Originally posted by Jacaylbaro: The only place the two can meet is in Addis .... not in a Somali soil. Sad indeed ........... I was thinking the same.... also thinking will American diplos meet with them in Somalia or Addis/Nairobi?

Originally posted by NASSIR: Based on USAID's programs in Somalia and the direct correlation with Corson's press statement, there's hardly a distinction. Contrary to Garowe Online, America won't extend diplomatic relations with both entities.. quote: Carson said the U.S. would not establish formal diplomatic relations with the two entities or recognize their independence, but would help their governments with agriculture, water, health and education projects. Diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, will lead the effort and increase their informal visits to Somaliland and Puntland. AP --------------- GOVERNING JUSTLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY USAID works with several partners to improve governance at the national, regional, and local levels, and to support key elements of civil society.... INVESTING IN PEOPLE Civil unrest has eroded Somalia’s basic social services. USAID assists local communities by providing integrated health and education interventions and improving the capacity of governance institutions to deliver services throughout Somalia. USAID has a higher education partnership with the University of Hargeisa to establish a program in conflict mitigation, and is also helping Somalia remain polio-free through child vaccinations..... Source: USAID Nassir, its helpful if you speak and read "Diplo speak". Carson said they would send Diplomats and Aid workers to Puntland & Somaliland. You are right, that doesnt mean recognition, (something Puntland isnt even looking for)but they will still engage "Diplomatically". They cant officially engage diplomatically because neither Puntland or Somaliland have any official diplomats. They want to help bolster social, civil, economic and security-counter-terror/pirate programs at the grassroots level(unofficially recognized regions)in both regions. On some levels this shows some disengagement with the TFG when they also say they want to reach out to groups in central and south, something the TFG has been unable to do. This sounds an awful lot like Bronwyn Brutons policy of TFG political dis-engagment latest recommendations to me, and letting differing Somali govts, regional or otherwise, working out their own problems through grassroots level assistance.

APD?

A Company I am familiar with will be operating 15 day (possibly shorter) tours in Somaliland. I am going to be sponsoring a tour company to bring in small groups of around a dozen people who want to understand what's going on in country. They would also want to see a diverse mix of sights as well. Its not for tourists since they will be charged with creating a small documentary on each trip and the interviews will be posted on a site along with their impressions. Its a perfect opportunity for the Somaliland military, political groups, NGOs, police etc. to send a message to normal people instead of through jaded or biased journalists. The focus will be on active experiential events, not so much sitting or watching. I want to add more relevant people, experiences and ideas. What would you suggest? Any "must see" or "must do" things? What experiences could we add that would enhance and make them understand something tourists don't see, good or bad. Puntland is next!

Based out of Switzerland. Anyone familiar with their tours in Somaliland?

AMISOM funding and budget has been very poor and small. Until within the last few days anyway.... huge donor funds promised to AU/AMISOM by the US, EU and UN but that Diplo money does take some time.

that would fall back on policy and the standards of the "Funders". You choose the wrong people in the leadership position, then they shouldnt have been funded in the first place. I dont claim to be an expert on PIS. Most of what I have heard is mostly internet details which can be shaky sometimes at best depending on what slanted Somali news websites I read, but it seems fairly certain to me that Puntland State should have been given some more control of the car steering PIS. That would also fall back on the Funders responsibility. I seem to remember the Agency funding certain undesirable warlords if I'm not mistaken. You see any parallel lines there?

Originally posted by Xudeedi: Dear xiinfaniin, I start with this quote, quote: When President Abdirahman Mohamed (Faroole) first came to the office in Puntland, he promised to reform the economic and security sectors of the state. Conversely, he failed to get in the affairs of PIS, for the reason that they are a separate entity under the false pretext of Puntland State. Their main donors are westerners who lack the competency to understand the convoluted political atmosphere in Somalia. Nowadays, the term "terrorism" became a mechanism to withdraw western tax payers' money in order to pursue personal/tribal goals. People of Puntland should stand up against these tyrannical leaders who could lead us into a period of devastation and mistrust. It is time for President Abdirahman to take full control of his administration or succumb to a new re-invigorated inter-clan warfare. The Greatest Impediment to Puntland's Progress Not as uncommon as you may think. The CIA made the same mistakes in Afghanistan, not understanding Clan & Tribal loyalties and long running blood feuds. While supporting one tribe they consider friendly, this tribe was also killing other tribes allied with US and Coalition interests. Big mistake! The funders are to blame, in not setting good policy and standards for the funding, not the fund-ees.

Soon we are also going to see much more AMISOM security moving in, a very possible shift to an offensive mandate change in an effort to push Kebab farther out of Mog. The UN has definite plans being set in stone as we speak of returning to Somalia. Also good news.

Originally posted by General Duke: Amistad the fact that the US will support the Northern States, and even the clans in central and the south independently does not bode well for Sharif's TFG. While the talking heads with large checkpoints at US State talk politics to the press, they have secretly given up any much of any hope of the TFG. I have that from a good source. They are simply doing what the TFG has failed to do, and will do so with or without their help. They are taking more of a "let the chips fall where they may" attitude.

Originally posted by General Duke: It's clear the US are thinking about the coming transition it's important to them that there is an allternative to the 2KM square Sharif Ahmed admin. Well said.... who else would they reconcile with if there is no one to reconcile ? South and South Central Clans seems like the obvious answer. In fact, the government controls a bit more than a few blocks -- 37.5 percent of Mogadishu, according to the United Nations. That's six city districts, or approximately 8 square miles (for comparison, Washington, D.C., is 61.4 square miles). Insurgents control another 31.25 percent, or five districts, and a final 31.25 percent of Mogadishu is considered "disputed" territory. AMISOM is slowly regaining some territory while Al Kebab launches desperate suicide attacks on the Villa and streets. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/23/how_much_turf_does_the_somali_government_really_con trol

The whole DoS release is posted here: http://www.somaliaonline.com/ubb/ultimatebb.php?/topic/9/24942 What is interesting to me is the US State Dept is announcing Stage 2 of their plan will be engaging Clans, sub-clans etc in south, south central Al Kebab held territory, something the TFG should have been doing a long time ago. It also goes against some experts recommendations of a US Standoff policy of mixing in Somali Politics.

Originally posted by AfricaOwn: quote:Originally posted by General Duke: Puntland gets recognition for our hard work, stability and also a single Somali state which is a corner stone of its viison. A reminder: Read through the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia. UN cites reports of puntland govt links to Somalia pirates You're not working hard enough dukey. doesnt matter, the US & UN engages politically speaking with many corrupt or criminal govts. If there are shady parts of one govt it doesnt mean you color them all bad and ignore them. You fail AfricaOwn....try again.

Africa: Remarks to the Press from UNGA [ http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2010/147922.htm ]"Fri, 24 Sep 2010 16:24:26 -0500" * Remarks to the Press from UNGA * Johnnie Carson Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African AffairsPhilip J. Crowley Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs New York City September 24, 2010 ________________________________________________________________________ *MR. CROWLEY: *(In progress) one of our regional assistant secretaries here at least once. There's been many things that you've seen in terms of the work this week on Africa. Certainly the high-level meeting that's happening on Sudan is an example of that, and also the Secretary's bilateral today with President Museveni. But there are a lot of things that you haven't seen in terms of engagement by others, including Deputy Secretary Steinberg yesterday on Somalia, Assistant Secretary Carson on a wide range of issues from Zimbabwe to the Congo to others, so we thought we'd try to have Johnnie for about 20 minutes just to kind of give you a broad sweep and then answer your specific questions. *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* P.J., thank you very much, and thank you all for coming this afternoon. It's a pleasure to see a number of the Washington faces also migrating up to New York with us at the UNGA. As P.J. says, this has been an important UN session for us because of the Administration's focus on Africa. Two things that are happening this week that are critically important: One is our engagement on Somalia, which occurred yesterday; and the engagement on Sudan, which will happen this afternoon. But over the course of the last several days, Secretary Clinton has, in fact, had a number of important bilateral meetings, including a very long and productive meeting yesterday with the South African Foreign Minister Mashabane, who is one of the most impressive foreign ministers on the continent. She also had a brief meeting with the president of Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan. And this morning she had a very productive hour-long meeting with President Museveni. Let me say a little bit about that meeting, if I could. President Museveni is probably one of the most important leaders in East Africa, and certainly in the continent. And he has, through his military, provided the backbone of the AMISOM peacekeeping forces in Somalia. He has probably in excess of 5,000 of the nearly 8,000 troops on the ground helping to defend the TFG government and carrying out both a UN and a AU mandate. The Secretary expressed her deep appreciation to President Museveni for what he is doing in Somalia on behalf of the AU and also on behalf of the international community. The Secretary also took the opportunity to indicate to President Museveni that the U.S. will continue to work with him and his government as he seeks to end the repressive activities of Joseph Kony and the LRA. As you know, the LRA has been one of the most ruthless rebel groups in all of Africa, having started its rampage of terror in Uganda, taking it to Uganda, and taking it from Uganda to Congo and into the Central Africa Republic. We will continue to work with the Ugandans as they try to eliminate the scourge of the LRA, and we will certainly continue to provide them support and assistance. One of the other big things that we've been working on here is on Somalia and our Somalia policy. Yesterday afternoon, there was a major meeting on Somalia chaired by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. There were approximately four or five heads of state there, including the prime minister of Ethiopia, the president of Uganda - President Museveni, and a number of the foreign ministers, including the foreign minister of France Kouchner, the foreign minister of Italy Frattini, the foreign minister of Great Britain, Mr. Hague, and we were represented at that meeting by our Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg. Mr. Steinberg pointed out to those there that we see the problem in Somalia as a national problem, a regional problem, and also a global problem. It is a problem that has metastasized over the last two decades, which has led to a situation where we now have international piracy, foreign fighters going into Somalia, and some groups in Somalia supporting remnants of the al-Qaida East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998. It's a regional problem because of the large number of refugees that flow out of Somalia into neighboring Kenya, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 move out every year from that country into Kenya, but refugees going into Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, and Djibouti as well; large amounts of illegal arms flowing, large amounts of illegal commerce. Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to its people. The African Union has stepped up and has put troops on the ground, but it does need additional support in terms of more troop contributing - troop contributors, more material support, and more monetary support. The U.S. Government has been working very hard alongside of African governments to gain more men, more materiel, and more money for this force. At the last African Union meeting approximately six weeks ago in Kampala, I met with some 13 states and organizations to try to marshal greater support for our initiatives in Somalia, and we have followed up in Washington with a meeting of the same groups to try to increase support for any AMISOM effort. We also outlined yesterday in a statement made by Deputy Steinberg what, in fact, is a two-track policy. We will pursue one track, which is the familiar track of supporting the Djibouti peace process, the TFG, and the government of Sheik Sharif, trying to help it become more effective, to make it more inclusive, and to give it the ability to provide services to its people. And we will also continue to work to strengthen AMISOM. That is the first track. That's the track that most people are familiar with. But we will also be pursuing a second track, which we think is also increasingly important, and that is we will work to engage more actively with the governments of Puntland and Somaliland. We hope to be able to have more American diplomats and aid workers going into those countries on an ad hoc basis to meet with government officials to see how we can help them improve their capacity to provide services to their people, seeing whether there are development assistance projects that we can work with them on. We think that both of these parts of Somalia have been zones of relative political and civil stability, and we think they will, in fact, be a bulwark against extremism and radicalism that might emerge from the south. Equally as a part of the second-track strategy, we are going to reach out to groups in south central Somalia, groups in local governments, clans, and sub-clans that are opposed to Al-Shabaab, the radical extremist group in the south, but are not allied formally or directly with the TFG. And we will look for opportunities to work with these groups to see if we can identify them, find ways of supporting their development initiatives and activities. Let me stop right there and probably take your questions, which are probably more central to your thinking than what I'm saying to you. *QUESTION:* Well, actually, what you said about Somaliland and Puntland, at one point you referred to them as countries. Are you contemplating some kind of a diplomatic recognition? *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* No, we are not. We believe that we should follow the African Union position on this. We still recognized only a single Somali state. This is the position of the Africa Union, which is the most important and largest continental regional body. We do not contemplate and we are not about to recognize either of these entities or areas as independent states. *QUESTION:* So what does the greater engagement - *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* The greater engagement can be defined as meeting on a periodic basis with government officials from these two political entities, talking to them about development issues, including a range of health, education, agriculture, water projects that they might want to develop, looking for ways to strengthen their capacity both to govern and to deliver services to their people. In the past, we have not engaged these areas and political entities aggressively. We will now start to do so. Yes, sir. *QUESTION:* Is that decision - I mean, how does that decision reflect on your assessment of the TFG's ability to have them get up and running? It sounds like you're getting sort of a couple of backups ready because you don't think the TFG is really going to pull it together. *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* We will continue to pursue the first track because it is an important track. The TFG is the recognized political government of Somalia. It is recognized by IGAD, which is the subregional organization. It's recognized by the AU and it's recognized by the UN. Sheik Sharif and the TFG government senior representatives are here participating in the UNGA. The TFG faces enormous challenges because governing Somalia has been an enormous challenge over the last two decades. It faces a security challenge from a radical extremist group called Al-Shabaab. It faces the challenges of living in a very harsh climate in which rainfall is frequently unpredictable. It is a challenge because of its location, its history, and its environment. We will continue to work with the TFG and its leadership, and we will work with other moderate forces and elements in the south who share many of the same values and principles of the TFG even though they may not be directly allied with it. *QUESTION:* I mean, do you anticipate setting up some kind of permanent offices in Somaliland, Puntland, or Hargeisa, or wherever? *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* No, we do not anticipate setting up any new diplomatic facilities in all of those - in any of those areas. But I must say that we were very pleased with the announcement yesterday at the meeting on Somalia that the UN is going to begin to staff on a regular basis its offices in Mogadishu. We think that's a positive development to have UN staff there (inaudible). *QUESTION:* (Inaudible) Somaliland or Puntland in terms of specific projects, money that -- *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* No, but we did have both embassy and AID officers in Hargeisa approximately four weeks ago. They had some very useful and exploratory meetings with the government there. We hope that we will be able to have, on a regular basis, opportunities to exchange views with government officials and to look for areas where we can provide development assistance and to help them stabilize and improve the economic and social conditions in their country. *QUESTION:* Okay. Just to - this is run out of Nairobi? *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* This is run out of Nairobi. Our operations for Somalia, all of Somalia, are based in Nairobi. *QUESTION:* One more about AMISOM. The Ugandans were quoted again and the military chief of staff was quoted recently as saying that they're ready to send up to 10,000 additional troops but they're awaiting U.S. funding to get that going. Given the troop deficit you've frequently mentioned, is the U.S. to fund this? Is that a plan, and when is that money going to happen? And secondly, on AMISOM, there's a discussion about whether or not they should - the forces there should be going on a more - taking a more aggressive stance and actually going after the rebels. What's the U.S. position on that? *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* First of all, the U.S. Government has been one of the largest supporters of the AMISOM peacekeeping effort. We support the AMISOM peacekeeping effort because it grows out of an African desire to support the Djibouti process, the TFG, and the current TFG leadership. We also endorse and support the efforts of the IGAD and the AU to expand the number of AMISOM peacekeepers. The United States will continue to make contributions to the AMISOM force based on our ability to win the appropriate congressional support for funding of that operation. We will not take responsibility for paying for all of the additional troops that go in there. We think that obligation should be shared broadly by the international community. As I said earlier, we believe that the problem in Somalia is both a regional and a global problem and, in fact, should be shared globally. Let me just point out again the fact that over the last three years, we have seen an enormous upsurge in the hijacking of ships passing through the Red Sea and the upper northwestern corner of the Indian Ocean. When that happens, it has an impact not just on the states in the region, but it has an impact on the global community as a whole. Yesterday afternoon, I had a conversation with my counterpart in the Japanese Government, and we talked about how the situation in Somalia directly impacts Japan. Any products that are moving from Japan or from Asia to Europe, or vice versa, from Europe, Germany or England and the Netherlands around to Asia, comes out and around through the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal, down to the Red Sea, and around. When ships are subject to hijacking, it has three or four negative global impacts. First, it raises substantially the cost of international insurance. Second, it can, if the countries believe it too dangerous to go through the Suez Canal and down to the Red Sea, extend the journey, the movement of products from Europe to Asia, or Asia to Europe, by as much as a week after they go around the Cape of Good Hope. And thirdly, it increases the cost of not only insurance and potentially time, but it also costs those countries that are contributing naval forces to prevent piracy - it costs them enormous amounts to fund the naval operations out here. So the impact is global. We are encouraging countries not only in Europe and Africa, but the Middle East and Asia, to recognize the negative impact that Somalia has on the global community as much as it has on Africa. African countries take a disproportionate burden for handling of the Somali pirates. I also would point out that the - still the second largest source of income for a country like Egypt is the use of the Suez Canal. When traffic is diverted because of problems in the Red Sea, it costs them money as well. So it's a major problem, not just a problem for Africa. *MODERATOR:* This has to be the last one, because I'm getting the staff scared that Johnnie is paying for our lunch. *QUESTION:* In the context of your meeting with your Japanese counterpart, did you discuss any possible joint projects or new solutions to this problem? *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* I certainly encouraged the Japanese Government to think about financial contributions to help defer the cost of countries in the region to handling pirates. States like Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, the Seychelles incur an enormous amount when they take pirates, have to prosecute them and jail them. Assisting them financially in doing that was one of the issues I discussed. I also encouraged them to think about making monetary contributions that can be used and directed towards AMISOM and directed towards supporting the TFG in its ability to deliver services. I also asked them to think about and consider providing the military equipment that could be used by AMISOM. This is something that we are encouraging a number of states in Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia to look at. It's important that countries in - who are part of the Arab League participate in this as well. We've seen the hijacking of some supertankers from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia could be of great assistance in this. It is a close neighbor to Somalia and it is impacted by what happens in Somalia. They too could make substantial financial and material contributions to this. So when President Museveni says Africa and Uganda are prepared to put in troops, that's their part of this international contribution. It is important that European, Middle Eastern, and Asian states find a way to make a contribution as well through material support or through monetary support. That's what I think President Museveni was saying, and it's a point that we believe is important to stress as well. Africans are prepared to play their role; it's important for others to do so as well. *MR. CROWLEY:* Thank you. *QUESTION:* P.J., what's the latest on the settlements? *MR. CROWLEY:* I have nothing to add to what I said last night. (Laughter.) *QUESTION:* Thank you. *ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON:* Okay, take care. *MR. CROWLEY:* Thanks, Johnnie. *QUESTION:* P.J., EAP in Washington is telling us to ask you for any statement on the release of the Chinese captain by the Japanese. They keep deferring us back up here to you. They say, "P.J. will have something to say on it." *MR. CROWLEY:* Well, as we had stated yesterday, we were concerned that this was an issue that had the potential to escalate. I think Jeff Bader yesterday talked about the strong nationalist fervor that had been generated both on the Chinese side and the Japanese side, so we are gratified that the situation has been resolved. It was something that the Japanese Government assured us that would be done within accordance of their legal process and international law. This was a Japanese decision to make, and we're just hopeful that with the release of the ship captain, tensions will recede and the countries in the region will get back to normal business. *QUESTION:* Thank you. *QUESTION:* Just one Japanese question. Is this - I mean, maybe that Prime Minister Kan's - his new cabinet is criticized by the other side, opposite side of the party - I mean the - this compromise means that Japan lost diplomatic - diplomatically with the Chinese - I mean this kind of chicken game, people (inaudible) chicken game. Don't you think that this kind of criticizing (inaudible)? *MR. CROWLEY:* I mean, as we - we think this is a proper outcome. And we had discussed this with the Japanese. It came up, as we said, in the meeting that the Secretary had with Foreign Minister Maehara yesterday. We had some low-level - lower-level conversations with the Chinese as well, and we sensed that there was a desire on both sides to resolve this soon. We think this is the right decision. It's how mature states resolve these things through diplomacy . And we think this is in the interest of the two countries and the interest of the region. Obviously, there are some underlying issues that have been triggered by this episode. The United States continues to support freedom of navigation in the region, and we will continue to emphasize that. Obviously, we have an important meeting that'll be going on today involving the ASEAN countries and you'll be seeing a communique that comes out of that meeting. *QUESTION:* Regarding to the Clinton and Maehara discussion, was there any indication from the Japanese side of this possibility to release him? *MR. CROWLEY:* This is a decision for - that Japan has made, and I'll defer to the Japanese Government to explain its reasoning. But obviously, we believe that this will significantly reduce the existing tension. We think it was a proper decision for Japan to make. *QUESTION:* Thank you. *MR. CROWLEY:* Thank you. PRN: 2010/1344 Back to Top [ # ] The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. ________________________________________________________________________

Eritrea May Become Failed State Selah Hennessy | London 22 September 2010 Eritrea is at risk of becoming a failed state, according to a new report from the International Crisis Group. It says internal repression coupled with international military conflict means the country is becoming increasingly isolated in the Horn of Africa. The report says during the past decade Eritrea's government has clamped down on dissent on a colossal scale. It says Eritrea's jails are full of political prisoners, journalists, and religious dissidents who are regularly targeted by the state. ICG's E.J. Hogendoorn says Eritrea has also undergone major military mobilization – a policy that has hit the country's youth hardest. "It has mobilized almost all of Eritrea's youth into so-called national service," Hogendoorn said. "So essentially, if you are a young Eritrean you are indefinitely serving in the military or in national service." The report says Eritrea has fought either directly or indirectly with Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, and Sudan and been involved in conflicts in eastern Sudan, Somalia, and Darfur. An estimated 80,000 people were killed in a two-year border dispute with Ethiopia that ended in 2000. Hogendoorn says Eritrea's militarization affects the entire region. "The Horn of Africa is very much an interlocked region and what people need to recognize is that if they want to promote peace and stability in other places, such as Somalia, what needs to be recognized is that regional players play a big role in that instability and as such those regional problems need to be addressed holistically," Hogendoorn added. Hogendoorn says the Eritrean government uses an ongoing border dispute with neighboring Ethiopia to justify repression. He says Ethiopia has not fulfilled border promises made in the Algiers Agreements, a 2000 deal between the two countries. The U.N. Security Council, he says, should urge Ethiopia to accept the border ruling. "It needs to put pressure on Ethiopia to abide by these border rulings in an effort to move the process forward and to try to foster some sort of normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea," said Hogendoorn. Mohamed Dalmar is a Britain-based political analyst from Somaliland. He says Eritrea is key to stability in the Horn of Africa. "Eritrea is now at the center of a troubled region," Dalmar said. "And if another failed state that crumbles is added into the picture I think it will be rather disastrous." Eritrea faces UN sanctions for allegedly supporting Islamist rebels in Somalia. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Report-says-Eritrea-May-Become-Failed-State-103538889.htm l

Cant wait....

Totally agree with that. And not just the US, but the combined international donors should form some sort of consortium and set a strategy because right now its all just short term, throw some money here and there and see what happens..... sickening really. Putting this all the shoulders of an ill equipped, underfunded and inexperienced AMISOM is certainly not the answer. The US in its efforts tend to group the entire region as a whole and strategize from there. Ive spoken with upper echelon DoS Plans and Policy folks and these people uphold Obamas policies of not fixing, not rebuilding, not stabilizing and certainly not nation building, quote unquote.

Well the fact remains that nobody is giving up on the TFG just yet. They have another year and it looks like no end to the flow of blood, as US & UN Gen Sec Moon, Ambassadors Rice & Mahiga call on more support for the TFG & AU in the way of funding and more troops. I often wonder what contingency operations these entities have in place if and when Mog falls. Perhaps the new capitol will be in Puntland, who knows?

Steps in Guerrilla War 1. Objective 2. Civil Support 3. Build Up 4. Attrition 5. Transition = Insurgency to Conventional 6. Govt Take Over Al Kebab is currently stuck somewhere between 3 & 4 and has a very long way to go to reach 5 if they plan on taking and holding Mogadishu. AU is stuck between a rock and a hard place, mainly because of TFG action and/or in-action. I speak with some of their ranking folks on occasion and it is almost impossible to put any long term strategy face on anything.

I`m white and traveled from Hargeisa to Berbera just after the Oct bombings in Hargeisa. I could not beleive the number of folks who were there that were American and Canadian. Everyone very friendly and helpful and a lot of nationalistic pride of Somaliland. We stopped at the Hieroglyphics, then traveled to beautiful Berbera. That place should be a tourist vacation spot of the highest order, the coasts alone are worth billions in tourism dollars.

Nice pics Duke! certainly more beautiful than downtown Djibouti, which is crumbling.

Good luck on the project! You guys are exporting livestock to Arabia again aren't you?

Nice Bridge, but very poor looking security for the President. I`d use a loose diamond formation on the principle with a close support standby vehicle in tow, two scoped snipers on the bridge and six men securing the riverbed after an area security assessment & saturation. But thats just me. It would be naive to think Shababies are not hanging about with some of these:

By SARAH CHILDRESS 10 Sept 2010 The Wall Street Journal A Somali militant group that has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda has turned to piracy to finance its effort to topple Somalia's government, posing new risks for shipping companies and the international naval forces patrolling the waters off the horn of Africa. Al Shabaab, which has been designated by the U.S. as a terrorist group, has proceeded from taxing Somali pirates' ransom revenue to dispatching its own fighters to attack ships—American vessels in particular—according to pirates, al Shabaab officials, residents of seaside towns and the Somali government. In a recent sermon in the southern port city of Kismayo, Sheikh Mahad, a senior al Shabaab official, branded the group's piracy as "sea jihad" and called on young militants about to head to sea to target American ships. "America is our enemy," he said, according to a person who was present and recorded the sermon. "We have to retaliate against them by sea or by land." The U.S. views the Somali government as a bulwark against al Shabaab and a rare chance for stability in Somalia—though it controls only a few blocks of the capital, Mogadishu, under the protection of African Union troops. Much of southern and central Somalia is controlled by al Shabaab. The rest is dominated by other militant groups, clans and along the northern coast, pirates. Al Shabaab has been waging an offensive against the government since the beginning of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, that has left 230 people dead and about 20,000 people displaced, according to the United Nations. On Thursday, the day before Somalis were to celebrate the end of Ramadan, al Shabaab suicide bombers struck Mogadishu's airport, leaving two African Union troops, two civilians and five militants dead. In July, al Shabaab claimed responsibility for its first known attack outside the country: three coordinated bombings in the Ugandan capital of Kampala that killed at least 76 people. The suspected mastermind of the attack said Americans were among its targets. Al Shabaab largely funds itself by taxing businesses that operate in the territory it controls—much of southern and central Somalia—as well as with contributions from supporters outside the country. In recent months, the group has sought more funds to support its fight. "We know they are directly using the pirates" to raise money, said Abdirisaq Qaylow, spokesman of Somalia's information ministry. Al Shabaab officials and pirates say the group has begun to send out militants in pirate skiffs from two southern cities it controls, Kismayo and Barawe. Residents of the cities, which previously weren't believed to be involved in piracy, say they have seen militants heading out to sea with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 rifles. There was no immediate evidence that the pirates who on Wednesday hijacked a German-owned ship in the Gulf of Aden, only to have U.S. Marines retake it the following day, were members of al Shabaab. Since January, there have been 119 attempted or successful hijackings by Somali pirates, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Analysts say the average ransom payment to Somali pirates is about $2 million, twice last year's average. Shipping companies have become increasingly willing to pay as quickly as possible to secure a ship's release, according to Roger Middleton, a researcher at Chatham House who studies piracy. In January, hijackers aboard a Greek supertanker reported receiving $7 million to release it—the highest ransom that has been reliably reported, according to analysts. The piracy boom has prompted foreign governments to dispatch multinational naval patrols, including the European Union Naval Force Somalia's Operation Atalanta. Russia, Japan and China have also sent warships to patrol these waters, and the U.S. Navy has established a multinational antipiracy task force. An al Shabaab associate and businessman said the group has attempted to attack American ships, but hasn't succeeded. Spokesmen for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which oversees the U.S. task force, and the EU Naval Force declined to comment on al Shabaab's threat to attack U.S. ships. While most of the traffic in Indian Ocean shipping lanes isn't American, some U.S.-flagged ships do pass through—notably the Maersk Alabama container ship, which was hijacked off Somalia in April 2009. The U.S. Navy ended the five-day hostage standoff. The development complicates the problem of how U.S. companies can get their ships and hostages back. Shippers and insurers could inadvertently pay otherwise legal ransoms that end up in the pockets of suspected terrorists—a violation of U.S. law that could entail penalties of up to $1 million. Because it is often difficult to know where ransom money ends up, said a representative of the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, which enforces U.S. sanctions, only blatant or willful violations of the regulations are likely to be prosecuted. So far, the representative said, no companies had been prosecuted by OFAC for paying a ransom. The Islamist militants-turned-pirates have been instructed to avoid ships from Muslim countries, in contrast to established Somali pirates, who are known for an impious lifestyle and chiefly seek targets that are easier to board from their small skiffs. Pirates new to the trade apparently endure a steep learning curve. Some recently arrested pirates were caught without food, water or fuel, and appeared to lask basic knowledge of the sea, according to Alan Cole, the coordinator of the United Nations' counterpiracy program in Nairobi. "The proficiency level is going down sharply," Mr. Cole said. "There are fewer fishermen and more fighters." Al Shabaab's piracy activities began with a militant leader who hails from the pirate haven Harardheere, and whose clan is involved in the piracy business, according to an al Shabaab official. About five months ago, when al Shabaab commanders called a meeting to discuss the group's need for funds, the leader, who had been collecting taxes from pirates, proposed launching the group's own pirate skiffs, according to an al Shabaab member based at Kismayo port. Veteran pirates complain that al Shabaab's involvement carries risks for them. "This could cause the antipiracy ships to shoot us since (al Shabaab) is an enemy to them," said Nur Abdi, a Somali pirate in Kismayo. "If the Americans find out, every seized ship will be rescued by force, and that's troublesome!"

good debate here, but a couple of items you are missing. AMISOMs Mandate is defensive posture only. Their sole mission is to protect the official government of Somalia, who can not do it themselves. A large group of Somalis who apparently feel the same are ASWJ. The TFG, AMISOM & ASWJ do not resort to terrorist tactics used by Shabab. AMISOM defends its positions using standard defensive tactics and rules of engagement set by their defensive posture. Shabab uses roadway IEDs, VBIEDs, human suicide bombers and launches lethal mortar attacks from civilian position (human shields), then moves and fires again from more civilian positions assuring an AMISOM defensive attack. They kill, be-head, whip, beat, harass and cajole the general public into their twisted views. I would think this last item alone would be enough to get a rise out of most Somalis, and anyone doing this to my people I would certainly take arms against, not a Force defending my government. It should be obvious by now AMISOM and their international support base is not going to go away, especially after attacking Uganda, and threatening Burundi and Djibouti. It doesnt really matter if Shabab takes Mogadishu. Wherever the government of Somalia is seated is where the new capitol would be, and Mog would just become more of Somalia occupied territory by the terror group Shabab.