Israel Recognises Somaliland: Why not?

[Deeq A.]

On 26 December 2025 Israel formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, ending over three decades of diplomatic isolation. Somaliland, located in the strategically vital Red Sea waterways and the Gulf of Aden, is a democratic and stable country that was originally granted independence in 1960, before entering a union with Somalia. After 31 years as part of a malfunctioning and disastrous union, in 1991 Somaliland re-claimed its sovereignty and worked to develop its democratic institutions, enhance security and rebuild its economy, largely without assistance from the international community.

Unlike Somalia’s non-democratic and fragmented “administrations”, Somaliland’s sovereignty is largely accepted by its population and the state fully exercises its authority over all its territory, in conformity with the principles of constitutional democracy. As was to be suspected, Israel’s move prompted a lot of eschatological reactions and predicable condemnations from nations that have long-objected to Somaliland’s independence, including Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt and Turkey, as well as contradiction-ridden organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Critiques of this new diplomatic link between Hargeisa and Tel Aviv have come in several forms, but can generally be grouped into three main types: 1) Israel’s move is presented as a spontaneous and opportunistic act; 2) arguments that ignore that sovereign states have a right to conduct international relations, including acting unilaterally in their own interests; and 3) the idea that Somaliland’s recognition will destabilize the region. None of these critiques stand up to historical facts.

Let’s start with the idea that Israel’s recognition is simply a spontaneous and opportunistic act. Rather than springing from nowhere, Somalilanders and Israelis’ ties in fact date back decades. Israel was one of the first states to recognize Somaliland’s independence in 1960, and Israel and American Jewish activists have recognized the mistreatment of Somalilanders at the hands of Mogadishu since the 1980s. In May 1990, Israel’s UN Acting Permanent Representative, Johannen Bein, raised concerns at the Security Council about grave human rights abuses in Somalia. This intervention followed on from years of tireless work by US Congressman Sam Gejdenson, Human Rights activist Aryeh Neier and Somaliland intellectuals and activists, as well as the full support of the American Jewish Committee.

Appalled by the military regime’s repression against Somalilanders, Gejdenson, Neier and Somalilanders organized in July and November 1988 two significant congressional meetings, which had a lasting and monumental impact on the civil war in Somalia and on the protection of refugees’ human rights.

These congressional consultations led to the fact-finding mission Why Somalis Flee (1989) commissioned by the US State Department’s Bureau of Refugee Programs. Subsequently, Gejdenson, Neier and their remarkable collaborators successfully succeeded in halting military aid to Siad Barre’s authoritarian regime, redirecting economic aid designed for Somalia, and incorporating human rights concerns into the US foreign policy processes.

A second set of critiques all implicitly challenge or ignore Israel’s rights as a sovereign state to act. One line of argument here challenges Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on the basis that it was a unilateral rather than multilateral decision. This critique is a non-starter as there is strong historical precedent for this type of action. Back in 1991, for example, Iceland and then Germany unilaterally recognized Croatia, which in turn recognized Slovenia. Icelandic, German and Croatian leaders broke with the unrealistic workings of multilateralism. Other European countries eventually followed suit, acting unilaterally rather than via a multilateral agreement with the EU or UN. A closely related critique is the ‘Pandora’s Box’ argument, i.e. the notion that recognition will lead to a cascade of secessionist claims. Since 1991, the West recognized twenty new European states whose borders were largely drawn along religious and ethnic lines.

From the dissolution of Yugoslavia alone, UN member states recognized six new states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, north Macedonia and Slovenia. But in Africa the situation has not been the same: only two new states have been recognized in the post-Cold War era, Eritrea in 1994 and South Sudan in 2011. Even the AU, an organisation wary of widespread secessionist movements in Africa, concluded in 2005 that Somaliland’s case is ‘historically unique and self-justified’ and ‘should not be linked to the notion of “opening the Pandora’s Box”’ because ‘the union was never ratified between Somalia and Somaliland and also malfunctioned’.

Another line of objection seems to criticize Israel for wanting to gain a foothold in a strategically important location while ignoring that this is precisely what an array of other states are doing as they pursue their own national interests. Many of these objectives have come from Muslim-led states who have implied that Israel should be excluded from the Horn of Africa’s strategic waterways because of its religious background. Understandably, regional states, but also superpowers, want to shape the Horn of Africa’s important geopolitical landscape, which include the Nile River, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. But countries must not wrap their strategic interest in the Horn in a religious façade to object to Israel’s right to have a strategical position in Africa, especially in the important Bab Al-Mandab strait.Acting as sovereign states with a right to be driven by their strategic interests, non-Muslim countries such as China, France, Italy, Japan and USA (Germany and Spain have small contingencies as well) have established military bases in Djibouti. And Turkey operates the only foreign military base in Mogadishu, the country’s putative capital that does not fully exert control over its own city’s territory. As an independent sovereign state, Israel can also negotiate access to establish a military base in Somaliland for its own strategical interest as any other sovereign state.

Given the presence of foreign military bases in the Horn, Somaliland will likely consider inviting Israel to set up a base in Berbera or any other site.Let’s look, finally, at the notion that Israel’s recognition will destabilize the region. This critique somehow overlooks the fact that Somaliland has been a rare stabilizing polity in the Horn.

Building upon existing and proven methods applied by successive Somaliland government and its people, Somaliland’s long overdue recognition has the potential to enhance regional stability and security rather than undermine it. Somaliland’s democratisation and state-building experience have contributed to keeping political Islam and religious extremism at bay. But ultimately it is the state’s popular local legitimacy that has contributed to Somaliland’s success in this regard, and its international recognition will thus deepen Somaliland’s stabilizing force in the region. Consider how Somaliland has mobilized to counter terrorism and piracy. Following Al-Shabaab’s rise in the early 2000s, there was a terrorist attack in Hargeisa in 2008. Dahir Rayaale’s democratically-elected government (2003-2010) responded by establishing neighbourhood committees in urban and rural areas to assist with intel-gathering. Their goal was to report any suspicious activities by Al-Shabab and other militant groups, particularly potential operatives of the highly sophisticated Amniyat (security), Al-Shabab’s intelligence agency. Additionally, through various awareness campaigns, the government, using its popular legitimacy, encouraged citizens to report new tenants to the authorities, regardless of their nationalities (including Somalilanders).

As a result, the cooperation between the government and its citizens helped prevent the re-occurrence of terrorist acts in Somaliland. At the height of piracy (2007-2011), Somaliland implemented a similar human intelligence-gathering method to protect the country’s 789km coastline. In conjunction with the police and the national intelligence agency, Somaliland small coast guard set up observation posts along the coastline. But their monitoring reach was limited. Using again its popular legitimacy, the government asked coastal communities to help. Together, they put in place monitoring methods that have effectively prevented piracy in the shorelines. This approach proved that anti-piracy activities were more effective on land than sea and also showed a government with broad democratic legitimacy could protect its waters against piracy.  It is fair to infer that international organizations such the AU and OIC – and their members countries’ driven by their own state-centric interest – are deflecting, with their post-sovereignty hallucinations, our attention away from how security and anti-piracy measures play out in practice in Somaliland. Rather than continuing to support some fantasy federal government unable to even provide basic security in Mogadishu, Israel has a pragmatic view on state formation and recognised Somaliland’s democratic polity and its functioning state.

Hassan holds a PhD from the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and currently serves as a Senior Advisor to Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Kenedid Hassan

safmkenedidhassan@gmail.com

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