstances favoring peace, would have a genuine chance to be resolved by body of experts and concerned populations.

Yes I did, In fact you can go ahead and visit www.nabadoon.com, my current website where the author's full information is exposed. I have been working on this paper for two monthes; I have went through a lot of pain and recurring nightmare reflecting upon the current state of our Republic. Enjoy and critique it. Thanks Valintino.

Views about foreign army deployment in Somalia examined Written by Zailici( real name Samatalis Haille, a recent graduate from University of Minnisota, USA, with degree in Philosophy and Social Sceinces) Somalis passionately express different views on the question of foreign army deployment in Somalia. They tend, with some regularity, to emphasize what is reasonable about their views and refrain from addressing what is unreasonable ; this selective emphasis, or some would say this ethnocentrism, predominates Somali political discourse. This paper, therefore, aims to expose this predominant feature of Somali political discussion as it pertains to the foreign army deployment in Somalia. Moreover, the paper contends that each view hitherto advanced has both reasonable and predatory (exploitative) consequences. To achieve its ends the paper is organized in the following fashion: In section I, I will cover some general characteristics of prevailing conditions in southern Somalia; In section II and III, I will survey different views people advance with regard to the foreign army deployment and their legitimate and exploitative consequences. Finally, I will suggest and justify what the Somalis and the international community can do to ameliorate or aggravate volatile human conditions in this precarious Republic. Section I a) Current prevailing dynamics While opposing views with regard to the foreign army deployment are advanced here and there, Somalia remains in anarchy: there is no common power capable of providing collective goods and services such as security provisions and arbitrations of disputes. Consequently, groups, supply their own resources to secure themselves from others and resolve disputes. Somalia’s prevailing anarchy, however, is entering a new stage, a stage where two major changes are about to unfold1: 1) possible shift of politico-military power (this shift is likely if biased army such as Ethiopia is deployed in Somalia, we will discuss this point farther in section 1, part c ; 2) Period of possible disarmament and demobilization of armed millitia. These likely impending changes generate a high degree of uncertainty and fear as well as an opportunity for triumph and defeat. These fearful and uncertain times incline people to assume worst-case scenario and thereby adopt various strategies that aim towards gaining more security from impending calamities; these strategies can range from radicalization of political discourse to preparation of preventive and preemptive attacks. Under such conditions, where the worst case scenario is expected, slightest accidents, banditry acts, extremist operations can easily drag the entire groups into sustained armed conflict. It is under such background conditions, that we examine the opposing views hitherto advanced with respect the foreign army deployment in Somalia. Moreover, we will repeatedly assume the worst-case scenario( as folks finding themselves in fearful and uncertain times do) to determine what is reasonable and what is not so reasonable. Section II a) TFG position towards the deployment of peacekeeping force President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed made a proposal to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in October, 2004 consisting of three points: 1) First, AU, he asserted, must deploy a peacekeeping force ranging from 20, 000 to 30,0002 ; Second, AU must recruit, train, and equip 20, 000 to 30,000 national security force, including an army and police3; Third, Until the TFG( Transitional Federal Government) develops into a sustainable institution capable of generating revenues through taxation and resource mobilization, the international community should bear the financial burden of brining peace and security to Somalia4. Some of the aforementioned requests had already been granted.5 To ensure the plans of the TFG are attained, it pursues a politico-military strategy that emphasizes three factors : 1) deployment of foreign army , including an army from neighboring countries6; 2) recruitment of national security force from a population other than clan militia; TFG officials have indicated in numerous times7 that they desire to disarm and demobilize current armed militia rather than train, equip, and nationalize them to take part in the stabilization process ; 3) relocation to a city other than Mogadishu .8 b) Legitimate objectives of the TFG The demands of the TFG for foreign army deployment, excluding Ethiopian army deployment, is, I believe, a reasonable one, because deployment of neutral peacekeeping force is likely to change the prevailing conditions, which currently favor conflict and exploitation rather than cooperation and reconciliation, by monitoring and reinforcing cease fire and other broadly reached agreements. More neutral peacekeeping force will also encourage formation of regional administrations where they do not exist, encourage amicable resolution to the question of land and clan in the southern Somalia, train security forces, protect the TFG and key infrastructures such as ports and airports. Moreover, a neutral peacekeeping force, above all, would enable TFG members to express and advance their own ideas without fear of their own safety. However, such freedom is unlikely, if the government relies its safety on particular clan based militia, for they( TFG members) will be inclined, out of common sense, not to pursue or endorse whatever policies that may upset their protectors: if they do, they will be annihilated. TFG is likely, under these conditions, to degenerate into an institution dominated by particular groups. It is for these reasons, and perhaps many others, that TFG is reasonable in demanding a peacekeeping force that protects itself and key government installations . c) Predatory objectives of the TFG The objectives, however, that the TFG pursues, are in another respect predatory, for they (some TFG members) endorse the deployment of known biased army: Ethiopia. The critic may suggest that Yusuf, and his collogues in the TFG, do not only advocate for the deployment of Ethiopian army, but also advocate for the deployment of any army willing to be deployed in Somalia including Igad armies; Since Igad states are willing to deploy their own troops in Somalia, the critic suggests, we have no reason to reject them, if they are willing to help us stabilize the country. The critic continues, since many people are concerned about Ethiopia's biases to its friends, we believe that these biases would be neutralized by the biases of other Igad countries such as Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea. I respond to the critic : Sudan is in the midst of civil war, it is not likely, therefore, that it will send large troops that are capable of neutralizing Ethiopian army biases. In fact, Sudan wants a foreign army for itself to resolve its problems in Dafur region. Djibouti is small country, which cannot match in terms of numbers and firepower to its Ethiopian counterpart; Eritrea is hesitant and remains undecided as of this day of my writing. AU-Arab force is likely not to be deployed in the nearer future( simply they are not ready yet). Now, Granting that in the end AU-Arab force would neutralize Ethiopian biases, Ethiopia, however, in the mean time would have the opportunity to crush its opponents in the south before more neutral force is deployed( we shall fully discuss this point in the next paragraph). Moreover, if biased peacekeeping force ( IGAD peacekeeping force) are brought to Somalia shall they not, I ask, side with their respective friends and inflame the civil war rather than assist in its resolution ?. On the other hand, TFG aims to recruit, train, and equip a new national security force rather than transform clan based militia into national security force. Now, If militia are disarmed and new security force is established under the command of the TFG and if Ethiopia is allowed to deploy its troops in southern Somalia, then it is likely that TFG and its friends, Ethiopia, would acquire immense power that can be used to dictate the destiny of southern Somalia and perhaps its adjacent territories; this can happen even if Ethiopian army is deployed in southern Somalia as temporary army until more neutral AU-Arab force can be deployed. How so ? Ethiopia is likely, under worst case scenario, to aid Yusuf to pacify areas south of Mogadishu, such as Juba and shebele valley, while simultaneously enabling TFG to build a strong army based in Baidabo, or else where in the South. As time goes by, Ethiopia and its friends would be better positioned to carry out military operations( under the pretext of stabilization, disarmament and terrorism) so as to eliminate their opponents and further consolidate their power in the country. This scenario, on one hand, will enable the TFG to rule the fertile areas south of Mogadisho , on the other hand, it will enable Ethiopia, in theory, not to worry about insurgent movements in southern Ethiopia, such as Ogeden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front, for they, in this new period, will be besieged( subsequently, it is hoped that they will die due to lack of military supplies and other necessities to continue the resistance) by Ethiopian army in one side and its friends on the other side. Under this scenario, Ethiopia would be able, if it succeeds, to shift more military and financial resources from the periphery to the center to deal with more numerous and more threatening opposition. Section III a) Position of the Mogadishu group There are many groups who qualify the notion of foreign army deployment in Somalia; however, they share one thing : they all oppose the deployment of Ethiopian army. They argue that Ethiopia 1) is a traditional Somali foe who has long historical and strategic interest in Somalia9 2) a state that is not neutral about Somali conflict, in fact it is state that have actively participated in the conflict10; 3) would not contribute to peace but rather would undermine peace efforts and enflame the civil war by siding with its friends and weakening its opponents11. It is not surprising, therefore, that some have called for armed resistance against them12 others have called for a holy war to defeat them if deployed in Somalia.13 Most of the groups that oppose Yusuf and his colleagues in and outside of the transitional authority, let us call them Mogadishu group( this name is reasonable because those who oppose and show their opposition towards Ethiopian army deployment were highly visible in and around Mogadishu), also espouse, with the exception of Mohamed Dhere faction, other objectives: They believe that TFG should be relocated to Mogadishu and they also believe that clan-based militia should be transformed into national security force.14 . b) Legitimate objectives of Mogadishu group If TFG attains its objectives,( deployment of Ethiopian army , relocation to a city other than Mogadishu, say Baiydabo, and creation of national security force other than clan based militia) then TFG as well as Ethiopia would have a center of military power in the south that can be used to pursue narrow military objectives. Moreover, Ethiopia would have a legal means to transfer large army and military hardware from its center to the Southern Somalia. Under worst-case scenario, Ethiopia may itself attempt to isolate or attack Mogadishu under the name of terrorism to draw the attention of Washington; So that it can acquire the resources needed to continue to sustain its gains and put down the subsequent armed resistance, while at the same time enabling its friends to rule the pacified land and populations in the south. Such scenario, for Mogadishu groups, and to be sure for many Somalis, is fundamentally unacceptable. Now, if one were to expect the worst-case scenario , which is not unreasonable when one’s survival is stake, then the opposition to Ethiopian army deployment would be legitimate and reasonable concern to be expressed and advanced by concerned groups. c) Predatory objectives of Mogadishu groups If, on the hand, the wishes of Mogadishu group were granted, namely 1) relocation to Mogadishu; 2) non deployment of foreign army; 3)and nationalization of militia rather than disarmament and demobilization, Mogadishu groups both within and outside TFG would be better placed not only to defend themselves but also to dominate the TFG itself . The TFG, under such conditions, is likely to degenerate into an institution dominated by Mogadishu factions because the primary force protecting and serving the TFG would be drown from Mogadishu factions who dominate the city, and because of this reason, TFG would be wise enough not to infuriate its protectors: if it does inhalation cannot be ruled out. Thus, without foreign army deployment, relocation to Mogadishu, and nationalization of militia is, under worst-case scenario, recipe for the continuation of anarchy( with its far reaching consequences, many of the neighboring countries regard the southern anarchy as source of the regional instability ) and degeneration of the TFG into dependent institution rather than an independent institution capable of stabilizing the country. For these reasons, and perhaps many others, such policies advocated by Mogadishu groups, viewed from this perspective, do not seem to be reasonably acceptable. Like wise, areas south of Mogadishu, if above wishes are granted, would continue to be under the domination of H/Gidir clans. Some groups challenge H/Gidir domination in the areas south of Mogadishu, for they argue that this domination in the south deprives native clans an opportunity to rule their own territories; This is reasonably legitimate concern that needs to be addressed. However, the argument becomes circular and unconvincing if non “native clans†advance similar proposition. I will discuss the land question and clans in another forthcoming paper. Conclusion So, as you can see TFG has legitimate point in rejecting the demands of the Mogadishu group, if , however, TFG concedes to Mogadishu demands, then its fear of degenerating into Mogadishu dominated government is very plausible, but on the same reasoning, if TFG is granted what it wishes: Igad army deployment, relocation to a city other than Mogadishu and creation of national security force( recruited and equipped under the command of the TFG), TFG too would degenerate into an institution dominated by those who are friendly to Ethiopia ; it would do so because Ethiopia is likely to aid its friends in Somalia to crush their common opponents. What therefore, TFG and Mogadishu groups reject would turn out to be the same :Each one of them pursues policies that would not only guarantee their safety but also would enable them to pursue predatory objectives such as domination and exploitation. Recommendations I 1-Support the deployment of more neutral AU-Arab force and exclude neighboring states particularly Ethiopia. Recommending II 2- AU-Arab force may assist: 1) in training, equipping and nationalizing clan based armed militia such as Digil & Mirifle Militia In Bay region, ***** Militia in Jubba provinces and ****** Militias in Mogadishu; 2) in establishing regional administrations where they do not exist. Justifications Nationalizing clan militia and establishing strong regional administrations would dissipate fears that many groups display with respect to certain elements of the TFG, for they, under this arrangement, would have a necessary provision to protect themselves from worst case scenarios : such as degeneration of the TFG into clan or group dominated institution, a military coup facilitated by local or foreign entities, or some other conditions that expose some disarmed groups to their armed opponents. The potential consequences of such worst case scenarios are easy to guess: unarmed former adversaries are likely to be exploited, dominated and, in the worst case scenario, annihilated. Thus, Powerful clans and regions are, therefore, necessary to prevent abuse of power. Moreover, establishment of more strong clan based regional administrations are also consistent with the constitution of the Federal Republic. The policies of Transforming clan-based militia into national security force and creation of regional administrations where clans dominate is not an invention or new idea, it is rather a working idea in Somaliland and Puntland. We therefore, believe it should be replicated in the south. The use of clans to recruit armed forces and create regional administrations with the facilitation of more neutral peacekeeping force is promising policy, because it is simply a familiar policy that has been used to build a governments and regional administrations in Somalia; it is also a policy that is not strange to the Somali public. likewise, this policy pursued under conditions that favor cooperation and reconciliation, rather than exploitation and conflict, is likely dissipate fears and, consequently, provide conditions that are favorable to political development. Opponents of nationalization of clan militia and use of clan, in general, as basis of politico-military arrangements are likely to argue that a sustainable government cannot exist or survive where clans or regions are still powerful. What about, I ask, powerful government and weak clans and regions? Isn’t a recipe for massacre, tyranny and another cycle of power abuse? TFG leaders, for instance, cannot guarantee that they will not abuse power, if they say they will not honestly abuse power, they still cannot guarantee that they will not change their mind in the future; lack of commitment and uncertainty about the future would naturally pressure clans and other organized groups to trust no one other than themselves. Consequently, this would necessitate creation of an arrangements guarded by clans and groups themselves to check the tendencies of federal authority to abuse power. Finally, regionalism and the use of clans to recruit, train, equip national security force, and to form regional administrations is plausible policy to be pursued during the transitional period, and perhaps until more acceptable framework can be worked out to settle the land and clan question in southern Somalia. End of the discussion. Reference 1- For an excellent discussion on the conditions that generate uncertainty and fear see the following book : Barbara F. Walter and Jack Synder Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Interventions, Ed.(New York: Colombia University Press, 1999). 4-8. This section have also benefited from security dilemma theories. 2- Peace and Security Council. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the support of the African Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia†January, 25, 2005. . ( Accessed on January 30, 2005). 2. 3- See Report of the Chairperson, 2, cited in number 2. 4- See Report of the Chairperson, 2, cited in number 2 5- ReleifWeb, “Communiqué: Peace and Security Council - Twenty- fourth meeting, 7 Feb 2005â€. Part of the statement reads :“ Authorize IGAD to deploy a Peace Support Mission in Somalia to provide security support to the TFG, in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security, including the training of the police and the army.â€` http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JWIN-69EF5A?OpenDocument. ( Accessed February 16, 2005). 6- Report of the Chairperson, 2. 7- President Yusuf and his collogues, have several times indicated to the media that they prefer to disarm the armed militia rather than integrate them to the national security force, see the interview: Waraysi( interview with spokesman of President Yusuf Ahmed, Yuusuf Bari-Bari- Feb 14, 2005 at www.hiiraan.com,. See also the interview of Yusuf Azhari with this website www.hornafrik.com. At February 15, 2005. (Accessed also February 16, 2005). 8- See number 7 with respect to the position of Yusuf with regard to the relocation to Mogadishu. 9- Shabelle Media Network, “Big Rally against IGAD at Mogadisho,â€14, February 2005 . 10- Ethiopia’s partiality has been confirmed by a report of an independent experts commissioned by the United nations :rnst, Jan Hogendoorn, Mohamed Abdoulaye, and Brynjulf Mugaas, Report of Panel of experts on Somalia Pursuant on Security Council resolution 1425( 2203). http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/unsc-som- 25mar.pdf. Ethiopia, 20-25. 11- This propostion follows from the evidence cited in number 10, above. 12- Reuters. “Somalis must fight Ethiopia peacekeepers – warlord†Wed February 9, 2005. <http://www.reuters.co.za/locales/c_newsArticle.jsp;:4209fcfd 71dd1d db?type=topNews&localeKey=en_ZA&storyID =7578936>. ( Accessed February 17, 2005). 13 Reuters. “Somalia clerics reject African troop deployment†Feb 11, 2005 (Accessed February 17, 2005). 14 Almost all ****** factions espouse these views: relocation to Mogadishu, non-Igad army deployment, and nationalization of armed militia rather than disarmament see an Interview of Muse Sudi Yalahow at :www.hiiraan.com Waraysiga Muse Sude. Farxiyo C. Qaajo, BBC Somali service section, interviewed Yalahow.

Gado region has seen a recurring civil war for quite some time, we hope this leads to sustained peace;however, I remain sceptical, local Clan relations and wishes of peace are susceptible to the intervention of Tigray dominated government in Addis Ababa, unless comprehensive peace is reached in African Horn between Christian and Muslim tribes, civil wars both in Ethiopia and in Somalia are inavitable. I encourage you, Hornafrique, to take the matter of Horn of Africa seriously and make it life long study and persuit, this I believe would make a difference. You have already possess, in my judgment, the propensity and recurring desire to make a difference, why not get the necessary intellectual armoury to make a real difference and leave the rest to posterity, unless you have already done it.

A very good discussion

What you gays are doing is becoming a victim to ongoing political societal decay. You are perfect replica of what we learn about ethnic conflicts, ethnocentrism, and propensity for ingroup bais and outgroup discrimination, investing emotions on minor isses, ethnicising every issue. You are reflection of what I learn from social sceintists. A 14th century Historian philosopher, Ibnu khalduun asserted that there are laws and social patterns that are descernable, among them he said is group feeling and blind bais and discrimination of outgroups. Samsam and Cali Samatar are examples. Continue the work I might add. Good lack.

many have missed the true politics, the Mps know very well that if h government goes to Baydhabo or mogadisho or for that matter to Garoowe, they will not be able to excercise their free mind to discuss political issues, the gun rules supreme in Somalia at this stage, with no kenya police to protect and maintain the rule and with foreing armed forces, the MPS will just be as Carta mps Puntland, and Somaliland MPs. The trick therefore, is to get seats as early as possible before the government goes to the stronghold of major clans with army. Moreover, no judicial insitutions are at work, the dispute, it seems, unfortunately will be solved through the parrel of the gun, as has been the case. No Mps with right mind should speak agains the government. Good freinds, discuss about real politics, democracy many experts agree does not work in post conflict society, what shall we do, shall we advocate for external army or what, that is the real question, im my mind.

Mualimu, I agree with classique, do not give up your potential love because of extremist tribalist manifestations, rather fight to get what you possibly might be a good women, you never know what she thinks, or why her family are mad, in the end, it might not be tribal phiniminon, but rather another phinimion manifesting it self in tribal fashion, so presevere and be the hero of your women, again I agree with classique, never mind what others think, of course, if you are revolutioinery, in the Moist/Marxist/Stalinist sense, you should worry about what others think for you wish to change them, other wise, you should not worry about what they think for they might be a prey to negative politcal clan probaganda, or actually they may suffer from personal and familial self esteam problems, because of the comlexity of human behaviour, I will not be dogmatic about the explanations I offer obout odd bahaviour, rather I would explore all possibilities to continue you relationship, unlike Classique I recommed relationships and dating for they lead to good things such as better understanding and everlasting human intimacy. Mualimu, worry about the complexity of human behaviour, but do not worry about what people say or you suppose they think about, precisely for this reason, persue your happiness.