Usually ABC Reporters most generally can be viewed ABC news is generally viewed as reliable news sources and reporting.... thats why I was thinking it may just have been some bravado statements of Puntland Security Officials. The "firing squad" statement did seem extremely strange. I visited pirates at the prison up in the mountains of Somaliland, and they had all received 10 years. What happened to the private counter-piracy force in Puntland, SOMCAN ? I read somewhere they where back and hard at it? I also caught this news this a.m. http://puntlanddiaspora.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83 Somalia: Puntland and the TFG sign a historic agreement. 10 April 2010 Somalia: Puntland and the TFG sign a historic agreement. By Hussein Farah On Saturday, the leader of the semi autonomous administration of Puntland State has signed a collaboration agreement with the Transitional Federal government of Somalia. After days of talks in Galkaio, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Dr.Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, told Horseed Media that they have reached important agreement with the Puntland administration. The agreement consisted of the following points: 1- The TFG and Puntland will collaborate in safeguarding the unity and the statehood of Somalia. The TFG recognizes Puntland as a stable and self governing part of Somalia, it also considers it as a model for the Federal system in Somalia. 2- The TFG would work on finalizing the Federal constitution, and will establish a constitution commission, Puntland will support the TFG with the consitution. 3- In order to accomplish, the Federal constitution and the creation of Federal states in Somalia, The commission will be based in Garowe, the capital of Puntland. In retrun Puntland will support the commission in fulfilling their tasks. 4- In accordance with the Federal Charter, The Federal government will form more autonomous states in Somalia, and the TFG will also encourage the only existing State in Somalia, which is Puntland 5- Puntland is allowed to participate as an administration, in all meetings regarding the State’s interests. 6- The TFG together with Puntland, will lobby for the return of Italian development projects of FIA and re-energizing the development projects in the region, that were terminated after the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. 7- Both parties agreed on setting up military camps in Puntland. 8- Both parties agreed on establishing the command of anti piracy forces in Puntland 9- The TFG and Puntland will collabarte on fighting the piracy. 10- All education funds and Scholarships to Somalia, Puntland will receive it’s share of 25%. 11- The Education ministers of Puntland and the Federal government will work together on training the teachers and establishing a new curriculum. 12- The TFG and Puntland agreed on, calling for all International agency working in Somalia, to move their main offices in to stable regions in Somalia, such as Puntland. 13- Both parties will work together on protecting Historic sites in the country, safeguarding the cultural heritage and the religion. 14- Both parties agreed to support and Encourage the Somali Diaspora, to take part in rebuilding their country. 15- Both administration’s ministers will also work together The agreement was signed by the Prime minister of Somalia Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Puntland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole. Source: horseedmedia.net

just wondering if anyone here can confirm this (?) or is this just some blustering bravado from Puntland security officials? Somalia: The Staging Ground for Piracy 30 Mar 30, 2010 - 10:45:00 AM Jim Sciutto: From the Front Lines News, commentary, views from the ground and adventure from around the world with ABC News Senior Foreign Correspondent Jim Sciutto “Our coast guard has one boat” The trip into Somalia gives an early taste of life on the ground here: nothing follows a schedule or a plan, only dumb luck. The airline we booked went out of business the week before our trip, so we had to hitch a ride in with a humanitarian team from Kuwait. It was, without exaggeration, the oldest plane I’ve ever flown on – an ancient turboprop piloted by a team of Ukrainians in matching sleeveless red t-shirts. We were the only plane at the airport as we arrived. But as soon as we landed, we got the royal treatment, greeted by a long convoy of gleaming SUV’s, ready to carry us and the members of Puntland’s Special Police Unit who would serve as our guards on the trip. Bossaso is Puntland’s largest port, and the staging ground for Puntland’s fight against piracy. But the coast guard consists of just one working patrol boat – a 15-foot skiff which had been confiscated from pirates. The other patrol boats were tied up in various states of disrepair. The commander explained that he and his forces borrowed fishing boats when they needed them – and proudly showed off their trophies: a pile of captured pirate skiffs, a handful of Russian and Chinese RPG’s, and the long, rickety metal ladders the pirates use to board the giant cargo ships they attack. We tried to raise the ladders ourselves – on land – and couldn’t imagine how they’d do the same in a skiff on the rolling seas. Firing the RPG’s from the skiffs would be an even bigger challenge. Our security guard – a former member of the British special forces – said his unit had tried the same in training and always failed. It becomes clear very early here that Somalia is fighting a losing battle against piracy, despite the international force of 29 ships now patrolling the shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden just to the north. Attacks were up sharply in 2009. The head of port security told us the number of Somalis involved in piracy was 1000 and rising. To date, they had 280 in prison, all of them sentenced to death by firing squad. But it remains an irresistible profession for many here. The going rate for a successful hijacking: $50,000 per pirate, with the rest of the ransom – which can reach as high as $7 million – going to the criminal gangs which oversee the business. Somali officials are suspected of involvement. The security chief told us a local police commander was recently arrested for involvement. Other jobs are painfully scarce in Somalia, with the exception of one: terrorism. Al Shabaab, the home-grown Islamist terror group now affiliated with Al Qaeda, is also a strong and growing presence here. Somalia has become a magnet for jihadis from around the world, including the US. We will meet some of the members of Al Shabaab (more on that in the coming days). But for now, consider this fact: the pirates and the terrorists are linked, with Al Shabaab charging the pirates a ‘tax ‘of $100,000 on each hijacking. It is an enormous source of funding – and another reason US officials consider Somalia, along with Yemen, a rising terror threat. SOURCE: ABC NEWS

GAAROODI, excellent piece, thanks for that !

Reuters: Al Qaeda members land in Somalia from Yemen: government Wed Apr 7, 2010 3:22pm GMT By Abdiaziz Hassan NAIROBI (Reuters) - At least 12 al Qaeda members have crossed from Yemen into Somalia in the last two weeks, bringing money and military expertise to Somali rebels battling the Western-backed government, a senior Somali official said. Somalia's al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab rebels are waging a deadly insurgency against the transitional government headed by a former rebel and are intent on imposing a harsh version of Sharia Islamic law throughout the war-ravaged nation. A smaller group -- Hizbul Islam -- which has an alliance with al Shabaab in Mogadishu, expressed its loyalty to al Qaeda on Wednesday for the first time and invited Osama bin Laden to Somalia. "Our intelligence shows 12 senior al Qaeda officials came into Somalia from Yemen in the last two weeks," said Treasury Minister Abdirahman Omar Osman, adding that he had been briefed by Somalia's intelligence agencies. "They were sent off to assess the situation to see if al Qaeda may move its biggest military bases to southern Somalia since they are facing a lot of pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq," he told Reuters by telephone on Wednesday. Osman did not say who the al Qaeda members were nor their positions in the organisation. Western and regional intelligence agencies have long feared that Somalia's porous borders and lack of a strong central government could make the Horn of Africa nation a safe haven for militants looking to attack the region and beyond. Al Qaeda in Yemen jumped to the forefront of Western security concerns after a Yemen-based regional wing claimed responsibility for a failed attack on a U.S.-bound transatlantic flight in December. "They brought money to al Shabaab which had been facing difficulties to recruit more fighters because of cash shortages," Osman said. Some of the foreign commanders had landed in airstrips in the south disguised as humanitarian workers and two were in Mogadishu, he said. BIN LADEN, WELCOME TO SOMALIA Since plunging into anarchy in 1991, hundreds of thousands of people have perished from famine, war and disease in Somalia. Multiple attempts to set up central rule have failed. Somalia's current government backed by African Union peacekeepers has been unable to wrest control of the sea-side capital from insurgent groups. Al Shabaab controls large swathes of southern Somalia and Mogadishu. Moallim Hashi Mohamed Farah, a senior Hizbul Islam leader in Mogadishu, said the group had asked bin Laden to Somalia. "It is true, we have invited him. Our call is that Islamist forces around the world have to unite, and defend their cause as one group. The West may call him as a criminal, but we call him our brother and he is not criminal," he told Reuters by phone. "Questioning the relationship between us and al Qaeda is like questioning the relationship between two brothers, and that is not realistic." © Thomson Reuters 2010. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world. Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests.

not likely.... they fly operationally at 19,000 ft

Just to throw in some Stats, 70% percent of the Puntland citizenry consider piracy as "needed" for their survival, while 30% say conditions (fishing) has improved enough to not need piracy anymore and is now considering it UN-Islamic and "predatory". Some former pirates like Boyah are working social programs to this end.

Thanks for all the informative,interesting and great replies. Somalias Clan Politics can be very confusing, especially to one who doesnt speak Somali (though I am learning my wife is Somali) Also understood about using Somalia based Media as a source of information, Ive learned to read all the regions different and sometimes conflicting views before ever trying to make any decisions. I have a keen interest in some politics though I must say I have to bow out as I dont know enough about the major Clans and Sub-Clans to ever make any kind of coherent or fair opinions, though it is great to get this kind of first hand information. Any of you ever think about wanting a Consulting job with us, let me know! Thanks again !

The barking mad-man is more like a re-visiting old friend.

sorry I dont speak Somali... could you explain to me CIA involvement in PIS affairs? I have heard the CIA has a strong hand (big monetary Support) to PIS. Could you tell me anything more about CIAs/PIS intentions there, amount of involvement etc? Thanks ahead of time !

Somalia A New Approach http://www.cfr.org/publication/21421/ complete text here Author: Bronwyn E. Bruton Publisher: Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date: March 2010 60 pages ISBN 978-0-87609-473-0 $10.00 Council Special Report No. 52 To order a printed copy of this publication, please contact our distributor, Brookings Institution Press, at 800.537.5487. DOWNLOAD THE FULL TEXT OF THE REPORT HERE (2.2 MB PDF) Overview Even among failed states—those countries unable to exercise authority over their territory and provide the most basic services to their people—Somalia stands apart. A country of some nine million, it has lacked a central government since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. Poverty and insecurity are endemic. Less than 40 percent of Somalis are literate, more than one in ten children dies before turning five, and a person born in Somalia today cannot assume with any confidence that he or she will reach the age of fifty. Failed states provide fertile ground for terrorism, drug trafficking, and a host of other ills that threaten to spill beyond their borders. Somalia is thus a problem not just for Somalis but for the United States and the world. In particular, the specter of Somalia’s providing a sanctuary for al-Qaeda has become an important concern, and piracy off Somalia’s coast, which affects vital international shipping lanes, remains a menace. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by CFR's Center for Preventive Action, Bronwyn E. Bruton proposes a strategy to combat terrorism and promote development and stability in Somalia. She first outlines the recent political history involving the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in 2004 and its Islamist opponents, chiefly the Shabaab, which has declared allegiance to al-Qaeda. She then analyzes U.S. interests in the country, including counterterrorism, piracy, and humanitarian concerns, as well as the prospect of broader regional instability. Bruton argues that the current U.S. policy of supporting the TFG is proving ineffective and costly. The TFG is unable to improve security, deliver basic services, or move toward an agreement with Somalia’s clans and opposition groups that would provide a stronger basis for governance. She also cites flaws in two alternative policies—a reinforced international military intervention to bolster the TFG or an offshore approach that seeks to contain terrorist threats with missiles and drones. Instead, Bruton advances a strategy of “constructive disengagement.” Notably, this calls for the United States to signal that it will accept an Islamist authority in Somalia—including the Shabaab—as long as it does not impede international humanitarian activities and refrains from both regional aggression and support for international jihad. As regards terrorism, the report recommends continued airstrikes to target al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorists while taking care to minimize civilian casualties. It argues for a decentralized approach to distributing U.S. foreign aid that works with existing local authorities and does not seek to build formal institutions. And the report counsels against an aggressive military response to piracy, making the case instead for initiatives to mobilize Somalis themselves against pirates. Somalia: A New Approach takes on one of today’s most vexing foreign policy challenges, offering concise analysis and thoughtful recommendations grounded in a realistic assessment of U.S. and international interests and capabilities. It is an important contribution to the debate over how to proceed in this most failed of states.

Interesting replies. As a Teaser, we are not a PMC like Blackwater/Xe, we are non-politically based, as we recognize the current TFG has a limited shelf life, but are also the only truly recognized Government in Somalia, we hold no loyalty to any One Somalia Govt, and we are not an NGO, UN or otherwise. You most likely cannot recognize who we are, but you will see results in all three republics in the next two years. We are financially supported by (?) many. We have a successful track record worldwide, and we will make a difference in Somalia in the next three years. Hold on to your Hats, and make your plans now. P.S. , dont bother guessing, you will never know us in any form. Just know, you are the worst of the world..... you can, .... and will be fixed.

and who the **** is this guy ? Ali Ahmed Jama Jangeli.... 2005 TFG, C`mon ?

That is not even enough for a serious Police Force, let alone the money they will make stealing and poaching all the Tuna.

Regards to this forum. We are a Somalia based American Company trying to make contact, if you are interested in working with us and re-affirm for our security purposes govt connections throughout Somalia. The TFG, Puntland & Somaliand Governments in General. We are trying to bring, Social, Economic and (anti-corruption) Political reform to all said States. Please contact me if you have an true interest in these programs. JS@INTERNATIONALSAFETYNETWORKS.COM

If you believe this guy, you are a real ***** !

Allah save the TFG and the people of Somalia and pray for them. This offensive is long overdue and the best the TFG can scrape up, let it happen. All experts agree that country and govt security is needed first and foremost before any other recovery can begin or start to take place. Take back, secure and hold Mog. All you donor nations that have promised the other $200 million you havent sent, now would be a really good time to send it.

my mistake: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8500611.stm WORLD BRIEFING | AFRICA Somalia: Danish Soldiers Foil Pirate Takeover SIGN IN TO RECOMMEND TWITTER SIGN IN TO E-MAIL PRINT REPRINTS SHARE By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: February 5, 2010 Danish special forces disrupted a takeover of a cargo ship by pirates in the Gulf of Aden on Friday, in a maneuver rarely undertaken by NATO warships. The crew of the cargo ship, Ariella, saw a skiff approaching with six or seven men firing at them, said Cmdr. Dan B. Termansen, the commander of the Danish warship Absalon. The captain sent out a distress call. The Absalon sent a helicopter, and its crew fired warning shots at the pirates, Commander Termansen said.

Tt depends on what year you want the body count to begin. If you start it back ten years ago when regional piracy started, it is more than 100.

mis-directed and mis-guided nonsense, and a sorry try at making some good PR for themselves. You people seem to forget how many innocents have died because of these pirates.

nicely done. The economist is a great ref.

you guys need to change the news you read. The MV Rim was freed yesterday by a Danish NATO Warship. The ships crew had locked themselves in the bridge, and the pirates could not get access. When the Danish approached the ship, the pirates escaped.

Here are better reasons why it doesn't work. Fractionalized, Armed and Lethal: Why Somalia Matters The Brookings Institution FEBRUARY 03, 2010 — For the last few years, Somalia has held strong onto the top spot in both the Index of Failed States and the Fragile States Index. And this country—if one can use that term—is likely to maintain its lead for the foreseeable future. But this is nothing to brag about. By definition of a failed state, Somalia has no single legitimate governing authority and is divided among numerous constituent factions that are relatively strong and have control of some lucrative sources of revenue. These factions are well organized and function more or less as independent states. Yet no single faction has a monopoly on violence, which explains why Somalia has remained a failed state for so long. In essence, the various factions have no interest in a well organized sovereign state. As such, the failed state is in a precarious equilibrium, resulting in what may appear as paradoxically both a functional and stable, stateless society. Probably because of its fragile nature and the fact that it is small and poor, the international community has grossly underestimated the capacity of this country to destabilize the region and to engage in extremely costly activities to the international community. At present, there are no well-coordinated international efforts to rebuild this state. Yet this country—or better, its various factions—possesses the potential to inflict major global damage and could be the next hotbed for international terrorism. Ignoring Somalia would be a huge political and humanitarian mistake. But the Somali state may also have degenerated beyond the stage where marginal interventions can be beneficial; thus the focus should shift to building a new state. As the events of the last two decades have shown, the Somali state was not consensual and focusing on reverting to the same structure is likely to be futile. Fractionalized Society A number of factors make Somalia an increasingly volatile country. The first of course is the presence of numerous factions that lay claim to a specific territory or strong mass of supporters. Some factions have established control of a sizeable part of the country while others consist of small warring groups. Of these factions, many have a claim to illegal enterprises and have established themselves as legitimate tax collectors or traders. With the vacuum created by the absence of a state sovereign, each faction has established its own organized “government” and possesses substantial capacity to impart violence. The factions include the governments of Somaliland and Puntland, both of which have been able to control a significant section of the country and are able to maintain some degree of peace. Other notable factions are the warring groups in the central region, including the Federal Transitional Government, Al-Shabab, Hizbul-Islam and Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jamaa. Then of course there are other groups like the Islamic courts that control most of South-Central Somalia, and the infamous pirates, whose sole interest is monetary gain (and which may support some of the other insurgent groups). With all of these groups competing for control, it is not surprising that some of these factions have connections or are sympathetic with terrorist groups. Some Somali factions have accepted financial support from terror organizations in order to settle clan disputes. The absence of a central authority combined with its general lawlessness makes Somalia an ideal haven for terrorists. Illegal Arms Market Not only is Somalia heavily fractioned, but these factions are well-armed. Although U.N. Security Council Resolution 751 placed an arms embargo on Somalia, reports indicate that the number and variety of small arms available in Somalia is greater than at any time since the early 1990s. Private businesses, nation states, arms dealers, Somalis in the Diaspora, and local clans/militia all contribute to the growing number of smuggled weapons in the country. In fact, small arms are so prolific in Somalia that they are a form of currency in most parts of the country. The Somali arms market, based in Mogadishu, is a key hub for arms trading in East Africa and weapons are constantly being transported along its porous border to Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and the DRC. The Kenyan government estimates that thousands of small arms are smuggled across the border every year. In fact, the Kenyan government is finding it difficult to fight crime as a result of the large number of illegal arms smuggled from Somalia. The presence of such a high number of guns poses a threat to security in Northeast Africa and beyond. Drug Economy Where there are guns, there are often drugs; and in Somalia the trade is in khat—a narcotic leaf that is traditionally consumed in parts of Africa and in Arab countries for its stimulating properties. Although khat is considered legal in many countries, it is an addictive drug. Khat is the most common drug in Somalia and it is estimated that approximately 75 percent of all males in Somalia use it. The khat trade is fairly lucrative, with a significant proportion of the drug originating from the Kenyan highlands and exported freely to Somalia. Kenya exports about $250 million of khat annually, beating out tea as one of the county's most lucrative exports, with a majority bound for Somalia. The Kenya National Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse estimates that Kenya exports about $300,000 worth of khat to Somalia daily. Despite the negative consequences of a stateless Somalia that Kenya is experiencing, there has not been any attempt by the Kenyan government to curtail this trade, because local interests benefit a great deal. With no central government to regulate the trade, warlords in Somalia have extended their power and now collect taxes and customs duties on khat. Many clans and regional administrations rely on import tax from the drug as their main source of revenue. In 2003, the U.N. Panel of Experts on Somalia reported that many warlords now control the khat trade and use the proceeds to buy weapons needed to maintain control of their territory. This highly addictive substance even allows warlords to keep their troops loyal since otherwise troops suffer the consequences of withdrawal. Accordingly, khat is often included as part of troop salaries. Diaspora Support of Factions Evidence shows that civil wars are likely to last longer and be more intense in countries that have large populations outside of their own, due to support that members of the Diaspora provide to warring factions. Somalia is a case in point. Although the Diaspora can and has played a critical role in facilitating peace building and local reconciliation in some cases (especially in Somaliland and Puntland), in other cases the Diaspora has also provided financial support to warring clans facilitating conflict. Without financial support from the Somali Diaspora, many clans lack the resources to wage war against each other. Estimates show that at least 1 million Somalis—approximately 13 percent of the population—live abroad, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, the U.K., Canada, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and the U.S. The UNDP estimates that annual remittances (or Hawala) from the Somali Diaspora are about $1 billion (about 18 percent of GDP). Although it is impossible to measure the exact amounts, the available data shows that the flow of remittances is substantial. On balance, the Diaspora is contributing to the further degeneration of the state. Piracy In the past couple years, Somalia has been making headlines with its infamous piracy. Some Somali factions that have specialized in piracy appear to be gaining influence, evidenced by the increasing number of international incidents. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that there were 111 reported piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in 2008. This resulted in the seizing of 49 by pirates and the kidnapping of more than 600 crew members for ransom. Preliminary estimates reveal that piracy rose at an even greater rate in 2009, with 217 pirate attacks off the Somali coast, which resulted in the seizing of 47 ships and the hostage of 867 crew members. It is estimated that pirate activities in Somalia brought in between $50 to $100 million in 2008, making it the most lucrative industry in Somalia. Piracy has proved to be a low-cost, high-profit industry for those seeking to control territory and maintain power in Somalia. In January 2010, over $5 million ransom was paid to the Somali pirates. Allowed to prosper, revenues from piracy fuel local economies and add to the chaos and fractionalization of Somali society. There are well established formulas for sharing the profits from the pirates involved in the hijacking with the ground militia who control the territory, the local community elders and officials, the financier/investor who supply weapons and equipment, and the sponsors. Evidence suggests that local businessmen sometimes even invest in hijackings in exchange for a share of the final ransom. With a coastline of about 1,880 miles, opportunities for piracy are great. One way or another, piracy money is laundered and finds its way into other parts of Africa and the Middle East, increasing the possibility that funds will support terrorism. Piracy earnings are also impacting neighboring economies, such as the distortion of the real estate market in Kenya. There is even a high probability that Somali piracy will soon attract the attention of international crime syndicates. The fact that piracy is now considered a lucrative investment opportunity further demonstrates how the disintegration of the state can benefit so many. Reconstituting a New State As the conflicts between factions continue unabated and human suffering increases exponentially, warlords thrive in their economic exploits, accumulating foreign assets and further investing in violence. For those who control the various aspects of the economy, statelessness is a highly-valued institutional asset. Combining economic and political interests has resulted in an equilibrium “state of statelessness” whereby factions have little interest in moving towards reconciliation. Why give up their power when they are profiting from the current situation? In addition to the warlords and territorial factions that frustrate peace, a number of neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea also support some factions and in the process intensify the divisions. Furthermore, statelessness has benefited many in the international community—not surprisingly some developed countries. There are credible claims that European firms have exploited the statelessness and signed contracts to dump waste off the Somali coast. There are also vast international commercial interests that frustrate peace in Somalia. They include fishing, trade in military hardware (mainly former communist states), and market access to the Middle East. It is well documented that foreign trawlers owned by companies in Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Russia, Britain, Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Yemen and Egypt have been illegally fishing in Somalia. All these interests are better served under a stateless Somalia. After years of lawlessness and the current state of organized chaos, it is unrealistic to expect the factions to negotiate a settlement and revert to the previous unified Somali state. From the perspective of individual factions, there are no gains that would arise from an agreement that removes their violence capacity and thus eliminating their economic rents. Yet, is it folly for the international community not to invest in an aggressive strategy to deal with the situation in Somalia? This strategy therefore must not focus on rebuilding the old state, but rather on building or constituting a new state or states. While the African Union (A.U.) must be involved in designing a way forward, the task calls for a broader international mandate. The United States and other developed countries should lead an international effort aimed at the reconstitution of the Somali state. After the unsuccessful Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. literally withdrew from direct engagement, preferring to act through surrogate front-line states such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and giving token support to A.U. peace keepers. The humanitarian dimension was sub-contracted to civil society such as CARE and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), among others. These approaches have limited success and will not work because they only treat symptoms. Thus far, efforts by African nations including the African Union have not yielded fruit. In fact, hardly any militarily strong African country has contributed forces and equipment to support the peace mission. In tandem with destroying terror networks, a prudent approach must focus on a long-term solution that not only leads to peaceful co-existence of the Somalis, but also improves the quality of life and creates opportunities to engage in productive activities. At the core of such a strategy must be the progressive weakening of the factions’ capacity to engage in violence and to undertake illicit activities. Achieving these objectives require a strong military presence and for an extended period of time. Sources of illicit wealth must be curtailed especially the trade in guns, drugs and piracy. In this respect, the United Nations must take an expanded role and should have the mandate to occupy the country until factions are sufficiently weakened and willing to negotiate peace. In essence, the monopoly on violence must be consolidated in an international body such as the U.N. probably together with the A.U. The outcome of negotiated peace is likely to be a new state, with different structures of governance. It is also conceivable that the outcome could be more than one state. Finally, the strategy must involve a broad development agenda. As already noted, statelessness has many concentrated benefits, which motivates factions to invest heavily so to retain the economic rents derived under statelessness. The military agenda must therefore be complemented with an internationally coordinated development agenda including investment in productive activities, building infrastructure and the provision of social services, especially investment in human capital-education and health. Today, investments in human capital are extremely low because alternative investment in illicit activities has much higher returns. Somalia is a small country. But like a tick that kills a big animal, this small country can destabilize an entire region and endanger the international community. Dealing with the crisis will involve substantial costs, but failure to act now raises future costs that the world will pay exponentially. And the future might not be that distant.

No,I just saw it on youtube... it shook me to my Muslim core. I flagged it with youtube to have it taken down.