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  1. Somalia intii ka dambaysay burburkii dawladii dhexe ee Somalia 1991 kii waxa markii ugu horeysay dawlad loogu soo dhisay dalka Djibouti gaar ahaan magaalada Carta, waxaana lagu soo doortay Cabdiqaasim Salaad Xasan sanadkii 2000. Magaalada Muqdisho xiligaasi waxa haystay hogaamiye kooxeedyo hubeysan oo mid waliba jufadiisa hor fadhiyo isuna qabo in uu madaxwayne yahay, waxa kale oo soo labaynayey kooxaha xoogaga maxaakiimta oo hubaysnaa ahaana awood qarsoon oo soo kobcaysa. Magaalada Muqdisho markii uu ka degay Madaxwayne Cabdi Qaasim Salaad Xasan ( 2000 ilaa 2004 ) waxa ku soo dhaweeyey xoogagaa hubaysan ee markii dambe isku badelay maxaakiimtii islaamiga ahaa, Al-shabab iyo Xisbul Islam, waxa sidoo kale dawladaasi oo dhaafi wayday Hutel Ramadan Muqdisho taageeray laba sadex hogaamiye kooxeed walow aanay awood lahayn . Xukuumada madaxwayne Cabdi Qaasim waxa ay yeelatay laba Raisal wasaare oo kala ahaa 1-Cali khaliif Galaydh, 2- Xasan Abshir Farax labadaba Alle ha u naxariisto e, waxaana ka hor yimid markiiba dalka Ethiopia iyaga oo ka cabsi qabay urur diimeedyada faraha badan ee awood doon ka ah in uu ka soo jeedo, gaar ahaan ikhwaanu muslimiin oo saldhigeedu yahay Egypt, waxaana ay xukuumadaasi qaadi kari wayday hal talaabo oo yagleel dawladnimo oo rasmi ah. Waxa ku xigtay xukuumadii uu gadhwadeenka ka ahaa madaxwayne Cabdilaahi Yuusuf Axmed (2004 ilaa 2008 ) Alle ha u naxariisto e oo iyada lagu xamanayey in Ethiopia wadato, waxaana lagu soo dhisay magaalada Embaghati ee dalka Kenya sanadkii 2004 . Xukuumadaasi waxa ay degtay Baydhabo oo ay ciidamo ku urursatay ay ka mid yihiin ciidankii maamul goboleedka Puntland oo uu Cabdilaahi Yusuf madaxwayne hore uga ahaan jirey iyo ciidamo Ethiopian ah oo badan, waxa Raisal wasaare ka ahaa Cali Maxamed Geedi, halka uu wasiirka arimaha guduhuna ahaa Xuseen Maxamed Faarax Caydiid. Dawladii Cabdilaahi Yuusuf hogaaminayey xoog iyo dagaal ayey ku tagtay Villa Somalia, waxaana dhacay dagaalo lagu hoobtay, dawlada Cabdilaahi Yuusuf waxa mus dambeed u ahaa dawlada Ethiopia sidaasi darteed ayey uga hor yimaadeen xoogaga islaamiyiinta ah, waxa kale oo ka hor yimid dadka deegaanka Muqdisho qaybo ka mid ah. Waxa dhacay dagaalo culus oo lagaga soo horjeeday in ciidamada Ethiopia Somalia soo galaan maadaama ay yihiin dal ay Somalia cadaawad soo jireen ahi ka dhaxaysay, dagaalkani oo markii dambe ujeedooyin kale yeeshay oo ay ururo argagixiso oo dano kale lihi dhex galeen, waxaa sameysmay mucaarid xoogan oo dal iyo dibad ba isaga yimid oo Asmara isku urursaday oo wadaado iyo siyaasiyiin ba isugu jira. Waxa is khilaafay Cabdilaahi Yuusuf iyo Cali Maxamed Geedi oo Raisal wasaare ahaa waxaana noqday oo uu Raisal wasaare ka dhigtay madaxwayne Cabdilaahi yuusuf, Nuur Xasan Xuseen ( Nuur Cade ) oo ay markii dambe is qabteen iyo Cabdilaahi Yuusuf oo loo arkay nin wada aargoosi siyaasadeed oo Ethiopia iska hor yimaadeen, markiiba caalamku cadaadis ku saareen in uu talada wareejiyo. Waxaa xigtay in la dhisay dawlad ay ku mideysan yihiin maxaakiimtii islaamiga ahaa oo uu la heshiiyeen maraykanka iyo dawladihii danaynayey arimaha Somalia xiligaasi waxaana lala hadashiiyey intii ka soo hadhay dawladii Cabdilaahi Yusuf oo uu Nuur Cade hogaaminayo waxa la dhisay dawlad ku meelgaadh ah oo wadata baarlamaan ka kooban laba baarlamaan oo la isku daray oo uu hogaaminayo Sheekh Shariif waxaana lagu dhisay dalka Djibouti caasimadiisa Djibouti 2009. Xukuumada uu madaxwayne Shariif hogaaminayey (2009 ilaa 2012 ) waxa ay fursad u heshay in ay haykalkii dawladnimo dhisto, diyaariso nidaam dalka Somalia kumeelgaadhka lagaga saarayo, waxaa hawlahaa gadhwadeen ka ahaa Raisal wasaare Maxamed Cabdilaahi Farmaajo oo ku helay sumcad badan iyo Xukuumadiisii la odhan jirey ( TAYO ) . Murug iyo isqabsi dhacay ka dib waxa heshiis Kampala lagu gaadhay in Farmaajo iyo xukuumadiisa la rido oo xiligaasi faro baas ku haysay kooxaha argagixisada iyada oo dan loo arkay markaasi cid wadatayba, waxaana heshiiskaa Kampala Accord aqbalay Maxamed Cabdilaahi Farmaajo oo sidaa kaga tagey xilkii, xukuumadiisiina dhacday. Waxa kale oo Maamulka Sheekh Shariif iyo sadexdii Raisal wasaare ee kala dambeeyey diyaariyeen hab federal ah in dawladnimada Somalia loo badelo oo maamul goboleedyo la dhiso waxaana la iskula qaatay shirarkii Garoowe 1 iyo Garoowe 2 oo mudo kooban ka horeeyey shirkii London ee dib u dhiska Somalia 2012 oo 52 dawladood oo aduunka ahi ka soo qayb galeen. Shirkii London 2012 waxa uu ahaa shirkii ugu horeeyey ee Somaliland iyo Somalia kawada qayb galaan waxaana ku jirey oo ahaa shirarkaasi communique keegii 26 qodob ahaa qodobkiisa 6aad in beesha caalamku adkaynayso in xukuumada ku meelgaadhka ah ee Somalia iyo kuwa ka dambeeyaa wada hadal la furaan Somaliland . Waxa ku xigtay xukuumadii uu hogaaminayey Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud (2012 ilaa 2017 ) oo raacaysay qariirdadii Garowe 2 ( Garoowe Two Roadmap ) oo ahaa hirgalinta nidaamka maamul goboleedyada ( federal system) iyo qodobadii ka soo baxay shirkii London 2012 ee dib u dhiska Somalia oo ugu weynaa qodobka wadahadalada Somaliland iyo Somalia, Ethiopia waxa loo arkayey cida dabada ka riixaysa nidaankan ee qorshaheega lagu socdo. Xiligaasi xukuumada madaxwayne Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud waxa abuurnayd qadiyad Ethiopia diid ah oo loo arkayey in talada Somalia ay Addis-Ababa faraha kula jirto waxaana si gaar ah saameyn u lahaa General Gabre oo qaabilsanaa arimaha Somalia oo Muqdisho fadhiyey, sidoo kale ciidamada Ethiopia iyo Amisom na taladooda wax weyn ku lahaa. Madaxweynihii xigey waxa uu noqday Maxamed Cabdilaahi Farmaajo ( 2017 ilaa hadda 2021 ) fadhiya oo ku ololeeyey in aanay aheyn wax la aqbali karo in Ethiopia Somalia dhexdeeda ka taliso waxaana uu ku helay taageero iyo cudud weyn oo dadku siiyeen xiligaasi maadaama aad loo dareemayey culeyska Ethiopia. Ayaan darada dhacday Madaxwayne Farmaajo oo jooga ayaa muwaadiniin soomaaliyeed inta uu qab-qabtay Ethiopia u dhiibay oo uu ka mid ahaa Qalbi dhagax, ka dib markii xukuumadii Tplf meesha ka baxdayna waxa uu noqday garabka koowaad ee Abiy Ahmed iyo dawlada Ethiopia oo ay wada galeen heshiisyo sadex geesood ah dalalka Somalia, Ethiopia iyo Erateria. Xigasho hadalsame media Maxamed Cabdi Jaamac Maxamed Dhimbiil FG: Qoraal kasta wuxuu ka tarjumayaa aragtida qoraha ku saxiixan
  2. militias related to eastern burco clan has declared its objective in western sanaag in response to the injustices that is happening in the secessionist clan enclave of somaliland. they have declared they will contact the federal government of somalia.
  3. first of all i wanna say that i was born and raised in hargeisa, growing i always hated how some of our people tried so hard to be arabs but what they dont know is that arabs hate somalis. i personally experienced this when i when to saudi arabia as somali people are constantly called african go back to your country. one time a friend told me about a story of him that happened to him, he came late to prayer so some him and his freinds decided to do jamac on their own and this arab guy said he would lead, so he lead but it turns his quran was poor and and the somali guy exited prayer and told him let me lead instead but the arab guy told him that he is african and cant lead him. theres more examples which i would rather not talk about enough of that and back to somaliland i think that our flag doesn't represent somali people why it looks too arab as theres the arabic language all over it instead of our own language even on our emblems its arabic and english and no somali which is very embaressing. which i wish would be changed and am not saying that we should take the shahada of the flag but what am saying is we should write it in our language or use the emblem that is on other muslim countries flags like pakistan and turkey.... i would like you to post alternative flags somaliland should use. here is mine
  4. Jubaland; Although being a relatively new state in terms of Somalia's independence seems as if its in search of pure and utter autonomy. But the question is why? Can Somalia ever surrender its southern coast and second largest port to Kenya? Though let's be honest, in terms of independence, Jubaland's urge and determination in search of self-governance and pure sovereignty can only mean WAR and DISASTER up North. This would mean Somaliland would need to fight even harder for recognition. Not only will the air up north be rigged in deep pessimism, but Jubaland's stance for independence will ruin the dream, that of course....never was-
  5. The UNSOM quickly edits their reference of Hargeisa from a "City in northern part of the country" into just "Hargeisa" in an hour.
  6. These are the 4 points that the UN/IGAD have tabled and Somaliland has accepted. 1. Cessation of hostilities 2. Humaniterian access 3. Openning communication channels 4. Release of Prisoners... Other issue regarding border issue, will be between Hargeisa and Mogadishu.
  7. The disagreements between the officials have reached a point of no-return. Direct communications have broken down and most importantly, who will survive this battle is to be determined. Let's see how this episode unfolds. The aspect that I am looking forward to seeing is Somaliland's ability to influence international power-brokers.
  8. Xukuumada Somaliland Oo Shaacisay In La Furay Dhoofkii Xoolaha, Kana Hadashay Rajada Ay Ka Qabto Inay Sii Socoto Dhoofinta Xooluhu Xukuumada Somaliland Oo Shaacisay In La Furay Dhoofkii Xoolaha, Kana Hadashay Rajada Ay Ka Qabto Inay Sii Socoto Dhoofinta Xooluhu
  9. [Somtribune] Link: http://www.somtribune.com/2018/06/10/farmajo-puts-operation-lightning-strike-underway-to-hit-somaliland-positions-on-eid-day/ The Federal President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, put a well-orchestrated military plan his commanders dubbed ‘Operation Lightning Strike’ in full gear sending armament, ammunition, and trained troops to the battlefront with the Republic of Somaliland in the last two to three days – and still on. Planes were seen being loaded with crates upon crates containing millions of rounds of ammunition, disassembled heavy artillery, mortars and spare parts on the Halane side of the Adan Adde International airport of Mogadishu. Boarding the planes in an ordered fashion, fully-equipped military units estimated at a total of 600-1000 men, who had been trained at the Turkish base and elsewhere at the many other foreign-supported training grounds in and around Mogadishu, have also been identified in line with points 1.5 and 1.6 of the recently concluded security council meeting of the FGS and the Somalia Federal states in Baidoa. #OperationLightningStrike is planned to open multi-fronts on the Somaliland army currently in defensive positions near Tukkaraq village of Sool. The two armies of Somaliland and Puntland, fronting for Somalia, clashed in the area several times before with the latter suffering heavy casualties. The unabashed, openly waged campaigns on the Puntland side crying for clan support seems to be paying it dividends with the ill-concealed military, morale, and material support President Farmajo, who belongs to the same clan as Gass of Puntland, is ferrying nonstop to Garowe and adjacent airstrips. Very confidential sources who had witnessed the loading of commissioned planes have come to know that Somalia planned to put all its might behind a blitz offensive against Somaliland positions on Eid day or immediately after or before it. The plan is to penetrate the Somaliland defenses from several directions and to smuggle arms and ammunition into Las Anod city in order to try to capture the town from within so to isolate the frontline positions of the Somaliland army. Somalia, of recent, did not conceal its ambitions and claims against its erstwhile partner in the ill-fated political union of 1960, denying the fact that Somaliland joined its younger partner as a fully-fledged, sovereign, internationally recognized state with a constitution, functioning parliament and a ministerial council in place. Somaliland restored its lost independence in 1991 on an all-clan resolution at Burao and had since then been on its own for these past 27 years building a modern, very democratic, fully functioning state so commended by the international community. The international community started to open a dialogue between the two sides in 2012 but had not had the drive or the commitment to see it through. The talks petered off eventually after Somalia started to disdainfully violate agreed parameters one after the other. Unchecked and unreprimanded, it has now come to a stage where Somali is once more starting another civil strife, not unlike that of the 1980s between Somaliland fighters and the southern-dominated military regime of Siyad Barre which ended in his ignominious deposal in January 1991. Political analysts accuse Farmajo and his kinsman Gass of embarking on a revenge political and military offensive against the more successful, peaceful enclave that is the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland is not very confident that an international community which previously failed to check the excesses of Somalia in failing the talks can come up with a meaningful resistance or even expose it now that the FGS’s Farmaajo is openly arming Puntland and sending it troops all belonging to one clan. On the other hand, many Somalians across a wide political spectrum are increasingly becoming disturbed and uncertain of where President Farmajo’s disoriented leadership is taking them. Not only in remote areas are the AMISOM and the US troops battling Al shabaab but Mogadishu, itself is witnessing a revival of street fights with hitherto sleeping cells of an emboldened insurgency. This despite an estimated 80 000 to 100 000 troops – registered and unregistered – since the Kenyan and Ethiopian presence is known to swell with unknown numbers as their respective commands deem necessary. The picture below where President Farmaajo, himself, is frisked by AMISOM foot soldiers at the gate of the Hallane compound, near the international airport, where the international community lives and works starkly, portrays Somalia’s current situation.
  10. Basically they allege the FSG gave the money to Muuse Biixi directly to instigate instability in "SSC". is this jealousy or something else?!! [Baroortu Orgiga ka wayn]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ypTAwTuLv4
  11. Anadolu Agency By Dr. Brendon Cannon and Dr. Ash Rossiter ABU DHABI In the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland has functioned as an independent country for close to three decades. It has held multiple elections, seen four presidents take office, prints its own money and issues its own visas, and its capital city, Hargeisa, houses two parliamentary bodies that pass and enact laws. However, it remains an unrecognized country and is viewed by the rest of the world’s states as part of the Republic of Somalia with its capital in Mogadishu. For almost an equally lengthy time, Ethiopia has been landlocked and completely reliant on its neighbors, particularly Djibouti, for imports and exports. This occurred when Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993, thereby resulting in Ethiopia’s loss of a lengthy coastline and ports. This has greatly complicated Ethiopia’s rise as a regional power and hampered the development of its 102 million people. The situation in the Horn of Africa is changing rapidly, however. In a recent article published in Rising Powers Quarterly, we sought to demonstrate how Ethiopia and Somaliland have been able to advance their interests by taking advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone. This is affecting the regional distribution of power to its advantage and reducing its dependency on Djibouti’s port for imports and exports through the refurbishment, development and use of other, regional ports: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. It is the development of the port of Berbera that has proved the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. Berbera Port’s importance From a geostrategic perspective, Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera is obvious. Of the three ports, Berbera is closest to Ethiopia proper and offers the potential of opening up the vast, albeit isolated eastern region of Ethiopia to trade, particularly in the export of livestock and agriculture. Yet because the port is located in the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland, both Ethiopia and Somaliland have experienced difficulty in attracting investors and port operators on account of the political and legal headaches associated with doing business in Somaliland. For Somaliland, development of the port would not only bring in much needed investment and jobs, but a deal signed by Hargeisa would show tacit, albeit obvious international support for Somaliland’s independence from Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the development and expansion of the port of Berbera fundamentally support the primary pillars of Addis Ababa’s regional policy that support its aspirations for regional hegemony and are deemed essential to its very survival and indivisibility. The first involves maintaining Eritrea’s isolation in order to weaken it to the point that it implodes, is formally reunited to Ethiopia or becomes a pliant, client state. The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia means that Ethiopia can concentrate its attention and forces on quelling persistent internal security difficulties and continuing to isolate and pressure Eritrea. Ethiopia has, until recently, been assisted in its goals vis-à-vis Somalia as much by the international community as by internal problems within Somalia. The cross-purposes of the international community coupled with and reinforcing political instability in Somalia, particularly in the capital Mogadishu, have resulted in the inability of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to do anything substantive about the de-facto independent Republic of Somaliland as well as the almost entirely autonomous northeastern region of Puntland. Ethiopia’s efforts and Gulf Arab interest Ethiopia has eyed the development of and access to the port of Berbera against this backdrop. However, Addis Ababa found itself unable to fully exploit opportunities to expand its influence and power -- not only because of the potential legal and political headaches of doing deals with Somaliland -- but also because of a paucity of critical resources and human capital. These deficiencies were partially alleviated with the entry of the Arab Gulf States to the region, especially the coastal zone beginning in the late 2000s in an effort to secure favorable trade and resources, as well as curtail Iran’s growing presence. However, it was the Yemen crisis that led Saudi Arabia to announce the beginning of a pan-Arab military operation to roll back the Iran-backed Houthis and restore the government. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- the two principal military members of the coalition -- initially used Djibouti as a support hub for operations in southern Yemen. Yet difficult relations with Djibouti led the UAE, in 2015, to sign a lease with Eritrea for its Hanish Islands and facilities at the port city of Assab for 30 years. The deal with Eritrea panicked Addis Ababa, with Ethiopian leaders viewing any expansion of Eritrean power as a corresponding loss of power for Ethiopia. Ethiopia dispatched officials to Abu Dhabi to plead for a shift in focus to Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Ethiopia’s diplomatic push and offer of economic incentives in the form of export/import traffic, coinciding with an increased UAE focus on stemming the flow of weaponry into Yemen, led to Addis Ababa’s desired results when DP World signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years in May 2016. Analyzing Berbera Port deal It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal over Berbera if it did not see at least some long-term commercial benefit and there appear to be strong economic incentives for both Ethiopia and Somaliland. For example, Dubai will reportedly support Somaliland’s fisheries industry; help build the road between Somaliland and Ethiopia; and build a Free Zone at the Berbera port. The port will be supported mainly by the export of livestock and import of goods to both Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, there are also military and political dimensions to the tripartite agreement. Separate to DP World’s deal, Somaliland’s government agreed to the establishment of a UAE military installation at Berbera. The base, only 90 kilometers from the shores of Yemen, is intended to help the UAE forces tighten its blockade against Yemen. Politically, the Berbera Port deal has been groundbreaking. At the stroke of a pen, Somaliland took a massive step towards international recognition and permanent separation from Somalia. While neither Ethiopia nor the UAE have voiced recognition, the deal inked in Dubai certainly makes it seem that way if the anger in Mogadishu is any indication. Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa. Regardless of the dissatisfaction in both Somaliland and Somalia surrounding the UAE’s deal with Hargeisa, Ethiopia has engineered -- largely behind the scenes -- access to another port, thus enhancing its security and strategic economic interests. The reality is that with the growth in annual volumes of Ethiopian transit cargo -- over nine million tons in 2011 -- Ethiopia has long required alternative routes for its cargo from Djibouti. With the signing of the port deal, the slowly-dying port of Berbera will see investments totaling US$442 million for the management and development of a “world-class, multi-purpose deep seaport project.” The UAE has also reportedly agreed to build a modern highway between Berbera Port and the Somaliland / Ethiopia border town of Wachale / Wajaale. This will link with the modern highway on the Ethiopian side of the border. Additionally, when the deal was signed between DP World and Somaliland, Ethiopia ensured its substantive presence in the running and development of the port in the form of Ethiopian Shipping Lines. ESL will reportedly control 19 percent share in the deal -- almost twice as much as it initially expected to receive. This was partially confirmed later by Hussein Ige Dayr, a spokesperson for the president of Somaliland, who noted, that DP World had allocated close to one-fifth of the port’s capacity for Ethiopian shipments (JOC). Somaliland Foreign Minister Saad Ali Shire further confirmed the percentage, noting that DP World sold 14 percent of its shares to Ethiopia with the government of Somaliland selling five percent of its shares to Ethiopia. Lastly, Ethiopia was able to engineer a formal, legally-binding agreement between the de-facto but unrecognized, independent state of Somaliland and the UAE. In doing so, Ethiopia further ensured the continuing Balkanization of Somalia and potentially paved the way for eventual de-jure, international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Dr. Brendon Cannon is Assistant Professor at Khalifa University’s Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS), Abu Dhabi, UAE. Dr. Cannon’s academic specializations are in the changing balance of power in the wider Middle East region – particularly the Horn of Africa; energy politics, policy and security (GCC and Northeast Asia); and international security. Dr. Ash Rossiter is an Assistant Professor in International Security within the Department of Humanities & Social Science at Khalifa University of Science & Technology. Dr. Rossiter’s current research lies at the intersection of technological change and global security with special regard to the utility of military force international affairs.