Jiiroow Bakaal

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Posts posted by Jiiroow Bakaal


  1. Gabbat the truth is MR will never be back to Villa Somalia or even as PM untill they make an STATE inside Somalia

    call it Jubbaland Quulle state whatever but to happen that :D;):D:D waxaan maqley adeer Barre il uu ku beeley xabsigii Doolow loooooooooool

     

     

     

     

    This time Ceyr cant help themselves let alone to help you...........................kax kax kax kax kax

     

     

     

     

     

    ppl used to tell Azanians are terrorists onlf bla bla bla but today they know how to play the game bring the neghbours

    in order to gain ground its called siyaasad


  2. There was days pirates were majority in Kismayo specialy Calanley they were in big numbers in Aw baale Marka Cadeey too and who can forget the Buraashadleeys of Bay Bakool but but but but these days they became lomaoyaan in the south and all migrated to the desert area of Somalia and dream never founding OIL


  3. Ma afkii baa juuqda gabay? isbuucaan Azania na waashey iyagii KISMAAYO sheegan jirey maxaa aamusiiyey<++?malaha wey xishoonayaan mise Dooloow baa weli laga soo dhaqaaaqin?

     

    Just ASKING


  4. Despite receiving massive air support from the USA, which will not be indefinite, Kenya is ill-prepared for the security situation that will emerge, mainly, how to deal with two factors.

     

    First, the driving force of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, particularly inside Kenya and Somalia. Secondly, how to manage critical uncertainties in Jubaland and western Somalia, which border Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa.

     

    In the first week of the invasion, the US has supported Kenya with real-time intelligence and drones to destroy Al-Shabaab targets. High civilian casualties makes this strategy unsustainable in winning local support.

     

    Al-Shabaab combatants could swap military fatigues for loin-clothes, hide their weapons, and melt away into the civilian population from where they will wage nibbling attacks.

     

    That they have threatened and are able to carry out lone wolf attacks deep into Kenya is most worrying.

     

    The second factor relates to the uncertainties born of Somalia’s fragmentation since 1994 and the inability of the international society to predict future trends.

     

    Kenya’s invasion is, so far, strategically limited to the geographical area of southern Somalia. The occupied region is seeking to secede and form an independent country known as Jubaland or Azania.

    On the one hand, a stable client state in the shape of an autonomous Jubaland provides Kenya a strategic buffer from the lawlessness in Somalia.

    On the other, support for Jubaland’s quest reinforces the continued fragmentation of Somalia as it could become yet another fiefdom.

     

    It is important to consider the cost-benefit equation as, when they choose to attack, Al-Shabaab will employ cheap means, such as land mines to exploit the vulnerabilities of regular ground troops and achieve costly outcomes.

     

    Deploying an infantry brigade 200 kilometres from the Kenya-Somalia border into a hostile environment has its attendant logistical difficulties.

     

    Movement by road during the rainy season is difficult as bogged down vehicles become easy picks for militants and opportunistic bandits.

     

    In conclusion, the invasion is a strategic miscalculation for not addressing the following key questions:

     

    How long is the occupation and at what cost to Kenya? Whose war is Kenya fighting? What is Kenya’s return on investment?

     

    Is the war legal? Is a military invasion the most sensible projection of power into a country where 750,000 people are at risk of death from starvation, typhoid, cholera and measles?


  5. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Kenya+invasion+of+Somalia+strategic+miscalculation/-/440808/1261554/-/item/0/-/pnf4xl/-/index.html

     

    By NENE MBURU

    Posted Tuesday, October 25 2011 at 17:10

     

    The invasion of another country is calculated to achieve one or a combination of several strategic outcomes. The strategic outcomes include:

     

    To establish authority or pacification in a territory whose lawlessness affects the invader’s territory, to force partition, and to liberate a region or country from the occupation of another.

     

    I call it invasion by virtue of Kenyan troops crossing the international border in force to conduct large-scale operations in a region under the indisputable juridical and territorial sovereignty of Somalia.

     

    The immediate strategic objective for the Kenyan brigade is to control Somalia’s seaport of Kismayu, which is the artery supplying Al-Shabaab, and possibly connects the militants to pirates.

     

    Kismayu is important for troops resupply or reinforcement, the monitoring of sea lanes of communication to the West, and the evacuation and treatment of casualties.

     

    It will be the springboard for future international humanitarian effort to Jubaland. However, Somalia’s coastline covers nearly 1,800 kilometres and the strategic choke-point is not Kismayu area but further north where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea.

     

    Hence, controlling Kismayu does not significantly address the insecurity Somali pirates pose to the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean.

     

    Many people of Jubaland do not support Al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, they lack the security apparatus that could keep the militants out, and their opposition has not crystallised into resistance.

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    Related Stories

     

    MWAURA: Kenya had better find another reason as self-defence won’t do

    WARIGI: Kenya can learn from Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia

    OPANGA: Government hasn’t sold military campaign well

     

    The inept Somali Transitional Federal Government is to blame for not policing Jubaland. As a result, a security vacuum was created which Al-Shabaab filled.

     

    In the immediate term, our infantry brigade will find it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the pacification of Jubaland without local support.

     

    In the long term, the lack of a local clientele group through which Kenya and its allies could change hearts and minds and nurture economic and political stability of the “liberated” region makes the invasion a strategic miscalculation.

     

    Somalis fight each other ferociously until a stranger appears on the scene, then they suspend their traditional feuding to face the common enemy.

     

    Kenya needs to consider other dynamics of asymmetrical warfare that apply in a situation where an invasion takes place in a territory controlled by non-state combatants.

     

    Arguably, the effectiveness of the invasion as a strategy for neutralising non-state combatants, specifically Al-Shabaab, is questionable as it leaves out apolitical bandits, pirates, mercenaries, and opportunistic criminal groups.

     

    The latter act in small covert cells, are not confined to a specific part of Somalia, and given that their attacks are not linked to any doctrine of war, can continue to cause widespread insecurity, which will ultimately undermine the invasion. In such a situation, a clear exit strategy is a must.


  6. But as I write this piece and four days into the campaign, government has not sold “Operation Linda Nchi” to Kenyans.

     

    Second, is there a clear exit strategy? This is not to say that everything will go according to plan; it rarely works that way.

     

    This campaign could assume a life of its own. Indeed, the danger exists that we could be bogged down in Somalia for a long time.

    This could be the case especially if al Shabaab and al Qaeda decide to wage a guerrilla war against our military; TFG remains a dead man walking; Somali public opinion turns against Kenya’s military or if the military becomes a common enemy of the Somali.

     

    Third, who exactly is the enemy? Al Shabaab is not a regular military and al Qaeda 10 years ago changed the definition of war.

     

    Might there not be al Shabaab sleepers here or on their way here ready to embrace death in order to cause mass murder? Isn’t here real danger al Shabaab could cause chaos on our streets?

     

    If the answers are in the affirmative then one al Shabaab suicide bomber could cause more loss and damage on Harambee Avenue than a Kenyan brigade would in Somalia.

     

    This is why President Kibaki should have sold this campaign to Kenyans before or immediately on committing the country to war.

     

    Indeed, the government should have, as it planned to invade, made plain al Shabaab had forced it to the end of its tether.

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    Mashujaa Day

     

    Then, on Mashujaa Day the Commander-in-Chief should have outlined to Kenyans the case for the invasion and made clear that it would have huge security and economic consequences for them.

     

    He should have told Kenyans why he was committing the military, country and economy to war now and not previously when armed groups have crossed into Kenya and killed, maimed and looted and retreated to celebrate their success.


  7. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Government+hasnt+sold+military+campaign+well+/-/440808/1259784/-/item/0/-/f5tuj4/-/index.html

     

     

    This government is uniquely talented at tying itself in knots. First, ministers explained on Wednesday that Kenya has not invaded Somalia.

     

    Second, they said our military is in Somalia at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

     

    Third, government says that having been invited into Somalia, al Shabaab cannot become our problem but remains the TFG’s. Last, government says our military is not an occupying force. Listen, this is damned diplomatic drivel.

     

    Good people, to invade is to enter by force; to invade is to march into; to invade is to attack, overrun, assault, occupy or raid. We have invaded Somalia with the aim of over-running the Islamist militia called al Shabaab.

     

    If we are to be effective we must ensure we push al Shabaab as far away as possible from our border.

     

    To succeed we must ensure a decapitated al Shabaab stays deep inside Somalia. Therefore, we must own and occupy the space from which we evict the militia.

     

    The reason we will own and occupy the space from which we evict al Shabaab is simply that TFG is a limping weakling. Indeed, the best way to define TFG is to personify and picture it as a dead man walking.

     

    Our problems

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    To own and occupy this space means we hold that territory by having soldiers on the ground. Yes, when our neighbour invites us to help solve his problem, he and his problem become our problems.

     

    But has not al Shabaab always been our problem? It has been our problem, which is why we have invaded its Somalia domicile.

     

    Al Shabaab is our problem because it invades Kenya, causes insecurity and disrupts our tourism.

     

    Somalia is a problem because it is a lawless wasteland in which desperate militias establish all sorts of fiefdoms and enforce all manner of draconian and demonic laws by equally grotesque rules. Inland there is a bandit economy; offshore a piracy economy.

     

    Both affect Kenya adversely. On this account the campaign by our military in Somalia is just and right. Our military is in Somalia to ensure our border with Somalia is secured and safe and the country is free from the scourge and plague of al Shabaab.

     

    Clearly defined

     

    But the objectives of this campaign have not been clearly and deliberately defined and explained. I have spelt out above what I believe to be the objective of the campaign.


  8. Pirateland its not safe anymore

     

    C/raxmaan Faroole iyo Augustine Mahiga oo hadalo iska soo horjeeda hawada isku mariyey

     

    Xildhibaano ka tirsan Baarlamaanka KMG Soomaaliya ayaa sheegay in wakiilka xoghayaha guud ee Qaramada Midoobay u qaabilsan Soomaaliya Augustina Mahiga iyo Madaxweynaha maamulka Puntland C/raxmaan Sheekh Maxamed {Faroole} ayaa hawada isku mariyey qoraalo iska soo horjeeda, ka dib markii uu Mahiga go’aansaday in wejiga labaad ee shirka wadatashiga aan lagu qaban magaalada Garoowe ee xarunta Puntland.

     

    Xildhibaan Cali Seeko oo la hadlay warbaahinta ayaa sheegay in Mahiga uu qoraal u soo diray dowladda KMG, isla markaasna uu ugu sheegay in wejiga labaad ee shirka aan lagu qaban Karin magaalada Garoowe, isla markaasna lagu qabanayo magaalada Muqdisho ee caasimadda dalka Soomaaliya.

     

    Sida uu sheegay Xildhibaano Seeko Mahiga ayaa qoraalka u soo diray Guddoomiyaha Baarlamaanka iyo Ra’isul wasaaraha, oo uu ku wargeliyey arrinkan, isla markaasna uu ka dalbaday inay u diyaar-garoobaan in wejiga labaad ee shirka lagu qabto magaalada Muqdisho, wuxuuna intaasi ku daray xildhibaanku in intii uusan ka jaawbin Ra’isul wasaare Gaas warqadda uu ka jawaabay C/raxmaan Faroole oo sheegay in Mahiga uusan awood u laheyn inuu bedelo in Garoowe lagu qabto wejiga labaad ee shirka wadatashiga.

     

    Madaxweynaha Puntland C/raxcmaan Faroole oo ka hadlay arrinkan ayaa sheegay in Puntland ay buuxisay shuruudihii looga baahnaa, isla markaasna aysan jirin cid bedeli karta go’aan horay loo gaaray, wuxuuna intaasi ku daray inay muqadas tahay in shirka lagu qabanayo magaalada Garoowe, taasina ay tahay go’aan horay loo gaaray.