It is a good read. I've read just about every pundit's analysis on Somalia in the past few weeks. On Iraq, PINR wrote many good reports that very accurately predicted the mess we witness today. They don't claim to know everything but whatever they claim, they often back up with a sound argument. The sad thing is, their assessment will likely come to pass.

The most lucid and cogent analysis I've read on the state of Somalia today and the near future. If you have the time, this is a must read.

During the first two weeks of January, the domestic and external actors with interests in Somalia's political future strove to adjust to the new balance of power created by Ethiopia's successful invasion of the country that drove the previously dominant Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) out of the official capital Mogadishu and installed the weak, unpopular, clan-based, warlord-riven and internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in its place. On January 13, the Ethiopian forces had driven the last hardcore holdouts of the I.C.C. from their last redoubt in Ras Kamboni at the forested southern tip of Somalia, ending the I.C.C.'s existence as an organized movement and leaving its leaders and supporters to retreat into their sub-clans, attempt to reconcile with the T.F.G., or try to mount an armed insurgency against the T.F.G. Having split into conciliatory and militant factions even before the Ethiopian invasion, the I.C.C.'s elements are, for the moment, minor players in Somalia's conflicts. Their role as protagonists in Somalia's political drama has been taken by Addis Ababa, the T.F.G. executive and clan leaders and their warlords, locked into a tense conjuncture. The events of the first half of January confirm PINR's forecast in its January 1 report on Somalia that the most likely scenario would be "a return to the pre-I.C.C. period of extreme decentralization, warlordism and state failure, either with or without an Islamist insurgency -- the latter being the more probable outcome." That conclusion is based on the underlying judgments that clan and warlord interests in security and control currently outweigh any more general interest in a viable Somali state, and that external actors are unwilling to expend the military, financial and diplomatic resources necessary to bolster the T.F.G. and to influence favorably a process of national reconciliation aimed at the formation of a unity government embracing all the major sectors of Somali society, including conciliatory Islamists. With the T.F.G., which would form the basis of a central government and is presently unopposed by any organized national movement, dependent for its existence on Addis Ababa's military support, Ethiopia is, for the moment, the major player in Somalia. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, has announced repeatedly that Addis Ababa's forces would end their occupation of Somalia within several weeks and that he is not prepared to commit Ethiopian resources to state building and reconstruction in the country. Having eliminated the possibility of an Islamic state on its eastern border and having sidelined its regional rival Eritrea, which had supported the I.C.C., Ethiopia would, in the best case, like to have Somalia as a client state. Addis Ababa, however, is convinced that this is impossible and is therefore content to leave the country weak and divided. Indeed, on January 10, Zenawi remarked that the elders and residents of Mogadishu "can pacify the city" by themselves -- a judgment that is shared by no other actor. Addis Ababa's position has been described succinctly and precisely by Canadian journalist Jonathan Manthorpe writing in the Vancouver Sun on January 11: "A return to factional instability will be a happy outcome for Ethiopia, which has a host of historic disputes with Somalia and does not want to see a united and effective government." Zenawi's threats to withdraw Ethiopian forces from Somalia rapidly have added a sense of urgency to the efforts of actors interested in the formation of a stable Somali state to prevent a reversion to Somalia's pre-Courts statelessness. Those efforts have focused on the introduction of African Union (A.U.) peacekeepers into Somalia to replace the Ethiopians, who are resented by most Somalis; encouraging the T.F.G. to accede to a reconciliation process that would broaden its base and might result in a new constitution; and attempts by the T.F.G. to assert itself as a guarantor of security, which it must at least appear to be if it is to be granted legitimacy by Somalia's population and for African states to commit themselves to providing peacekeepers. It is telling that alone among all the actors, save the T.F.G., Zenawi has said that the T.F.G. is "sufficiently comprehensive" as it stands to reconcile Somali society. Since 1977, when Ethiopia won a bitter war initiated by Somalia to annex the former's ethnic-Somali ****** region, Addis Ababa has successfully derailed attempts to unify Somalia, and it is doing the same now. Having crushed the I.C.C., Addis Ababa is likely to work carefully to prevent the T.F.G. from becoming viable, despite pressure against that strategy from its patron Washington, European donor powers and most of the regional states. With vital interests in Somalia that no other actor has and a long practice of playing divide and rule, Addis Ababa will be expected to exploit the inherent decentralizing tendencies within Somalia to thwart reconciliation. As Addis Ababa settles into its accustomed strategy, the other actors with less intense interests are likely to give way. In the last 15 years, there have been 13 unsuccessful attempts to broker unity governments in Somalia and there is no reason to believe that present efforts will bear any better fruit. Again, Manthorpe puts the matter precisely: "There are no signs of anyone coming up with the money to pay peacekeepers or finance Somalia's reconstruction." Reversion Gets Underway PINR's judgment that Somalia is reverting to its pre-Courts past is based on the unfolding facts on the ground that portend instability and on evidence of the external actors' lack of political will to fill the security vacuum that will appear after Ethiopian forces withdraw with a peacekeeping mission. The failure of the actors to make serious efforts to start a genuine reconciliation process is another factor. With its highest priority establishing credibility in and control over Mogadishu, the T.F.G. moved to disarm the city's many clan-based militias and private security forces on January 1, when the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, announced a deadline of January 4 for voluntary disarmament, after which weapons would be seized. Reluctant to surrender their arms in a climate of radical uncertainty, Mogadishu's population and factions failed to respond to Gedi's decree, and the deadline passed without any T.F.G. action to seize weapons. On January 6, there was a violent demonstration in the city against disarmament and the Ethiopian occupation. Immediately following the demonstration, the T.F.G. abandoned its disarmament plan. T.F.G. deputy defense minister, Ali Salad Jelle, announced: "The disarmament operation which was due to start today has been postponed after a local ****** clan asked the prime minister to set disarmament for another time and not now." As the disarmament initiative ground to a halt, there were sporadic attacks on Ethiopian forces and T.F.G. militias in and around Mogadishu. The T.F.G. responded by adding checkpoints on the city's streets and sealing off neighborhoods, which angered local residents. After a grenade attack on an Ethiopian convoy on January 10, following skirmishes on the three preceding days, Ethiopian forces initiated house-to-house searches for weapons, breaking with their policy of keeping a low profile in order to avoid a popular backlash against their occupation. Few weapons were confiscated in the raids because small arms had been buried and heavy weapons dismantled. Opposition to the T.F.G. and the Ethiopians was centered in neighborhoods dominated by the ****** clan, particularly the Ayr sub-clan, which had been a support base for the I.C.C. On January 4, Ayr leadership sent a communiqué to Gedi calling for "politically inclusive dialogue" and a halt to efforts by the T.F.G. to impose a state of emergency in Somalia. On January 12, the T.F.G. parliament, still meeting in the south-central town of Baidoa, where the T.F.G. had been based prior to the Ethiopian invasion, approved the state of emergency by a vote of 154-2. On the same day, the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, met with warlords who had returned to Mogadishu and extracted from them an "agreement in principle" to integrate their militias into a national army. No date was set for the turnover and a committee was proposed to work out its arrangements. Outside the meeting, a dispute over parking spaces erupted between T.F.G. security guards and members of warlord Mohamed Qanyare Afrah's militia, in which eight of the militiamen were killed. Civil society groups and businessmen met on January 13 at a Mogadishu hotel to express opposition to the state of emergency, which they judged to be "an obstacle to reconciliation" and a "danger to freedom." Inter-clan fighting, resistance to the occupation and political conflict between T.F.G. officials and local leaders also surfaced in the western Hiraan region, the central Galguduud and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, and the southern Lower Jubba region. Aid agencies reported looting and harassment of civilians by roving gangs in the south-central Bay region. Journalists in Mogadishu reported the appearance of roadblocks manned by clan militias extorting tolls from travelers, and noted a tendency of "reclanization," as families moved into areas dominated by their sub-clans to seek security. Taken as a whole, developments on the ground do not bode well for the success of a T.F.G. lacking significant popular and external support. No faction is willing to consider disarming until all the others do so. The ******, fearing reprisals from the rival ***** clan, of which Yusuf is a member, are particularly resistant to giving up their weapons and ceding control over their neighborhoods. The Ethiopians are in a mode of force protection, allowing resistance to organize and criminal gangs to function. T.F.G. interior minister, Hussein Aideed, told the Washington Post's Stephanie McCrummen: "We have a symbolic government. Ministries we don't have, a military we don't have. We're limited." Mogadishu's police commander, Ali Mohamed Hassan Loyan, admitted that any weapons confiscated from the population would be needed to arm his own forces. Aideed did not help matters when he suggested that the boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia be erased; he quickly took back his words and they were repudiated by the executive, but they fanned public distrust of the T.F.G.'s aims. As the T.F.G. stalled, Ethiopian troops backed by air power and T.F.G.-allied militias were destroying the last vestiges of I.C.C. military resistance in Somalia's deep south, with the aid of a United States naval blockade, border controls imposed by Kenya and U.S. special forces and intelligence support. Washington took advantage of the disruption of the I.C.C. to target suspected al-Qaeda operatives, whom it had linked to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in an airstrike that failed to achieve its aim and resulted, according to reports by local media, in civilian deaths. Washington's action received the approval of Yusuf, the acquiescence of Zenawi, expressions of "concern" from international and regional organizations, and the disapproval of Arab states, Djibouti, from which the mission was launched -- officially without its consent -- and the European Union, opening up a trans-Atlantic rift. The major result of the airstrike was to weaken the T.F.G.'s credibility by making it appear to be a pawn of Washington. Washington had given cover for Ethiopia's invasion at the United Nations, had tacitly approved it and had provided support for it, from a shared interest with Addis Ababa in preventing the emergence of an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. The airstrike -- Washington admitted to one, but there were reports of several more -- was piggy-backed on the Ethiopian operation as part of the "war on terrorism." An anonymous U.S. Defense Department official told Agence France Presse: "It was a target of opportunity we had to take." The failed mission does not indicate increased U.S. military involvement in Somalia; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer has made it clear that Washington intends to "lead from behind" in Somalia. The airstrike simply added another destabilizing shock to an already insecure situation and weakened Washington's diplomatic influence and narrowed its options. As the T.F.G. showed few if any signs of consolidating its control on the ground and becoming an effective authority, external actors struggled to find a military and political formula, which might stabilize Somalia, in a whirl of diplomacy that continues unabated and has as yet achieved no conclusive results. The centerpiece of diplomatic efforts was a conference in Nairobi on January 5 that was sponsored by the Washington-inspired Contact Group for Somalia (C.G.) -- composed of former European colonial powers in Somalia and European donor states, plus the sole African representative Tanzania -- and was attended by all the external actors interested in Somalia: the A.U., the Arab League (A.L.), the European Union, the United Nations and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.) -- the regional organization comprising Somalia and its neighbors. The purpose of the meeting was to find a way to prevent a security and power vacuum from forming in Somalia after Ethiopian forces withdrew that would gain the assent of all the external actors. The meeting produced a consensus in favor of deploying an international "stabilization force" in Somalia to prop up the T.F.G. and of pressing the T.F.G. to begin immediately an "inclusive process of political dialogue." The unaccustomed agreement among organizations representing states and regions with often divergent interests in Somalia was abstract and masked serious differences in interpreting the practical meanings of "stabilization force" and "inclusive process of political dialogue," and their relation to one another. Those differences have surfaced in the days following the Nairobi conference, stalling progress toward the achievement of either goal. The U.S. airstrike served to harden opposed positions. At the heart of disputes over interpreting the consensus statement is the question of which goal needs to be realized first. The T.F.G., Ethiopia, the United States and -- with some reluctance -- Kenya, which was forced by Ethiopia's military campaign and Washington's support of it to collaborate with them to the dissatisfaction of its ethnic-Somali and larger Muslim population, are insistent that a peacekeeping mission sponsored by the A.U. be deployed immediately. The E.U., A.L. and Djibouti counter that a peacekeeping mission would be likely to destabilize Somalia were it introduced before progress was made on reconciliation and broadening the T.F.G.'s base. The African states that would contribute to a mission pay it lip service, but refuse to commit troops, save Uganda, or to deploy until there is security on the ground and adequate funding from Western powers. Eritrea is opposed to a peacekeeping mission and holds that the T.F.G. should be scrapped as the basis of reconciliation talks, and the T.F.G. and Ethiopia claim that the transitional institutions are already sufficiently inclusive. The European Union has conditioned financial support on a satisfactory reconciliation process, has broached the idea of a U.N. force given the over-straining current peacekeeping obligations of African states, and envisions a political solution that would supersede the T.F.G. constitution. The T.F.G. and its patrons view the transitional charter as the political structure for a unity government. Given the divergent interpretations of peacekeeping and reconciliation, and of their relation to one another, it is not surprising that no peacekeeping mission has yet been formed, despite the strenuous efforts of Nairobi to gain commitments; and that no reconciliation talks have yet been scheduled, despite efforts by Yemen to mediate between conciliatory elements of the former Courts movement and the T.F.G., which alternates between offering to dialogue with the Islamists and dismissing them as a spent force of criminals. The conflicting interpretations of the consensus statement reveal that the same alignments of conflicting interests in play before the Ethiopian invasion are still in force. Addis Ababa and Asmara continue to use Somalia as an arena for their longstanding conflict; the United States and the Europeans, save Great Britain, continue to duel over the advantages of military and diplomatic measures; the states to the north of Somalia, which had leaned toward the I.C.C., remain determined to prevent Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn; and African states to the south are eager to please Washington, but are wary of injecting their forces into an unstable situation that would force them to be peacemakers rather than peacekeepers, and would put them in harm's way. Washington's notion of "leading from behind" has little substance in light of its support of Addis Ababa and the airstrikes. There are too many conflicting interests and there is too little political will among the external actors for them to exert sufficient concerted influence to stabilize Somalia. The question of how a stabilization mission would be funded illustrates the gulf between aspiration and serious commitment. Washington has offered US$16 million for the mission; the European Union has offered $19.5 million contingent on the T.F.G entering serious power sharing talks; the A.U. Peace and Security Council estimates that the projected 8,000 troop mission would cost $160 million for a six-month deployment. Only Uganda has committed troops to the mission -- up to a maximum of 1,500 -- and its parliament has yet to approve deployment. Due to internal opposition to Uganda's participation, its president, Yoweri Museveni, has demanded to know the exit strategy for the mission, its rules of engagement and the sources of its funds, none of which has been determined and all of which are subjects of dispute. Aid for reconstruction, which is essential to the T.F.G.'s survival, is even less adequate, with commitments of approximately $28 million over direct short-term humanitarian donations. Now that the Courts have been defeated, Somalia returns to its status as an international step child and custody case. Conclusion With the T.F.G. haltingly struggling for power and authority, and determined to avoid genuine power sharing; the clans and sub-clans, and their warlords asserting themselves; and an incipient Islamist insurgency forming that will league with disaffected sub-clans and warlords, reversion to political fragmentation is underway in Somalia. With Addis Ababa threatening to withdraw its forces and giving, at most, half-hearted encouragement to reconciliation, regional and international actors -- riven by divergent interests and unwilling to make Somalia a high priority -- are unlikely to be able to arrest the drift toward political entropy; their inability to coordinate mirrors Somalia's centrifugal tendencies -- it is also political entropy. It is always possible that PINR's judgment is mistaken, that -- as hopeful actors and analysts repeat -- the defeat of the Courts has opened a window of opportunity for a genuinely representative government in Somalia. Looking at the facts on the ground and the discussions in the conference halls, PINR sees no indication that Somalia is moving toward political integration. The Courts were a genuine attempt at Somali national unification; the T.F.G., however, remains another of the many efforts to achieve integration through external pressure and tepid support -- none of those efforts has reconciled competing domestic factions or insulated Somalia from the self-serving interventions of external actors. Somalia's political future appears to be its pre-Courts past. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Power and Interest

Originally posted by bambo: castro why are you always advertising bad news comming out of home land Saaxib is the bad news coming out of the homeland made up? If not, why wouldn't you want to hear about it? If you're interested in positive news, many people bring that here as well. I feel there's a lack of balance between the overly rosy picture painted by the supporters of the TFG and the other (what you call bad) news coming out of the country. I'm not a journalist and I only bring quotes from media sources who have deemed fit to right about these incidents and issues. If you find them to be bearers of bad news, take it up with them. I always provide the source, unlike many of the fly-by-night "good" news coming out of Villa Somalia complete with pictures and all. Finally, I'll leave you with this thought. If you'd been paying attention, you'd recall the Bush administration complained about the "bad" news coming from Iraq in the early months of the war. They attacked the media for focusing on car bombings and death squad killings and not the reconstruction effort that was underway. Well guess what, they don't complain anymore. Do you know why? Because no one believes their rosy lies of reconstruction and security in Iraq. It's so bad out there any talk of reconstruction projects pales in comparison to the carnage gripping the country. Muqdisho is far from Baghdad but blaming the media for the bad news is an exercise in futility. Many of the corporations owning the media reporting the bad news are interested in keeping the TFG there. Why would they shoot themselves in the foot? Think about it saaxib.

Originally posted by Abu Paragon: I cannot bring myself to debate with the proud clients of Ethiopia and the US. Paragon, saaxib, our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are no more wrong (or treacherous) than we are right (or nationalistic). We're on the left, they're on the right. We're all keyboard commandos, however. Unless some here are actually receiving tangible benefits from the TFG (or the ICU before its collapse), we're all voicing what we believe is right. Even if someone is getting paid to spread propaganda one way or the other, the SOL crowd is so savvy he or she wouldn't last a week before they're sniffed out and marginalized. Love (or hate) of a clan is powerful but it's probably no more powerful than being a rabid Chelsea fan. Who knows what Somalia will be like in 1 year or 5? Most of us, if not all of us, hope it gets better but if it doesn't, and unless we live there, we'll still go on with our lives elsewhere. I didn't have much interest in the politics section of SOL because my interest in politics is mainly global. For as long as it was inter (or intra) tribe feuding, I figured it was not a major problem as no one clan was that much stronger than all the others. Age old skirmishes were the worst that could transpire. Ethiopia's interference was also not newsworthy for they've been aligning themselves with one strongman or the other over the 15 years. Still, nothing to lose sleep over. In the unique case of the warlords in Muqdisho, the outrage I felt of the chaotic and dangerous life has faded with the years. Essentially, I had become accustomed to hearing bad news from the homeland once in a while but nothing so bad to ruin my day. I would shrug my shoulders and pray for the suffering people. And that would be it. Last spring with the advent of the ICU, things changed a bit. Though I've not been a big fan of the Al-Itihad (probably because I wasn't propaganda savvy in the 90's), what peaked my interest was the CIA paying the warlords to form the "anti-terrorism alliance". It wasn't the first attempt by the world superpower to give the keys for the hen house to the fox but it was one that became public. The rag-tag men of the ICU with all their funny looking red beards and head dresses had managed to do the unthinkable: defeat the big, bad warlords that were parading the crisp $100 bills from the CIA. The more the US got involved, the more I was interested. Then things deteriorated rapidly for the ICU and now with the invasion and occupation, I see what I read about from other countries happen in my own. I reject imperialism and hegemony in any form and on any land. I further reject naked aggression on false pretenses for monetary gain. To me the TFG has signed a deal with the devil. Simple and plain. No matter the make up of it (clan-wise), they're men of dishonor who have decided, for one reason or the other, that whatever the Ethiopians or US whispered in their ears was good enough for their remaining days. Whether it is a lifetime lease on Villa Somalia, a million dollars, a 100 million dollars or what have you. Even if some of them are sincere and want the best for Somalia, having chosen such allies as Ethiopia and the US, they have essentially forfeited any chance their wishes would come true. On the other hand, I supported the ICU, despite my reservations about ideological movements, because their mandate seemed simple: rid the city (and later the country) of the roving war-gangsters. Establish some form of Islamic state. Heck, the whole nation is made up of Muslims, right? An Islamic state certainly describes a nation of 100% Muslim population. The details, I thought, could be sorted out later. First, do some house cleaning. Today, that's neither here or there. So, to sum up, don't leave. If you do, the balance of opinions will shift to the right. P.S. Sorry about the sermon.

And you people blame Brown and I for calling people names? How can we possibly resist the urge with people like Captain Xalane and MC Yonis around? Brown, 12-step program brother. Must-not-call-anyone-door-k-nob-no-matter-how-much-they-tempt-us.

Mohamed Hebaan has summed up how I feel about this wretched puppet government: The views of the new pen warlords come in varieties and different titles, but they have one common theme: Let us forget what happened and support the TFG…The interest of the Somalis lies in supporting the TFG. The best way to get rid of the Ethiopia’s occupation is to support the TFG (I read someone making this last claim in Somali language!) The problem with these assertions and pleadings by the new pen warlords is that their logic seems to be intended for children, rather than for grown up and thinking people. First, you don’t help the enemy to invade the country and kill thousands of its people, and then pretend as though nothing happened. It is not that easy! Second, how can a corrupt and Ethiopia imposed regime that reached Mogadishu through Ethiopian tanks, and over the bodies of thousands of dead Somalis, be beneficial to Somalia? It will never be!

NAIROBI — Kenya’s effort to secure African peacekeepers to aid the transitional government in Somalia looked doomed yesterday as clashes intensified. At least five people were killed as gunmen battled government and Ethiopian troops in the heaviest fighting in the capital, Mogadishu, since the ousting of Union of Islamic Courts militia in a lightning offensive last month. A policeman was also gunned down when a gang raided a cache of weapons he was guarding, witnesses said. Regional diplomats said it was unlikely African Union (AU) members would agree to send peacekeepers unless fighting halted. Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, who heads a seven-nation regional peace body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, sent envoys to secure at least 8000 African troops to take over from Ethiopian forces. Kibaki sent special envoys to Rwanda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Tunisia and Algeria. So far only Uganda has offered a 1500-strong troop contingent, although parliamentary approval is yet to be secured. President Thabo Mbeki said last week that “Africa has no choice but to help bring peace to Somalia”, but did not commit South African troops. Meanwhile, members of parliament in Somalia approved the imposition of martial law at the weekend, giving the security forces wide-ranging powers. Analysts said US and Ethiopian participation in ousting the Islamists had greatly jeopardised the chances of ending fighting. US jets launched attacks against suspected al-Qaeda hideouts shortly after Islamists fled Mogadishu, killing scores and sparking international outrage. AU officials were in Mogadishu yesterday to discuss peacekeeping at the invitation of the Somali government. Business Day

Originally posted by peacenow: Eritrea and it's people have always been allies and friends of the Somali people. So I don't understand your motive for this. It is also inaccurate. Because, as you know, they were no Eritran troops in Somali at all. While both the Ethiopians and Americans are there in Somalia now in force . Hmmm. Let me see. The occupiers are getting attacked every day as the insurgency grows. Atheero hasn't left Villa Somalia since the day he moved in. There's only talk of disarmament but no one wants to give up their weapons to this puppet cowards. There are only promises of peacekeepers but no one wants to send their youth to protect a treacherous and universally incompetent installed regime. The security of the city has not been worse than this since the days of the warlords. Oh wait, it's the same warlords that are back. Any wonder then that General Cut & Paste has resorted to posting discredited information like this or the "breaking news" of Aweys or Sharif? Desperate situations call for desperate measures.

^ Is that even possible? I heard the boy is already walking around with a melon.

Disarmament, no disarmement. Negotiations, no negotiations. Amnesty, no amnesty. Media ban, no media ban. What else do these puppet flip-floppers have in store for us?

Originally posted by xiinfaniin: ^^I think you got it wrong;Ethiopia asked tfg's and America's assistance and got it! tfg has been asking assistance for some time now and still didnot get it! tfg is usefull tool for Ethiopia, so is Somaliland and Puntland! what can we do about it? War yaa soo baxay oo su'aashaa isku daya? Make a thread of it and there will be many who would throw their two taano in there. I'll think about what can be done while I read my book in bed.

Originally posted by Pi: People, people, it's called hadith science 101. Someone gives you a testimony about what someone else said, or about an event that happened. Believe it or not, before you accept their testimony, they have to exhibit intellectual competence (along with piety and other factors). So, I don't accept what full time goat-herders and shoe-makers say. Oh yes, this also includes animals and plants. What about part-time goat herders? And which animals or plants have been giving you testimony? Single cell door****. LOL.

Originally posted by MKA Yoonis: I'm a Puntlander, the people you hate and envy day and night so don't badmouth them, it's unbecoming for a servant to badmouth his master you know? LOOOOL. Hell hath no fury like a Buntlander scorned.

by Iqbal Jassat (Monday January 15 2007) "It matters not to Bush that the euphemistically styled "Somali government" and its unelected "president" symbolise corruption and self-enrichment. What matters is that these war-lords are the gateway to Somalia's new found oil riches. Also that they would be willing to allow further US military bases in the Horn of Africa. Power and its brutal exercise by America is the only game in town, is the message Bush has repeatedly send out since 9/11." What have Somalis done to earn the rage of George W Bush? This question underscores immense difficulties confronting Somalia in the aftermath of an Ethiopian invasion and American bombing. Within days following a massive ground and air offensive by Meles Zenawi's US-backed army, the Pentagon reluctantly released sketchy details of its own direct bombardment of areas within Somalia. Subsequent verification of facts on the ground reveal that far from targeting so-called "Islamic terrorists", the US military force killed hundreds of innocent men, women and children. The strategic deployment of their naval armada in the Red Sea off the Somali coast-land, which allows the US to intimidate and bully countries who stray from the neo-con path, has been used to co-ordinate with their huge military base in Djibouti. So the "war on terror" continues unabated - even though so-called "al-Qaeeda terrorists" have yet to be found in Mogadishu! That America is hell-bent to catapult the globe into a head-on collission with Muslims who are defined as "terrorists" is a reality and widely known. What is lesser known and not sufficiently debated is the fact that the defining chracteristic of these so-called "terrorists", is their individual and collective refusal to submit to US dictates. What it means therefore is that maintaining client-states in power requires the elimination of their adversaries. In order to do so, malign your opponnents as criminals by listing them and their supporters as "terrorists", thereby granting legitimacy - albeit a false one - to despotic tyrants to ruthlessly torture and kill them. This scenario has played out over and over in numerous places. The Saudi dictatorship provides a classic example. They are close allies of the US and participate vigorously in its open-ended wars. From financing CIA operations in the early 80s, the Saudi clan has come a long way in managing the art of masquerading as a benign Muslim government while collaborating with Israel. The fact that democracy does not exist in Saudi Arabia, is of no consequence for the Bush administration. Yet the world is regularly coerced to support a White House crusade to re-image parts of the Middle East. George Galloway, during a recent visit to South Africa, made a telling point: If Saudis were free to elect their leader, Osama bin Laden would win by an overwhelming majority! It matters not to Bush that the euphemistically styled "Somali government" and its unelected "president" symbolise corruption and self-enrichment. What matters is that these war-lords are the gateway to Somali's new found oil riches. Also that they would be willing to allow further US military bases in the Horn of Africa. Power and its brutal exercise by America is the only game in town, is the message Bush has repeatedly send out since 9/11. A few days ago, a Somali refugee in South Africa made a pertinent observation on a radio talk-show: He could only return to his family during the short respite provided by the Islamic Courts Union after more than a decade of anarchy! Now that the leaders of the Islamic Courts have been routed and peace, calm and security has once again become hostage of the US-backed war lords, Somalia and its people justifiably dread the future. After all, Iraq remains a mirror reflecting America's arrogance and ****** stubborness. Media Monitors

Eric Margolis can't count. This is the 5th war against Muslims in 5 years. There's been many more over the years. Sudan and/or Iran is next.

Different name, same door knob. :rolleyes:

Very interesting read and in hindsight, shows the relative unimportance of the TFG or even the ICU. Though the latter was important for the tired residents of Xamar.

It's from AllBuntland.com

^ I look forward to the day this puppet regime falls and these treacherous cowards are skinned alive.

General Cut & Paste, Sheikh Fakekhayre and taako bell can rejoice all they want. It ain't no leaders of the ICU that will scorch the earth under the dabadhilif and the occupiers. It will be regular Somalis.

^ You can email the NY Times at letters@nytimes.com and ask them why they didn't interview the "intellectuals". Alternatively, you can call this number (212) 556-7652.

“Totalitarian rule has arrived,” said Asho Elmi Ahmed, a shopper. “And it didn’t take long.”

Somalia Makes Moves to Crush Insurgency By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN MOGADISHU, Somalia, Jan. 15 — Somalia’s transitional government shut down three of the country’s biggest radio stations today after officials accused them of airing incendiary propaganda. At the same time, hundreds of government soldiers stormed into the streets of Mogadishu, the capital, as Ethiopian tanks chugged through downtown for the first time, drawing crowds of onlookers and the occasional rock. It seems that Somalia’s government, which declared a state of emergency on Saturday, is intent on using its newfound powers to crush the seeds of a growing insurgency and already that has stirred clan tensions. On Sunday night, gunmen attacked an Ethiopian convoy, setting off an intense hourlong firefight in one of Mogadishu’s ramshackle neighborhoods. Ethiopian troops are backing Somalia’s shaky transitional government and last month helped rout Somalia’s Islamist forces, which had controlled much of the country. As the days pass, the insurgent attacks grow more frequent and more lethal. The government has not released casualty figures but residents in Mogadishu said that more than a dozen people have been killed in gun battles this past week. Executives of Mogadishu’s radio stations, however, said that was no excuse to kick them off the air. “All we have done is voice different opinions,” said Mohammed Amiin, deputy chairman of Shabelle Media Network. “ We never expected this to happen.” Abdirahman Dinari, spokesman for the transitional government, accused Shabelle, along with the other stations, of reporting false information to stir up the people against the government. “They said our soldiers were looting the markets and harassing people, which was totally untrue,” Mr. Dinari said. “They are using the media to undermine the government. They have been doing this for months.” Of course, in a land of rivaling clans, there is a clan dimension to all this. The owners of both Shabelle and Horn Afrik, one of the other closed radio stations, are members of the Ayr, a branch of the powerful ****** clan, and many government officials blame the Ayr for the rising level of violence. “The Ayr clan is part of the problem,” Mr. Dinari said. The Ayr was closely associated with the Islamist movement, with several top Islamist leaders from the Ayr. Many residents of Mogadishu suspect that Ayr members are the backbone of the insurgency, although Ayr elders vehemently deny this. So far, the most intense fighting — and the most intense crackdowns, in which government and Ethiopian soldiers have searched house-to-house — are in Ayr neighborhoods, which is beginning to fuel Ayr resentment. “We are being harassed simply because of our clan,” said Abdi Ali Halaneh, an Ayr businessman who sells building materials in north Mogadishu. Mr. Halaneh said many of his friends now wanted to leave Somalia. “There may be no place for us here,” he said. The government also closed the Mogadishu office of Al Jazeera and a Somali religious radio station, a move that some people feared could play straight into the hands of the Islamists, who have been military defeated but vowed to regroup underground. Security officials summoned station owners to a meeting on Tuesday, and Mr. Dinari said there is a possibility that the stations will soon be back on the air, after they are given a warning. In the Bakara market in Mogadishu, where even the tiniest tin kiosk has a radio, shoppers and shopkeepers moaned and hissed when the music and news turned to static. Many shook their radios. Some pointed out that the transitional government a few months ago had criticized the Islamists for not allowing radio stations to play Western music, totally shutting down those same stations. “Totalitarian rule has arrived,” said Asho Elmi Ahmed, a shopper. “And it didn’t take long.” Mohammed Ibrahim and Yuusuf Maxamuud contributed reporting. NY Times

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