NASSIR Posted October 14, 2006 The New Crisis in Somalia Victory of the Union of Islamist Courts (UIC) Over the faction leaders By Prof.Kinfe Abraham* October 13, 2006 Overview The conflict which erupted in the months of May to June 2006, between the Somali faction leaders and a grouping of leaders of eleven Islamic (Sharia) Courts which controlled different parts of Mogadishu that resulted in more than 400 causalities and over 2000 wounded civilians, has heightened international concern about Somalia’s political future. This source of alarm and anxiety was exacerbated when the Islamists defeated the warlords and assumed full control of the Somali capital. The concern was felt very widely in various circles including among member states of IGAD, the UN, United States, and the Arab League which convened different meetings to review the new developments in Somalia. Similar concerns were expressed by the AU, EU, other organizations and individual states. Following these developments, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia led by President Abdulahi Yusuf had appealed for international involvement and the support of the AU and IGAD in dealing with the crisis which seems to threaten its legitimacy and survival as an elected government. As a result, IGAD countries met in Nairobi in early June to review the situation and look at options on the way forward. Likewise, an Arab League meeting between the TFG and leaders of the sharia courts had taken place in Kahartoum on June 20, 2006 leading to the signing of an accord in which the Islamists accepted the legitimacy of the TFG and the TFG recognized the reality of the existence of the Islamists. US Concerns about Somalia Meanwhile, the Bush administration had convened an international meeting on political developments in Somalia, marking an abrupt shift in its policy after Islamists seized control of the Somalia capital from the allegedly US-backed warlords-led militias. This was followed by the formation of a “Somalia Contact Group†by the State Department. According to the Washington Post of June 10, 2006, the announcement of the State Department was made on June 9, 2006. The State Department had earlier expressed concern about the danger of a US policy largely restricted to counter-terrorism priorities which it saw as counterproductive. Further, according to the Washington Post of June 10, 2006 in the days which followed, the US administration indicated that “it was open to discussions with the Islamists as long as they were prepared to seek a peaceful resolution and pledge not to allow Somalia to become an Al-Qaeda safehaven.†According to State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, the goal of the group’s meeting, which was held in New York, is “to promote concerted action and coordination to support the Somalia transitional federal institutions.†In this connection he said, “we are going to be working with other interested states and international organizations on this matter.†The decision to launch a multinational diplomatic initiative reflects the lack of immediately viable options in Somalia short of overt military engagement. It also appears to indicate a further resurgence of the State Department’s voice in the foreign policymaking of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. McCormack said the contact group will be open to “interested parties†from governments and international organizations and suggested that “the UN would want to participate in this.†Meanwhile, the United Nations expressed its willingness to participate, especially as the timing coincided with the return from Somalia of Francois Lonseny Fall, the UN representative who had met with different faction leaders. In the same vein, representatives from the European Union which also expressed interest in talks with the Islamists attended the meeting. The US delegation was headed by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer Re-thinking the Policy on Somalia A re-thinking of the policy of the US, EU, UN, AU and the IGAD member states was provoked by the unraveling of fast-moving events over the months which followed June, 2006 when the faction leaders were defeated by the UIC in Mogadishu. This has opened up a new Pandora’s Box of many unknowns in Somalia which has been afflicted by a civil war and inter- and intra-clan conflicts over the last sixteen years. Without a coherent government since 1991, and left largely to its own devices since the 1994 withdrawal of a US-dominated UN military force, Somalia has been driven by turf wars among clan warlords and their well-armed militias. A transitional government established under UN auspices two years ago has proved incapable of control and was forced to retreat several months ago from Mogadishu, the capital, to Baidoa, 150 miles away from it. U.S. interest in Somalia has long focused on the presumed presence thereof a group of al-Qaeda operatives, believed to be led by Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a Kenyan citizen also known as Harun Fazul. Indicted in absentia in the United States in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Fazul was on the U.S. “Most Wanted Terrorists†list issued immediately after the attacks of Sep. 11, 2001. The concern of the US Government grew over the past year with the expanding power of the Islamic Courts Union, a coalition of 11 autonomous, clan-based courts that have sought to bring order to southern Somalia through the imposition of Islamic law. As the court-backed militias gradually became the country’s most powerful fighting force, secular warlords who fashioned their own “anti-terror†coalition in opposition found that the Bush administration—while officially backing the transition government in Baidoa—was willing to provide clandestine financial support. Although those in the Defense Department and the CIA favoring aid to the warlords prevailed, other administration officials argued that putting all U.S. support behind the warlords was unwise. According to one senior official who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, the relationship between the Al-Qaeda cell led by Fazul and the Islamic courts has always been unclear. He said, “we think that there are elements within this Islamist group that are providing refuge and support to this Al-Qaeda leadership, but not the Islamic courts as a whole.†Concerns over the Union of Islamist Courts (UIC) The takeover of Mogadishu by the forces of the Islamist Courts has brought the internal and external debate over Somalia to a head. The Islamist Courts Union leadership issued an open letter to the international community “categorically denying and rejecting all accusations that it is harboring terrorists,†and declared its desire to establish peace and “a friendly relationship†with the outside world. As a result, the US administration decided to extend “a tentative olive branchâ€. The US administration then hoped a new multinational contact group could shepherd an accommodation between the Islamists and the Transitional Federal Government. Awad Ashara, a member of the Somalia parliament, had then told Reuters News Agency that a meeting between the two is in the works. According to Ashara, the government was then preparing to send cabinet members, lawmakers as well as influential traditional elders to Mogadishu. They were expected to achieve reconciliation between the Islamic courts and other groups. The TFG had also hoped to work out voluntary disarmament between the Islamists and the warlord-led militias. According to reports from outside the capital, the warlords had then given up attempts of trying to retake Mogadishu. Meanwhile, two Arab League sponsored conferences which brought together the TFG and the Union of Sharia Courts were convened in Khartoum towards the end of June and September, 2006. A third one is also scheduled to be held on October 30, 2006. The two meetings led to the signing of accords. According to these agreements, the Union of Sharia Courts recognized the legitimacy of the TFG, while the TFG did the same by accepting the existence of the Sharia Courts as a force in Somalia. They also agreed to observe a cease-fire. The Involvement of Neighboring Countries The situation in Somalia is of particular concern to the Horn of African countries, in that the stability or lack of it has direct bearing on the latter. Despite the effort of the international community which wants to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to assume power and bring law and order to the country, various players from within and outside the country have been impeding the process. As a result, the situation in Somalia still poses a threat to sub regional and regional peace and stability. Illegal arms trade is flourishing and many of these weapons are being used inside Somalia, and continue to find their way into the neighbouring countries. The lack of a central government has also made Somalia a breeding ground for criminal activities including terrorism. While the neighbouring countries and the international community have their vested interests in the political stability of Somalia, Eritrea's involvement however is unique in that it is fuelling the unrest in Somalia. Eritrea is said to be doing this in the hope that the spillover will have a destabilizing effect on Ethiopia with whom it has an unresolved boundary dispute. To this end, Eritrea has been arming and supporting insurgent groups such as the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which are waging war against the government of Ethiopia. According to a report submitted to the UN Security Council (USC), it is also dealing with Islamist terrorist groups such as Al-Itihad extensively. According to the report of the Arms Embargo Violation Monitoring Group, reference is made to "another State in the region" which has committed arms embargo violations. The Monitoring Group does not identify the State by name because, at the time the report was prepared, the investigation had not been completed. The Monitoring Group now believes that it has obtained sufficient additional information to warrant naming the State as Eritrea. For the sake of presenting a more complete picture that suggests a pattern of activities involving arms embargo violations by Eritrea, the Monitoring Group has reproduced below the relevant paragraphs from that report, followed by new information. It states that Eritrea has provided support to Ethiopian opposition groups such as the ONLF, OLF and others “in the form of armsâ€. Eritrea has also provided support of arms to opposition allies “including Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde (Governor of Lower Shabelle), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys (an Al-Itihad leader and newly elected chairman of the Union of Sharia Courts) and others for the purpose of countering support allegedly provided to the TFG by Ethiopia.†Credible intelligence sources also have it that, approximately from the beginning of February to the end of the second week of May 2005, Eritrea is said to have supplied “arms on eight different occasions to Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of ONLF which at the time were located in the Dhusamareeb area of the Galgaduud region. The arms were transported on aircrafts that flew from Eritrea to an airfield located in the Dhusamareeb area.†This, of course, does not include subsequent shipments which took place between mid May and the month of August, 2006. Besides, Hassan Dahir Aweys had traveled to that central Somali location “to establish sharia courts and provide military training to his militia (Al-Itihad) and set up military training programmes.â€5 While there, he is also said to have met with representatives of “OLF and ONLF.†According to the report, some of the people whom Dahr Aweys met were, “militia leaders who arrived in Dhusamareeb by aircraft from Eritrea.†This happened in April 2005 and subsequent months in 2005 and 2006. Again, during the last week of April and the end of the second week of May 2005, approximately three flights transporting 270 trained and equipped ONLF militia are said “to have arrived in Dhusamareb†from Eritera. The report adds, “most of the shipments of arms provided during the first part of the period mentioned above went to Hassan Dahir Aweys, with the smaller portion given to ONLF.†The Monitoring Group also received credible information that Eritrea provided a member of the UIC, “Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, with arms by transporting them to two locations in Middle Shabelle i.e. by aircraft to Baledogle Airport, near Mogadishu, and by Ship to the port of Marka.†Both shipments arrived between March 25 and April 10, 2005. The shipments of arms were said to have included, “anti-aircraft guns and mines.†The Monitoring Group also noted that Sheik Indohaadde and other opposition leaders from Mogadishu had provided arms “to Habsade, opposition leader in charge of Baidoa, for potential use against TFG forces in the fight for control of that city.†This happened on May 30, 2005. Following the battle over the control of Mogadishu, the Monitoring Group had also obtained credible evidence about two metal ammunition containers and photographs of other ammunition containers that were alleged by the Monitoring Group sources to have been provided by the State in question which is now widely established to be Eritrea. Further, the Monitoring Group learned that an opposition leader and TFG dissident from Mogadishu had traveled to Eritrea during the said period to make arrangements with the authorities there for arms shipments. Eritrea is then said to have promised, “to give arms only to the opposition and in quantities that equaled what TFG President Abdulahi Yusuf received from other countries.†The Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Eritrea on 27 March 2006 requesting its response concerning the arms shipments reported to have taken place around 3 and 5 March 2006. In reply to the Monitoring Group's letter, the Government of Eritrea denied responsibility for the shipments of arms and characterized the Monitoring Group's information as "outrageousâ€. The 7 and 14 March 2006 information was not however included in the March 3 and 5 letter as the Monitoring Group received the information after the dispatch of its letter. Subsequent shipments of arms were also reported in the months of June, July and August. Further, some three thousand Eritrean soldiers were said to have been dispatched to Somalia to reinforce the militia of the Union of Islamist Courts (UIC). Further details on the contacts between the UIC and Eritrea is provided in the annex at the end of this paper. Profile of Somalia's Islamist Courts The Islamist group that now controls Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, has emerged out of a judicial system funded by the powerful business community to try and bring some law and order to a country without a government. But over the last two to three years (2004-2006), the Union of Islamic Courts has become Somalia's strongest army - forcing the warlords who had controlled the capital for the past 15 years into retreat. According to the BBC Somali Service editor, Yusuf Garaad Omar, they are currently (the most popular political force in southern Somalia). There are 11 autonomous courts in Mogadishu, some of which have periodically tried to clamp down on robbery, drugs and pornographic films which are shown in local video houses. At first, they concentrated on petty crimes, but by the mid 1990s they had progressed towards dealing with major crimes in north Mogadishu. Thieves had their limbs amputated and murderers were executed. This has happened in spite of protests from human rights organizations. Yet, it is said that the residents of north Mogadishu were pleased to enjoy law and order - in stark contrast to south Mogadishu, where crime was rampant. The system has since further expanded and the Islamic courts are said to have validated transactions of the purchase of houses and cars. They also oversee weddings and divorces and have expanded their authority across most of the capital, while staying out of politics until recently. As a result, they were trusted by the people, who had no other institutions to refer to. Most of the Islamic courts have expressed a clear desire to promote Islamic law rather than clan allegiance, which has divided Somalis over the past 15 years. Nevertheless, all but one of the 11 courts is associated with just one clan - the ******, who dominate the capital, but they are divided into sub-clans. In order to avoid accusations of clan bias, each court tries members of its sub-clan, wherever alleged crimes are committed. Some clan elders in north Mogadishu have now set up their own court, independent of the union. Until recently, the union's public face was chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate who sought to assure Somalis and the international community that the Islamic Courts were no a threat to international peace and that they only wanted order. Mr. Ahmed, 32, is a law graduate from Libya and former secondary school geography teacher. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the union contains radical elements such as Sheikh Dahir Aweys who recently replaced Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as chairman. The new chairman is clearly radical and close to Eritrea which is promoting a proxy war on Ethiopia from Somalia. In fact, it is as a result of his close connection with the Eritrean leadership that he recently declared Jihad on Ethiopia. Sheikh Aweys and his associates are also said to have an uneasy relationship with Kenya on which they recently launched a vitriolic allegation. For details on the political and religious position of Sheir Dahir Aways, please see his pronouncements in annex II. Two of the 11 courts are seen as militant and one of them is led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. He is on the list of US terrorism suspects. One reason for this is that he was the former leader of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which is linked to al-Qaeda. According to Mr Aweys says al-Itihaad al-Islamiya no longer exists, but this is seriously contested by Somalia analysts. He also denies accusations by some western diplomats and observers that there are training grounds for Islamic fighters in Somalia. Further, He is strongly critical of the United States and its "war on terror". Western diplomats are also concerned by Afghanistan-trained militia commander Adan Hashi Ayro, whose militiamen have been implicated in numerous killings of Somali nationals, as well as five foreign aid workers and a BBC producer, Kate Peyton. It is alleged that the extremist leaders derive their support from rank and file Somalis who had increasingly turned to their faith for some sort of solace and comfort. One visible evidence of this is that before the civil war began in the 1980s, very few women wore headscarves in Mogadishu, but at present almost every woman wears a headscarf and an increasing number are wearing veils covering their faces, with just narrow slits for the eyes. Even those Mogadishu residents who are wary of Islamic extremism may welcome a single group being in control of the capital for the first time in 15 years, hoping that there would at least be some form of authority and control. This does not however mean they wouldn’t look for a democratic alternative government such as an empowered TFG and an eventual elected government. Nevertheless, there is no doubting the fact that they were avers to the warlords who looted the city since 1991 and rendered it anarchic. As a result, according to Yusuf Garaad Omar, the warlords were hated even more because of the widespread belief that they were being backed by the United States to fight the Union of Sharia Courts. This is so because most Somalis in Mogadishu are suspicious of the US because of the legacy of the humanitarian intervention which went disastrously wrong leading to the death of about 1,000 Somalis and 18 US troops in 1993. Conclusion The conflict which still afflicts Somalia remains a serious challenge to the region as well as African and global security. As noted earlier, the situation has been exacerbated by the defeat of the faction leaders or warlords by the Union of Islamists Courts (UIC) on June 7, 2006, in Mogadishu. The changed situation has precipitated a new crisis in Somalia. The meetings held on July 7 and September 2-4, 2006, between the TFG and UIC in Khartoum under the auspices of the Arab League in an attempt to narrow the gap between the two have resulted in a number of important agreements. These include the agreement to maintain the truce of June 7, 2006, form joint police and armed forces and a decision to hold another meeting on October 30th, 2006 to address the issue of power sharing and political settlement. The above accords augur well for an eventual resolution of the current conflict peacefully. Nevertheless, these would still require a lot of lobbying and persuasion on the part of the international community including the UN, Arab League, African Union, EU, the US and IGAD countries which are key interlocutors in the Somalia crisis. The above should be seen against the backdrop of all previous peace efforts, from Sodere (Ethiopia, 1996-98), Arta (Djibouti, 2000) through Eldoret and Mbagathi (Kenya, 2002-2004) plus several other initiatives, including those of some Arab states like Egypt and Yemen which did not fully succeed in restoring peace and statehood to Somalia. The new crisis in Southern Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, is also an indirect consequence of the poor leadership provided by the warlords of Mogadishu which resulted in their humiliating defeat in the hands of the UIC. Unfortunately, the absence of unity of purpose among the Somali faction leaders was also reflected in the lack of interest witnessed among some of the external players or interlocutors. At times, the absence of some Frontline IGAD States and other important interlocutors had a divisive effect on the pursuit of peace. Nonetheless, the 5th IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, held on May 6, 2004 in Nairobi, and attended by Ministers from all the IGAD countries had made a significant headway byway of fostering cohesion. This active engagement of IGAD countries should also be continued in the context of the new crisis which faces Somalia. In the above connection, Ethiopia, Kenya and the other IGAD countries, the US as well as the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF), League of Arab States (LAS) and the international community at large that have been trying to assist Somalia achieve peace and statehood, should continue to be griped in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement to the conflict between the TFG and the UIC. The above failing, the international community should adopt a multi-pronged strategy of alternating carrots and sticks as appropriate. Further, in the context of power sharing the political clout, social base and capacity of the different political actors to cause damage which can have adverse effect on the future of Somalia should be given serious consideration. This would call for a strategy of damage control. A mechanism of preventing an assault coming from the UIC should also be given due consideration by extending all necessary financial and military support to the TFG in order to maintain a balance of power which would make it possible to mediate between the two adversarial forces currently operational in Somalia. This is important in view of the negative impact of the prevailing insecurity partly caused by the proliferation of arms in the country which has dire consequences on the social fabric of the Somali society and the daily livelihood of ordinary people. This has recently been compounded by the interference of external players such as Eritrea which the United Nations arms monitoring group has accused of making large shipment of personnel and weapons to Somalia adding to the current state of instability in the country. Given the above, the international community, the AU, IGAD member states, League of Arab states, the UN, United States, EU and others should remain seized with finding a durable solution to the current problem with which Somalia is embattled because of the confrontation between the TFG and the UIC. Concerted efforts should also be made in the upcoming meetings of the UIC and TFG including the one scheduled for October 30, 2006. This should include talking to the two groups separately in an attempt to persuade them to make all necessary concessions in order to narrow the gap and bring them together in the interest of Somalia and the Somali people at large. Here, the role which the League of Arab States can play together with the AU and IGAD member states need not be over emphasized. Annex I Excerpts from the Report of the Arms Embargo Violation Monitoring Group, submitted to the United Nations Security Council Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde arrived in Asmara on or about 14 November 2005 from Saudi Arabia. Indohaadde went to Eritrea to obtain assurances that arms would be supplied by the Eritrean authorities to the Al-Itihad leadership in Mogadishu. Indohaadde returned to Somalia, arriving in Mogadishu on or about 21 November 2005. Also, on or about 14 November 2005, officials from the Eritrean Foreign Office who were posing as businessmen arrived in Mogadishu. The team met with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The same delegation also met with the spokesman of the members of the transitional federal institutions in Mogadishu, Colonel Omar Hashi Adan briefed them on the situation in Somalia and thereafter appealed for extensive Eritrean support to match the continuous assistance allegedly given to the TFG by Ethiopian. The Eritrean officials told Colonel Hashi to put his request to the Eritrean representative in Mogadishu. The delegation also expressed a keen interest in supporting the militant fundamentalists for the purpose of using them as a platform to mobilize and support an anti-Ethiopia agenda, also directed at the Ethiopian opposition elements (insurgent groups). The Eritrean envoy in Mogadishu is Elias Habteselassie. As his ability to move freely around Mogadishu is limited, he operates through an informal local network of people, including a number of local assistants. The envoy's activities are dominated by dealings with dissident Ethiopian ethnic groups who are concentrated in Banaadir and the Lower Shabelle regions. Accordingly, he has been instrumental in developing good cooperation between the militants and the dissident ethnic groups. During the aforesaid periods, the Government of Eritrea provided at least four separate consignments of arms, ammunitions and military equipment. This was directly sent from Asmara to Baledogle airport (Lower Shabelle region). The types of weapons and equipment sent are given below: Source: Agia Agia Forum --Wardheernews Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
NASSIR Posted October 14, 2006 This is very informative study. There are many new materials in there that needs to be paid attention to. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
