Israel was right to recognize Somaliland

[Deeq A.]

Israel was right to recognize Somaliland

Israel has become the first nation in the world to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. Although it was bound to draw condemnation in the short term, Jerusalem’s move is more than just defensible in legal and political terms: it could prove to be a far-sighted strategic gambit that improves the lives of 6 million Somalilanders and strengthens the long-term security of the Horn of Africa.
The territory now called Somaliland was a British protectorate from 1884 to 1960. It enjoyed sovereign statehood for a few days after achieving independence from London before its leaders chose to join with neighboring Italian Somaliland—a United Nations trust territory—to form the united Somali Republic, the predecessor of today’s Federal Republic of Somalia.
In 1991, however, Somaliland declared independence from Somalia following years of civil war, including a horrendous genocide perpetrated by the totalitarian regime of Siad Barre against the Isaaq clan, Somaliland’s dominant ethnic group. Despite its inauspicious beginnings, Somaliland soon exhibited all the characteristics of a fully functioning sovereign state: it had a permanent population, administered a defined territory with stable borders, and developed strong enough national institutions to facilitate the peaceful handover of power between rival political groups.
By contrast, the rest of Somalia—with the partial exception of Puntland—underwent complete and utter state failure during the 1990s and 2000s. Successive governments in Mogadishu refused to recognize the independence of Somaliland, but they were nominal governments at best, rarely capable of governing much of the country beyond slivers of Mogadishu. Over time, the separation of Somaliland from Somalia became an entrenched political fact.
But even though Somaliland flourished while Somalia floundered, most of the international community sided with Mogadishu and refused to recognize Somaliland’s independence. Why? The reasoning is simple and not without merit: if Somaliland were to become independent without Mogadishu’s consent, the argument goes, then this would embolden other separatist movements to push for independence, potentially threatening the breakup of numerous other nation-states.
African governments are particularly sensitive to this argument. In 1964, they explicitly agreed via the Cairo Resolution to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” This is still a cardinal principle of the African Union, enshrined in its founding document. As a result, new African nations like South Sudan (2011) and Eritrea (1993) have been few and far between. For the most part, colonial-era borders are regarded as sacrosanct.
Yet the case for Somaliland statehood is strong. Most importantly, it meets all of the criteria for statehood laid out in the Montevideo Convention, the best available codification of international law as it pertains to states and sovereignty. These are: a permanent population, defined frontiers, a single government, and “capacity to enter into relations with other States.”
Somaliland has checked the first three of these boxes for several decades, which nobody seriously disputes. All it lacked until recently was willing partners abroad. Now, the final stumbling block is being steadily overcome: not only has Israel recognized Somaliland’s sovereignty, but Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates have also inked important deals on issues such as trade, transportation, and security. Others may be poised to follow suit.
In a more legally coherent world, Somaliland would have been accepted by the international community long ago. The Montevideo Convention says that the “political existence of [a] State is independent of recognition by the other States.” In plainer language, this means that no country or group of countries can elevate non-sovereign territories into the ranks of sovereign statehood by simple declaration—and conversely, none has the legitimate authority to exclude candidates for statehood if they fulfill the requisite criteria. Simply put: if Somaliland is a state, it should be treated as one.
In the real world, of course, things are more complicated. Political and security considerations matter. So, will accepting the reality of Somaliland statehood lead to conflict in the Horn of Africa? It is hard to see how. Certainly, the security situation in Somalia cannot get much worse—and if it does, this could hardly be attributed to actions taken by Somaliland, which has been divorced from the rest of Somalia for more than 30 years. On the contrary, any moves to compel the reunification of Somaliland and Somalia would be certain to result in bloodshed.
Viewed more optimistically, Somaliland is well placed to be an anchor of security in a troubled region. Its coastline offers ports from which allied navies can tackle piracy and ensure freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most vital shipping lanes. And greater international cooperation would unlock foreign investment, lead to improved living conditions for ordinary Somalilanders, and contribute to economic development across the entire region.
Even under the strict conditions preferred by the African Union (that colonial-era borders be respected), there is no good reason to oppose statehood for Somaliland: British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were distinct during the colonial era, and so it should be eminently possible to recognize them as independent of one another today while still preserving a high bar for the creation of new states.
There are challenges ahead. What if other governments do not follow Israel’s lead? What if Jerusalem’s bold diplomatic gambit has an overall negative effect on Somaliland’s aspirations for international recognition? How can Mogadishu be persuaded to relinquish its legal claims over Somaliland? These are fair questions, to be sure, but they must be weighed against the abject unfairness of the status quo.
In the final analysis, Israel is on firm legal, political, and strategic ground with its Somaliland decision. The case for Somaliland being a state is stronger, probably, than was the case for Kosovo in 2008 and is certainly stronger than the case for Palestine today—an ambiguous political entity that enjoys some international recognition but has neither defined borders nor a functioning government nor even an agreed population.
Somalilanders deserve a state. In fact, they have had one for several decades. Israel has done the right thing by recognizing this reality. The rest of the international community must now do its part to bring about a sustainable political solution for Somaliland and the region.
About the AuthorPeter Harris is an associate professor of political science at Colorado State University.Related Topics

 

 

Source  The Times of Israel

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