Israel–Somaliland: Recognition &Irreversibility

[Deeq A.]

 

Gulaid Yusuf Idaan

Strategist and Diplomat Analyzing Somaliland and Horn Affairs

Israel–Somaliland: Recognition &Irreversibility

Jan 8, 2026, 5:42 PM

“Expanding Diplomatic Horizons: Somaliland–Israel Engagement Framed by Regional and Global Partnerships, with the Flags of Kenya, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Nepal Symbolizing Broadening International Cooperation.”

Abstract

This paper evaluates how the Israeli and Somaliland high-level strategic engagement is a determining mechanism in the generation of geopolitical legitimacy for unrecognized states. It leaves behind legalist conceptions of sovereignty, claiming that the diplomacy at the level of the ministries in Israel with Somaliland constitutes a kind of official recognition that speeds up Somaliland’s shift from de facto to de jure acceptance. Placing this interaction into the context of securitizing the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb passage, the article illustrates that recognition consequences are more and more directed by the idea of strategic utility, signaling, and path dependency. The relationship between Somaliland and Israel provides an example of a new form of statehood where legitimacy is built upon strategic interaction as opposed to multi-lateral legitimacy, making the further exclusion increasingly unsustainable. The keywords will be Somaliland, Israel, informal recognition, security, Red Sea, de facto states, sovereignty, and Horn of Africa.

Introduction:

Recognition Beyond Law

Somaliland has more than 30 years of experience functioning as a self-governing political unit, but is not officially recognized by the international system. Traditional theories of this anomaly stress the African Union rules, the territorial claims of Somalia, or the inflexibility of international law. Although these reasons still have explanatory power, they cannot explain recent changes in diplomacy that have indicated a qualitative change in the foreign position of Somaliland. In this article, the main point is made: high-level strategic involvement of competent and security-related states, most importantly Israel, has come to be the main force in the context of changing the international legitimacy of Somaliland. The visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Somaliland is not only the beginning of strengthening bilateral relations but a structural process of lifting Somaliland in the informal hierarchy of sovereign subjects. New practices, signaling, and strategic necessity generate recognition in contemporary international politics, as it is not a binary legal act but is a cumulative process. This article places Israel-Somaliland relations at the center of analysis, which makes it relevant to the wider discussion of informal recognition, securitization of the maritime environment, and the metamorphosis of sovereignty in the context of geopolitical rivalry.

Theoretical Framework: Informal Recognition, Signaling, and Path Dependency.

Traditional recognition theory swings between the constitutive and the declaratory approaches, neither of which sufficiently explains the modern practice. States are increasingly practicing graduated recognition, granting much of the functionality of sovereignty, such as diplomatic interaction, cooperation on security, and visits at the elite level, without making any formal statements. This paper uses the idea of informal recognition, which is characterized as high-level and sustained interaction that considers an entity to be sovereign in operation, as opposed to law. Informal recognition works by way of diplomatic coded messages, strategic alliances, and institutionalized collaboration. It becomes especially relevant in situations when official acknowledgement is politically disputed and strategically fitting. This process is further explained with the help of signaling theory. Diplomatic behaviors on a high level are a way to send expensive messages of intent, credibility, and commitment. After sending such signals, it creates path dependency and therefore reversal is expensive and politically unstable. The involvement of Israel with Somaliland is an example of this.

Ministerial-Level Engagement and Diplomatic Irreversibility: Israel’s Strategic Projection in the Red Sea.

The visit to Somaliland by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar is a carefully calculated exercise in strategic diplomacy that may be understood as indicating that the Israel-Somaliland relationships have entered a stage of practical irreversibility. The visits of ministers in international practice are not exploratory nor ceremonial acts, but acts of deliberate statecraft, based on the reliability of institutions, functionality of operations, and strategic long-term value.

The selection of a foreign minister, as opposed to a more junior envoy, indicates a deliberate decision that Somaliland can and is useful as a partner in regional security, maritime surveillance, and energy geopolitics. Through this interaction with Somaliland, Israel has, in effect, normalized diplomatic engagement, indirectly acknowledging the functional sovereignty of the territory. This normalization leads to long-term commitments: signaling to allies and adversaries that Somaliland is reliable, establishing expectations of prolonged collaboration, and embedding the entity into networks difficult to undo without reputational loss, policy incoherence, and strategic defeats. Israel turns de facto rule into actionable geopolitical advantage, making recognition a practical reality even without legal status. More importantly, this interaction continues despite opposition from regional powers like Turkey, Turkey, Somalia, and Egypt have expressed their opposition  Somalia, and Egypt.

These states may contest the legality of recognition or question Israeli policy, but their ability to deter effective normalization is diminishing. Objection in the international system, managed by strategic pragmatism, is not veto power. Israel’s strategic priority highlights that Somaliland’s utility in maritime security, warning mechanisms, and proximity to the Bab-el-Mandeb outweighs the cost of contravening established orthodoxies. The ministerial visit is also a signaling and deterrence tool. Israel offsets Turkey’s growing presence in Somalia and the Somali Basin, where Turkey seeks offshore energy reserves and maritime supremacy. High-level ties with Somaliland provide Israel advantage over strategic chokepoints, influencing the environment and limiting Turkey’s unimpeded projection.

This establishes a horizontal escalation: Israel exerts strategic pressure without direct confrontation, relying on partnerships, geography, and operational trust to shape calculations across East Africa, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This exemplifies functional recognition and strategic sovereignty. Israel focuses on operational reliability, governance capacity, and strategic relevance over formal legal status. Somaliland’s ministerial-level status enhances its standing as a de facto state, capable of hosting strategic assets and maintaining long-term relationships. The visit also reinforces Israel’s integrated Red Sea policy, linked to maritime security, energy geopolitics, and coalition-building.

Somaliland provides Israel early-warning and maritime depth, protects energy supply routes, and shields shipping against asymmetric threats from Yemen, Iran, and proxies. Israel’s presence counters Gulf fragmentation, the Turkish-Somali axis, and Ethiopia’s maritime influence, making it a strategic force in the regional balance. Overall, Gideon Saar’s visit marks a shift from tentative engagement to institutionalized, irreversible diplomacy, showing that functional sovereignty, operational trust, and strategic utility now determine partner selection. Somalia becomes part of a multidimensional chessboard, where strategic geography, energy interests, and regional power balancing intersect.

Israel’s Strategic Calculus: Red Sea Security and Maritime Control.
This activity in Somaliland should be interpreted as an extension of a more general strategic reconsideration in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The Bab-el-Mandeb strait connecting the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea with the Suez Canal has developed as a major trade route to become one of the most disputed maritime avenues in the world. To Israel, the maritime trade and energy flows are not a policy issue but an operational imperative, owing to which its economy and security are closely linked.

The Red Sea has turned into the scene of a more intense militarization, which is preordained by the combination of great-power rivalry, regional conflicts, and the rise of non-state armed groups. The ongoing naval presence of the United States, China, Iran, and European nations collides with asymmetric threats posed by Yemen-based Houthis that can harass the United States, China, Iran, and European nations with the help of missiles, drones, and the sea. The outcome is that the maritime insecurity ceases to be a hypothetical statement but a real operational problem. Disturbances of the Bab-el-Mandeb threaten not just the commercial supply chains but also the strategic depth of Israel, energy security, and freedom of navigation, which are some of the pillars of its national security doctrine.

The strategic response of Israel concentrates on forward situational awareness, layered security of the sea, and operational collaborations. The most significant elements of this doctrine are intelligence collection, the early-warning, as well as monitoring, and the ability to influence the situation outside of Israel’s territorial waters. In this context, Somaliland is exceptionally strategic. Regulated leadership, territorial dominance, and lack of aggressive military forces enable Israel to have a continuity of operation through an unstable maritime path without the need to use remote naval presence.

Somaliland is a forward positional asset, which yields: Nearness to Yemen and Iran, reducing the time taken to respond to asymmetric threats. Surveillance and capabilities of early warning, which guarantee real-time position awareness on critical maritime routes. Strategic depth, which enabled Israel to externalize some of its security periphery into an environment of predictability and stability in its partners.

Other than maritime security, the strategic calculus of Somaliland overlaps with the regional energy geopolitics. Israel is an important participant of the East Med Gas Axis in the Eastern Mediterranean, connecting offshore Israeli gas fields via Cyprus and Greece to European markets. This project will not only enhance the integration of the Israeli energy and security infrastructure with the European setups but also undermine the Turkish desire to have a monopoly on energy transmission within the region.

The opposition of Turkey has turned the basin into a militarized area, and pipelines and drilling infrastructure have turned into hotspots that must be protected, which shows how energy infrastructure has become irreplaceable with security and the creation of alliances. At the same time, it has become a high-stakes game in the Somali Basin. The presence of offshore discoveries in Turkey and the deep-rooted military presence in Somalia provides Ankara with more leverage over one of the most important energy-related checks to the world.

The involvement in Somaliland is a balancing mechanism that ensures Israel has leverage in the Bab-el-Mandeb and other seaways, influence on the operational environment, and limit Turkey’s influence in the region without facing competitors. This is an example of horizontal strategic balancing whereby Israel does not demand to engage in direct confrontation, but instead, it engages partnerships, geography, and operational trust to shape the regional security dynamics in various theaters.

Theoretically, the strategy of Israel is a classic example of security functionalism and pragmatic recognition. De facto sovereignty that Somaliland has enjoyed throughout the course of more than thirty years offers dependability and predictability to the disjointed landscape of the area. To Israel, operational utility and alignment are more important than formal recognition, in a wider trend of increasing determination of partnerships in warring regions by functionality, governance, and stability.

This calculus also overlaps with larger Horn of Africa processes. The availability of the coastline of Somalia and the investments of the Gulf states, as well as the regional rivalry over the maritime routes, make Somaliland a hinge region rather than a periphery. The involvement of Israel is therefore reactive and proactive; by securing maritime chokepoints, exerting influence, and embedding itself in regional energy and security systems, whilst limiting its vulnerability to its opponents.

To sum up, the calculus by which Israel relates to Somaliland is not symbolic, but opportunistic. It is an expression of a multidimensional evaluation of maritime security, energy geopolitics, functional sovereignty, and alignment with the region. Somaliland becomes a strategic intersection point between geography, the reliability of operations, and strategic utility, and a new logic of international relations is being created with conditional sovereignty, functionality, and strategic relevance defining recognition and the creation of alliances.

Strategic Recognition and the Production of Legitimacy. The involvement of Israel depicts how legitimacy is being produced more on a practice than proclamation. Informal recognition reforms the external perception by reducing the perceived political risk of intercourse by other actors. This is because legitimacy is built on the fact that credible states normalize relations. This procedure dislocates the justification load. Somaliland does not have the greatest burden to demonstrate its statehood anymore, those who reject the notion of recognition have to justify why a stable, strategically relevant, and increasingly engaged entity deserves to be left behind. Such a reversal makes the perpetuation of non-recognition hard over time.

Recognition as a Strategic Pivot: Country-Specific Analysis. The latest diplomatic events highlight the emergence of Somaliland as a player on the world chessboard, playing a strategic game. Kenya, Morocco, the UAE, India, and Nepal will officially appreciate Somaliland, and Ethiopia may also be a crucial regional ally. Such recognitions mean more than legal recognition; they represent functional legitimacy, governance effectiveness, and operational reliability. This direction is supported by the acceptance and top-level interests of Israel, espoused by the visit of the Foreign Minister Gideon Saar. The ties between Israel and Somaliland on a ministerial level legitimize the operational value of Somaliland, in terms of providing forward operating depth in the Bab-el-Mandeb, maritime chokepoints, energy, and trade security. The calculus of strategy adopted by each of the recognizing actors is a preference towards regional stability, facilitation of trade, and geostrategic location as opposed to adhering strictly to inherited post-colonial boundaries. Somaliland has ceased to be a peripheral or symbolic agency in this new order, but an influential pivot; through its governance, stability, and geographical location, it has been able to exercise a tangible influence on the regional alignment as well as the international diplomacy at large.

Kenya. Somaliland’s location in the Gulf of Aden provides Kenya tactical access to the Red Sea and nearby trade routes. President William Ruto has used back-channel diplomacy to mediate Ethiopia–Somalia tensions, positioning Kenya as a key Horn of Africa actor. As a regional economic hub with maritime investments, Kenya benefits from a stable northern neighbor protecting shipping lanes, enhancing its leverage over Somalia in a fragmented security system.

Morocco. Morocco’s interest in recognizing Somaliland aligns with geopolitical strategy, countering regional rivals, and diplomacy. It strengthens Morocco’s position on territorial integrity issues like Western Sahara and signals support for stable governance, while deepening ties with Israel, the UAE, and other strategic partners.

United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE, a key Ethiopian ally, invests in Berbera port through DP World, linking commercial interests with Ethiopia’s maritime needs. With a military presence and ongoing modernization, the UAE seeks to formalize its Red Sea position, counter Turkish influence in Somalia, and cement itself as a decisive regional power based on operational reliability.

India. India’s focus is maritime security and trade. The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is critical for energy imports. Recognizing Somaliland would enhance India’s control over maritime chokepoints, strengthen naval logistics, and expand influence in a Horn increasingly shaped by Gulf and Chinese investments, supporting India’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Nepal. Nepal’s recognition would be symbolic, encouraging effective governance and de facto statehood. Though without direct strategic stakes, it signals alignment with international sovereignty principles and strengthens Nepal’s multilateral position through soft power.

Ethiopia. Landlocked Ethiopia relies on Djibouti for maritime access. Renting Somaliland’s coastline through the January 2024 MoU gives Ethiopia Berbera port access for commerce and potential military use, ensuring Red Sea access, reducing Djibouti’s monopoly, and reflecting a shift toward practical sovereignty over historical claims.

Conclusion: Israel, Somaliland, and the Future of Statehood. Somaliland–Israel engagement shows modern statehood prioritizes strategic relevance, diplomatic signaling, and functional cooperation over legal criteria. Ministerial-level interaction accelerates Somaliland’s normalization as a sovereign actor. Formal recognition may lag, but realities created through strategic engagement are irreversible. The question is no longer if Somaliland qualifies as a state, but how long recognition can ignore geopolitical realities. Israel’s involvement moves Somaliland from contingency toward inevitability.

About the Author

Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, international law, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He holds multiple Master’s degrees and publishes extensively on state recognition, geopolitics, governance, and regional security, linking academic analysis with policy-relevant insight.

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