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  1. 27 Mar 2018 REPORT from UN Security Council Published on 27 Mar 2018 —View Original SC/13264 Security Council 8215th Meeting (AM) The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) until 31 March 2019, as previously set out in resolution 2158 (2014). Unanimously adopting resolution 2408 (2018), the Council underscored the importance of the Mission’s support to the Somali Government‑led political process as well as the importance of its support to the federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of inclusive, credible and transparent elections. Also by the terms of the text, the Council requested continued support for the Government’s efforts to implement the country’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism. Strongly condemning recent attacks by the terrorist group Al‑Shabaab, including on 14 October 2017 and 23 February 2018, the Council expressed serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by the group, as well as the presence of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and reiterated its determination to support efforts to reduce that threat. Welcoming the resolution’s adoption, the representative of Somalia said while there may be nuanced differences in how the Council members assessed the current situation, they were united in recognizing the important role that the United Nations would continue to play in promoting peace and stability in his country. At the same time, he expressed deep concern that UNSOM senior officials had made erroneous statements on political issues, and was troubled by the negative impacts such statements generated in the Council and in his country. Accordingly, he urged Mission leadership to refrain from “sensationalizing” political trends. The meeting began at 10:17 a.m. and ended at 10:25 a.m. Resolution The full text of resolution 2408 (2018) reads as follows: “The Security Council, “Recalling its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia, “Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and underscoring the importance of working to prevent destabilizing effects of regional crises and disputes from spilling over into Somalia, “Strongly condemning recent attacks by the terrorist group Al‑Shabaab including the terrorist attack of 14 October 2017, which targeted civilians in Mogadishu killing in excess of 500 people, and the attacks of 23 February 2018, expressing serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by Al‑Shabaab, as well as the presence of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and reiterating its determination to support efforts, including through a comprehensive approach, to reduce the threat posed by Al‑Shabaab in Somalia, in accordance with applicable international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, “Paying tribute to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali security forces in the fight against Al‑Shabaab, commending AMISOM and the Somalia security forces for the provision of security and recognizing that security provided by AMISOM remains critical at this stage, “Commending the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in supporting peace and reconciliation, conflict resolution, the State formation process, the electoral process, the national security architecture implementation, a realistic conditions‑based transition plan (Transition Plan) with clear target dates, and the promotion and protection of human rights and compliance with international humanitarian law in Somalia, “Expressing its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary‑General and Head of UNSOM, Michael Keating, and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the Head of AMISOM, Francisco Caetano José Madeira, “Welcoming the progress made since the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo on 8 February 2017, including the swift appointment of a Government, the increased representation of women in Parliament and Government, commitment to economic reforms, including those needed to support re‑engagement with the international financial institutions, formal approval of the drafting of a national development plan and the mobilization of a coordination architecture to support its implementation, agreement on the national security architecture, development of a Transition Plan and the political road map, “Underscoring the need to maintain momentum towards consolidating Somalia’s federal system in this regard, welcoming the commitments of the federal Government of Somalia to one person, one vote elections in 2020/2021, underscoring the importance of making progress on the political road map, agreement on revenue collection and resource sharing, the new policing model, the justice and correction model and formalizing the status of the federal member states as soon as possible, and further welcoming the commitment of the federal Government of Somalia and federal member states as set out in the 5 November 2017 consultative meeting to reach an agreement on outstanding constitutional issues in close consultation with the Parliament within six months, “Welcoming the commitment of the federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to pursue inclusive political dialogue to support the peaceful resolution of disputes that threaten internal peace and security including the recent efforts in Gaalkacyo, Marka and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)‑led reconciliation agreement between the Galmudug administration with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a that confirmed Dhusamareb as the administrative capital of Galmudug, and expressing concern over continuing tension between “Somaliland” and Puntland in Sool and Sanaag, “Underlining that a capable, accountable, acceptable and affordable security sector, with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, is a crucial part of long‑term peace in Somalia, noting that progress in improving Somalia’s security needs to be accelerated and prioritized, and stressing the importance of stabilization activities, development and political and economic reforms to a comprehensive approach to security, “Welcoming in this regard agreement on the Somalia national security architecture endorsed by the National Security Council on 8 May 2017, the Security Pact adopted by the federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and all international partners attending the London Somalia Conference on 11 May 2017, consistent with the transition of the primary responsibility for security to the Somali security forces, and the renewed commitment of the federal Government and federal member states at the Somalia Security Conference on 4 December 2017, “Welcoming the federal Government of Somalia’s development of a Transition Plan with clear target dates, geographical priorities and the operational readiness assessment, with a view to conducting a conditions‑based, gradual handover of security from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, including conducting joint operations with AMISOM in order to become the primary security provider in Somalia, and calling for its swift finalization and implementation, “Welcoming the federal Government of Somalia and the international community’s commitment to a comprehensive approach to security in Somalia, and recognizing the need for non‑military approaches as part of this approach in order to achieve long‑term human security for Somalis, “Welcoming the federal Government of Somalia’s active engagement with the universal periodic review process, encouraging full implementation of all accepted recommendations, condemning the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia, and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold and fulfil human rights and hold accountable those responsible for crimes involving violations or abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, “Recognizing that the year ahead should see the swift implementation of critical agreements reached in 2017, particularly the outcomes from the December high‑level meetings in Mogadishu which agreed a mutual accountability framework setting out political, economic and security priorities for 2018, agreed to map a conditions‑based transition with clear target dates and an implementation plan for the national security architecture which together lay the political, development and economic milestones for the completion of the political road map, underscoring the importance of effective implementation and mutual accountability, and emphasizing UNSOM’s central role to support implementation, “Recalling the 10 December 2017 UN Protection of Civilians report and the Conclusions on children and armed conflict (document S/AC.51/2017/2), “Expressing grave concern at the credible and continued risk of famine in Somalia as a result of the severe drought in the context of ongoing conflict and environmental factors, welcoming the federal Government of Somalia’s response to the humanitarian crisis, and encouraging further cooperation with international and national humanitarian actors to relieve immediate need and build longer‑term resilience, including for internally displaced persons, “Recalling its presidential statement S/PRST/2011/15, recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizing the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by Governments and the United Nations relating to these factors; “Welcoming the generous support of donors to the Somali authorities and the Humanitarian Response Plan, encouraging further contributions to humanitarian assistance efforts, and welcoming United Nations’ efforts to coordinate the drought response and support the Somali authorities, “UNSOM “1. Decides to extend until 31 March 2019 UNSOM’s mandate as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2158 (2014); “2. Requests UNSOM to implement its mandate at both the national and regional level, including through strengthening further and maintaining its presence in all federal member states including in Galmudug and its administrative capital Dhusamareb, subject to United Nations security requirements and as the security situation allows, in order to provide strategic policy advice on the Somali Government‑led inclusive political process, reconciliation, peacebuilding, State‑building, including the review of the provisional federal Constitution, their preparations for the 2020/2021 elections, security sector reform and implementation of the Transition Plan; “3. Underscores the importance of UNSOM’s support to the Somali Government‑led inclusive political process, including the provision of United Nations good offices functions to support the federal Government of Somalia’s peace and reconciliation process, in particular with regard to the consolidation of the State formation, mediation, prevention and resolution of conflicts, and constitutional review processes, resource and revenue sharing, improved accountability of Somali institutions especially on anti‑corruption issues, strengthening the rule of law, including the development of an effective federal political system, and a federal justice system, and implementation of the new policing model in line with the comprehensive approach to security; “4. Further underscores the importance of UNSOM’s support to the federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of an inclusive, credible and transparent one person, one vote elections in 2020/2021 with a focus on the National Independent Electoral Commission at national and sub‑national level to fulfil its constitutional mandate, in line with the Somali‑led Operational Strategic Plan for 2017‑2021, the goal of nationwide voter registration by 2019, and coordination of international electoral support to Somalia; “5. Encourages UNSOM to enhance its interaction with Somali civil society at the national and regional level, including women, youth including through the Youth Council and the Youth Caucus, business and religious leaders, and to help ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated into the various Somali‑led, inclusive political processes; “6. Requests UNSOM to provide strategic advice to accelerate implementation of the comprehensive approach to security, including facilitating more effective coordination of international partners’ efforts to support the Security Pact, priorities of the Transition Plan, national security architecture implementation and the New Partnership for Somalia; “7. Requests UNSOM, in coordination with international partners, to continue to support the federal Government of Somalia’s efforts to implement Somalia’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism, consistent with its international obligations, relevant Security Council resolutions and implement the UN Global Counter‑Terrorism Strategy; “8. Requests UNSOM to support system‑wide implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy across all United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali security sector; “9. Welcomes the strong relationship between UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations country team and AMISOM, and underlines the importance of all entities continuing to strengthen the relationship further at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum; “10. Requests UNSOM to continue to implement its mandate in an integrated manner, and welcomes the Secretary‑General’s efforts to strengthen strategic integration and decision‑making across the UN system within respective mandates, including with consideration of the role of women and youth; “Somalia “11. Welcomes the commitment of the federal Government of Somalia, in accordance with the rule of law, to continue to make progress on inclusive transparent and accountable State‑building and federalism through the next phase of the constitutional review process, including allocation of powers, resource and revenue sharing, the development of a political system, and Federal Justice and Corrections Model signed on 24 January 2018, further welcomes the commitment of the federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to work closely together through the National Security Council mechanism, and with the Parliament on these issues, building on the existing work on the constitutional review, and encourages dialogue with civil society and the Somali public, including the integration of women and youth in this regard; “12. Emphasizes the importance of reconciliation, including inter-and intra‑clan reconciliation, across the country as the basis of a long‑term approach to stability, and urges the federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to pursue reconciliation talks at local, regional and national level, including a resumption of the dialogue with “Somaliland”; “13. Welcomes the commitments of the federal Government of Somalia to one person, one vote elections in 2020/2021, the launch of the National Independent Electoral Commission strategic plan and the commitment to develop and approve an electoral law setting out the legislative framework by the end of 2018, recalls presidential statement S/PRST/2017/3 in which the Security Council called for active steps to lay the foundation for elections in four years, and stresses the importance in this regard of the federal Government of Somalia and federal member states reaching agreement on the system of representation, decisions on voter registration, institutional development of the National Independent Electoral Commission and development and adoption of the electoral law in 2018; “14. Reaffirms the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and in peacebuilding, stresses the importance of their full, equal and effective participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, notes that women are not adequately represented in governmental organizations at regional and national level and urges the federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision‑making levels in Somali institutions; “15. Welcomes the federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states’ commitment to security sector reform, in particular the historic political agreement Somalia’s leaders reached on 16 April 2017 to integrate regional and federal forces into a coherent national security architecture capable of gradually taking on lead responsibility for providing inclusive security, welcomes the integration of Puntland security forces into the Somali National Army, the establishment and meetings of the National Security Council and National Security Office, the completion of the national operational readiness assessment, as an essential element for the right‑sizing and reform of the Somali security forces, and the commitment to undertake regional operational readiness assessments as soon as possible; “16. Welcomes the development of a realistic conditions‑based Transition Plan with clear target dates agreed by the federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and international partners and formalized on 4 December 2017 at the Security Conference in Mogadishu; “17. Underlines the importance of swift implementation of the national security architecture in order to develop Somali‑led security institutions and forces, both military and civilian, that are capable, affordable, acceptable and accountable with the ability to provide security and protection to the people of Somalia, in particular to deliver effective security and protection for women, children and persons in vulnerable situations, as part of a comprehensive approach to security, and emphasizes the vital importance of the rule of law and civilian oversight of security forces complying with international humanitarian law and human rights law as applicable, in particular with respect to ending and preventing recruitment, re‑recruitment and the use of children in armed conflict; “18. Welcomes the launch of Somalia’s National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, the development of federal member states action plans, and calls upon Somalia to become party to the international counter‑terrorism conventions and protocols; “19. Welcomes commitments by international partners to provide additional and more effective support, including more standardized and more coordinated delivery of mentoring, training, equipment, capacity‑building and remuneration of police and military forces consistent with the Security Pact agreed at the London Somalia Conference and in line with a realistic conditions‑based Transition Plan with clear target dates. “20. Calls on international partners to strengthen coordination in order to harmonize donor support to the Somali security sector, and requests UNSOM to continue to assist the federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support to Somalia’s security sector in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, including through coordination and advice to the comprehensive approach to security structure; “21. Welcomes the progress made by the federal Government of Somalia to meet the requirements of the ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff‑monitored programme, encourages the federal Government of Somalia to continue to fulfil its commitments to sound, transparent and accountable financial management including revenue mobilization, resource allocation, budget execution, and anti‑corruption measures, as set out in the New Partnership for Somalia, and requests UNSOM to continue to work with partners to provide support and strategic policy advice to achieve this in order to lay the foundations for inclusive and transparent elections, bolster the Government’s ability to deliver services, attract investment, and help advance Somalia along the path towards normalization with international financial institutions and debt relief; “22. Expresses concern about all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights including by Al‑Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, also known as Da’esh, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, calls on all parties to comply immediately with their obligations under international law and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law to take all feasible precautions to avoid or, in any event minimize civilian deaths and casualties; “23. Welcomes the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, and encourages the federal Government of Somalia to approve the appointment of the Commissioners, and implement fully the Action Plan of its Human Rights Road Map, including by implementing legislation aimed at protecting human rights and investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes involving violations or abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and conflict‑related sexual and gender‑based violence; “24. Underlines the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, by all parties to the conflict in Somalia; “25. Reiterates its continued concern at the high number of refugees and internally displaced persons, including persons newly displaced by the drought, expressing its serious concern at the ongoing forced evictions of internally displaced persons in Somalia, stresses that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, calls upon the federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and further calls upon the federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to create the conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons with the support of the international community; “26. Expresses grave concern at the worsening humanitarian crisis and renewed risk of famine in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, commends the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their humanitarian partners in preventing famine in 2017, encourages all partners and donors to maintain humanitarian efforts in 2018, condemns any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, reiterates its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe, rapid and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia in line with the humanitarian principles, including by dismantling illegal checkpoints and removing administrative hurdles, underlines the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and encourages national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger coordination and leadership role; “27. Strongly condemns all violations and abuses committed against children in armed conflict in Somalia, calls upon the federal Government of Somalia to implement fully the Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Action Plans signed in 2012, the recently adopted Somali National Army command order on the protection of children’s rights before, during and after operations and the standard operation procedures on the handover of children, and underscores the need to strengthen the legal and operational framework for the protection of children, including by ratification of or accession to its Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; “28. Requests the Secretary‑General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, identify and report on progress towards achieving key political benchmarks, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 1 May 2018 and every 120 days thereafter; “29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”
  2. The minister of state for foreign affairs and international cooperation, Abdelkader Ahmed-Khair Abdi in his office at the ministry of foreign affairs today, received his Excellency Mohamed Ahmed Osman Alhammadi, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates During the meeting, a number of issues took place, including the illegal agreement between the administration of Somaliland and the Dubai global ports company on the Somali port of Berbera and the legal issues that might result in violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. The Secretary of state for foreign affairs and international cooperation said that the federal government of Somalia is distributing quotas and development programmes in all Somali territories without exception, and will not compromise its sovereignty and national ownership, and will not agree to any agreement that will be reached without it. For his part, the UAE Ambassador to Somalia stressed that his country was fully committed to protecting, respecting and supporting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia, stating that there was a need for continued coordination and consultation to broaden and deepen cooperation between the two countries, thereby ensuring Somali Somali
  3. Suldaanka, This school is near border to Ethiopia, but not Ethiopian.
  4. The Nomad heritage can help people take even war in stride. Not all depressed about it. Top 10 Happiest Countries In Africa – UN Happiness Report 1. Mauritius 2. Libya 3. Algeria 4. Morocco 5. Nigeria 6. Somalia 7. Cameroon 8. Gabon 9. South Africa 10. Ivory Coast
  5. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has offered to mediate between the United Arab Emirates and Somalia after strained relations following the recent signing of the Berbera Port deal. A source confirmed to Radio Dalsan that Riyadh had made an initial communication with the government of Somalia seeking to mediate the two countries. Last week an alleged UAE government sponsored anti-Farmaajo campaign on social media strained the relations even further. Somalia President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s is set to tour Qatar this week a move seen by analysts as tactical. The Farmaajo administration had declined to cut ties with Qatar following the 2017 Gulf crisis. Mogadishu termed “null and void” the Berbera concession to Ethiopia and DP World saying it interfered with its sovereignty
  6. Somali parliament on Monday banned the DP World from Somalia barely two weeks after Emirati ports operator unveiled its agreement with Ethiopia and Somaliland. In a hotly debated session, Somali lawmakers jointly declared the company a threat to the country’s sovereignty, independence and unity. “DP World had deliberately infringed on the country’s sovereignty there for it has been banned from operating in the country,” reads resolution issued after the session. The resolution said the agreement between Ethiopia, Somaliland and DP World was against the country’s Provisional Constitution . “Any agreement engaged in a country or organization which is not based on the provisional constitution of Somalia is null and void, therefore all the deals signed with Dubai Port World are invalid as they are against the country’s constitution, foreign investment regulations and other regulations of the country,” the resolution ruled. The move comes barely a day after Somali president warned the foreign countries and companies against breaching the country’s sovereignty. "Whoever wishes to engage investment in Somalia should seek the permission from the legal institutions of the government. Somalia's foreign policy is based on neutralism and mutual respect," he told the opening session of parliament. The ban will also affect the agreement between Puntland state and DP World's P&O ports which was granting the company to manage the port for 30 years. "I am warning companies and countries not to cross the line and put to question the sovereignty of Somalia". Early this month, Dubai announced a tripartite agreement dividing the Berbera port between DP World (51%), the Ethiopian government (19%), and Somaliland (30%). The Somali government‘s ministry ports had previous termed the deal as null and void.
  7. Pillaging Somalia: The Dubious DP World- Ethiopia Deal March 7, 2018 By Faisal Roble Baadida ninbaa kula deydeya, daalna kaa badane Oon doonahayn inaad heshana, daayin abidkaaye W/T. Qamaan Bulxan On March 1, 2018, the Dubai-owned DP World and the government of Ethiopia have concluded a dubious deal with the unrecognized secessionist region of Somaliland. This happened without notice to or approval from either the fledgling Parliament or the Executive branch of the Somali Federal Republic (SFR). Saamiga loo kala qeybsaday, sida uu dhigayo heshiisku Despite a Faustian pact between an African neighbor and a petrodollar Arab company across the Gulf of Aden, each being awarded 19% and 51% of the ownership of the Berbera Port, respectively, leaving only a trifling 30% for Somaliland, the deal is both illegal, and injurious to the stately interest of Somalia. The Ethio-DP World deal was signed in a makeshift office in Dubai. No one can have so far explained why and how Ethiopia garnered 19% of the ownership of a prime real estate (Berbera Port) that it neither owns nor invested any capital for the construction and modernization of said Port. The only public explanation thus came from Mohamed Hure Buba, a member of one of the opposition parties in Hargeisa, who in an interview said that DP World gave that 19% share to Ethiopia. The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport of SFR issued a press release on March 2, 2018, declaring the dubious deal null and void, and warned that “the so-called agreement is defective and detrimental to the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia (SFR) and the unity of the country.” Moreover, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Hassan Khyre, issued a stern repudiation of the deal and pronounced it dead on arrival (DOA). In response to the SFR position, the acentric DP World CEO, Sultan Ahmed bin-Sulayem, burbled with unstately statements and said that Somaliland is “an independent country” that has the right to enter into bilateral agreements. Somaliland leaders have gone rogue on this matter and violated an understanding between Villa Somalia and Hargeisa, which was Somaliland will approach international agreements that seek economic development with the consent of the Federal government. As to the Ethio-DP World, their action is part of a web of foreign entities pillaging Somalia’s resources. For some time now, there have been credible anecdotal information that United Arab Emirates (UAE), the government behind DP World, has been sabotaging Somalia. There are credible security sources that affirm the financing of some ISIS operation by the UAE. Also, Ethiopia since 2006 had either invaded Somalia, undermined various transitional governments through its clients in regional governments and in the parliament, or even armed insurgents, including but not limited to Al-Shabab, all these while she is an AMISOM contributing country. Founded in 2005, DP World is a NASDAQ listed company with over $15 billion portfolios and employs over 36,300 in 103 counties (DP World Strategic Plan, 2017). Its revenue for 2017 was a whopping $4.2 billion. One of the pillars of the company’s strategy is to conduct business with “courage.” Whether the Berbera deal reflects a strategic “courage” or a risky investment, time will tell. The elephant in the house, though, is whether bin-Sulayem, who enjoys enoourmous confidence of the erratic Crown Prince, Mohammed bin-Zayed Al Nahyam, can change the fate of a five-century-old ambition held by Ethiopia towards the warm waters of Somalia. Making Ethiopian Imperial Ambitions Possible For Ethiopia, to reach its imperial goal and sustain a regional status quo where it freely accesses Somali ports for its wellbeing without Somalia’s buy-in is a pipe dream, especially when one looks at the long trajectory of history. The region had been and continues to be one plagued by conflicts. A prudent Ethiopia would have sought its ambitions through a more stately alternative, i.e., through a collaborative means with the legitimate and internationally sanctioned SFR. Call the Faustian pact between the EPRDF-led government in Addis and DP World nothing but a short-sighted policy in a volatile region. In a way, the current Ethiopian government’s posturing over Berbera is a complete repudiation of the late Meles Zenawi’s initial position towards Somalia’s resources. Following a meeting with the late Mohammed H. Ibrahim Igal in 1994, Mr. Zenawi (founder of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) rebuffed any idea of his country taking advantage of Somalia. He underlined the immense contribution Somalia made to the Ethiopian revolution. In his concluding remarks, he affirmed to all sides that Ethiopia will only collaborate with Somalia, economically and politically, only when Somalia gets its bearing and reestablishes its unified state (Kindh Ethiopia, 1994). At the moment, we can arguably say that the post-Meles government in Addis’ Arat Kilo, controlled by young cadres who lack focus, are confused; they have put into motion a policy to pursue the dreams of ancient imperial Ethiopia – having unbridled access to the sea of Somalia even if it is through a dubious deal. Taking into consideration the endemic instability and ethnic strife in Ethiopia, the Berbera deal represents an infantile path for EPRDF to take vis-a-vis Somalia – perhaps a reflection of the beginning of the deterioration of a revolutionary regime in the Horn. It is titillating to argue that EPRDF is behaving as an unsophisticated government that has failed to learn lessons about the history of this region. Western Bias against Muslim Somalis The Ethio-Somali conflict on resources, in the past on grazing lands but recently on maritime resources owned by Somalis, goes back to the 16th century. It is to be recalled that the wars between Imam Ahmed Ibunu Khazali and Ethiopian Kings (Libna Dhingil, among others) marked the beginning of this regional conflict. Emperor Menelik himself never shied away from his dream of soaking his cold feet into the warm waters of the Indian Ocean by any means necessary. America’s preeminent Political Science scholar, the late Samuel Huntington, traces back the Ethio-Somali mistrust to distant days – back to the 16th century. In “The Clashes of Civilizations,” he situates the conflict between Somalis and Abyssinians in the war between Christianity led by the Portuguese and Islam by Turkish. He brings the import of these distant wars to present-day politics and openly sides with what he calls “friends” of the West, i.e., Ethiopia. In the conclusion of his controversial treatise, Huntington calls upon Western institutions (World Bank, IMF, USAID to defend Ethiopia and diminish the profile of Muslim countries. Somalia is one of those disfavored countries. In 1996, after he published another controversial book titled “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Huntington was commissioned by USAID to go and spend time in Addis Ababa to guide and advise the then-nascent revolution of Ethiopia. It was then that lessons on “The Clashes of Civilization,” and how to establish a one-dominant party system were inculcated in the Ethiopian body politic. As western Political Science has been shaped by the thoughts of Huntington and his predecessor, George F. Kannon, contemporary Africanist perpetuate the “inalienable” need of Ethiopia to have access to the sea; they advanced a narrative that is biased against Somalia, indeed overplaying the concept of Ethiopian being a Christian nation in a Sea of Muslims. Lately, nuanced narratives about Ethiopia’s rising military and economic power and how that takes primacy over the territorial integrity and sovereign state interests of Somalia is abound in Western media. Which is what a recent article, “Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of power in the Horn of Africa,” carried by a Western publication called Rising Powers Quarterly, argued. It stated that Ethiopia as a regional power should impose its “superiority” on its neighbors, i.e., Somalia. One is tempted to ask, why Somalia, and not Eretria? Didn’t Ethiopia historically claim Masawa and Assab – two ports that are close to the heartland of traditional Ethiopia? Of course, the obvious answer lies in the weak government in Mogadishu. To wit, what does Ethiopian economic growth as the largest market in the region has got to do with the sovereign rights of Somalia to be the sole guardian of its own country? In a reversed argument, would any western social scientist see it reasonable for Russia to take over the ports of Finland or Ukraine, because Russia is more populous and has a larger economic market than either Finland or Ukraine? Pillaging Somalia: The Dubious DP World- Ethiopia Deal Faisal Roble
  9. DO you know that is real possibility? Djibouti agrees to Berbera as long as Berbera does not take more than 20% of Ethiopia's business from Djibouti Somaliland agrees will not have free trade zone, and if Somaliland is so interested will have to give up to 50% share in this free trade zone to Djibouti corporation Somaliland agrees not to start her own shipping lines for next 10 years and instead take shares in both Ethiopian and Djibouti shipping lines UAE will not change its mind and develop port of Assab for commercial purposes UAE will not develop Bassaso for Ethiopian business, but only for Somalia I am not party or representative to any of the above entities, I am too small of a man, but some British law firm is working on such a deal which of course means all these corporations will be clients of this firm and related insurance companies next.
  11. Its almost 6 year he is in office yet no progress whatsoever from his first year. He didnt talk about Beled Haawo border/fence situation and he is arresting mps that are against him extending his rule. This Kenyan plant managed to kill Jubbaland project.