Jamster

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Posts posted by Jamster

  6. Posted

    Ibtisam, mayee wiilashan qalalley ee hilib doonka ah ayaan usheegi!! doing my bit; you ladies complain of us being bit skinny; so this is for the guys.

     

    The place is between harlesden and Edgwhare Road-- not the most glomorous place; but worth the travelling.

  8. Posted

    For those of us who take delight on satiating our hungry for good meat with affordable tag on; behold for behesht would be indeed the place for the meet eaters.

     

    The décor is authentic, the food is huge portions—trust me on this guys; you would love this; by to village and Ocean.

     

    Price: let us just 5 of us (we were tempted to ask to go/take away as the huge plate was full of meet and chicken) paid only 52 pounds!!

     

    The food is delish.

     

    You should check out.

     

    PS: You should book before you go there as it is booking only. Also, you must speak quite slowly as most waiter's arent fluent in English.

  11. Posted

    Somalia! By Any Manner of Means

    By Ismail Ali Ismail

    January 25 2007

     

     

    “In friendship false, implacable in hate:

    Resolv’d to ruin or to rule the state.”

    Dryden

    Background

     

    Few, if any, will doubt that the above quotation is an apt description of our Somali war-lords. It may be argued that the war-lords, scavenging on the remains of our ruined State, were the product of a vacuum created by the inability of the clan- based liberation fronts to come together and lay new foundations for a state which would be in accord with their own vision. Alas, they had no vision of their own beyond sweeping out the regime of Siad Barre, and did not, apparently, foresee the necessity of forging a state together.

     

    The task of toppling a deeply entrenched dictatorial and repressive regime was, obviously, so absorbing that it eclipsed all that was supposed to follow its successful accomplishment. In the event, confusion reigned as happens in all such situations. The gruesome events that followed the demise of the Bourbons in the French Revolution (1789) were termed “The Reign of Terror”. And there were two ‘kinds’ of terror in Ethiopia following the so-called ‘creeping revolution’ of the Dergue that overthrew the aged and senile Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1974. The Dergue manged to settle in authority only after shedding so much blood in 1976 and 1977 through its massive campaign of “Red Terror” conducted under the pretext of countering a “White Terror” unleashed by its opponents.

     

    By contrast, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF for short) entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 in a very methodical, organized and (to a large extent) peaceful manner. They came in one late afternoon and, except for sporadic gun fire, Addis Ababa fell quietly. It was amazing: the final stage of regime change in Ethiopia seemed orderly and orchestrated, and it looked as if we were simply witnessing a change of the guard. It is important to remember, for the purpose of analysis, that the EPRDF was an umbrella organization comprising: (a) Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization; (b) Amhara National Democratic Movement; © South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front; and (d) Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front. Clearly, they were all, like ours, ethnically based. Incidentally, I happened to witness all these vicissitudes.

     

    Ours movements were: (a) the SSDF of ******; (b) the SNM of *****; © the USC of ******; and (d) SPM of ******. Although it seemed that they all shared the common goal of overthrowing the Siad Barre regime they themselves were not really on speaking terms and did not trust each other. Even Aideed and Abdullahi Yusuf, long time comrades in arms, friends of long standing, colleagues and cell-mates in their long incarceration could be seen in the corridors of the Ghion in Addis Ababa trading hateful glances, not because they had personal grievances against each other but because one was ****** and the other ******. Such unfortunate circumstances stood in the way of forming an umbrella organization to coordinate the policies and streamline the fighting strategies of the Somali movements. A major contributory factor to the collapse of the Somali State was also the disintegration of its military even before the regime finally crumbled.

     

    Ali Mahdi was proclaimed President in Magadishu by a small group who gathered around him immediately after the downfall of the regime. But he was confirmed later by the first Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 1991. The problem, however, was that Aideed would not let anyone other than himself have the presidency and fighting ensued between Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The conflict continued and war-lords mushroomed. Later on, Aideed proclaimed himself President and established a broad-based government called “sal-ballaadh” which contained elements from all clans but was not recognized. But the conflict did not stop and Aideed fell in the process.

     

    In 2000 the TNG was born of another reconciliation meeting, also in Djibouti. Abdulqassim Salaad Hassan was elected, through a free and fair and transparent process, as President and gained thereby international legitimacy but was unable to bring the war-lords within the fold of his government; nor was he able to unite and bring the capital city under the control of his Administration.

     

    Now there is the TFG which was born of a two-year arduous process of interclan consultations, negotiations and haggling as a result of which a Parliament was formed and Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as the transitional President of the Republic in a process that was also free and fair and transparent. But the TFG had no resources, no army or police, and was unable to settle in the capital where everyone was fighting everyone else including the war-lords who had been appointed ministers but were still wreaking havoc in the city; it also had too many enemies from within and without who spared no effort to bring it down. And then of course there was that vulpine Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who could not lead his Parliament but always remained a thorn on the side of government’s flesh because of his scheming nature and continual encroachments upon its territory. The Sharif , although Speaker of Parliament, was heart and soul with the forces of discord, of disunity, of death and darkness – the war-lords who broke away from the government. And after he and the President patched their differences it did not take him too long to decamp to the ICU. By running with the hares and the hunting with the hounds the Sharif laid bare the true nature of his character which finally led to him being voted out as Speaker of Parliament. Such a character cannot be an asset to any side of the political divide.

     

    These adverse circumstances notwithstanding the TFG was required to bear the heavy burden of reconciliation single-handedly and to install a federal system within a matter of only two years in a country that was tearing itself apart. And of course it could acquit itself of these tasks. Sadly, even some of our so-called intellectuals were and still remain only too eager to criticize, to ridicule and to point to the ineffectiveness of the TFG. But what have these bystanders themselves done to help their country? Any one possessed of normal intellectual faculties can understand that only a robust (not weak) government can undertake the monumental tasks of bringing about peace, reconciliation and the restoration of services.

     

    The Advent of Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU)

     

    Last year the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) appeared out of nowhere on the scene of conflict in Mogadishu and, inevitably, went into head-on collisions with the multiplicity of long-established war-lords. Fortunately, they prevailed and sent the war-lords fleeing to the four corners of the earth; then they cleared the city of all the malcontents: road-blockers, thieves, robbers, rapists, prostitutes, etc. They restored peace in full measure – a badly needed service which the TFG sitting in Baidoa could not, obviously, provide by the use of remote control. Even houses illegally occupied were restored to their original owners without fuss or quibble. Indeed that was the time I should have gone to Mogadishu to reclaim my house which has been illegally occupied throughout this long period of turmoil.

     

    Under the control of the ICU Mogadishu was transformed overnight from a burning hell to a haven of peace. And the womenfolk took upon themselves to clean the streets off the garbage and filth that had accumulated. In the olden days, Mogadishu used to be praised by its foreign visitors for being clean, peaceful, friendly and reasonably cheap. Despite the rabble and the destruction of buildings and physical infrastructure the ICU restored to the city the main essentials of its original features. Anyone who had veritable Somali blood running in his veins must have then felt proud of ICU’s singular achievements.

     

    The ICU, by its appearance and its achievements, gave a jolt to the legal government sitting in Baidoa but moved quickly to assure it of recognition and collaboration. We all read that assurance as the beginning of an approaching end of hostilities in the country and a flurry of diplomatic activities brought the two sides (TFG and ICU) together in Khartoum.

     

    Opportunities Lost

     

    The first round of Khartoum was not only encouraging but also euphoric. The two parties met like brothers who have not met for a long time and were too eager to meet. The hugs, the kissings, the broad smiles, the gigglings and the exchange of jokes and kind words, all pointed towards successful negotiation. When they settled down to serious business, however, their differences surfaced up. The TFG wanted to discuss the political issues first and then go into the question of power sharing, The ICU wanted to discuss the issue of ‘security’ first and, having settled that, come to the political issues and, subsequently, power sharing, The TFG was of the view that once political issues have been agreed upon and power sharing achieved the security issues would even cease to be issues for obvious reasons. In the event the two sides agreed only to meet again after consultations with their respective superiors. But the meeting ended on a good note.

     

    However, the ICU started expanding to the outlaying areas of the capital and continued even further into the hinterland until one day they dared make an incursion into Bur Hakaba – a mere 60 kms. to Baidoa – an event which raised alarm in the TFG causing it to call for Ethiopian reinforcements to deter the ICU. The ICU was incensed at the sight of Ethiopian forces on Somali territory which provided them with an excuse to break the negotiation. But the two sides went nevertheless to Khartoum for the second round but the ICU refused to go into the meeting hall unless Ethiopian forces first withdrew from Somali soil. The TFG retaliated by demanding that the ICU relinquish all the territories it had occupied since the previous meeting. A further but relatively minor complication was also that the ICU objected to IGAD (particularly Kenya) being involved in the mediation, and the TFG objected in turn to the Arab League and Sudan. Had the mediators done their homework such embarrassing developments would have bee avoided. In the event, the mediators could not manage to bring the two parties to one table, and the meeting was adjourned sine die.

     

    The first and second rounds of Khartoum represented golden opportunities that have been squandered and lost. As a matter of fact the ICU had on both occasions the advantage of negotiating from a point of strength. Yet, it was they who squandered both opportunities.

     

    ICU Mistakes And Miscalculations

     

    It is a self-evident fact the ICU made a number of mistakes; and the first mistake related to the composition of its leadership; for its most visible leaders belonged to the same subclan and even the same sub-subclan. It was a mistake on their part to think that religion transcended affiliation and loyalty to the clan particularly, as in their case, where religion and politics were enmeshed. Because of this, many Somalis thought that the ICU contained the seed of its own destruction. The second mistake was its public expression of sentiments regarding the unity, not only of Somalis but also of Moslems in the Horn of Africa. In Africa there is little, if any, difference between an expression of sentiment and a statement of policy and the pronouncements of ICU sent danger signals to both Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have substantial Somali and Moslem populations. When a regime emerges from the ashes of civil war or as a result of coup d’etat the first thing to do is to assure one’s neighbours of peace and good neighbourliness, and the rest of the world that international treaties and agreements would be observed and respected. The third mistake was to give an ultimatum to Ethiopia and embark on a campaign of rapid expansion to all southern areas culminating in laying siege to the headquarters of the TFG.

     

    The ICU was apparently a collection of religious zealots – a religious fraternity perhaps – who were evidently unschooled in state-craft. They sought to impose on the nation their own vision of an Islamic state but did not know the politics and the mechanics – the nitty-gritty, if you like – of translating their dream into reality.

     

    Restoring Somalia: Does the End Justify the Means?

     

    The TFG, with an ICU knife on its throat, had no option but to defend itself and even call for Ethiopian help and the Ethiopians came with overwhelming military might and helped to crush the ICU militia within a matter of days; and the ICU vanished into thin air. So many thousands of innocent lives have been tragically lost to a reckless military adventure. But that tragedy marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. It marks the end of an era of armed confrontations and statelessness and lawlessness and ushers in, hopefully, an era of reconciliation, statehood and stability. As optimists in the Churchillian sense we must find an opportunity in our calamity so that we can move forward towards peace and stability. It is a responsibility we owe to posterity. And we should not flinch from it.

     

    To be fair the TFG had from the very start sought the necessity for an African force to be deployed in the country. But, there was stiff opposition from the war-lords, who themselves were cabinet ministers, and the speaker of parliament, who went to great lengths in conniving with them to thwart government policies; it was fiercely opposed even after it was agreed to exclude the neighbouring countries from such a force. The ICG (International Crisis Group), benefiting from our continuing crisis as usual, fought tooth and nail against such a move. And the ICU, a late-comer to the scene, swore to fight any external force. Furthermore, the Europeans and the Americans said the move was a bad idea and the countries that had promised to contribute to the force developed cold feet. The UN Security Council also prolonged the crisis by playing dilatory tactics but finally ‘lifted’ an arms embargo that was never enforced in the first place. But, curiously enough, there were those among us Somalis who demonstrated a few days ago against the nominal lifting of the embargo but had not even lifted a voice in favour of its enforcement. Why protest against lifting a measure that had not been working anyway? The key to our continuing crisis has always been in our hands but we have permitted others to use it because we ourselves could not or did not use it.

     

    Only time will tell whether the Ethiopian intervention was good or bad, but the mere fact that it is Ethiopia (and not another country) which intervened created shock waves in many quarters. The reactions have been generally hostile. It is so because Ethiopia is a country many of us still love to hate and is still seen as a “traditional” enemy. I was once told by a Tanzanian lady working for the OAU in Addis Ababa that according to her observation Somalis hated Ethiopians but that Ethiopians did not hate Somalis, and she asked why. I told her of course that Ethiopians connived with the British while we slept, stole our land and ruled our people in the most savage and repressive manner and that that was something that we never did to them. She was satisfied.

     

    But Ethiopia has changed, despite claims to the contrary; and we have changed; and the world around us has changed. For the historical and attitudinal changes which I have personally witnessed in Ethiopia pleased refer to my article in the WardheerNews.com which was published under the date of July 06, 2005 and under the caption of “Ethiopia and Somalia: Missed Opportunities and Some Challenges”. Surely, the march of history did not stop in Ethiopia in the 19th or even the 20th century. Nor did it stop in Somalia: look at the changes that occurred to us! Despite our misplaced pride, our homogeneity and our progress in many fields of human endeavour we have deteriorated to a nation in tatters and what the Ethiopians did for us should be viewed as a charity from a kindly neighbour. Our flag was burned only the other day in Hageisa by none other than Somalis; and in full view of a multitude of other Somalis protesting against being Somali – Somalis who would be much happier to be Ethiopians. It is incredible but true! That day will be “… a day that shall live in infamy”, to borrow the words of Roosevelt. The Ethiopians could have afforded diplomatic recognition to our breakaway region in the Northwest and even lobbied for it with other African countries and AU but were kind enough not to do it. The old Ethiopia (including Mengistu Haile Mariam) would not have hesitated a second to do so.

     

    I think it is completely justifiable to stabilize the country by the use of an external force, and if that force was destined to be Ethiopian, so be it. Now the Ethiopians are withdrawing and there is, all of a sudden, clamour for an African force to replace them. Without a government, without a state, and the paraphernalia of a state, our nationalism will only remain spurious, and we will not be able to raise our heads and walk proudly among free peoples everywhere. Everything therefore must be subordinated to the overriding purpose of getting our Somalia back by any manner of means.

     

    Opportunity Restored

     

    The question facing us now is: where do we go from here now that there is an internationally recognized government sitting for the first time in a long time in our national capital? Do we destroy it or build on it? The TFG has been warming up to the advice rendered by various quarters that it should begin reconciliation in earnest and begin negotiations with its own adversary, the ICU. But there are contradictory signals from the latter: those leaders of the ICU who went underground have vowed to launch a ‘campaign of resistance’; the others who took refuge in Kenya and the Yemen have expressed their readiness to negotiate. There is real chance for a rapprochement which should not be missed.

     

    However, let us not underestimate the very wide conceptual gap that separates the two sides. Though the TFG may very well negotiate from a point of strength it is scarcely likely that the ICU will give much ground. But with skillful handling of the negotiations it is not altogether impossible for the parties to reach a common ground and thereby spare us yet another round of armed conflict which will drive us and our well-wishers to despair. It is inconceivable and unacceptable that those rogue and unscrupulous warlords are accommodated by the TFG while the ICU luminaries, with all the good deeds that speak for them, are thrown to the wolves. The TFG should seriously consider, inter alia, the setting up of a powerful Council of Religious Affairs with a clear mandate and stipendiary positions in order to accommodate the scholars of the ICU. I do earnestly hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that an amalgam of TFG/ICU Administration will emerge.

     

    I am optimistic – and incorrigibly so – that sense will prevail and we will soon be talking about the reconstruction of our ship of state which will probably be renamed as the “Islamic Republic of Somalia”. We will pin our hopes on that ship of state and will then have reason to quote Longfellow:

     

    “Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!

    Sail on, O Union, strong and great!

    Humanity with all its fears,

    With all the hopes of future years,

    Is hanging breathless on thy fate! “

     

    Ismail Ali Ismail

    geeldoonia@gmail.com

  14. Posted

    ^^^^^^^^^And being Single in 30's is a bad thing? what is this world coming to?

     

    Being free and not locked up brings the possiblity of having throngs of Hareems!! beat that old ladie!!

  15. Posted

    Victory is only enjoyed truly when the vanquished are treated morally, otherwise the result will sow devastating fruits. What the government ought to do in order to avoid any miscreant mutineers would be to engage considered, measured and thoroughly reconciliatory tone. For the victors (many see them as traitors who brought to Somalia our age old enemies to our soil) they should now sow the seeds that will bear the much needed fruits of peace, prosperity and most of all respect of law. They must see themselves as the protectors of the people and not some sort of faction trying to impose their will upon the society.

     

    What needs to Happen Now:

     

    1. Though African countries don’t have the capacity for nation building; donor nations (particularly the EU and US) must genuinely engage the situation, provide the capital and technical know how to stabilise what could otherwise be a source of wider disability within the region.

    2. For this nascent government to function properly, they must be forthcoming with financial help. This is a government without the cardinal resources and indeed is faced massive obstacles.

    3. The Diaspora along with the civil societies in Somalia must vigorously campaign for the complete and utter engagement of the EU and US. This is vital. This needs to be done with surgical precision---- no need for what the Duke would call a cyber insurgency.

    4. The Somalis should never engage any mutiny against the Ethiopians as this will of course further complicate the matter and drive the TFG leaders into the bosom of Ethiopia—also, of course unnecessary bloodshed will ensue. The nation must indeed not allow this to happen; especially the intellectually, religious leaders must engage with the government.

    5. The government must endeavour to be representative— the legislative body of the government should be a good place to start (Horn Advocacy Group is in the middle of drafting a document that deals with the technical aspect of this)

     

     

    As Somalis we have an opportunity to help our people; it is our moral duty to cease this opportunity and work with what we have.

  16. Posted

    Force Won't Bring Peace to Somalia

    Khadija O. Ali | January 19, 2007

     

    Editor: Emily Schwartz Greco, IPS and Emira Woods, IPS

     

     

     

     

    Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org

     

     

    The sudden defeat of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by the Ethiopian army and their U.S. backers proved easier then expected. A reported 15,000 Ethiopian troops and U.S. aerial bombardment succeeded in installing the Transitional Federal Government, two years after its formation in neighboring Kenya.

     

    Despite the ICU’s military defeat, the war is far from over. Three issues are very important to examine as the crisis in Somalia continues to unfold. First, can the transitional government survive without the presence of the Ethiopian or American troops? Second, how much does the foreign troops’ presence help or hurt the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its people? Third, how willing is the United States to support a government that has no popular support base?

     

    Experts in the region believe that the United States has directly or indirectly supported this operation because of the Islamists’ alleged al-Qaida associations and the assumed provision of safe heaven for al-Qaida operatives. The recent military air raids in southern Somalia confirm U.S. involvement and suggest, unfortunately, that the Bush Administration has chosen yet again force over diplomacy.

     

    Military Approach Increases Animosity

    While the Bush Administration and the Ethiopian regime may have legitimate concerns vis-à-vis the ICU, invading a sovereign nation and killing innocent civilians does not justify this agenda. The military approach will only increase animosity between Americans and the Muslim world. In Somalia, this military aggression escalates tensions with neighboring Ethiopia and re-ignites anti-American sentiments throughout the country. It has the potential to prolong the Somali conflict, increase the humanitarian crisis and increase the likelihood of insurgency.

     

    It is true that the ICU, unlike the transitional government, enjoyed popular support though they were far from perfect. The ICU’s “hard” negotiation style dragged the reconciliation process and disappointed many of their early supporters. Their military expansion to areas controlled by the transitional government and their decision to engage the powerful U.S.- backed Ethiopian army were suicidal and politically immature. The ICU lost a golden opportunity to bring a lasting peace to Somalia.

     

    Unfortunately, the transitional government seems to be following suit by imposing martial law, ceding all power to the president. Parliament’s unanimous approval of this law was unsurprising to Somalis since the parliament generally acquiesces to presidential mandates. Moreover, those who followed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-sanctioned Embagathi reconciliation process that produced the transitional government know full well that most of the members of the parliament and the government have been handpicked by Ethiopia. Not only is the emergency law counterproductive, it indicates the transitional government’s unwillingness to reconcile with all parties in this conflict which is the only way they can regain their legitimacy to govern. The transitional government can only win the hearts and mind of the Somali people and the international community through its deeds but not through force.

     

    Viable Alternative: Diplomacy

    Diplomacy is the only option. It is still possible to prevent the rise of an insurgency in Somalia. Consequently, the United States and the transitional government’s performance over the next few weeks will have a substantial impact on the direction of the Somalia crisis.

     

    The United States and the international community have a moral obligation to play a positive role in helping Somalis help themselves. The U.S. should refrain from all military operations and encourage the transitional government and its Ethiopian counterparts to stop hostile actions. Furthermore, the United States should press the Ethiopian government to withdraw its troops from Somalia. This will provide the transitional government with an opportunity to win the confidence of its people--an understandably difficult task under the present circumstances. To assist in this effort, an African Union peacekeeping force must be deployed as soon as possible.

     

    The Bush Administration must also understand that with the complex political structure in Somalia, clan-based loyalties determine support for either the ICU or the transitional government. The present crisis has the potential to ignite long dormant clan conflicts. While the U.S. officials may view the ICU as religious extremists, members of their clans view them as their fellow clansmen. Aggregating them together under the umbrella of extremism, therefore, clearly alienates many clansmen who are not extremists.

     

    Constructive Dialogue

    The U.S. should encourage constructive dialogue between the transitional government and all parties involved in the Somalia conflict. The U.S. should support a democratic process for building the institutions necessary for a sustainable peace. This will reverse a tradition of warlord leadership and hierarchical top-down tyranny.

     

    In order to dispel the notion that the transitional government is a puppet government for the Ethiopian and American regimes, it is imperative that an inclusive and broad-based government be fashioned. In its present form, the government is viewed as externally imposed with little popular support and legitimacy. Lasting peace and security can only be achieved if this government transforms itself into an entity genuinely committed to national unity and reconciliation.

     

    Ethiopia should revisit its policy on Somalia since it is merely fuelling the historic animosity between the two countries. It is in the interest of the Ethiopian government to have a strong united Somali government that is accountable to its people.

     

    The U.S. government must remain positively engaged in Somalia. But only through diplomatic means can the U.S. fulfill its obligation to end the suffering of the Somalia people and reduce the violence spreading within and beyond the Horn of Africa.

     

     

    Khadija O. Ali, a former member of the Somali Transitional National Parliament and a Minister of State from 2000 to 2002, She is a doctoral student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

  17. Posted

    Oh beauty on the other hand is measurable thing! all for the skin deep stuff.

     

    Intlectuality can be faked; but true beauty though skin deep is marvelous thing!!!.

  18. Posted

    There is no alternative I say. The south was waited for 16 years and nothing happened-- granted the self-imposed pre-mature ejaculation of Wadaado's political stint was a ray of hope; but 16 years nothing came out of that gloomy citi. We have now somewhat a system; granted it is crooked nevertheless it is a system; we need to aid this and make sure our state is saved.

     

    Politics is the art of taking the lesser evil.

  20. Posted

    I see fat Xaliimos pretending to be cool (i am at univ) while they are being so hopelessly lonely.

     

    and becayuse of I see, myself in 10 years time being single because of lack of intelligent, driven and genuinely interesting sisters.

     

    I in my I heard I see me being happy because of this.

  21. Posted

    This is my local mate; love it. I have been going there for the past year-- you see I am not up stairs wise related to the guys who hang out there (being reer waamo and t hat) so this sharing of food never happens to me.

     

    Walahi, i went there last night (5:30) had meet and canjeero; it was delicious; mouthwateringly so.

     

    PS: full of goofy teeth people though.

  22. Posted

    ^^ Cambaro cadeey; education is road not the actual destination. One travels with caution but anticipates the rewards one is awaiting at the destination. On the other hand, marriage is complex, demanding and thoroughly tiring (or so i am told) and it requires a simplicity rather that complex solutions to the issues that crop up time to time. The over educated might indeed try to supply those problems with complex solutions thusly making it impossible to deal with the issue.

  23. Posted

    ^^ Cambaro cadeey; education is road not the actual destination. One travels with caution but anticipates the rewards one is awaiting at the destination. On the other hand, marriage is complex, demanding and thoroughly tiring (or so i am told) and it requires a simplicity rather that complex solutions to the issues that crop up time to time. The over educated might indeed try to supply those problems with complex solutions thusly making it impossible to deal with the issue.