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  1. [Somtribune] Link: The Federal President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, put a well-orchestrated military plan his commanders dubbed ‘Operation Lightning Strike’ in full gear sending armament, ammunition, and trained troops to the battlefront with the Republic of Somaliland in the last two to three days – and still on. Planes were seen being loaded with crates upon crates containing millions of rounds of ammunition, disassembled heavy artillery, mortars and spare parts on the Halane side of the Adan Adde International airport of Mogadishu. Boarding the planes in an ordered fashion, fully-equipped military units estimated at a total of 600-1000 men, who had been trained at the Turkish base and elsewhere at the many other foreign-supported training grounds in and around Mogadishu, have also been identified in line with points 1.5 and 1.6 of the recently concluded security council meeting of the FGS and the Somalia Federal states in Baidoa. #OperationLightningStrike is planned to open multi-fronts on the Somaliland army currently in defensive positions near Tukkaraq village of Sool. The two armies of Somaliland and Puntland, fronting for Somalia, clashed in the area several times before with the latter suffering heavy casualties. The unabashed, openly waged campaigns on the Puntland side crying for clan support seems to be paying it dividends with the ill-concealed military, morale, and material support President Farmajo, who belongs to the same clan as Gass of Puntland, is ferrying nonstop to Garowe and adjacent airstrips. Very confidential sources who had witnessed the loading of commissioned planes have come to know that Somalia planned to put all its might behind a blitz offensive against Somaliland positions on Eid day or immediately after or before it. The plan is to penetrate the Somaliland defenses from several directions and to smuggle arms and ammunition into Las Anod city in order to try to capture the town from within so to isolate the frontline positions of the Somaliland army. Somalia, of recent, did not conceal its ambitions and claims against its erstwhile partner in the ill-fated political union of 1960, denying the fact that Somaliland joined its younger partner as a fully-fledged, sovereign, internationally recognized state with a constitution, functioning parliament and a ministerial council in place. Somaliland restored its lost independence in 1991 on an all-clan resolution at Burao and had since then been on its own for these past 27 years building a modern, very democratic, fully functioning state so commended by the international community. The international community started to open a dialogue between the two sides in 2012 but had not had the drive or the commitment to see it through. The talks petered off eventually after Somalia started to disdainfully violate agreed parameters one after the other. Unchecked and unreprimanded, it has now come to a stage where Somali is once more starting another civil strife, not unlike that of the 1980s between Somaliland fighters and the southern-dominated military regime of Siyad Barre which ended in his ignominious deposal in January 1991. Political analysts accuse Farmajo and his kinsman Gass of embarking on a revenge political and military offensive against the more successful, peaceful enclave that is the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland is not very confident that an international community which previously failed to check the excesses of Somalia in failing the talks can come up with a meaningful resistance or even expose it now that the FGS’s Farmaajo is openly arming Puntland and sending it troops all belonging to one clan. On the other hand, many Somalians across a wide political spectrum are increasingly becoming disturbed and uncertain of where President Farmajo’s disoriented leadership is taking them. Not only in remote areas are the AMISOM and the US troops battling Al shabaab but Mogadishu, itself is witnessing a revival of street fights with hitherto sleeping cells of an emboldened insurgency. This despite an estimated 80 000 to 100 000 troops – registered and unregistered – since the Kenyan and Ethiopian presence is known to swell with unknown numbers as their respective commands deem necessary. The picture below where President Farmaajo, himself, is frisked by AMISOM foot soldiers at the gate of the Hallane compound, near the international airport, where the international community lives and works starkly, portrays Somalia’s current situation.
  2. Basically they allege the FSG gave the money to Muuse Biixi directly to instigate instability in "SSC". is this jealousy or something else?!! [Baroortu Orgiga ka wayn].
  3. Anadolu Agency By Dr. Brendon Cannon and Dr. Ash Rossiter ABU DHABI In the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland has functioned as an independent country for close to three decades. It has held multiple elections, seen four presidents take office, prints its own money and issues its own visas, and its capital city, Hargeisa, houses two parliamentary bodies that pass and enact laws. However, it remains an unrecognized country and is viewed by the rest of the world’s states as part of the Republic of Somalia with its capital in Mogadishu. For almost an equally lengthy time, Ethiopia has been landlocked and completely reliant on its neighbors, particularly Djibouti, for imports and exports. This occurred when Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993, thereby resulting in Ethiopia’s loss of a lengthy coastline and ports. This has greatly complicated Ethiopia’s rise as a regional power and hampered the development of its 102 million people. The situation in the Horn of Africa is changing rapidly, however. In a recent article published in Rising Powers Quarterly, we sought to demonstrate how Ethiopia and Somaliland have been able to advance their interests by taking advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone. This is affecting the regional distribution of power to its advantage and reducing its dependency on Djibouti’s port for imports and exports through the refurbishment, development and use of other, regional ports: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. It is the development of the port of Berbera that has proved the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. Berbera Port’s importance From a geostrategic perspective, Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera is obvious. Of the three ports, Berbera is closest to Ethiopia proper and offers the potential of opening up the vast, albeit isolated eastern region of Ethiopia to trade, particularly in the export of livestock and agriculture. Yet because the port is located in the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland, both Ethiopia and Somaliland have experienced difficulty in attracting investors and port operators on account of the political and legal headaches associated with doing business in Somaliland. For Somaliland, development of the port would not only bring in much needed investment and jobs, but a deal signed by Hargeisa would show tacit, albeit obvious international support for Somaliland’s independence from Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the development and expansion of the port of Berbera fundamentally support the primary pillars of Addis Ababa’s regional policy that support its aspirations for regional hegemony and are deemed essential to its very survival and indivisibility. The first involves maintaining Eritrea’s isolation in order to weaken it to the point that it implodes, is formally reunited to Ethiopia or becomes a pliant, client state. The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure Eritrea. Ethiopia has, until recently, been assisted in its goals vis-à-vis Somalia as much by the international community as by internal problems within Somalia. The cross-purposes of the international community coupled with and reinforcing political instability in Somalia, particularly in the capital Mogadishu, have resulted in the inability of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to do anything substantive about the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland as well as the almost entirely autonomous northeastern region of Puntland. Ethiopia’s efforts and Gulf Arab interest Ethiopia has eyed the development of and access to the port of Berbera against this backdrop. However, Addis Ababa found itself unable to fully exploit opportunities to expand its influence and power -- not only because of the potential legal and political headaches of doing deals with Somaliland -- but also because of a paucity of critical resources and human capital. These deficiencies were partially alleviated with the entry of the Arab Gulf States to the region, especially the coastal zone beginning in the late 2000s in an effort to secure favorable trade and resources, as well as curtail Iran’s growing presence. However, it was the Yemen crisis that led Saudi Arabia to announce the beginning of a pan-Arab military operation to roll back the Iran-backed Houthis and restore the government. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- the two principal military members of the coalition -- initially used Djibouti as a support hub for operations in southern Yemen. Yet difficult relations with Djibouti led the UAE, in 2015, to sign a lease with Eritrea for its Hanish Islands and facilities at the port city of Assab for 30 years. The deal with Eritrea panicked Addis Ababa, with Ethiopian leaders viewing any expansion of Eritrean power as a corresponding loss of power for Ethiopia. Ethiopia dispatched officials to Abu Dhabi to plead for a shift in focus to Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Ethiopia’s diplomatic push and offer of economic incentives in the form of export/import traffic, coinciding with an increased UAE focus on stemming the flow of weaponry into Yemen, led to Addis Ababa’s desired results when DP World signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years in May 2016. Analyzing Berbera Port deal It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal over Berbera if it did not see at least some long-term commercial benefit and there appear to be strong economic incentives for both Ethiopia and Somaliland. For example, Dubai will reportedly support Somaliland’s fisheries industry; help build the road between Somaliland and Ethiopia; and build a Free Zone at the Berbera port. The port will be supported mainly by the export of livestock and import of goods to both Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, there are also military and political dimensions to the tripartite agreement. Separate to DP World’s deal, Somaliland’s government agreed to the establishment of a UAE military installation at Berbera. The base, only 90 kilometers from the shores of Yemen, is intended to help the UAE forces tighten its blockade against Yemen. Politically, the Berbera Port deal has been groundbreaking. At the stroke of a pen, Somaliland took a massive step towards international recognition and permanent separation from Somalia. While neither Ethiopia nor the UAE have voiced recognition, the deal inked in Dubai certainly makes it seem that way if the anger in Mogadishu is any indication. Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa. Regardless of the dissatisfaction in both Somaliland and Somalia surrounding the UAE’s deal with Hargeisa, Ethiopia has engineered -- largely behind the scenes -- access to another port, thus enhancing its security and strategic economic interests. The reality is that with the growth in annual volumes of Ethiopian transit cargo -- over nine million tons in 2011 -- Ethiopia has long required alternative routes for its cargo from Djibouti. With the signing of the port deal, the slowly-dying port of Berbera will see investments totaling US$442 million for the management and development of a “world-class, multi-purpose deep seaport project.” The UAE has also reportedly agreed to build a modern highway between Berbera Port and the Somaliland / Ethiopia border town of Wachale / Wajaale. This will link with the modern highway on the Ethiopian side of the border. Additionally, when the deal was signed between DP World and Somaliland, Ethiopia ensured its substantive presence in the running and development of the port in the form of Ethiopian Shipping Lines. ESL will reportedly control 19 percent share in the deal -- almost twice as much as it initially expected to receive. This was partially confirmed later by Hussein Ige Dayr, a spokesperson for the president of Somaliland, who noted, that DP World had allocated close to one-fifth of the port’s capacity for Ethiopian shipments (JOC). Somaliland Foreign Minister Saad Ali Shire further confirmed the percentage, noting that DP World sold 14 percent of its shares to Ethiopia with the government of Somaliland selling five percent of its shares to Ethiopia. Lastly, Ethiopia was able to engineer a formal, legally-binding agreement between the de-facto but unrecognized, independent state of Somaliland and the UAE. In doing so, Ethiopia further ensured the continuing Balkanization of Somalia and potentially paved the way for eventual de-jure, international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Dr. Brendon Cannon is Assistant Professor at Khalifa University’s Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS), Abu Dhabi, UAE. Dr. Cannon’s academic specializations are in the changing balance of power in the wider Middle East region – particularly the Horn of Africa; energy politics, policy and security (GCC and Northeast Asia); and international security. Dr. Ash Rossiter is an Assistant Professor in International Security within the Department of Humanities & Social Science at Khalifa University of Science & Technology. Dr. Rossiter’s current research lies at the intersection of technological change and global security with special regard to the utility of military force international affairs.
  4. Gargaara is one of the most affected areas by Cyclone Sagar; thank you Djibouti for bringing much needed aid for the people in that area.
  5. C 130 heavy lifting planes did not come to Somaliland to deliver 100 cartons of dates and water. Some sources in Somaliland say that two military planes who usually transport military grade weapons had landed Berbera and then went to Hargeisa to disguise of delivering relieve food. Traditionally , C 130 hercules or Cargo planes are used for delivery of goods and food , not Helicopters. Imagine a two heavy duty military grade planes delivering just few cartons of dates and some water. I do believe the dates and the water was loaded in Hargeisa from the refugee aid warehouses as was admitted by their director. Folks, I am not 100% sure, but , I do believe that the UAE is fueling the war between Somaliland and Puntland.
  6. This Could be Fake News; but interesting otherwise.
  7. Founding fathers of the Somaliland National Movement (SNM) - the formation of an armed movement for the sole purpose of overthrowing long time Somali dictator by military means. 1. The Rebirth of Somaliland: History of Somaliland 2. The Rebirth of Somaliland: The Process Of The Union And The Act Of Union 3. The Rebirth of Somaliland: Northern Mistrusts And Discontents: Origins And Emergence Of Early Signs 4. The Rebirth of Somaliland: The 1961 Aborted Military Coup 5. The Rebirth of Somaliland: The Formation Of The SNM And Liberation Struggle
  8. On April 9, 2018, the Somaliland cabinet had approved a budget in the amount of 1,867,000,000,000. One trillion and six hundred eighty seven billion, and Since the exchange rate is $1=10,000 Somaliland shillings, that is the equivalent of $187,000,000 dollars. The 2017 budget was $362,517,393. This years budget is 110% less than that of last year. How did that happen. Although in order to deceive the parliament , they have revised the numbers and added another $50 million at the last minute . If the so called experts and the opposition parties do not catch the huge discrepancies of these budgets , the ordinary people has no business to scrutinize or examine the numbers. In 2017, former finance minister Samsam Cabdi released a budget of 2, 175,104,355,662 SS, which they say was an equivalent of $362,517,393. last year in 2017, the Somaliland shilling was hovering between eight to nine thousand dollar. In the summer of 2017, just few months after the budget released the dollar hit ten thousand shillings. Rather than use the market rate or the approximate official exchange rate which was fluctuating between 9,000and 10,000, the Jeegaan used the lowest rate of exchange which was impossible even for the bank at the rate of 6,000 Shillings for a dollar. Governments usually do estimate their revenue earnings conservatively Im roder to avoid huge swings or a deficit from the original estimate. Now, using the market rate , the budget of 2017 should have been $217,510,355 or two hundred and seventeen million. in order to inflate the budget from 217 million to 362 million which is an increasing of almost an extra $150 million, they have to use an exchange rate of six thousand shilling to the dollar which doesn't exist in Somaliland. By cooking the books they could get 40% more from the shilling than it could produce. In order to cover the gabs of the false estimate, they must print more shillings to cover the 40% gap. Let me give you unexampled: You give some one 20,000 shilling and you tell him this is part of your salary as the equivalent of $4 American dollars. By giving this person four dollars , the exchange must be 5,000 Shillings per dollar. If that person goes to the market and the exchange rate becomes 10,000 per dollar in the market, you did not give him $4 but 2. He already lost half of the money. So, in order to cover these shortcomings, the government must print more money and give that person 40,000 Shillings to get four dollars. Folks, in a nut shell, that is the basic problems of the false money paper called Shillings in Somaliland and the inflation that robbed people of their savings. The corrupt family oligarchs who run Somaliland for the last seven years used these schemes and told the gullible public, the opposition parties and the international community that the Somaliland budget has increased five or six teams. How can a budget that was $362 million a years ago shrined to $187 million, almost 100% less than last year. It is all about cooking books. If you remove the world bank projects that was added to the budget, the actual Somaliland budget is around $175 million. Muuse Biixi took 7.5% of the budget. Now, let is focus the title of the main topic. The office of the president or an office that manages less than $200 million dollars is taking 7.5% of the budget or $12.5 million . That is almost the exact amount the of the budget the entire ministry of education with thousands of teachers were allocated..It is almost less than just over one percent of the budget for the health care of the entire people of Somaliland. Even if this man has 30 staff to assist, advice and manage his office, that could not reach even a million dollar a year. During the reign of the RAyaale regime , the ministry of the presidency ( Wasaarada Madaxtooyada) used to spend just over a million dollar a year, yet the hungry tribe that was agitating to replace him used to write stories comparing his salary to the white house and other leaders while full well knowing that the million dollar was for the whole office of the presidency. Siilaanyo went from the Rayaale\s million to nine million, and now the new guy is taking almost $13 million dollars. That is over one million dollar a month. .Here in Canada with a population almost 40 million people, the office of the prime minister with three dozen staff spends an average yearly budget of 6-7 million. This is a day light robbery of public purse and theft. No one is asking him to produce invoices or expense accounts; there is no budget committees that scrutinizes the expenditure of the office of the president. This is what you get when discard institutions and the system that supposed to guard the public purse. Worse of all , no one is complaining. If the man stealing the milk of your children, the water walls from your rural communities and medicine from hospitals is your clan, you should be quite and support him against others. If there is no save guard, the greedy warlords will steal with vengeance. Let me give you few strange break downs of the 2018 budget. $142,205 for news papers and books for government ministries and agencies. The office of the president alone is spending $40,000 for news papers. I wonder who has this contract to provide papers for the government. The program to build water reservoirs for the rural people is allocated for $100,000 dollars only. $60,000 was allocated for the necessary buying the medicine for hospitals, and $5000 for education travel and exams. Papers for the dear leader to read are more important than water reservoirs for the rural people and hospitals. The ministry of finance is taking almost 12% of the budget. Why would you spend $20 million to collect $140 million. The plan is some of that money would be used later for the discretionary of the dear leader. I could go on and on, but you probably got the message. Folks, the people of Somaliland had not only been lied constantly, but also abused and robbed. There are no journalists who could go and investigate these issues related to the cooking of the books and false budgets. Anyone can create a false paper, print trillions of it and exchange 10,000 to one. If you print enough money that is equivalent of the economic out put of the so called country, you might control the exchange rate to remain reasonable, but if you print to loot the dollar from the people the false currency would collapse. Muuse biixi is in office for four months , yet he stole millions already and the sad part is no one can stop him.
  9. Somalia’s federal government can do little to stop the project THE ancient port town of Berbera in Somaliland, a breakaway state in northern Somalia, is generally a sleepy place. The heat, which can reach 50 degrees Celsius in the summer, stifles even the dogs. Yet visitors will find it buzzing at the moment. Near the edge of town, sand and rubble fill the space where, until recently, there were 19th-century Ottoman traders’ houses. New buildings are springing up. A little out to sea, as half a dozen ships idle in the sun, a barge from Dubai hauls a colossal crane towards the shore. All of this activity relates to a new port being built by DP World, a company mostly owned by the government of Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At the moment, Berbera’s port is small—used mostly for the export of livestock to the Persian Gulf, and the import of goods to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. However, over the next decade or so, thanks to DP World, it could turn into one of east Africa’s biggest. The port and another Emirati project, to build a military base in Berbera, are powerful reminders of how money from the Gulf is changing the Horn of Africa. It also risks exacerbating the struggle between Somalia’s weak, but internationally recognised federal government in Mogadishu and its restive, secessionist regions. The Berbera port, which will cost some $450m, is by far the biggest investment in Somaliland since the province declared independence from Somalia in 1991 (in practical, but not legal, terms it is a separate country). It has taken on a new significance since February, when DP World was thrown out of neighbouring Djibouti, where it had operated the main port since 2009. Djibouti currently handles over 90% of Ethiopia’s sea trade, and also hosts French, American and Chinese naval bases. Somaliland officials probably hope to steal some of that traffic. In March Ethiopia announced it had bought a 19% stake in the Berbera port. The project annoys politicians in Mogadishu, who fear losing more of their already meagre authority. So they have kicked back at the UAE. Last month parliament passed a law banning DP World from all of Somalia (something it cannot enforce). On April 8th the authorities in Mogadishu temporarily seized an Emirati plane carrying some $9.6m in cash, apparently intended for soldiers in Puntland, another autonomous state, being trained by the UAE. On April 11th the defence minister announced that Somalia would end a similar programme in which the UAE paid and trained soldiers in the national army, who will henceforth be paid by the (penniless) federal government. Officials in Somaliland are unruffled. The federal government “cannot control even ten square kilometres of Mogadishu”, says Liban Yusuf Osman, Somaliland’s deputy foreign minister, dismissing its objection to the port deal. But the dispute drives a big wedge between the two governments, says Rashid Abdi of International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based NGO. It does not help that many politicians in Mogadishu are thought to have taken money from Qatar, the UAE’s rival, or that Turkey, another rival, is one of Somalia’s biggest foreign investors. Indeed, the government in Mogadishu is a mess, thanks in part to constant manoeuvring by foreign-funded politicians. On April 9th the speaker of parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, stood down, having apparently lost a power struggle with the prime minister, Hassan Ali Khayre, and the president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known by his nickname “Farmaajo”. A few days before, African Union soldiers had to step in after Mr Jawari’s bodyguards stormed the parliament and ran up against troops loyal to the prime minister. Both sides ostensibly oppose the port in Berbera, but Mr Jawari saw an opportunity to seize more power for parliament by holding a (symbolic) vote on the deal, without consulting Mr Mohamed. The bickering does not help the cause of a unified Somalia. The government in Mogadishu has little to offer the country’s regions. That allows countries like the UAE to swoop in and fill the gaps. Al-Shabab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda, continues to mount successful attacks. On April 1st dozens of Ugandan soldiers were killed by the jihadists in the most deadly raid in over a year. The greater the chaos in the areas ostensibly controlled by federal government, the smaller the incentive for regions such as Somaliland to care what its politicians think. This article appeared in the Middle East and Africa section of the print edition under the headline "A storm over a port"
  10. There is a full force campaign by the Jeegaan administration to not only weaken but also fragment and eventually destroy the Waddani party before the election of 2019. Mohamed Kahin, a warlord who runs the interior ministry in Somaliland , had publicly declared that the WAddani party is fighting within itself. Laba grab ayuu noqday. Others hired by the Jeegaan to spread disinformation have come out and declared their intension to fragment the WAddani party. Among those hired to fragment the party are central committee member Aadan Dhoolayare, and dismissed former secretary Mohamed Uurcade and probably Hirsi Hassan hiding behind the curtain. Non of these men except Hirsi were able to bring any votes to the party. The majority of the community of Uurcade were either voted for Faysal Waraabe or Ina Biixi . Uurcade, the man who was acting both as spokesperson and secretary of the part was unable to bring any meaningful vote from Hargeisa. Dhoolayare was one of the first to concede the election defeat before even the chairman and the party agreed on strategy. He encouraged Ina Biixi to cancel and arrest the leaders of the West Burco community who called a " Shir Beelled" to sort out things and comfort the Jeegaan tribal strategy. People like INa Dhoolayare had always acted like mercenaries who will do the bidding of those who pay him the most. He was minister during the regime of the Rayaale government , but changed party at the last minute to support Siilaanyo for tribal reasons. Last summer, he visited Alberta to encourage and organize the Waddani party members in the province. An Awdalite who was the chairman of the Alberta wing of the party, invited me at the evening event and told me to listen to the one of the top leaders of the party. I showed to the surprise of some people and sat In my corner and listened while people asked him questions about the inability of the Waddani party to fight back. When they asked him about the arrest of prominent Waddani members by Siilaanyo, and their inability to demonstrate for their grievances, he just shrugged off and gave answers that was befitting of a Jeegaan member. He said, "our country doesn't have insurance to cover property damages caused by demonstrations " he continued, " During the Rayaale administration which I was member , we even shot demonstrations and governments have a duty to do these things to keep the order". He was talking as a member of the Jeegaan. When people asked him about the corruption involved about the finance minister Samsam, he just shrugged off and said, " in our culture it is difficult to point the corruptions of a lady or call her names". Looking back, I come to realize that the reason chairman Cirro was reluctant to challenge forcefully the former Jeegaan administration was basically he was surrounded by people who were not only weak but also had ulterior motives within the party. These kind of people must be purged from the Wadani party. If the chairman gets tough and honest lieutenants the fortune of the party could even grow bigger. Chairman Cirro should stay now and lead the election of 2019. I was one of those who criticised chairman Cirro during and after the election due to his behaviour toward the departed old man Siilaanyo. Yet, at the moment , there is no one other Chairman Cirro to unify the party and organize the next face of the party. Premature party leadership contest or party convention at this juncture is a recipe for disaster. There is no one more honorable than chairman Cirro In Somaliland politics at the moment. For the last few months after the election, chairman Cirro had acted tough on both issues of inflation, Tukaraq skirmishes and the Berbera port issues. He demanded the disbanding of the former election commission who failed to hold fair and free election. The Waddani party should never allow those comminissioners to hold anymore elections. These public servants had failed and allowed the registration of tens of thousands of under age kids and other illegal means to take place at the last election.. He is the only credible force for real opposition in Somalilnad. Today, Biixi and company are scared to death from the Wadani chairman and are using paid operatives like Uurcade to weaken his standing and resolve. At this juncture, chairman Cirro , not only represents the real opposition, but he has the best credibility among the people, the region and the international community. For the last few months, Ina Biixi felt both the power and the prestige of chairman Cirro by trying to bring him on board to help his agenda. Ciroo has accepted some of the invitations to discuss the next elections, but also has declined when the weak Biixi tried to get a boost from the Waddani party to implement his weak agenda. Due to the fragmented nature of the Somali culture where everyone is his own chief (Keligii Suldaan) and the evil intensions of the Jeegaan, the Waddani party must keep it's unity and hold it's convention when all underlining issues are resolved behind the curtain. In the next few years, if a different strong leader emerges in the future to carry the flag, then, and only then you might think to replace chairman Cirro . Yet, the experience gained by chairman Cirro in the last election could be a great assets that will help him to win the next one. There is also another unique issue among the Somali politicians where every disgruntled, fired or fool who loses the inner party politics would cry foul and say, " the party is broken in two" (Marka uu arko in laga adkaaday ama awood waayo, waxa uu odhan, Baarlamaankii ayaa laba u kala jabay, ama xisbigii ayaa laba u kala jabay). It was Chairman Jawaari who claimed that the parliament was broken in two blocks. Now, this loser Uurcade, who is appointed as secretary, has no legal authority to hold a convention without the party executive. I do not know very well about the rules of the Waddani party, but in most party politics, the candidate of the party usually appoints his campaign team and the executive team that must answer to him. AS we speak, chairman Cirro, temporary chairman C/qadir Jirde and vice candidate Mohamed Cali , who form the senior core of the party want to postpone the party convention and rebuild the party while holding accountable the weak Biixi administration who is losing both on economic issues ans regional issues. Let Mr. Uurcade, Dhoolayare and those who are hiding behind the curtain to get out of the party and join Kulmiye or any other entity. I heard some people talk about Dr. Gaboose who was a member of the Siilaanyo cabinet. The doctor has no business in the throat cut Somaliland business. He was one of those used by Siilaanyo and promised to replace him. He was briefly a minister and was discarded immediately. While a member of the Wadani party during last election, he disappeared without helping the party. The god doctor is nothing but a vehicle to fragment the party at this crucial state before the 2019 election. Deja Vue all over again. in 2011, Cali Waran Cadde destroyed the UDUB party after he lost to Jamaal C. Huseen who fulfilled all the necessary requirements. After that, he sold the rest and joined Kulmiye. This fool, Waran Cade, is thinking that the Jeegaan would transfer the Kulmiye party from Biixi to him, but if he believes that, he is not only naïve but also a fool. Just like Siilaanyo and Waran Cade conspired to destroy UDUB once and for all, Uurcade and Dhoolayare are doing exactly to do the same. It seems those from South Hargeisa , and Waraabe family are always bought and sold people in the political market place of the Jeegaan in Hargeisa with no change in sight .Waran Cade destroyed Udub, Faysal Waraabe eliminated UCID of Jamaal and now Uurcade and Dhoola Yare are trying to destroy Wadani. Yet, this time they will fail miserably. The plot of the Jeegaan is to fragment Waddani like they did to UCID and then bring the whole issue to the Jeegaan controlled court(Kadibna Gar been ahMaxakamada Jeegaanta ha lagu qaado). Unlike UCID, the Waddani party is united under the current leadership and will not accept the false convention proclaimed by Uurcade and others. The party also must warn the Jeegaan not to interfere with the internal party issues or the whole system will be disbanded. No one would accept a Jeegaan managed chaos at this stage. Uurcade and others are not happy about the political and electoral moves done by the party executive especially chairman Cirro. This week , Uurcade, Shiine Dheere and others were replaced by the chairman. Shiine Dheere , who is from Awdal is a good man from an influential community, but his own close cousin is the deputy chairman of the UCID party and according to Somaliland tribal politics that would fragment their votes. I do believe that the WAddani party must keep the block or the last constituency that gave them hundred of thousands of votes and bring in more regions. On that note, chairman Cirro has brought in as the new deputy of the party someone from the Sool community. While keeping the last block , Waddani must bring Sool and Sanaag which could put them easily on the winning block. The short term strategy of the party . 1- Reject and never compromise the dismissal of the last electoral commission. The old way of electing the election commission must change. The seven commissioners were appointed by the parties (3), Guurti(2) and the president(2). That formula must change. You can't have the president and his party to send three members with multiple authority. Each party must choose two and the Guurti must appoint one. That is the only way to assemble a fair and balanced commission. 2-Do not make any leadership changes of the party at the moment. 3- Do not hold any conventions until all underlining issues are agreed and consensus found among members. 4- If possible, the municipal elections must be done first in order for someone else to form a third opposition party that could replace UCID. Having an opposition party helping the Jeegaan was the worst thing that prolonged their rule. Faysal must be defeated or forced to give up the leadership to someone else. You can not have two ruling parties and one opposition. 5-Hold Muuse Biixi and his group accountable and put fire on their feet. Do not associate with him. Muuse can not take the pressure well, so when he cries for help or useless pip artisan coordination, reject you must. 6- Keep and increase the Awdal support. Reach out Sool and Sanaag and keep the last block. 7- Reject the UAE base in Berbera which will endanger the people and put Somaliland in foreign conflict. Yesterday the Houthie missile had hit central Riyaad. A large number of residents could not go outside and the worst is yet to come. The billion dollar American anti missile patriot could not even intercept. So, never compromise on that issue. If one single missile hits Berbera port, no foreign ship will dock that port just like Aden, Yemen. 8-If Biixi and company break the law, arrest innocent people or steal public assets, Mobilize your supports and hold strong demonstration to show the public anger and frustration. 9- You must expose and defeat Muuse Biixi and company before the election ( Doorashada ka hor waa in aad dadka tustaa in uu ku fayl garoobay xaggii dhaqaalaha iyo maamulka. 10- The chairman must appoint educated , energetic and credible critics who must be ready to answer every government move. 11- Finally , create a powerful media branch of the party that must expose government corruption and Jeegaan nepotism within the public.
  11. The Strategic Implications Of A Possible Russian Base In Somaliland If the unconfirmed reports about a possible Russian base in the breakaway region of Somaliland are to be believed, then Moscow is finally flexing its military muscles beyond Eurasia and signaling its eagerness to return to Africa. The typically trustworthy Alt-Media information portal South Front republished the claims that have been circulating for the past couple of days about a possible Russian military base in the breakaway region of Somaliland, a development that initially caught many observers off guard but is entirely explainable in hindsight if it actually comes to pass. The report alleges that Moscow has been in talkswith the self-proclaimed authorities in Hargeisa to build a small multiuse air and naval facility in the Djibouti-bordering town of Zeila in exchange for formally recognizing the region’s “independence”. The UAE is already constructing its own base in Berbera despite not officially recognizing Somaliland, but the Gulf State is a rising military power with much more money to throw around than Russia and therefore probably isn’t subject to the same conditions as Moscow would be for that simple pecuniary reason. Read more @ Oriental review
  12. The minister of state for foreign affairs and international cooperation, Abdelkader Ahmed-Khair Abdi in his office at the ministry of foreign affairs today, received his Excellency Mohamed Ahmed Osman Alhammadi, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates During the meeting, a number of issues took place, including the illegal agreement between the administration of Somaliland and the Dubai global ports company on the Somali port of Berbera and the legal issues that might result in violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. The Secretary of state for foreign affairs and international cooperation said that the federal government of Somalia is distributing quotas and development programmes in all Somali territories without exception, and will not compromise its sovereignty and national ownership, and will not agree to any agreement that will be reached without it. For his part, the UAE Ambassador to Somalia stressed that his country was fully committed to protecting, respecting and supporting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia, stating that there was a need for continued coordination and consultation to broaden and deepen cooperation between the two countries, thereby ensuring Somali Somali
  13. Hargeysa - Taxnaha 89 - 90 - Qaybta Toddobaad Halkan ka akhri: Hargeysa - Taxnaha 89 - 90 - Qaybta Toddobaad
  14. "Amr Mozeb told the officer at the consulate his family can't stay in Djibouti. They're running out of money. He says the consular officer suggested moving them to Somaliland, which is cheaper. " These are Yemeni Americans stranded by travel ban.